

Cybersecurity conference

The link between Safety Culture & Cyber-security

02-03/10/2024 | Lille



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- Railway Safety Culture
- Cyberthreat in railway
- The link between safety culture and cybersecurity in railways

Railway Safety Culture



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Safety Culture Model

Safety Climate Survey

Organisational Just Culture

Safety Culture Declaration

Safety Leadership

Safety Culture Oversight

Safety Culture Model

Model building blocks:

•**Cultural Enablers:**


levers through which an organisational culture develops;

•**Behaviour Patterns:**

shared ways of thinking and acting which convey the organisational culture;


•**Railway Safety Fundamentals:**

core principles which must be reflected by behaviour patterns to achieve sustainable safety performance and organisational excellence.



Safety Culture Programme

To devise *dissemination* and *evaluation instruments* to support the development of a positive safety culture within the Single European Railway Area



Key principle: any deliverable is tested with partner organisations



Programme Management, Knowledge and Strategy

Organisational Just Culture

Developing an OJC

- dedication and consistency
- open and respectful dialogue
(staff report safety issues)
- analyse and act upon to improve


to achieve an..
appropriate, sustainable, safe
operational performance

Free online basic module:
[ERA Organisational Just Culture flow](#)



ERA Just Culture Flow

Global Overview and Action Plan



Safety management system

What is the SMS **for** ?

Who is **responsible** for safe railway operation ?

Safety Management System (SMS)

the organisation, arrangements and procedures established by an IM or a RU to ensure the safe management of its operations

RU.s IM.s are responsible for the SMS, **each one for its own part** of the system and its safe operation



RU – IM interface risks

RU.s IM.s shall co-operate together to manage the **interface risks**.

Through their SMS, RU.s IM.s demonstrate that they have the ability to identify, assess, control risks which arise from its own activities and **risks caused by others***.

National safety authority has still the ability **to check** effectively the **co-operation arrangements** put in place by RU.s IM.s during its supervision activities.



Risk based approach



RU.s IM.s **continuous control** of (identified) risks and co-operate with each other for shared interface risks.

New/amended rules shall be **traced back** to the original identified risk.

Difficult to **relate** numerous old **rules to risks**. There is no single solution.

Discuss possible solutions (e.g. grouping of rules, cross-references) and their implementation together with the **safety certification body**.

Significant change in safety & RA

Regulation (EU) No 402/2013 criteria for **assessing the significance** of a safety-related change, adequate documentation to justify the decision.

The question on the significance of a safety-related change does not release the railway company from its **obligation to perform a proper risk assessment**

to demonstrate that the level of safety is maintained or even improved

when the change is significant, in addition to the RA, an **independent assessment body** must be appointed,
to verify independently the correct application of the RA - Annex I Reg.402-2013

Time for change



Cyber-threats in railways



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
Cyberthreat in railway

“Cyber” **risks cannot be dissociated** from railway risks

Boundary between railway safety and cybersecurity to be determined...
Essential to clarify the functioning at the **interface** between the “worlds” SMS - IMS.

The **increasing degree of connectivity** of the infrastructure and rolling stock (i.e. DAC – FDFTO) is creating a significant increase of their attack surface

Programmable devices exposed to cyberthreats when “**not connected**”, besides communication, we need to protect design, production, maintenance (standards, certifications, ...)



Security measures for railway operators defined as operators of essential services (OES)

What to highlight:


- the respective scopes of the railway and of the cybersecurity **regulatory frameworks**;
- the ongoing works aiming to **build a shared framework** between **safety and cybersecurity**, and to strengthen the way the cybersecurity dimension is taken into account in the railway sector and in the other means of transport;
- the operational subjects that have already been identified and that justify the need for a clear **operating framework** in the area of **“overall” safety**;
- **recommendations** stemming from the discussions and exchanges

Cyberthreat in railway



Taking cybersecurity challenges into account in railway safety

Railway Safety Fundamentals: Keywords



Regulatory frameworks

Terms & competences are different:

Railway safety - overall functioning of the system, subsystems (INF, RST, CCS, OPE, ...).


The risks are above all, technical and environmental.

Operating safety - ability of the components (brakes, etc.) of a sub-system to meet one or more functions

(safety of technical sub-systems)

Cybersecurity - technologies, processes, practices to protect the networks, computers, data against attacks, damage and unauthorised access.

IT “security” includes cybersecurity & physical safety.



IEC 62443 – Series of standards that define requirements and processes for implementing and maintaining **electronically secure industrial automation** and control systems (IACS).

CLC/TS 50701 - Technical Specification introducing requirements and recommendations to **address cyber security** within the **railway** sector.


IEC 63452 standard: aims to create a strong, clear, and implementable framework which will **enhance the security of rail systems** across rolling stock, fixed installations, management systems and additional services.

Implement and share

Building cyber secure Railway Infrastructure 2022

ENISA & European
Rail Information
Sharing and Analysis
Center (ISAC) report

sectorial
implementation of
the NIS Directive.



ENISA Transport Threat Landscape

mapping and studying
cyber incidents 2021-
2022

identifies prime threats,
actors and trends

(aviation, maritime,
railway, road)



The link between safety culture and cybersecurity, in railways



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Risk Management Perspective

Risk Management Perspective:

Both cybersecurity and safety culture focus on identifying and mitigating risks. A strong safety culture encourages proactive identification and management of safety risks within an organisation.

Similarly, cybersecurity involves identifying vulnerabilities and threats to digital assets and infrastructure and implementing measures to mitigate these risks.

Integrating cybersecurity into safety culture frameworks ensures that risks to both physical safety and digital security are addressed comprehensively.



Examples of link to the Safety Culture Model

F1.1 - Risk awareness

F1.3 – Questioning attitude

Organisational Awareness and Training

Organisational Awareness and Training

A robust safety culture emphasizes the importance of continuous awareness and training for employees at all levels. This includes understanding safety protocols, reporting procedures, and maintaining vigilance to potential hazards.

Similarly, in the context of cybersecurity, awareness and training programs are essential to educate railway personnel about cyber threats, phishing attacks, secure handling of data, and the use of digital systems safely.

By integrating\linking cybersecurity training into existing safety culture initiatives, railway organisations can create a more holistic approach to risk management.



Examples of link to the Safety Culture Model
E2.3 Organisational systems

E3.2 Competence management
F2.2 System complexity

Resilience and Incident Response

Resilience and Incident Response

A strong safety culture fosters resilience by ensuring that the personnel is prepared to respond effectively to incidents and emergencies.

This readiness includes clear communication channels, rapid response protocols, and post-incident analysis to prevent future occurrences.

In the realm of cybersecurity, resilience involves having robust incident response plans, including procedures for detecting, containing, and recovering from cyber incidents.

By aligning incident response strategies across safety and cybersecurity domains, railway organisations can enhance their overall operational resilience.



Building A Resilient Organisational Culture for Crisis Preparedness

(image: [FasterCapital](#))

*Examples of link to the Safety Culture Model
F3.2 Analysis (for incident response)*

*F1.2 Resilience F2.3 Reporting
F3.3 Learning from others (cross-sector mitigation)*

Regulatory Compliance

Regulatory Compliance

Both safety and cybersecurity in railways are subject to regulatory frameworks and standards.

When apply for a safety certificate, it is required to railway operators to demonstrate adherence to safety management systems (SMS) and cybersecurity standards to ensure operational safety and data protection (area of potential conflict, transparency vs privacy).

Integrating cybersecurity measures into safety culture frameworks helps ensure compliance with regulatory requirements and demonstrates a commitment to maintaining high standards of safety and security.



Examples of link to the Safety Culture Model

E2.1 Roles, responsibilities

E2.2 Organisational design

E2.3 Organisational systems

E1.3 Regulatory relationships

Cultural Norms, Organisational Values

Cultural Norms and Organisational Values:

Safety culture extends beyond formal procedures and regulations to encompass organisational norms, attitudes (leadership), and values regarding safety.

Similarly, promoting a cybersecurity-aware culture involves embedding security consciousness into everyday practices and decision-making processes across all levels of the organisation.

By fostering a culture where safety and cybersecurity are seen as shared responsibilities, railway organisations can cultivate an environment where both physical and digital aspects of operational integrity are prioritised.



Examples of link to the Safety Culture Model

E1.1 Teamwork and collaboration

E1.2 Interpersonal values

E4.1 Leading by example

F4.3 Decision making

- Guide safety culture:
 - https://www.era.europa.eu/activities/safety-culture_en
- Guide TSI OPE:
 - [Guide for the application of the TSI OPE \(2019 version\) \(1\).pdf](#)
- Guide HOF:
 - https://www.era.europa.eu/activities/safety-management-system/human-and-organisational-factors-hof_en
- Guide CSM on SMS :
 - [Guide on safety management system requirements](#)
- General information for Single Safety Certificate applicants:
 - https://www.era.europa.eu/applicants/applications-single-safety-certificates_en



Thank you
Have a safe trip!

Moving Europe towards a
sustainable and safe railway system
without frontiers.

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