



# Pearls and Perils of Sectoral Cooperation

Joseph Mager

NS Cybersecurity

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rail

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# Personal Pearls and Perils







IOIO  
IOIO  
Digitalisation

  
Increase in  
Legislation

  
Pearls

  
Sectoral  
Cooperation

  
Lessons  
Learned

  
Threat  
Landscape

  
Perils






# Digitalization in our sector



# Threat landscape for Rail



The image shows a browser window with a green address bar containing "[ AKIRA ]". Below the browser, there are two main content areas. On the left, a 403 error page from "jirnaod.net" features a bear illustration and the text "403 Запрещенный". Below this, a text block discusses a DDoS attack on Sweden, listing disabled sites: Port of Helsingborg, Oskarshamn Ferry Port, Norrtåg (circled in red), and Blekinge Coastal Railway (circled in red). On the right, a news article from BFM TV titled "COMPUTER HACKING OF AN SNCF SERVICE PROVIDER, STOLEN PERSONAL DATA" is shown. The article includes a video player and a banner for a newsletter.

403  
Запрещенный

We visited again The Kingdom of Crooked Mirrors, Sweden, because our volunteer from the DDoSia project whispered to us that Sweden will give Rb 99 (AMRAAM) air-to-air missiles to Ukraine.

We do not like this news, however, as well as the Swedish infrastructure, from the income for the use of which such "gifts" are paid.

Swedish sites were disabled:

- ✗ Port of Helsingborg <https://check-host.net/check-report/112efb70k497>
- ✗ Oskarshamn Ferry Port (<https://t.me/sskarnaukhov/50597>) <https://check-host.net/check-report/112f04eckb4a>
- ✗ Norrtåg is the Swedish railway carrier <https://check-host.net/check-report/112f82cak511>
- ✗ Blekinge Coastal Railway <https://check-host.net/check-report/112f811akc3e>

## COMPUTER HACKING OF AN SNCF SERVICE PROVIDER, STOLEN PERSONAL DATA

J.R. with AFP The 28/06/2023 at 22:00

Week End Premiere **BOOKING.COM : ATTENTION AUX CYBERATTQUES!** 12.00

Résultats Quinté+ : Prix de Croix (Vincennes)  
14 3 12 8 9

AVEC FRANÇOIS BAYARD PRÉSIDENT DU WINDEN

**DÉCOUVREZ LA NOUVELLE NEWSLETTER CYBERSÉCURITÉ DE FRÉDÉRIC SIMOTTEL** [CLIQUEZ ICI](#)

Several hundred companies, including SNCF, and government agencies were victims of this major cyberattack.

The personal data of railway workers, stolen when a service provider of the SNCF was the victim of a computer attack, were broadcast on the dark web, said the public railway group Wednesday, calling on its



# Legislation

## NIS (2)

- Essential entities: Railway Undertakings, Infrastructure Managers, Digital infrastructure, ICT Service Management
- Important entities: Manufacturers of railway locomotives and rolling stock, mechanical and electromechanical signalling, safety and traffic control equipment, computers, electronics, machinery equipment

## Cyber Resilience Act: Digital products

- Essential requirements for life cycle and for vulnerability handling
- Critical products (Class I and Class II): stricter conformity assessment
- Conformity: self assessment / certification


## CSA: Cyber Security Act: Certification Schemes

- EU-CC: Common Criteria
- Cloud Services
- ....





# Overview of Sectoral Ecosystem




- Railway Undertakings
- Infrastructure Managers
- Manufacturers of rolling stock
- Manufacturers of railway equipment
- ICT service providers
- Manufacturers of ICS/ OT equipment
- Manufacturers of ICT equipment

Source: Enisa report on railway cybersecurity



# Initiatives for Cooperation



# Pearls of Sectoral Cooperation

ER-ISAC  
(2018)

UIC CSSP  
(2020)

Spoor-ISAC  
(2021)

Others  
(2020-2022)

## Goal

Improve resilience and security through information sharing

## Activities/Results

Information sharing meetings  
Ad-hoc meetings (incidents)  
Zoning and conduits (with Enisa)  
Input of TS50701  
Mutual comments on NIS1

## Goal

Build platform/community on (technical) security solutions

## Activities/Results

Information sharing meetings  
Solution catalogue  
Threat landscape  
Joint assessment of applicability of solutions  
Sharing technical best practice (f.i. IAM, patching)

## Goal

Improve resilience and security through information sharing

## Activities/Results

Information sharing meetings  
Ad-hoc meetings (incidents)  
Topics of interest, like NIS1, SOC, patch management OT, supply chain

## Goal

Development of (input for) future standards

## Activities/Results

Security Concept  
Threat and Risk Analysis  
Code of Practice  
Security Specifications  
Security part of standards



# Perils of Sectoral Cooperation

ER-ISAC  
(2018)

CSSP  
(2020)

Spoor-ISAC  
(2022)

Others  
(2020-2022)

**Perils**  
COVID  
Language/cultural barriers  
Legislation  
Differences in size and maturity  
Involving stakeholders  
Commitment to execute  
Right persons attending

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**Perils**  
Differences in size and maturity  
Potential Competitors

**Perils**  
Balanced representation of rail sector



# Turning Perils into Pearls

## ER-ISAC

### Maturity assessment

- 13 domains
- 1.5 on a scale of 1 to 5

### Stakeholder interviews

### Meet project

- Focus on improving 6 of the 13 domains
- Cooperation with other ISACs

### Reboot information flow

Success factors from a study on cooperation

Trust

Open and transparent communication

Leadership

Shared goals

Evaluation

Expertise

Knowledge transfer



# Turning Perils into Pearls

## CISO Forum (Est. 2023)

- Strategic direction
- Common voice
- Commitment and empowerment
- Network of CISOs



# Lessons Learned



**Cooperation needs trust and builds trust**



**International cooperation differs from national**



**Involvement and commitment of senior executives**



**Building communities takes time and perseverance**



# Time for Discussion

What is your experience:

- Is cooperation needed?
- What are the pearls you have discovered?
- Which perils did you have to circumvent?
- How can we learn from each other?

