**REPORT No. PKBWK 01/2021 (a part)**

**on the investigation of a serious accident category A13 that occurred on 9 March 2020,   
at 4:15 am, at the Szymankowo, track no. 2, km 287.360**

**Warszawa Wschodnia Osobowa – Gdańsk Główny railway line no. 9** an area of the infrastructure manager PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A., the Railway Line Unit in Gdynia.

## A short description of the incident, place and time of the serious accident and its consequences

On 09.03.2020, at approx. 4:15 am, a motor car WMB10-182 (work train Rob.1) was running from the closed route track no. 2 to the Szymankowo station and omitted the home signal “P” that was indicating S1 “Stop”. At the same time, the Gdynia Port GPA – Malbork train LTE 555122 (locomotive E186-261, carrier HSL Polska Sp. z o. o.) was running in the same direction on the Tczew – Szymankowo route track no. 1; the train had been scheduled for the section from this route track to track no. 2 of the Szymankowo station. The section scheduled for the train included e.g. switch no. 26. After train LTE 555122 passed home signal “O” indicating “S6 - *clear road, run with a speed up to 100 km/h…*”, the train continued running along the track connecting track no. 1 and track no. 2 and ran at the speed of 76.7 km/h into motor car WMB10-182, which had stopped on switch no. 26 that was included in the train's route (motor car WMB10-182 of the Gdynia Railway Line Unit of PKP PLK S.A.). As a result, two people died: the driver of the motor car and the accompanying trackman, and motor car WMB10-182 was destroyed; electric locomotive E186-261 and railway infrastructure elements were damaged.

### **Immediate cause**

Train LTE 555122 (locomotive alone) running into train no. Rob.1 (motor car WMB10 – 182) standing on the route of the former train.

### **Underlying cause**

Failure of the train dispatcher at the Szymankowo station, trackmaster and driver of motor car WMB10-182 to comply with rail operation regulations, as a result of which circumstances arose conducive to the driver of the motor car (train Rob.1) omitting home signal “P” that was indicating S1 “Stop”.

### **Indirect causes**

1. The train dispatcher at the Szymankowo station issuing to the trackmaster, a person who was not present in the vehicle can, an incorrect authority for train Rob.1 to arrive at the Szymankowo station.
2. The trackmaster passing the above-mentioned authority by phone to the driver of motor car WMB10-182 indicating the possibility to omit home signal “P”.
3. The driver of motor car WMB10-182 (work train Rob.1) omitting home signal “P” without the required authority as provided for in Instruction Ir-1.
4. Wrong organisation of work train running during works.

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### **System cause**

Not found.

# **RECOMMENDATIONS AIMED AT PREVENTING SUCH ACCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE OR LIMITING THEIR IMPACT**

1. In accordance with the applicable Safety Management System (SMS), the infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall conduct a risk assessment and evaluation concerning the threats identified in this Report that had contributed to the examined incident or constituted other relevant irregularities. The infrastructure manager shall also undertake relevant measures to mitigate the risk of the above-mentioned threats.
2. The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall add a hazard of “the use of mobile phones to issue rail-operation commands instead of the means allowed in internal regulations” to the “hazard register”, conduct the risk assessment and evaluation and also undertake relevant measures to mitigate the risk of occurrence.
3. The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall strictly implement the following recommendation included in the Annual Report on the Operations of PKBWK (State Commission on Railway Accidents Investigation) for 2013:

“*Verify the number of internal checks concerning:*

1. *the obligation to listen to conversations held by means of communications or radiocommunications on a periodic basis (as regulated by internal instruction),*
2. *the correct entries in the operation and maintenance documentation kept at signal posts, including train register books, in particular to see if they are legible and up to date,*
3. *the types and frequency of faults of railway traffic control devices and legibility”.*
4. The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall extend the training program to include the rules related to train arrival, departure and passing on the basis of § 61 of Instruction Ir-1 and the organisation of the transportation process operation by the train dispatcher, the issue of commands, the issue of authorities and communication with the driver and manager of a work train (§ 23 of Instruction Ir-1).
5. The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. and carrier HSL Polska Sp. z o.o. shall undertake action aimed at eliminating other irregularities that doe not have a causal connection but are included in this Report in point IV.6.
6. The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall effectively implement the ban on the use of mobile phones during the performance of job duties related to the rail operation, shunting tasks for trains in connection with closures – in accordance with the order of the Vice-President of the Office of Rail Transport of 30.05.2012 in letter no. DKKBK-550/R-03/KB/2012.
7. The infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. shall enforce compliance with the obligation to provide signage with “D1” board for a closed track according to the provisions of § 53 para. 6 of Instruction Ir-1 plus the use of auxiliary measures (warning plates) according to provisions of § 50 of Instruction Ir-1.

Pursuant to Article 28l para. 8 of the Rail Transport Act of 28 March 2003 (consolidated text: Journal of Laws of 2020 item 1043 as amended), the following recommendations are addressed to the President of the Office of Rail Transport, that performs the statutory supervision of infrastructure managers and carriers.