

## **Extract from the investigation report RJ 2008:02 on a near-collision occurred on 19/10/2007**

### **Summary**

On Friday, 19 October 2007 a near-collision occurred between trains 67373 and 3743 on the line section Stenungsund–Ytterby.

The line section of railway between Stenungsund and Ytterby is a line section without an automatic block system, a so-called “telephone-block system” (“tambana” in Swedish). The principle for train traffic between these stations is that there must be only one train on the line section at a time. The traffic management for the line section between the stations is handled jointly through train announcement between the train dispatchers of both stations.

Train announcement is based on a system of administrative rules. These rules describe the various manual measures that the train dispatcher must carry out in various situations in order to be able to manage traffic control properly on the line section. These rules and measures constitute the safety barriers in the system.

The direct cause of the near-accident was that the train dispatcher in Stenungsund set the departure signal to “go” for train 3743 without having obtained the allowance call for the train, while at the same time train 67373 was out on the line section.

Contributory causes of the near-accident are that the Swedish Transport Agency has failed to follow up how the Swedish Rail Administration has gone about identifying and introducing effective barriers in the system for train notification. A technical barrier could have prevented the incident.

The investigation by the Swedish Accident Investigation Board (SHK) shows that no new barriers have been introduced on line sections without an automatic block system and that planned additions to centralised traffic control or ERTMS have in many cases been postponed to some future date. This is despite the fact that no documented risk assessments or risk analyses have been carried out.

### **Causes**

The direct cause of the near-accident was that the train dispatcher at Stenungsund had not received a “clearance signal” for train 3743 before the departure signal was set to “go”.

A contributory cause is that the Swedish Transport Agency has failed to sufficiently follow up how the Swedish Rail Administration has gone about identifying and introducing adequate barriers in the system for train announcement. A technical barrier could have prevented the incident.

### **Recommendations**

The Swedish Accident Investigation Board (SHK) notes that the previous recommendations that were submitted in report RJ 2004:2 have not yet resulted in any major changes, and in part submits the same recommendations as in the previous report.

The Swedish Transport Agency is recommended to take steps to ensure that:

- the Swedish Rail Administration takes steps to ensure that train dispatchers have the prerequisites in place so that they can easily obtain correct telephone numbers in order to be able to contact drivers (*RJ 2008:2 R1*);
- the Swedish Rail Administration takes steps to ensure that the system for individual follow-up takes account of variations which arise in duty shifts (*RJ 2008:2 R2*).

The SHK has previously recommended:

- that the Swedish Rail Administration, as a matter of urgency, develops an automatic block system or ERTMS-based safety system on train announcement lines with heavy traffic (*RJ 2004:2 R1*);
- that the Swedish Rail Administration identifies and introduces more effective barriers in the train announcement system (*RJ 2004:2 R2*.);
- that the Swedish Rail Administration creates effective follow-up systems in order to spot systematic shortcomings and deviations, for example in the area of compliance with rules and local practice (*RJ 2004:2 R6*).