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Extract from the investigation report BMVIT-795.035/II/BAV/UUB/SCH/2006 on the derailment of train 68146 on 31/08/2006

13. Recommendations

• ÖBB-Infrastruktur-Betrieb AG decreed that in addition to periodic investigations with the track recording car, the actual track area is to be inspected on foot by an employee of the ÖBB-ISC. In accordance with the requirements of the maintenance plan, all tracks of category 'a' are to be inspected every two months by the district inspector.

This inspection can be replaced by an inspection on foot.

In addition, during both regular maintenance and inspections in accordance with the maintenance plan, particular attention should be paid to whether an overhaul of the bed is necessary on the basis of the geological conditions.

• All structural facilities under the management of ÖBB-Infrastruktur Betrieb AG must be monitored. General responsibility for this rests with the infrastructure operator, which, through internal ÖBB agreements, delegates the organisation and execution of inspection activities to the ISCs. The ISCs are a division of ÖBB-Infrastruktur Betrieb AG.

As a result of splitting ÖBB into five companies, including ÖBB Infrastruktur Betrieb AG and ÖBB-Infrastruktur Bau AG, the normative guidelines for track fall under the responsibility of ÖBB-Infrastruktur Bau AG. In this connection it would seem advisable to make the current normative provisions for track engineering easily accessible to the employees of ÖBB-Infrastruktur Betrieb AG as necessary.

During the investigations carried out it was found that such ease of access to ÖBB internal rules in the area of track engineering was not fully guaranteed at the time of the accident (for example on the ÖBB-Infrastruktur Betrieb AG Intranet).

The implementation of the maintenance plan that came into force on 13 December 2006 was in preparation at the start of April 2007, and training on the maintenance plan content for track has been ongoing since that time.

As a result of these measures all affected employees of ÖBB-Infrastruktur Betrieb AG have been informed as necessary about the changes resulting from the maintenance plan.

The absence of or defective recordings by the traction unit recording device must in future be avoided in all circumstances, since these data are in most cases essential for determining the cause of an accident.

In this connection the following recommendations are made:

• Provision of information on an ongoing basis to the service partners/employees concerned on the required formatting of the ATA flashcards in the required MessMa-MC format.

ÖBB-Traktion GmbH has drawn up a checklist for reading the recording device and handling the flashcards and has made this available to the employees concerned.

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• Periodic checking of a representative cross-section of traction units with MessMa memory cards for functionality of the data recording.

This check was ordered by ÖBB-Traktion GmbH from ÖBB Technical Services and it takes place each time there is maintenance of a traction unit. For traction units of series 1016/1116 this takes place after a distance travelled of 100 000 km, corresponding to a check every 5-6 months. In 2006, the reading of the recording devices was carried out by ÖBB-Traktion GmbH during trial runs and unusual events 448 times (19 with MessMa memory cards). No irregularities were noted.

• The functional requirements of the recording device (data recording) on the traction unit and the use of this should be specified as a mandatory precondition for operation of a traction unit.