

Ministry of Construction and Transport

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BUREAU

**Occurrence ID:** HU-5520 (Hungarian ID:№ 2017-1524-5)

**Subject:** Closing of investigation

**Occurrence category:** Railway accident / Collision with an object

**Date & time:** 28 November 2017, 08:31

**Location:** Line № 1, Budaörs station

**Brief summary of the occurrence:**

On 28 November 2017, between 08:22 and 08:37, at Budaörs station, between the railway sections № 190 and № 191, the pantographs of the passenger trains № 919 and № 912 (running through the station) and of the passenger train № 4932 (departing from the station) were damaged due to a mechanical malfunction in the overhead contact line system. The malfunction affected both main tracks of the line at the station.

The locomotive driver of the train № 919, which was first affected by the occurrence, detected and reported the damage to the pantograph at the following station (Kelenföld). The train № 912, which was running in the opposite direction, stopped on the open line between Budaörs and Biatorbágy stations after the damage to its pantograph. At that time the traffic manager was occupied with the departure of the train № 4932 therefore they could not get information on the malfunction of the overhead line system or the damages from the drivers of locomotives of the passenger trains previously affected, and so the train № 4932 also ran under the damaged overhead line and also got damaged.

Due to the layout of the tracks of the station, the traffic manager did not have a sight of the area involved in the occurrence when receiving and dispatching trains. The tracks at the downside end of Budaörs station take a right bend of ca. 15° along a large radius curve, and due to the buildings and vegetation along the curve, the area around the entry signal cannot be seen from the area in front of the traffic control office. The distance between the damaged overhead line section and the traffic control office was 700 metres.

Preliminary investigation found no underlying factors such as organisational or regulatory factors which may have led to these accidents.

Based on evaluation of data and the circumstances, any safety lessons from further investigation are not expected, therefore pursuant to Article 20 of Directive (EU) 2016/798 on railway safety the case requires no investigation or further action by Transportation Safety Bureau, and TSB considers it as closed.

Budapest, 04 January 2018