**HU-3032 (2013-0980-5)**

**SUMMARY**

Despite a preliminary notification of extraordinary stopping, and without permission, the freight train No. 62579-2 travelled through Mád station, thus moved towards the passenger train No. 35235 coming from the opposite direction according to timetable. The traffic manager of Mád station took action by telephone to stop the trains immediately. The two trains stopped at a distance of 2300 m from each other.

**Factual statements directly connected to the occurrence of the accident**

The train No. 62579-2 travelled through Mád station despite the preliminary notification to the train crew and the lack of permission, and the mistake was not realised by the locomotive driver or the shunter.

**Factual statements indirectly connected to the occurrence of the accident**

The chapter relating to the stopping of trains in the Train loading and running regulations No. F.2 does not require giving manual signals to the train if the train crew was notified in advance of a stop not included in the timetable.

**Other risk factors**

The service timetable of the trains running according to a prompt timetable is formally identical with the service timetable of the trains running on specified paths, despite the fact that the safety critical traffic data indicated in the former is not based on real facts. Thus, this document may mislead the train crew.

**Safety recommendation issued after the investigation**

BA2013-980-5-1

*The investigation performed by the Investigating Board of TSB found that at the railway stations (in the national network) without exit signals accompanied by distant signals, the main rule for stopping trains that cross according to timetable requires preliminary notification only. In the case it takes place, there is no other activity at the station to remind it to stop, while in the case it no such notification takes place then the train crew’s attention is attracted by several activities (blocking at the signal, giving manual signal). For this reason,*

**TSB Hungary recommends National Transport Authority to review in the safety management system of MÁV Ltd. whether the rules applying to the stopping of the trains that cross according to timetable give adequate answer to all risks, and to take action as necessary.**

*According to the Investigating Committee, if the main rule is completed and, at the stations without exit signal, specific activities are performed to remind the train crews to stop, then the risk of repetition of occurrences caused by similar attention errors could be reduced significantly.*

Rejected

BA2013-980-5-2

*The investigation performed by the Investigating Board of TSB found that the format of the service timetables delivered to the trains running by prompt timetable fully corresponds with the format of the specified timetables despite the fact that the safety critical traffic data (e.g. the direction of entry to stations without safety installation) included in the former type may not necessarily reflect the real situation, so they may mislead the train crew. For this reason,*

**TSB Hungary recommends National Transport Authority to review in the safety management system of MÁV Ltd. the risk in the similarity of the formats of the service time table for the trains running by prompt timetable and the specified service timetable, and to take action as necessary**

*In the opinion of TSB, in the case of accepting and implementing the above recommendation, the differentiation of the formats of the service timetables including false data as well will call the train crew’s attention more efficiently to interpret the data indicated therein appropriately.*

Accepted, implementation in progress