

# Capture your Safety Critical Components! Improve your barriers!

2 June 2023

14.30 [CEST]

***Welcome! Webinar to start soon!***

#ERAwebinars

Josef Doppelbauer

Executive Director | ERA



Nathalie Duquenne

Project Officer | ERA



Jean-Marie Dechamps

Team Leader | ERA



Giuseppe Ragusa

Maintenance Engineering Project Officer | Trenitalia



Leonardo Cozza

Rolling Stock Maintenance Engineer | Trenitalia TPER



Raymond Groves

Operational Safety Director | Alstom



# AGENDA



Results of the survey



Definition and methodology



Feedback from a RU/ECM



Feedback from a Manufacturer/ECM

And .....answers to your questions



# Answers received

- ECM managers
- Railway undertakings
- Quality managers
- Spare parts for RS manager
- NSA
- Mechanical laboratory
- Consultant



- What is your feeling about the definition of “safety critical” (serious accident, single failure, credible potential)?

Definition is OK but understanding is sometimes challenging. Need for more explanation on meaning of ‘critical’ , ‘single failure’ and difficulties to not take into account the safety mitigation measures already in place

- What is your comprehension about the definition of “component” related to the vehicle structure?

Problem of software component  
Confusion with other components ( IC, spare parts....)  
Definition needs to be improved

- Did you experience any new SCC discovered “during maintenance” monitoring both for new and existing vehicle? If yes, did you ask for SCC identification confirmation to the vehicle Manufacturer?

No but there are in some cases good cooperations with the manufacturers  
Sometimes there are still difficulties to obtain the list of SCC from manufacturers

- Did you develop any specific procedure in your management system related to SCCs processes both for new and existing vehicles?

Yes via internal engineering procedures or specifically for ECMs relevant  
exchange between maintenance delivery function and maintenance  
development function

- What about the collaboration between Keeper/RU/IM/ECM/Manufacturer/Holder of vehicle authorization (exchange of information about maintenance including on SCC)?

Difficult to get information from other parties even if it is clearly stated in the contract

- Do you know the CEN Technical Report 17696 “Guide for identification and management of SCCs for railway vehicles”? If yes, do you use it in the processes of your management system or in general what is feeling using the CEN TR 17696?

Yes for the majority of respondents, they use this standard to build the process for identification of SCC

- Do you know the SAIT (Safety Information Tool by Agency)?

Yes , but it needs to be more advertised, disseminated and explained .  
The sector doesn't know really what to record inside.

- Has any Assessment Body ever commented in the contents of the SCC list (give details)?

No on the list but there is sometimes an assessment concerning the process used for the elaboration of the list

# Problem statement

## For Many years

Recurrently, stakeholders and authorities wanted lists of safety critical components. Also, after catastrophic accidents.

## But:

No consensus on the meaning of 'CRITICAL'

Different attempts led to lists covering ...ALL COMPONENTS of vehicle with the result of "if all is Critical, nothing is Critical"

Consensus on Criticality of components linked to vehicle movement (axle, wheel,...), but substantially "obvious". No added value

## However:

Everyone conscious that CRITICAL components mean strengthened rules for operation and maintenance.

Criticality depends on the vehicle design and the context of operations.

Example: An external door locking system may be critical in a specific design and not in another one depending on reliability, availability or maintainability and operational context.




# What has been done

DEFINITION focus on operational safety and on components:

- SINGLE FAILURE,
- SERIOUS ACCIDENTS,
- CREDIBLE POTENTIAL.

WHO are involved and must COMMUNICATE: Directly: Manufacturers, ECMs, RUs. Indirectly IMs, keepers.  
Requirements on the PROCESSES to be implemented by stakeholders  
Requirements on OUTCOMES of the process (manufacturers).



2018

ERA addressed recommendations

2021

EN standard  
CEN/TR 17696

2016

## EU Commission

- inserted several requirements in the EU legal framework
- requesting ERA to issue recommendations


## ERA

- Discussions with authorities and stakeholders trying to define what would be the most efficient way.
- Different approaches were discussed leading to different definitions.

2019

- TSIs Amendment 2019/776
- ECM Regulation 2019/779

# Definition Terminology



## Agency regulation

Regulation (EU) 2016/796

## Interoperability directive

Directive (EU) 2016/797

## Safety directive

Directive (EU) 2016/798

## TSIs revision

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/776



## ECM Regulation

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/779 of 16 May



## CEN/TR 17696

*Vehicle Maintenance  
Guide for identification and  
management of Safety  
Critical Components for  
railway vehicles*




**Safety critical components** are **components** for which a **single failure** has a **credible potential to lead directly** to a **serious accident** resulting in stated **consequences**

# Definition Terminology

**Safety critical components** are *components* for which a *single failure* has a *credible potential to lead directly* to a *serious accident* resulting in stated *consequences*

CEN/TR 17696 "Vehicle Maintenance - Guide for identification and management of Safety Critical Components for railway vehicles" – Section 7.3.1

SCCs are a sub-set of the **safety-related components**, where these are defined as components performing safety relevant functions keeping the vehicle in a safe state and preventing a safety hazard occurring (see EN 17023-2018-ANNEX\_B).



# Definition Terminology

**single failure:** it means that when the failure of the component occurs, it is the unique event causing the partial/complete loss of the function performed by the component. No other failure or combination of failures is considered. All the other vehicle's components have to be considered in good state for performing their functions;

The **components** of the vehicle can be defined and identified by starting with the definition as in 3.11 of **EN 15380-2:2006**:

### **'3.11 component**

*uniquely identifiable product that is considered indivisible for a particular planning or control purpose and/or which cannot be disassembled without it being destroyed*


- (12) **'serious accident'** means any train collision or derailment of trains resulting in the death of at least one person or serious injuries to five or more persons or extensive damage to rolling stock, the infrastructure or the environment, and any other accident with the same consequences which has an obvious impact on railway safety regulation or the management of safety; **'extensive damage'** means damage that can be immediately assessed by the investigating body to cost at least EUR 2 million in total;

**Table 1 — SCCs - List of accidents (non-exhaustive) from CEN/TR 17696**

**Safety critical components** are **components** for which a **single failure** has a credible potential to lead directly to a **serious accident** resulting in stated consequences




Safety Critical Components  
Who is involved ?




# Methodology

- SCC what is involved ?
- SCC Identification process
- SCC method 1- FMECA
- SCC method 2 - FTA
- SCC deliverables



Reference document


# Safety Critical Components – What is involved



# Safety Critical Components – Identification process


## Perspective from Manufacturer/Entity managing the change

New vehicle or engineering change/ renewal/upgrading/refurbishment of existing vehicles




# Safety Critical Components – Identification process

## Perspective from ECM



# Safety Critical Components – SCCs – Identification method - 1



Vehicle FMECA

- Breakdown Structure
- Functions of component
- Failure modes and causes

Evaluate effects on railway system

Can the effect on the railway system potentially lead directly to one accident in the list?

Table 1 – SCCs List of accidents

The component is not Safety Critical

Can the accident have one of the consequence in the list?

Table 2 – SCCs List of consequences

**Expert Judgement considering:**

- failure mode, historical statistics, REX from oper. and maint.
- scenarios of the operation
- component datasheet
- safety recom./reports available

Can the event be considered credible by expert judgement?

The component is Safety Critical

# Safety Critical Components – SCCs – Identification method - 2

Vehicle FTA  
Top event= Accident

INPUT

Top Event is the combination by OR Logic Gates of the accidents in Table 1 – SCCs List of accidents

Develop Fault Tree Analysis down to the level of Basic Event (Partial/Complete Loss of function of a component due to a failure mode)

Identify all the Minimal Cut Sets (MCS)

Discard MCS

Is the MCS of order 1?

NO

YES

The component inside the MCS is potentially critical

The component is not Safety Critical

NO

Can the accident have one of the consequence in the list?

INPUT

Table 2 - SCCs List of consequences

YES

Can the event be considered credible by expert judgement?

INPUT

NO


YES

The component is Safety Critical

**Expert Judgement by information on:**

- failure mode of the component
- historical statistics of serious accident linked to the component
- return on experience (REX) from operation and maintenance for the component
- scenarios of the operation
- component datasheet
- safety recommendations/reports available

# Safety Critical Components SCCs Deliverables



# Trenitalia Tper

## Safety Critical Components (SCC) - Focus

Springer Giovanni Marco – Responsible for Management Function (ECM-F1)

Cozza Leonardo - Fleet Maintenance Engineer



## CONTENTS

<b>01</b>	Presentation of Trenitalia Tper	3
<b>02</b>	Railway Safety Management System	4
<b>03</b>	Safety Critical Components (SCC) - Definition	5
<b>04</b>	Safety Critical Components (SCC) - Procedure	6
<b>05</b>	Safety Critical Components (SCC) - Identifying	7
<b>06</b>	Safety Critical Components (SCC) - Monitoring	9
<b>07</b>	Safety Critical Components (SCC) - How To	10

# Trenitalia Tper

## Presentation

- Trenitalia Tper is a railway company with its own **safety certificate**
- Trenitalia Tper is certified as an **entity in charge of maintenance ECM** in accordance with Regulation (UE) No 779/2019

### THE NUMBERS



**155.000 TRAVELLERS**



**1416 RESOURCES**



**4.893 STORES** → **19 TICKET OFFICES**



**90 + 26 NEW TRAINS**



**880 RUNS PER DAY**



**1 NEW MAINTENANCE PLANT «IMC Bologna»**

### THE FLEET



HITACHI  
ROCK

39



ALSTOM  
POP

47



STADLER  
ETR350

26



COMPLESSI  
VIVALTO

6



PESA  
ATR220

12



Automotrici/Rimorchiato  
Diesel ALn

67



HITACHI ROCK 621

4

# Trenitalia Tper

## Railway Safety Management System





# Trenitalia Tper

## Safety Critical Components (SCC) - Definition

**Safety Critical Components (SCC) are components for which a single failure has a credible potential to lead directly to a serious accident resulting in stated consequences**

1. any train collision or derailment of trains resulting in the death of at least one person or serious injuries to five or more persons or extensive damage to rolling stock
2. any other accident with the same consequences which has an obvious impact on railway safety regulation or the management of safety
3. 'extensive damage' means damage that can be immediately assessed by the investigating body to cost at least EUR 2 million in total



# Trenitalia Tper

## Safety Critical Components (SCC) - Procedure

Trenitalia Tper has its own sub-procedure for **Identifying and Monitoring** Safety Critical Components.



Trenitalia Tper has outsourced the maintenance development Function (ECM-F2) relating to the development of maintenance to the following External Subjects:

- **Trenitalia** DT for new vehicles Rock ETR421-521-621, Pop ETR103-104 owned by Trenitalia and Trenitalia Tper;
- **MaFer** for existing vehicles ETR350, ATR220, E464, Vivalto, Aln/Ln.

Both external subjects have their respective identification and monitoring procedures for Identifying and Monitoring Critical Components.



**With procedure PS.028 Trenitalia Tper implemented the documents and procedures of the suppliers**

<b>TRENITALIA TPER</b>	Titolo: Identificazione e Monitoraggio dei Componenti Critici per la Sicurezza dei Veicoli	Codice documento: SFP.PS.028.00
		Revisione: 00
		Data: 05/03/2022

SFP.PS.028.00

### Procedure to identify and manage Safety Critical Component

Revisione	Emissione	Decorrenza	Motivo	Redatto	Controllato	Verificato	Approvato
00	17/02/2022	05/03/2022	Emissione	G. Frattucci	A. Filoni	M. Tuffanelli	A. Tullio
<b>Modifiche</b>							
-							

Sistema di Gestione per la Sicurezza 1

Informazione confidenziale - Confidential information

# Trenitalia Tper

## Safety Critical Components (SCC) - Identifying



### New Vehicles Rock ETR 621-521-421

For the Rock fleet, Hitachi (manufacturer) has identified Safety Critical Components which are indicated in the Maintenance Documentation Dossier through a risk assessment taking into account the use and environment of the components:

#### ➤ Carbody

#### ➤ Running gears:

- Standing Bogie
  - Bogie Chassis
  - Axile
  - Anti-roll Bar
  - Standing Bogie-Chassis Connection
- Motor Bogie
  - Bogie Chassis
  - Axile
  - Gear
  - Secondary Suspension
  - Motor Bogie-Chassis Connection

#### ➤ Traction and Repulsion

- Automatic Coupler
- Bearings
- Springs



HITACHI Inspire the Next QY70P019504B Rev. 07 Pagina/Page 15/201

### Safety Critical Component (SCC)

Codice RAM	Descrizione	Codice P/N
1	Cassa	034295CG01 cassa DM1
		034446CG01 cassa TA
		034448CG01 cassa TX
		036292CG01 Cassa M3
		034449CG01 cassa TB
		034450CG01 cassa DM2
4	Organi di Corsa	
4.1	Carrello Portante	
4.1.1	Telaio	031644EB03
4.1.1.1	Telaio principale	031567EB01
4.1.1.3	Rulli limitatori	00069433EA01
4.1.2	Sala montata	032338EC01
4.1.2.1	Assile	00050274EC03
4.1.2.2	Ruota	00050272EC02
4.1.2.3	Cuscinetto	00050270EC04
4.1.2.4	Boccola a braccio	028837EC04 028836EC04
4.1.5	Barra antirollio	00055131EF01
4.1.6	Collegamento cassa-carrello	-
4.1.6.1	Trave di trascinamento	032146EB02
4.1.6.2	Biella di Trazione	030941ED03
4.1.6.3	Bilancere	033628ED03
4.1.6.4	Perno di trascinamento	00054369ED03

4.3	Carrello Motore	
4.3.1	Telaio	031388EB01
4.3.1.1	Telaio principale	030838EB01
4.3.1.4	Rulli limitatori	00069433EA01
4.3.2	Sala montata	031421EC01
4.3.2.1	Assile	00050273EC03
4.3.2.2	Ruota	00050272EC02
4.3.2.3	Cuscinetto	00050270EC04
4.3.2.4	Boccola a braccio	028837EC04 028836EC04
4.3.2.5	Riduttore	031377EA03
4.3.4	Sospensione secondaria	
4.3.4.6	Ammortizzatore antiserpeggio	032629ED02
4.3.5	Barra antirollio	031630EF01 00055131EF01
4.3.6	Collegamento cassa-carrello	-
4.3.6.1	Trave di trascinamento	032146EB02
4.3.6.2	Biella di Trazione	030941ED03
4.3.6.3	Bilancere	033628ED03
4.3.6.4	Perno di trascinamento	00054369ED03
16	Dispositivi di collegamento	
16.1	Trazione e Repulsione	031377EA03
16.1.1	Accoppiatore Automatico	231 004934
16.1.1.1	Blocco Accoppiatore	230 041026
16.1.1.2	Molla di tensione (per il Blocco Accoppiatore)	230 008813
16.1.1.4	Involucro della Testa	230 031854
16.1.1.26	Cuscinetti in Gomma della Barra di Trazione	230 043970
16.1.1.27	Dispositivo Collassabile	230 043970
16.1.1.29	Dispositivo di Centraggio	230 041027
16.1.1.31	Manicotto di Accoppiamento	230 034730

With reference to the management of these SCCs, Trenitalia Tper satisfies the maintenance requirements for operation:

- Traceability
- Identification by Serial Number (Bogie and Axile)
- Qualifications of the maintainers who carry out the maintenance activities

# Trenitalia Tper

## Safety Critical Components (SCC) - Identifying

### New Vehicles **Pop ETR 104-103**

At the moment the manufacturer has not identified Safety Critical Components so Trenitalia and Trenitalia Tper, both as ECM, has chosen the **wheelset** as SCC based on Trenitalia's feedback on experience.

Considering the evolution of the attentional theme, Trenitalia Tper is studying other solutions about it.



### Existing Vehicles **ETR350, ATR220, E464, Vivalto, Aln/Ln.**

Trenitalia and Trenitalia Tper, both as ECM, has identified the **wheelset** as SCC based on Trenitalia's feedback on experience .



### Ongoing and Next Steps

- Inform Manufacturer, the holder of the vehicle type and the holder of the vehicle authorization (if these parties can be identified), when it becomes aware of evidence about a new SCC is identified .
- where necessary, addressing a request to the Manufacturer, directly or via the Keeper, for technical and engineering support about SCCs and their safe integration
- collaborating with the Manufacturer to develop specific servicing, maintenance and maintenance traceability requirements after the vehicles have entered into operation

# Trenitalia Tper

## Safety Critical Components (SCC) - Monitoring

Trenitalia Tper Management function **monitors** and **verifies** the correct application of the actions and criteria adopted by External Subjects and Fleet Maintenance Management (ECM-F3) and Maintenance Delivery (ECM-F4) regarding the management of the Critical Components.



**Technical Meetings**



**Maintenance Return of Experience**



**Audit**



**Engineering Studies**



# Trenitalia Tper

## Safety Critical Components (SCC) – How To

Trenitalia and Trenitalia Tper, as ECM, are **studying, learning and analyzing the SCCs** as required by article 4 of 779/2019 Regulation (UE).


In fact, Trenitalia and Trenitalia Tper already considered and still consider the function of «**Organo di Sicurezza**» (Safety Component) in compliance of ANSF Decree #4/2012, that defines the responsibilities and operating methods of the training delivery process, the certification and maintenance of the skills of the personnel who carry out the security activity of vehicle maintenance.

It is now clear that the regulamentation of SCCs is leading to the next level of safety to ensure the maximum safety criteria for the railways system.





Thank you





**ERA Webinar: Capture your  
Safety Critical Components. Improve  
your barriers**

**Manufacturer / ECM  
Experience**

Raymond Groves

2<sup>nd</sup> June 2023

**ALSTOM**  
• mobility by nature •

# SCC: a Rolling Stock Manufacturer's point of view




- Requirements of the **Fourth Railway Package (4RP)** relating to the creation of a **Safety Critical Components (SCC)** list
  - Interoperability Directive EU 2016/797
  - TSI revision regulations (all)
  - Entity in Charge of Maintenance Regulation EU 2019/779
    - New requirements primarily relating to Safety Critical Components (SCC) for the manufacturer and the use of the SAIT tool
  - Amendment to TSI (Loc&Pas) includes the requirement for a SCC list - (EU) 2019/766
- For the purposes of new build and **Vehicle Authorisation (EU 2018/545)**
- **Rolling Stock RAMS** teams are responsible for the creation of the SCC list and methodology document (risk assessment)
- **ECM EU 2019/779 Art. 4, 5. (a)** *manufacturers shall manage information on safety critical components and appropriate maintenance instructions related to them through reference in the technical file of subsystems.*

SCC = Safety Critical Component

ECM = Entity in Charge of Maintenance

RAMS =Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety



This diagram shows the responsibilities between the two different actors - the New Build vehicle Manufacturer and the ECM Maintenance organisations.

# SCC List - Example



Rechtm. Eigentümer: Alstom Transport Deutschland GmbH		Verantwortliche Einheit: RAMS	Dokumententart: Sicherheitsanalyse / Safety Analysis	Dokumentencode: QB	ALSTOM	
Name des Erstellers: Dirk Hoffmann		Titel / Benennung: Safety Critical Component List (SCCL)		Dok.-Status: released		
				Dokumentnummer Ersteller: AFD0005809932		
		Dateiname: XKR_RSA_SCCL_-C	And.:	And.-Datum: 14.06.2022	Sprache: de/en	Seite: 1 Seiten: 16

Plattform: Coradia Continental	Projekt: XKR
Führende Sprachfassung: de	Produktgruppe: Ablageort: DMA

	Name	Position	Datum/date	Unterschrift/signature
Erstellt:	Dirk Hoffmann	Safety Engineer	17.06.2022	<i>D. Hoffmann</i>
Geprüft:	Susanne Meller	Safety Manager	17.06.2022	<i>S. Meller</i>
Freigegeben:	Gernot Hesse	Project Engineering Manager	20.06.2022	<i>Gernot Hesse</i>
Freigegeben:	Jan Vörsmann	Domain Leader Safety	20.06.2022	<i>Jan Vörsmann</i>

Weitergabe sowie Vervielfältigung dieses Dokuments, Verwertung und Mitteilung seines Inhalts sind verboten, soweit nicht ausdrücklich gestattet. Zuwiderhandlungen verpflichten zu Schadenersatz. Alle Rechte für den Fall der Patent-, Gebrauchsmuster- oder Geschmacksmuster-Eintragung vorbehalten.

The reproduction, distribution and utilization of this document as well as the communication of its contents to others without explicit authorization is prohibited. Offenders will be held liable for the payment of damages. All rights reserved in the event of the grant of a patent, utility

- The Safety Critical Component List (SCCL) is a mandatory component of the technical file, as outlined in the EU Interoperability Directive (EU 2016/797)
- In addition, the ECM Regulation (EU 2019/779), which falls under the EU 4th Railway Package applicable to Alstom as a rail vehicle manufacturer, also requires the SCCL
- Moreover, the SCCL aims to prioritise safety critical components during maintenance activities, ensuring they receive special attention.

SCC List produced as part of vehicle authorisations process deliverables





# Discussion – difficulties in application of SCC for the Manufacturer

## Current situation:

- Different definitions of accident types are given in the RSD EU 2016/798 and CSM-RA EU 402/2013 (EN 50126)

Activities	References	Used definitions
Reporting of safety in operation (CSI) and trigger for investigation	RSD 2016/798	Serious accident
Demonstration of safe integration and Safety requirement capture	CSM-RA 402/2013	Catastrophic Accident Critical Accident
Management of Safety Critical Components	ECM 2019/779 with reference to TSI Loc&Pas	Serious accident

- The safety demonstration for vehicle authorisation uses the accident scenarios for Catastrophic and Critical as required in accordance with CSM Risk Evaluation and Assessment EU 402/2013.
- Once the vehicle is under the responsibility of the RU and ECM, the operational and locational context can be reassessed addressing the Safety Directive requirement to consider also potential extensive damage to the infrastructure or the environment (e.g. the IM may be approached to assist with infrastructure details)
- The operating conditions may change over the life of the vehicle depending on any change in usage or new RUs e.g. passengers and goods transported, and routes operated.

RSD = Railway Safety Directive

RU = Railway Undertaking

CSM = Common Safety Method



# Entity in Charge of Maintenance (ECM) – point of view

- The transferred technical documentation for Operation and Maintenance
- ILS / ISR team includes the flagged safety exports in the Maintenance Manual and match it to the maintenance tasks.
- ECM is responsible for the management of the SCC list during the O&M phase
- Alstom maintains 20% of fleets that are non-Alstom manufactured.
- Many are in service before the 4RP / ECM regulations → no SCC List exists
- However, it can be that the ECM needs to identify new SCCs e.g. following a vehicle modification that upgrades or introduces new or changed components
- CEN/TR17696:2021 Railway applications - Vehicle Maintenance - Guide for identification and management of Safety Critical Components for railway vehicles is a help.
  - However, CEN/TR 17696 talks about whether an “event” is credible regarding a potential SCC e.g. UAT maintenance means an axle failure is an incredible event?

ILS = Integrated Logistic Support

ISR = Integrated Service Readiness

UAT = Ultrasonic Axle Testing



# Exported requirements SRAC in Maintenance Manual with traceability

## Traditional Paper Documentation

ALSTOM		ROLLING STOCK		CHECKLIST				
Title	CITADIS XO5 - 25,000 km Inspection Checklist			Version	A			
AEC Reference	A-0000185815A-0000156562			Page	- 9 of 25 -			
System	Brake Disk Assembly			TMP Reference	A-0000184737			
Component	Calipers and Absence of Oil Leaks			eCatalogue Ref.	LRCX000336102			
Qty	2 per Motor Car 4 per Trailer Car	Material	Safety degreasing solvent SOCOMOR hyso 94, Qty: 1	Tools	Standard Tool Kit, Qty: 1 Torque Wrench, Qty: 1 Dry Cloth, Qty: 1			
Maximo Task No./LRC Step No.	Task Description			M1	C1	IC	C2	M2
130 - A2 130 - A3	 <b>WARNING:</b> Before any work on the brake calipers, make sure that the disks have cooled down. In fact, the disks heat up during braking and their cooling can take up to 3 hours (maximum).  Secure and electrically lockout the trainset.							
130 - A4	Remove the skirt (Ref. LRCX000339320).							
130 - B	 <b>SAFETY WARNING:</b> Safety related operation 430R358.							
130 - B1:10	Visually check the overall state of the calipers (good state, absence of oxidation, of corrosion).							
130 - B2:10	Check for possible leaks: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At couplings (1) and (2) of the hoses</li> <li>Over the length of the hoses (3) and (4)</li> <li>At the pressure taps (5) and (6)</li> </ul>							
130 - B2:30 130 - B2:40	Check the oil level in the hydraulic power unit and if need be top up the oil.							
TOOL ID	Calibration Date		Calibration Due Date					
Remark(s)	Staff Initial(s)							

Example from a maintenance manual for a

SRAC = Safety Related Application Conditions    SES = Services Execution System

## Service Execution System (SES)

Ordine di Servizio : 60241716      Descrizione Service order : VG porte treno 04 - carrozza

Priorità SO: 1      Tempo allocato: 8

Op. nb.: 0020      Descrizione operazione: PORTE ESTERNE Op.A

LISTA OPERAZIONI    CHIUDI SO    RI-APRIRE L'OPERAZIONE    MODIFICAZIONI

< Lista Sub-Operazioni    Aggiungi Componenti    Notifiche    Strumento utilizzato    Valori

CRONOLOGIA    TUTTI OK

Profile: Default Profile

Safety	Tool	Sta...	Descrizione Sub Op
Display			Not filtered
			Porte accesso passeggeri Lato Stella Azionare manualmente porta, verificare assenza blocco: cuscinettguida inf. kit cuscinetto glycodur, assenza danni snodo sfericoradiale, bocco la scorrimento tubo, snodo sferico radiale, kit braccio boccola. ESEM 15 3-167-169-173- 174-176-177-180.(Qual. E)
			Porte accesso passeggeri Lato Stella Verificare l'assenza di danni per: i fissaggi del supporto motore, il pignone vite<(>,<(> il kit boccola carrellino e i suoi fissaggi. Segue ESEM 153-167-169-173-174-176-177-180.(Qual. E)
			Porte accesso passeggeri Lato Stella Ispezionare guida interna, i suoi fissaggi ed il suo supporto: assenza di urti, deformazioni, presenza integrità fili di sicurezza sulle teste delle viti, presenza di tutte le parti di fissaggio e assenza di allentamento.(Qual. E). ESEM 152-145

SES shows "Safety related" task with a Red warning sign.  
This will replace the paper check list in our Depots

# Conclusions



1. **Regulations** in the 4RP introduced new SCC requirements on the Manufacturer and the ECM
2. **Manufacturer** – initially concerned to produce the SCC list for Vehicle Authorisation
  - ▶ SCC List document in the Technical File
  - ▶ Risk Assessment method included in the Maintenance Design Justification file
3. **ECM** – is then responsible to manage the SCC List for the remainder of the O&M lifecycle
  - ▶ For example, tagging specific SCC tasks in the Work Instruction
  - ▶ Ensuring adequate control processes in compliance with CSM Monitoring
  - ▶ Identifying new or changes components that may be in the SCC list (e.g. as a result of change)
4. An **Example has been shown**
  - ▶ SCC Lists do exist
  - ▶ SCC items identified
5. **Question** – the requirement for Manufacturer to perform Safety Demonstration to one definition (CSM RA) and SCC list to another (ECM)


# Conclusions



6. **ECM and RU** - have a role during the O&M phase on the Vehicle usage in the identification of **Environmental** and **Infrastructure** related hazards likely to involve the SCC definition. Arguably this is outside the knowledge of the Manufacturer
7. What to do about **older vehicles** and where the Manufacturer is no longer around?
8. Little or **no Feedback / REX** on other SCC Lists
  - ▶ Should there typically be 1 or 100 items?
  - ▶ Any views or challenges from the assessment bodies?
  - ▶ The EU Agency for Railways?
9. The Manufacturer identifies safety critical components, recognising their vital role as **safety barriers** against potential hazards.
10. The ECM ensures controlled maintenance of safety critical components through robust **documented processes** and strict **quality checks**, serving as additional barriers that effectively prevent potential failures.

---- Thank you ----

REX = Return on Experience / Lessons Learned



[www.alstom.com](http://www.alstom.com)



**ALSTOM**  
• mobility by nature •

# Questions/Answers



Give us your feedback



# Upcoming ERA Events

## TSI Revision Package 2023: Key Changes (part 1)

15 June

12.00-13.00 (CEST)

## ETCR Seminar 2023

3-14 July

**REGISTER NOW**

Bruges, Brussels, Antwerp – Belgium

19 June

**REGISTER NOW**

## Safety Leadership Training

20-22 September


Tallinn, Estonia

**REGISTER NOW**

## Safety Days 2023

Give us your  
feedback





# THANK YOU

---

Moving Europe towards a sustainable and safe railway system without frontiers.

Follow us:



in

