

Critical issue:

A different approach between MSs to adopt improved safety measures can introduce the risk of:

- tendency to adopt over-sizing in technical and organizational security measures by supervisors (NSAs and NIBs), with non-homogeneous approaches in the various Member States
- self-defense approaches to existing safety measures every time the need for improvement becomes a response to single events and is not supported by objectively significant elements (system approach) and there is no reasonableness and practicability assessment

Both approaches are legitimate (both are the result of the interpretation of the quality principles) but are dangerous and can be an obstacle, for example, to the process of simplification of national safety standards and in building a truly competitive single European railway area

Proposal:

- A. Regulation (EU) 402/2013 defines a common method for managing the risks introduced by the changes but does *not* provides a method for assessing the effectiveness of existing safety measures (SMS).**
1. It should be supplemented by a section defining a criterion for assessing and accepting the residual risk level of hazards, for example by including the semi-quantitative approach to the so-called "risk matrix" of EN 50126/1999.
 2. The frequency and severity classes should also be quantitatively defined.
 - 3. This common method would allow to measure the effectiveness of the security measures adopted by operators in their SMS and to justify the decision in order to take or not to take improvement measures**
- A. Regulation (EU) 1078/2012 should be integrated by inserting appropriate CSIs significant to essential safety requirements defined in the TSIs: *this would allow for an objective and harmonized monitoring in order to identify critical areas and to assesses the ability of SMS to generate improvements over time***