#	N°	Reference (e.g. Art, §)	Type	Reviewer	Reviewer's Comments, Questions, Proposals	Reply	Proposal for the correction or justification for the rejection
1	1	Appendix D Index 13	M	BaneDK	14263 :2016 shall be 14363 : 2016	A	Point corrected
2	2	TSI-WAG 4.2.3.5.3.2	G	BaneDK	If the unit is fitted with an automatic central coupling as defined in point 5.3.x of this TSI, the DPF shall comply with the requirements set out in point x.x.x.	R	This point and same sentence in point 4.2.3.5.3.3 shall be deleted as DAC is finally not part of this TSI revision cycle
11	1	4.2.3.5.3.2	M	CER	It is written "If the unit is fitted with an automatic central coupling as defined in point 5.3.x of this TSI, the DPF shall comply with the requirements set out in point x.x.x. of ERA/TD/XXX." the previous sentence should be deleted as it is not longer foreseen to integrated in the 2022 TSIs text the ERA/TD on DAC	**A**	Indeed, DAC is part of next revision cycle
12	2	4.2.3.5.3.3	M	CER	It is written "If the unit is fitted with an automatic central coupling as defined in point 5.3.x of this TSI, the DDF shall comply with the requirements set out in point x.x.x. of ERA/TD/XXX." the previous sentence should be deleted as it is not longer foreseen to integrated in the 2022 TSIs text the ERA/TD on DAC	**A**	Indeed, DAC is part of next revision cycle
13	3	7.1.2 (g)	U	CER	It is written "in accordance the specification referenced in Appendix D Index 51" It should be written "in accordance **with** the specification referenced in Appendix D Index 51"	**A**	Editorial, no comments
14	4	C 19bis	M	CER	It is written "19bis Derailment detection and prevention function If a unit is provided with DDF or DPF as defined in points 4.2.3.5.3.2 and 4.2.3.5.3.3 of this TSI and if the coupling system is in accordance with Appendix C1.2, it shall be demonstrated that these functions are compatible with the requirements set out in points xxx of ERA/TD/xxx." the previous sentence should be deleted as it is not longer foreseen to integrated in the 2022 TSIs text the ERA/TD on DAC	**A**	Indeed, DAC is part of next revision cycle
15	5	7.1	P	CER	Reference: Appendix D Table 1 - Transitions for new requirements introduced for parking brake in WAG TSI 4.2.4.3.2.2 and 4.8 approved with CR437 have not been categorised by the WP. CER proposal: C2 classification. - Transitions for new requirements introduced for dispensation from running tests for wagons in WAG TSI 6.1.2.1 approved with CR 472 have not been categorised by the WP. CER proposal: C2 classification.	**A**	
16	6	Appendix D index 13	M	CER	EN142**2**63 is written instead of EN143**3**63	**A**	
17	7	Appendix D index 13	P	CER	As argued by ERA for CR517, it is objected that "update to 2018 version not possible. reference to 2018 version will create confusion whereas next version will solve the issues." EN14363:2016 currently referenced in L&P TSI contains some errors. Keeping these errors in TSI 2022 is not acceptable. Even though EN 14363:2016+A1:2018+A2:202x may be published soon, benefits from A1:2018 are needed for the sector. Reference should be made to EN 14363:2016+A1:2018 pending further publication of A2:202x Also, the discripancy introduced with the 2022 Package between INF and WAG TSIs is not correct: INF TSI:2022 -> EN 14363:2016+A1:2018 WAG TSI:2022 -> EN 14363:2016	**D**	VG : the agency is not in favour of quoting A1: 2018 because in any case the technical opinion ERA-OPI-2018-3 is still needed as long as EN14363:2022 is not available. It is reasonable to refer to EN14363:2016. ERA-OPI-2018-3 is referring to EN14363:2016 and not to EN14363:2016+A1:2018, therefore it seems reasonable to skip EN14363:2016+A1:2018. this was agreed by the working party in CR517. CR517 also contains an update in TSI INF to refer to version 2016 (and not 2016+A1:2018) instead of version 2005. TWG STA was informed during meeting N°14 that version 2022 may be ready ontime for TSI package 2022. The agency will analyse the draft and, depending on the result and on the standard availability, may propose a review in next TWG STA (15/09)
18	8	7.1.2, Figure 1	P	CER	A new marking is introduced into the TSI WAG which is appreciated. EN 15877-1:2012 containing marking on freight wagons is required by TSI WAG clause 7.1.2 (g). This EN should be updated. We propose that ERA writes a Request for standards (RfS) to CEN to update EN 15877-1 according to 7.1.2 Figure 1	R	since the agency regulation (EU) 2016/796 The process of RfS doen't exist any longuer. But as discussed during last TWG-STA and as stated in the minutes of TWG-STA 14th meeting, the draft version of EN15877-1 contains already the new marking.

19	*1*	TSI Wagon	P	NSA DK	Proposal: Following discussions in the Combined Transport group and in the JNS normal procedure Great Belt Incident, the Danish NSA proposes that the following text is incorporated into TSI Wagon, for instance (as previously discussed in the Combined Transport group) in section 4 of the TSI: "*The seating device (hitch) for the locking of a kingpin on a semitrailer must have a minimum vertical locking force of 85 kN. The minimum locking force shall be demonstrated and documented on each hitch type/variant/version by a physical test.* "	R	ERA proposes to follow the conclusions and recommendations of sub-group IIIb of the JNS Normal Procedure on the Great Belt Bridge accident that say: Conclusions: - The determination of a minimum threshold value of locking force shall be the outcome of a transparent and sectorial common risk assessment. It should also be evaluated if for example the Great Belt Bridge is to be categorized as special or general case. (...) - After the results of the holistic analysis and risk assessment (precondition), additional specifications could be added in the TSI WAG and in the EN standards and/or UIC-related IRS. Recommendation #4: The respective TSIs and standards shall be only adapted when the results of the common risk assessment on the GBB will be available. This assessment shall consider all possible cases that might occur on the GBB: from (1) best case: semi-trailer perfectly locked and secured with different seating devices and vertical forces to (2) worst case: semi-trailer not locked and secured at all.
29	*1*	4.2.3.5.3.4	M	NSA ES	Section 4.2.3.5.3.4 indicates the following: "*The DDAF shall indicate its status (activated/deactivated) and this status shall be visible from both sides of the unit. If this is not physically feasible, the DDAF shall indicate its status from at least one side and the other side of the wagon shall be marked in accordance with the specification referenced in appendix D* ***Index 2*** " However, reference should be made to index 49.	R	Standards have been renumbered in order to have 1 index n° for 1 standard
30	*2*	Appendix D	U, M	NSA ES	Index 37 to 41, 100 to 103, 107 to 119 and 121 are not fullfilled. Each index should ~~be~~ clearly state to which sub-section refers to. Hence, table in Appendix D should be revised. Index 51 refers to section 7.1.2.(g) but it reflects 7.1.2.(h). Hence, table in Appendix D should be revised.	A	Same answer as above
31	*3*	7.1.2(h)	M	NSA ES	Remove unnecessary comma: *(h) The minimum and, where relevant maximum parking brake force, the number of wheelsets (N) and the number of wheelsets* ~~*(,)*~~ *on which the parking brake is applied (n) shall be marked as set out in Figure 1*	A	
39	*1*		G	NSA FR	Attention has to lent about the way standards are refered to in the document. In § 4.2.4.3.2.2 for example, a standard is quoted directly in the text. In § 4.2.6.2.1, the standard is not quoted in the text but a reference to appendix D is made. This should be done in an homogeneous way.		Noted.
40	*2*		G	NSA FR	We take note that Digital Automatic Coupler (DAC) is not yet part of this project. According to what was agreed in Working Party, a paragraph will be added with a few words on DAC. As well as for derailment detection (see hereunder), the text foreseen to be included in this TSI is not mature yet and make it unsuitable for designing a DAC. Attention shall be lent to DAC availability and reliability, which have to be very high in order to be able to perform in an appropriate manner safety functions (train integrity and train length) and to avoid staff putting itself in danger due to DAC difficulties.		Noted.

41	*3*	4.2.3.5.3	G	NSA FR	This paragraph is not mature yet. The lack of definition of interfaces with other wagons and with locomotive make it unsuitable for designing a derailment detection device. Attention shall be lent to derailment detector availability and reliability, to avoid: - for DDAF, unexpected and possibly dangerous stops (bridges, tunnels); - for all derailment detectors, unnecessary stops, degradation of infrastructure and of exploitation.	R	Freight wagons are vehicles intended for general operation. By definition, these vehicles are intended to be coupled with other unit(s) in a train formation which is not defined at design stage. Therefore, the interface (signal) is required to be defined and recorded in the technical file so they can be operated (i.e. coupled) with compatible wagons. Regarding the availability and reliability of the derailment detection, this has been considered: - in DDAF, wit the requirement to perform a explicit risk assessment - for the rest of derailment detectors, by having to levels of alarm (warning to the driver, and if ignored, triggering of an emergency brake which can be bypassed by the driver)
42	*4*	4.3.3	G	NSA FR	Reference to interface document will have to be updated (version 5.0 is under preparation). Due to the inclusions of derailment detection device and, in a near future, of DAC, this paragraph may have to be updated, at minimum regarding effects of electromagnetic compatibility.	A	The last draft of the TSI already considers compatibility between freight wagons with electrically live components and tds.
43	*5*	7.3.2	G	NSA FR	The Agency shall decide if UK specific cases have to maintained (as here) or removed (as in CCS TSI).	A	Uk specific cases was delt during WP16
44	*6*	Appendix C 19bis)	G	NSA FR	Why is DDAF not quoted here?	NWC	Because no compatibility requirements with DAC are needed, as DDAF is fully autonomous. Please note that the full C19b is deleted, as DAC is not part of this revision cycle
49	*1*	*3*	*G / U / P*	*NSA IT*	In the table at point 3 it seems that for some points it needs to add reference to essential safety requirements. The list below is an example of issues; please consider that other points could require attention. Why is not 4.2.4.3.2.2 related to avalilability? Why is not 4.2.6.1 related to avalilability?		*This change proposal would need to be discussed with a Working Party and cannot be introduced at this stage of the revision for the TSI package 2022. A change request can be created to initiate that discussion for a future revision.*
50	*2*	*4.2.4.3.3*	*P*	*NSA IT*	It should be right to change the reference for the thermal capacity according the innovation in the material of the brake blocks. P = 45000 W for t = 34min = 2040s E = Q = P*t = 45000 W* 2040s = 91.8*10^6 J Q = m*c*delta T thus delta T = E/(m*c) c_steel = 502 J/kg*°C m_wheel 920mm = 360 nearly delta T = 91.8*10^6/(360 kg *502J/kg*°C) = 508 °C At the sliding surface there is not thermal radiation or convention. Moreover the temperature could locally be higher due to hot spots. Finally the rolling resistance at the wheel-rail interface is a source of energy increasing. That value could be acceptable for cast iron, not for other types of brake blocks; it is worth noticing that safe integration and compatibility between wheel material and brake material should be an objective of the requirements.	*R*	*This change proposal would need to be discussed with a Working Party and cannot be introduced at this stage of the revision for the TSI package 2022. A change request can be created to initiate that discussion for a future revision.*

51	*3*	4.5.1, 4.2.3.6.2 and Appendix D	P	NSA IT	The standard EN 15313, where the EWT protocol on the European traceability of wheelsets has been implemented, is not present in the Wagon TSI (just in the application guidelines) but of fundamental importance as regards the maintenance of wheelsets in operation and out of work. In fact, following the Viareggio accident, it was necessary to allow the ECM to carry out a timely tracking of the maintenance of the wheelsets. To ensure the traceability of in-service vehicle axles, it is necessary that the wheelset manufacturer provide all the data required by the standar EN 15313 (4.2.4.2, 4.2.4.3.2 and Annex A) already during the vehicle authorization phase and these must be part of the vehicle Technical file. Change the text of the Wagon TSI clause 4.5.1, 4.2.3.6.2 and Appendix D as follows (in RED the new text proposed): at the end of the last bullet point of paragrapf 4.5.1 "Configuration files for each vehicle (parts list and bill of material) to enable (in particular but not only) traceability during maintenance activities." to add: "In particular the data necessary to ensure the traceability of in-service wagon wheelsets complying with the specification EN 15313:2016. Afeter the second subparagraph of paragraph 4.2.3.6.2 to add: "In order to ensure traceability, in-service boxed wheelsets shall have marks complying with the specificationEN 13260, EN 13261 and EN 13262". In the Appendix D to add for the point "Characteristics of wheelsets" paragraph 4.2.3.6.2 the reference to the EN 13260 Point 3.2.8, EN 13261 point 3.10 and EN 13262 point 3.10 and to add new point "General documentation" paragraph 4.5.1 and to sepcify the standard EN 15313:2016 ppoints 4.2.4.2, 4.2.4.3.2 and Annex A.	R	This change proposal would need to be discussed with a Working Party and cannot be introduced at this stage of the revision for the TSI package 2022. A change request can be created to initiate that discussion for a future revision.
52	*4*	4.2.3.6.1. and Appendix J-1	P	NSA IT	In the Chapter 4.2.3.6.1. “Structural design of bogie frame” there is no reference to joining techniques. This is a serious lack in the TSI WAG, so the text it should at least the same of the text in the chapter 4.2.2.2 (the Note: Joining techniques are deemed to be covered as well by the demonstration of conformity in accordance to point 6.2.2.1.) concerning “Strength of unit”. All welding joining carried out on the bogie frame should be made too according to harmonized procedures in compliance with at least the only and best standard currently in use in the railway sector, namely the series of standards EN 15085. If the manufacturer can demonstrate through experience and risk assessment that it has more effective procedures at the production phase than the EN Standards 15085, it should better introduce these in its quality system and to give evidence to the NoBo. It should be possible to write this in the Application guide of TSI WAG but important is to establish as mandatory at the minimum the EN standard 15085. Therefore, it is necessary to modify the current requirement reported in the TSI WAG in point 4.2.3.6.1. Change the text of the WAG TSI clause 4.2.3.6.1. and Appendix J-1 as follows (in RED the new text proposed). At the end to add: Joining techniques are covered by the above requirements. A verification procedure shall exist to ensure at the production phase that defects that may decrease the mechanical characteristics of the structure are controlled. In case of welding processes the existence of an above procedure may be demonstrated through compliance with the specification EN 15085- 1:2014, EN 15085-2:2020, EN 15085-3:2008, EN 15085-4:2008, EN 15085-5:2008 and EN 15085-6:2020.	R	EN 15085 series is quoted in EN13749:2021 chapter 7. this chapter is defined as harmonized in annex ZA of EN13749:2021. because the TSI doesn't aim to define the joining technology in details, this harmonisation is seen as suffisient.
53	*5*	6.2.2	P	NSA IT	Add in the section 6.2.2 the timing for the release of the certification. The correct timing is necessary to design and produce correctly the vehicle. Therefore, another comma should be added in order to fix the procedure of the certification. The new proposed comma is reported below: (5) The SD certification must be released after that the Conformity assessment body has evaluated and certified the design/project/type SB at the and of the phase A (7.1.3.1). The audit in the production line must be made during the production/assembling of the vehicle with a fixed configuration certified by SB. Appropriate reasonable proofs could be given in case the audit is lead in the procution line of similar and interchanchangeble projects with explicit exportability report of NoBo/DeBo and declaration of applicant.	R	

54	6	6.2.2	P	NSA IT	Add in the section 6.2.2 the timing for the release of the certification. The correct timing is necessary to design and produce correctly the vehicle. It has happened that SB and SD certifications had been released after 2 years that dynamic behaviour tests of the vehicle was performed. Moreover, if SB is released after production, this means that the vehicle/prototype has designed like an experiment by changing reference rules and basis when some of them had been difficult to apply or not convenient or expensive. Finally it is noticed that the refrence rules to design and project should be defined and fixed in the requirements capture. Therefore, another comma should be added in order to fix the procedure of the certification. The new proposed comma is reported below: (6) SB certificates should be released before that the production of the project/design/type is performed, otherwise there is a risk to produce and assembly vehicle without a fixed and defined project.This mode of practice is justified in that SB certification is the result of the verification of a configuration in the sense of 545/2018 and according to 7.1.3.1 (2) basis.	R	This change proposal would need to be discussed with a Working Party and cannot be introduced at this stage of the revision for the TSI package 2022. A change request can be created to initiate that discussion for a future revision.
55	7	6.2.2	P	NSA IT	Add in the section 6.2.2 the timing for the release of the certification. The correct timing is necessary to design and produce correctly the vehicle. Therefore, another comma should be added in order to fix the procedure of the certification. The new proposed comma is reported below: (7) The requirements capture for a type/project/design should be finished before that the SB has been released, otherwise the validity of the certification is damaged by continuous adjustements of requirements and vehicle design aspects and basis according to 7.1.3.1 (2) and 7.1.3.1 (4). The release of requirements capture assures that the project is fixed and production of the project could start with a determined configuration according to 545/2018.	R	This change proposal would need to be discussed with a Working Party and cannot be introduced at this stage of the revision for the TSI package 2022. A change request can be created to initiate that discussion for a future revision.
56	8	Annex D	P	NSA IT	In the Annex D are listed the harmonized rules (EN). New EN revisions are released, so it could be better to spercify that the manufacturer should be designed and produced t the vehicle with the released EN at the time of design and production, then the test on the vehicle should be performed with the current harmonized rule		This is ongoing with TWG-EDIT and already done in the draft master documents
61	1	4.2.3.5.3 Derailment and Prevention function	U	NSA NL - 10	Referring to TSI Loc & Pass 4.2.9.3.7.similarity regarding usage of inframonitoring system such as Quo Vadis is applicable?	D	The link with 'Quo Vadis' isn't clear - according to Proral network statement it is an infrastructure-based system to measure the quality of the running surface of wheels, not an on-board derailement detection device
62	2	6.1.2.4. Axle	U	NSA NL - 2	The revision of this item is may result in reproduction of freight wagon type Lgj?	D	We don't understand the question
71	1	All document (e.g. 4.2.2.2)	G	Trafikverket	References to specificatons such as EN-standards have been gathered in Appendix D and assigned an index numbre. This change does not seem to be consistent through out the document. For the document to be consistent gather all specifications in Appendix D with indexes and refer in the text to the appendix.	NWC	consistency has been checked in the document
81	1	4.2.4	U	UTP	The paragraph 4.2.4 should be modified to take into account the CR422 to modify the standard references which have to be updated	A	
82	2	4.2.3.5.3.2	M	UTP	It is written “If the unit is fitted with an automatic central coupling as defined in point 5.3.x of this TSI, the DPF shall comply with the requirements set out in point x.x.x. of ERA/TD/XXX.” The previous sentence should be erased as the ERA/TD on DAC is no longer forecast.	A	
83	3	4.2.3.5.3.3	M	UTP	It is written “If the unit is fitted with an automatic central coupling as defined in point 5.3.x of this TSI, the DDF shall comply with the requirements set out in point x.x.x. of ERA/TD/XXX.” the previous sentence should be erased as the ERA/TD on DAC is no longer forecast	A	
84	4	7.1.2 (g)	M	UTP	It is written “in accordance the specification referenced in Appendix D Index 51” It should be written “in accordance **with** the specification referenced in Appendix D Index 51”	A	
85	5	C 19bis	M	UTP	It is written “19bis Derailment detection and prevention function If a unit is provided with DDF or DPF as defined in points 4.2.3.5.3.2 and 4.2.3.5.3.3 of this TSI and if the coupling system is in accordance with Appendix C1.2, it shall be demonstrated that these functions are compatible with the requirements set out in points xxx of ERA/TD/xxx.” the previous sentence should be erased as the ERA/TD on DAC is no longer forecast	A	
86	6	7.1	P	UTP	It is written “(3) Compliance with the TSI WAG 321/2013 including amendments 2015/924, 1236/2013, 2019/776 and 2020/387, is deemed equivalent to compliance with this TSI, except for the TSI changes listed in appendix A.” This sentence means that the applicant could choose to apply the previous TSI in case of projects with design phase before the publication of this new TSI, and neglect some new requirements that have been added to this TSI and not listed in appendix A. Those new requirements (like parking brake in 4.2.4.3.2.2 and 4.8, running gear in 6.1.2.1) shall be included in the appendix A.	A	Requirement for the parking brake added in appendix A. Regarding the requirement on running gear, the working party didn't consider it as a requirement with a transition period (compliance with the current TSI implies compliance with the revised TSI)

87	*7*	Appendix D	U	UTP	The Appendix D should be modified to take into account the CR422 to modify the standard references which have to be updated	A	
88	*8*	Appendix D index 13	M	UTP	EN14263 is written instead of EN14363 Every occurrence of EN14363 will be better with 2018 version (EN14363:2016+A1:2018) as this last version correct some errors	A	Typo corrected; the working group on standards and the working party didn't consider appropriate to update the reference to EN 14363:2016+A1: 2018
89	*9*	Appendix D index 13	M	UTP	EN13103:2017 is written instead of EN13103-1:2018	R	https://standards.cencenelec.eu/dyn/www/f?p=CEN:110:0::::FSP_PROJECT,FSP_ORG_ID:39096,6237&cs=15BEE9D72B1F1FB90031A93F7994F160C
90	*10*	Appendix D index 35 to 40	M	UTP	Normative references on fire and smoke standards have to be updated according to CR420 conclusions	A	
91	1	4.2.3.5.3	G	ASSOCIAZIONE AUGUSTO CASTRUCCI APS - Ancora IN MARCIA	Improving the safety of rail transport in the EU. Technically prevent a derailed train from continuing to run without control. An automatic and immediate intervention of the train brake is necessary when one or more wheels have come out of the rail or in any case when there are anomalous factors or elements in the dynamics of the wheel / rail contact, in rolling or for any other abnormal mechanical stress of the carriages during the march. On countless occasions it has happened that a freight train has continued running uncontrollably on the tracks with one or more wheels or bogies out of the normal running position. It is necessary to eliminate this particular eventuality. The absence of derailment detectors amplifies the risk of a serious train accident. The prolonged running of a trolley outside the normal location increases the probability of rolling stock overturning exponentially and the involvement of other trains running on the adjacent tracks. 4.2.3.5.3 Automatic derailment detection and prevention function. The derailment detection and prevention function is intended to prevent derailments and mitigate the consequences of a derailment on each rolling unit in all freight trains. The derailment detection function on rolling units must meet the following requirements. The function shall be able to automatically detect either a derailment or conditions which are a precursor to a derailment of the unit in accordance to one of the three sets of requirements described in points 4.2.3.5.3.2, 4.2.3.5.3.3 and 4.2.3.5.3.4 below: It is allowed to combine these functions as follows: - 4.2.3.5.3.2 and 4.2.3.5.3.3 - 4.2.3.5.3.2 and 4.2.3.5.3.4 **4.2.3.5.3.2 .1** **Priority requirements**	R	"The Agency agrees with the objective of avoiding derailments. However, imposing an automatic derailment detection has the potential risk of causing false detections automatically triggering emergency brake applications which under certain circunstance may trigger a derailment. This is why the automatic detection and prevention, when used must be reliable enough in order to avoid the risk of false detection triggering dangerous brake applications. Also, other technical solutions are allowed: derailment prevention/detection functions which inform the driver and in case there is no reaction start an emergency brake application which can be by-passed by the driver. Please find a link to the guidelines of the Agency on derailment detection/prevention, where more information is provided on intempestive brake applications triggered by an automatic detection system: https://www.era.europa.eu/sites/default/files/activities/docs/guidelines_from_eu_agency_for_railways_use_derailment_detectors_en.pdf " Please note that only one of the three possible derailment detection and prevention functions is automatic: the DDAF, which is fully contained in the freight wagon.

					The derailment detection function 4.2.3.5.3.4 with automatic brake activation, without the possibility of the driver's intervention, must be ensured with priority over functions 4.2.3.5.3.2 and 4.2.3.5.3.3. The requirement 4.2.3.5.3.4 must be met within 12 months of the approval of this TSI for rolling stock and units for the transport of dangerous freight. Requirement 4.2.3.5.3.4 must be met within 24 months of the approval of this TSI for all rolling stock and units used for the carriage of freight.		
92	1	4.2.3.5.3	G	Associazione Il Mondo che Vorrei ONLUS	**Important: considering the considerable technical and linguistic difficulties encountered in contributing to the revision of this TSI, it is requested, in the event of typos, inaccuracies or presentation errors, deriving from the translation, to integrate and / or correct them in the spirit indicated by the proposal, or to obtain the best technically possible safety in rail transport**	A	"The Agency agrees with the objective of avoiding derailments. However, imposing an automatic derailment detection has the potential risk of causing false detections automatically triggering emergency brake applications which under certain circunstance may trigger a derailment. This is why the automatic detection and prevention, when used must be reliable enough in order to avoid the risk of false detection triggering dangerous brake applications. Also, other technical solutions are allowed: derailment prevention/detection functions which inform the driver and in case there is no reaction start an emergency brake application which can be by-passed by the driver. Please find a link to the guidelines of the Agency on derailment detection/prevention, where more information is provided on intempestive brake applications triggered by an automatic detection system: https://www.era.europa.eu/sites/default/files/activities/docs/guidelines_from_eu_agency_for_railways_use_derailment_detectors_en.pdf " Please note that only one of the three possible derailment detection and prevention functions is automatic: the DDAF, which is fully contained in the freight wagon.
					Improving the safety of rail transport in the EU.	R	
					Technically prevent a derailed train from continuing to run without control.		
					An automatic and immediate intervention of the train brake is necessary when one or more wheels have come out of the rail or in any case when there are anomalous factors or elements in the dynamics of the wheel / rail contact, in rolling or for any other abnormal mechanical stress of the carriages during the march.		
					On countless occasions it has happened that a freight train has continued running uncontrollably on the tracks with one or more wheels or bogies out of the normal running position.		
					It is necessary to eliminate this particular eventuality.		
					The absence of derailment detectors amplifies the risk of a serious train accident.		
					The prolonged running of a trolley outside the normal location increases the probability of rolling stock overturning exponentially and the involvement of other trains running on the adjacent tracks.		
						R	
93	1	4.2.3.5.3	G	Trade union organization CUB TRASPORTI (Italy)	**4.2.3.5.3 Automatic derailment detection and prevention function.**		"The Agency agrees with the objective of avoiding derailments. However, imposing an automatic derailment detection has the potential risk of causing false detections automatically triggering emergency brake applications which under certain circunstance may trigger a derailment. This is why the automatic detection and prevention, when used must be reliable enough in order to avoid the risk of false detection triggering dangerous brake applications. Also, other technical solutions are allowed: derailment prevention/detection functions which inform the driver and in case there is no reaction start an emergency brake application which can be by-passed by the driver. Please find a link to the guidelines of the Agency on derailment detection/prevention, where more information is provided on
					The derailment detection and prevention function is intended to prevent derailments and mitigate the consequences of a derailment on each rolling unit in all freight trains. The derailment detection function on rolling units must meet the following requirements.	R	
					4.2.3.5.3.1 General requirements		
					The function shall be able to automatically detect either a derailment or conditions which are a precursor to a derailment of the unit in accordance to one of the three sets of requirements described in points 4.2.3.5.3.2, 4.2.3.5.3.3 and 4.2.3.5.3.4 below: It is allowed to combine these functions as follows: - 4.2.3.5.3.2 and 4.2.3.5.3.3 - 4.2.3.5.3.2 and 4.2.3.5.3.4		

					4.2.3.5.3.2 .1 **Priority requirements** The derailment detection function 4.2.3.5.3.4 with automatic brake activation, without the possibility of the driver's intervention, must be ensured with priority over functions 4.2.3.5.3.2 and 4.2.3.5.3.3. The requirement 4.2.3.5.3.4 must be met within 12 months of the approval of this TSI for rolling stock and units for the transport of dangerous freight. Requirement 4.2.3.5.3.4 must be met within 24 months of the approval of this TSI for all rolling stock and units used for the carriage of freight.		intempestive brake applications triggered by an automatic detection system: https://www.era.europa.eu/sites/default/files/activities/docs/guidelines_from_eu_agency_for_railways_use_derailment_detectors_en.pdf " Please note that only one of the three possible derailment detection and prevention functions is automatic: the DDAF, which is fully contained in the freight wagon.