



Czech Republic



**The Rail Safety
Inspection Office**

NIB ANNUAL REPORT 2024

according to Article 24(3) of Directive (EU) 2016/798

The Rail Safety Inspection Office

Czech Republic

September 2024



PREFACE TO THE REPORT

A National Investigation Body operates in the Czech Republic – The Rail Safety Inspection Office – conducting independent investigation of the causes and circumstances of railway accidents and incidents according to Directive (EU) 2016/798, the principles and requirements of which have been implemented into the national legislation. The objective of the investigation of the causes and circumstances of railway accidents and incidents is to increase the safety of railways.

This Annual Report is an annual report issued by the National Investigation Body of the Czech Republic, The Rail Safety Inspection Office, for 2024, pursuant to Art. 24(3) of Directive (EU) 2016/798. It comprises information regarding:

- the National Investigation Body
- the system of investigation of railway accidents and incidents
- the investigations of accidents and incidents completed in 2024
- the safety recommendations issued



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Summaries of investigations completed in 2024



1 INTRODUCTION TO THE INVESTIGATION BODY

1.1 Legal framework

Directive (EU) 2016/798 was implemented into the national legislation of the Czech Republic by Act 266/1994 Coll., on Railways, as amended, and the subsequent issue of implementing Decree 376/2006 Coll., on the System of Safe Railway Operation and Railway Transport Operation and Procedures Following Railway Accidents and Incidents, as amended.

Accidents and incidents are further divided into the following categories, reflecting their nature and consequences:

- serious accidents
- accidents
- incidents

The national legislation of the Czech Republic orders infrastructure managers (IM) and railway undertakings (RU) to investigate the causes and circumstances of railway accidents and incidents.

The accident and incident investigation performed by The Rail Safety Inspection Office is independent of any other party and independent of the investigation conducted by other bodies, especially police investigation and the investigation of the causes and circumstances of accidents and incidents conducted by infrastructure managers or railway undertakings.

1.2 Role and Mission

The National Investigation Body (NIB) was established in the Czech Republic on 1st January 2003. The mission is to guarantee independent investigation of the causes and circumstances of railway accidents and incidents. The national legislation of the Czech Republic also authorizes the National Investigation Body to investigate accidents and incidents within trams, trolleybuses and cable-ways, because all these kinds of transport are included in the same legislation regime as the railways.

The main goal of the Office's work is to prevent the occurrence of accidents and incidents. Therefore, the Rail Safety Inspection Office:

- investigates the causes and circumstances of rail accidents and incidents,
- issues safety recommendations to the National Safety Authority (NSA) and where needed by reason of the character of the recommendation, to the European Union Agency for Railways, other administration bodies and authorities or other relevant bodies of different member states.



1.3 Organisation

On 1st January 2003, the National Investigation Body – The Rail Safety Inspection Office – was established in the Czech Republic pursuant to the provisions of Act 77/2002 Coll. The Rail Safety Inspection Office is a national body investigating the causes of railway accidents and incidents independently of any other party. As an investigation body it is independent of any infrastructure manager, railway undertaking and regulatory body. The competences of The Rail Safety Inspection Office include:

- railways (main lines, regional lines, sidings, underground)
- tram lines
- trolleybus lines
- cable-ways


The Rail Safety Inspection Office has a total of **38 employees** in five cities of the Czech Republic (Ostrava, Brno, Praha, Plzen, Ceske Budejovice). It comprises of the Central Inspectorate and three (since 1st July four – Ostrava, Brno, Praha and Plzen) Regional Inspectorates covering the area of the entire country. The Central Inspectorate consists of the Economic Department, the Department of the Methodology and Department of the Central reporting work place (since 1st July 2024 - Central Inspectorate consists of the Economic Department and the Department of the Methodology).

The Economic Department plays supportive role for the Inspector General and the whole structure of The Rail Safety Inspection Office. It provides human-resource management, economic, IT and legal services and public relations.

The Department of Methodology creates and improves methodology for investigations, maintains accident investigation including the co-ordination of the regional inspectorates' activities, manages staff training and mediates communication with EU bodies.

The Department of Central reporting work place provides 24/7 reporting office for notification of accidents and incidents.

Regional Inspectorates investigate the causes of rail accidents and incidents with the aim of enabling lessons to be learned for improving the safety of railways.





1.4 Organisational flow


The structure of railway sector in the Czech Republic and relationships among the parties involved are defined in Act 266/1994 Coll., on Railways, as amended, and its implementing regulations. The legislation applies to the following transport systems:

- railways (main lines, regional lines, sidings, underground)
- tram lines
- trolleybus lines
- cable-ways

The most important bodies in the railway sector include the Czech Ministry for Transportation, The Railway Office and The Rail Safety Inspection Office. The Czech Ministry for Transportation is in charge of the national railway legislation, including implementation of the EU railway legislation. The Railway Office is the National Safety Authority carrying out certification, authorization and regulation of railway and railway transport operation and performing state supervision of railways, according to the national legislation. The Rail Safety Inspection Office is the National Investigation Body independent of any party in the railway sector.

All these authorities are involved in the system of maintaining and improving safety of railways and railway transport:

- **The Czech Ministry for Transportation** sets the framework by developing railway legislation.
- **The Rail Safety Inspection Office (NIB)** investigates railway accidents and incidents and issues safety recommendations to The Railway Office.
- **The Rail Authority (NSA)** sets and adjusts safety rules for infrastructure managers and railway undertakings.





2 INVESTIGATION PROCESSES

2.1 Cases to be investigated

The national legislation of the Czech Republic orders the National Investigation Body, The Rail Safety Inspection Office, in accordance with European principles, to investigate the causes and circumstances of serious accidents on main and regional lines, border railways and sidings. In addition, The Rail Safety Inspection Office can investigate, in cases defined by the respective law, other occurrences in the following cases:

- serious accidents regarding underground, trams, trolleybuses and cable-ways
- accidents and incidents on all types of guided transport

When making decision whether to investigate or not, The Rail Safety Inspection Office takes into account the set legal requirements (seriousness, repeating, impact on railway safety, requests from infrastructure managers, railway undertakings, the national safety authority or the Member States) as well as possibility to learn safety relevant lessons from the accident or incident.

2.2 Institutions involved in investigations

Following the occurrence of railway accident or incident, various parties may launch several independent investigations, depending on the occurrence's nature and consequences:

- **Infrastructure manager or railway undertaking** identifies the causes and circumstances of accident or incident, focusing on the drafting of preventative measures and the proposal of responsibility for the occurrence.
- **The Rail Safety Inspection Office** investigates the causes and circumstances of accident or incident with a focus on the determination of the causes and contribution factors and issue of preventative safety recommendation. The investigation shall in no case be concerned with apportioning blame or liability.
- **Czech Police** investigate accident or incident with the aim of defining responsibility for the committing of offenses or criminal acts.

2.3 Investigation process or approach of the NIB

The objective of the investigation of the causes of railway accidents and incidents is to gain knowledge for the prevention of accidents and incidents, minimize the consequences and increase the safety of railways.

Investigation performed by the National Investigation Body of the Czech Republic, The Rail Safety Inspection Office, focuses on the following aspects of each occurrence:



- independent investigation of the causes and circumstances of accident or incident (serious accidents and selected accidents and incidents only)
- meeting legal requirements for procedures following railway accident or incident by infrastructure manager and railway undertaking (for example notification without any delay, securing of accident site, etc.)

When notified about the occurrence of accident or incident by an infrastructure manager or railway undertaking, The Rail Safety Inspection Office will decide whether it will immediately go to the accident-site or not. The investigation of accident or incident may be launched immediately after the occurrence and/or later, in reaction to specific circumstances. If The Rail Safety Inspection Office launches an investigation, it will notify the European Union Agency for Railways within seven days.

The Rail Safety Inspection Office will publish the conclusions of its investigation in Investigation Report, the structure of which is based on the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2020/572. If the accident or incident occurred without any violation of legislation or internal regulations of infrastructure manager and/or railway undertaking, The Rail Safety Inspection Office issues safety recommendation with the aim of preventing reoccurrence of the accident or incident. Safety recommendation is issued also if there are other findings relevant for the safety.



3 INVESTIGATIONS

3.1 Overview of investigations completed in 2024 identifying key trends

Trends of completed investigations (last column of the table) are calculated as difference to previous year (2023).

| Type of accidents investigated | Number of accidents | Number of victims | | Damages in € (approx.) | Trends in relation to previous year |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| | | Deaths | Injury * | | |
| Collisions | 7 | 0 | 26 | 8.337.017,- | +40 % |
| Derailments | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1.850.441,- | -57 % |
| LC-accident | 3 | 0 | 11 | 2.901.137,- | -66 % |
| Fire in RS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 % |
| Acc. to person | 4 | 4 | 3 | 25.581,- | +400 % |
| Other | 5 | 0 | 0 | 2.069,- | -37 % |

* In the national legislation of the Czech Republic in Act 266/1994 Coll., on Railways, as amended, is already mentioned only term harm to health (there is no definition of serious injury or any other classification of injuries).

3.2 Investigations completed and commenced in 2024

Investigations completed in 2024

| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location) | Legal basis | Completed (date) |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------------------|
| 26. 9. 2020 | Train derailment: in Uporiny station | i | 8. 7. 2024 |
| 10. 2. 2022 | Other: Unauthorised train movement other than SPAD in Decin Prostedni Zleb station | i | 5. 9. 2024 |
| 17. 2. 2022 | Trains collision with an obstacle with consequent derailment: between Zdarec u Skutce - Hlinsko v Cechach stations | i | 10. 7. 2024 |
| 10. 3. 2022 | Trains collision: in Odbocka Skaly station | i | 11. 4. 2024 |
| 10. 10. 2022 | Trains collision with an obstacle with consequent derailment: in Poricany station | i | 25. 1. 2024 |
| 13. 2. 2023 | Trains collision with an obstacle: between Cervenka - Stepanov stations | i | 9. 9. 2024 |
| 16. 2. 2023 | Other: Accident to person caused by RS in motion: in "LASSELSBERGER Chlumcany u Dobran" siding | ii | 27. 2. 2024 |
| 28. 3. 2023 | Other: SPAD in Vlastec station | i | 15. 2. 2024 |
| 6. 7. 2023 | Other: SPAD in Usti nad Labem hlavni nadrazi station | i | 12. 11. 2024 |
| 10. 7. 2023 | Level-crossing accident: km 7,491 in Bozice u Znojma station | i | 12. 6. 2024 |



| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location) | Legal basis | Completed (date) |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|
| 18. 7. 2023 | Other: Collision of shunting operation with standing rolling stocks with consequent derailment in Cerhenice railway test circuit | ii | 9. 7. 2024 |
| 4. 8. 2023 | Other: SPAD in Dluhonice station | i | 30. 7. 2024 |
| 14. 9. 2023 | Trains collision: in Bezdecin station | i | 10. 5. 2024 |
| 3. 10. 2023 | Accident to person caused by RS in motion: between Belcice - Blatna stations | i | 4. 6. 2024 |
| 6. 10. 2023 | Accident to person caused by RS in motion: between Brno Malomerice - Odbočka Brno Zidenice stations | i | 20. 8. 2024 |
| 16. 10. 2023 | Accident to person caused by RS in motion: between Moravský Písek - Nedakonice stations | i | 24. 7. 2024 |
| 17. 10. 2023 | Level-crossing accident: km 0,580 in Olomouc hlavní nadraží station | i | 12. 9. 2024 |
| 19. 10. 2023 | Other: Tram trains collision in The City of Plzeň – behind the stop Pod Zahorskem | ii | 26. 3. 2024 |
| 9. 11. 2023 | Level-crossing accident: km 18,441 in Pelhřimov station | i | 7. 10. 2024 |
| 13. 12. 2023 | Train derailment: in Brumov station | i | 11. 12. 2024 |
| 18. 12. 2023 | Train derailment: in Stupno station | i | 5. 11. 2024 |
| 16. 1. 2024 | Other: SPAD in Rynoltice station | i | 7. 6. 2024 |

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).



Investigations commenced in 2024

| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location) | Legal basis |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 16. 1. 2024 | Other: SPAD in Rynoltice station | i |
| 24. 1. 2024 | Level-crossing accident: km 281,911 between Detmarovice - Bohumin stations | i |
| 16. 2. 2024 | Other: SPAD in Havlickuv Brod station | i |
| 5. 3. 2024 | Accident to person caused by RS in motion: between Roznov pod Radhostem – Stritez nad Becvou stations | i |
| 18. 3. 2024 | Other: SPAD in Zalhostice station | i |
| 2. 5. 2024 | Train derailment: in Cisovice station | i |
| 21. 5. 2024 | Level-crossing accident: km 12,330 between Cermna nad Orlici - Borohradek stations | i |
| 24. 5. 2024 | Trains collision: in Praha hlavní nadrazi station | i |
| 5. 6. 2024 | Trains collision: in Pardubice hlavní nadrazi station | i |
| 9. 6. 2024 | Trains collision with an obstacle with consequent derailment: in Milovice station | i |
| 10. 6. 2024 | Other: SPAD in Chrudim station | i |
| 15. 6. 2024 | Train derailment: in Rychnov u Jablonce nad Nisou station | i |
| 27. 6. 2024 | Trains collision: between Holubice – Rousinov stations | i |
| 14. 7. 2024 | Train derailment: between Lednice stop – Bori les station | i |
| 4. 8. 2024 | Other: SPAD in Jablonne nad Orlici station | i |
| 6. 8. 2024 | Other: SPAD in Chodov station | i |
| 22. 8. 2024 | Trains collision with an obstacle: between Praha Radotin - Dobrichovice stations | i |
| 18. 9. 2024 | Trains collision: in Odbocka Balabenka station | i |
| 1. 11. 2024 | Trains collision: in Praha Malesice station | i |
| 3. 12. 2024 | Other: Unauthorised train movement other than SPAD in Hostivice station | i |

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive)



3.3 Research studies (or Safety Studies) commissioned and completed in 2024

Safety Studies completed in 2024

| Date of commission | Title of the Study (Occurrence type, location) | Legal basis | Completed (date) |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------|
| | none | | |

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

Safety Studies commenced in 2024

| Date of commission | Title of the Study (Occurrence type, location) | Legal basis |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| | none | |

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

3.4 Summaries of investigations completed in 2024

See annex of this report.

3.5 Comment and introduction or background to the investigations

| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location) | Legal basis |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| | none | |

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

Investigations commenced in 2024 and not followed

| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location) | Legal basis | Reason of non following or suspension of investigations | Who, why, when (decision) |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| | none | | | |

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).



3.6 Accidents and incidents investigated during last five years (in 2020–2024)

Rail investigations completed in 2020–2024

The table groups investigations by year of their completion.

| Accidents investigated | | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | TOT |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|
| Serious accidents (Art 20.1) | Train collision | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 5 |
| | Train collision with an obstacle | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | Train derailment | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| | Level-crossing accident | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| | Accident to person caused by RS in motion | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Fire in rolling stock | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | Involving dangerous goods | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Accidents (Art 20.2) | Train collision | 5 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 20 |
| | Train collision with an obstacle | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 11 |
| | Train derailment | 8 | 7 | 12 | 6 | 3 | 36 |
| | Level-crossing accident | 14 | 9 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 35 |
| | Accident to person caused by RS in motion | 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 11 |
| | Fire in rolling stock | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Involving dangerous goods | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Incidents | | 7 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 17 |
| TOTAL | | 41 | 34 | 30 | 23 | 15 | 143 |



4 RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Short review and presentation of recommendations

A safety recommendation can be issued only on a basis of an independent investigation performed by The Rail Safety Inspection Office (NIB). Safety recommendation is usually issued when an accident occurred without any violation of legislation or internal regulations of infrastructure manager and/or railway undertaking, or if there are other findings relevant for the safety.

According to national legislation, safety recommendations are not legally binding. When a recommendation is issued, all relevant parties (for example National Safety Authority, another administration body, etc.) are obliged to adopt their own preventative safety measures based on the safety recommendation issued.

Implementation of recommendations during 2020 – 2024

| Recommendations issued | | Recommendation implementation status | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------|-----|-------------|-----|-----------------------|-----|
| | | Implemented | | In progress | | Not to be implemented | |
| Year | [No.] | [No.] | [%] | [No.] | [%] | [No.] | [%] |
| 2020 | 25 | 8 | 32 | 15 | 60 | 2 | 8 |
| 2021 | 21 | 9 | 43 | 10 | 48 | 2 | 9 |
| 2022 | 16 | 5 | 31 | 9 | 56 | 2 | 13 |
| 2023 | 16 | 3 | 19 | 11 | 69 | 2 | 12 |
| 2024 | 13 | 4 | 31 | 6 | 46 | 3 | 23 |
| TOTAL | 91 | 29 | 32 | 51 | 56 | 11 | 12 |

Accidents with safety recommendations issued in 2020 – 2024

| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location) | Status of implem. | Completed (date) |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| 6. 1. 2018 | Trains collision: in Ceska Lipa station with consequent derailment | implemented | 3. 9. 2020 |
| 2. 12. 2018 | Level-crossing accident: km 434,211 between Velke Brezno - Usti nad Labem Strekov stations | partially implemented | 21. 2. 2020 |
| 23. 2. 2019 | Other: Collision of rolling stocks during shunting operation in Ceske Budejovice station | implemented | 7. 4. 2020 |
| 4. 3. 2019 | Trains collision: between Ronov nad Doubravou – Zleby stations | implemented | 17. 4. 2020 |
| 29. 3. 2019 | Train derailment: in Kostelec u Hermanova Mestce station | partially implemented | 22. 4. 2020 |



| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location) | Status of implem. | Completed (date) |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| 29. 3. 2019 | Other: Uncontrolled movement of rolling stock with consequent collision with an obstacle and derailment in Veseli nad Moravou station | partially implemented | 9. 4. 2020 |
| 28. 6. 2019 | Train derailment: in Vysoke Myto station | partially implemented | 30. 1. 2020 |
| 16. 7. 2019 | Level-crossing accident: km 108,978 in Horetice station | implemented | 15. 2. 2020 |
| 21. 7. 2019 | Other: Tram trains collision with an obstacle in The City of Praha – between Trojska – Nad Trojou stops | partially implemented | 30. 7. 2020 |
| 24. 7. 2019 | Trains collision with an obstacle with consequent derailment: between Nova Paka – Lazne Belohrad stations | partially implemented | 8. 2. 2020 |
| 28. 7. 2019 | Train derailment: between Chodova Plana – Marianske Lazne stations | partially implemented | 29. 5. 2020 |
| 30. 7. 2019 | Level-crossing accident: km 4,981 between branch Moravice – Hradec nad Moravici station | partially implemented | 26. 2. 2020 |
| 20. 8. 2019 | Other: Unauthorised movement of shunting operation other than SPAD with consequent collision with an obstacles, other rolling stock and derailment in Lovosice station | in progress | 10. 8. 2020 |
| 21. 8. 2019 | Level-crossing accident: km 16,382 between Ronov nad Doubravou – Tremosnice stations | in progress | 13. 5. 2020 |
| 23. 8. 2019 | Level-crossing accident: km 94,631 between Zakupy - Mimon stations | implemented | 2. 10. 2020 |
| 25. 8. 2019 | Other: Uncontrolled movement of tram train with consequent collision with an obstacle in The City of Olomouc – in U Domu stop | implemented | 16. 4. 2020 |
| 6. 9. 2019 | Level-crossing accident: km 169,968 in Praha Uhrineves station | in progress | 28. 4. 2020 |
| 12. 9. 2019 | Level-crossing accident: km 16,178 between Hnevceves - Vsestary stations | partially implemented | 17. 2. 2020 |
| 1. 10. 2019 | Level-crossing accident: km 0.645 in Hrusovany nad Jevisovkou Sanov station | not implemented | 30. 4. 2020 |
| 20. 10. 2019 | Level-crossing accident: km 182,324 between Blansko - Rajec Jestrebi stations | implemented | 5. 5. 2020 |
| 27. 11. 2019 | Other: SPAD in Praha Bechovice station | not implemented | 5. 10. 2020 |
| 17. 1. 2020 | Train derailment: in Krasny Jez station | implemented | 15. 6. 2020 |
| 21. 2. 2020 | Level-crossing accident: km 9,040 between Mestec Kralove – Chlumec nad Cidlinou stations | partially implemented | 14. 8. 2020 |
| 27. 4. 2020 | Level-crossing accident: km 1,856 between Hermanova Hut – Nyrany stations | partially implemented | 14. 9. 2020 |



| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location) | Status of implem. | Completed (date) |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| 16. 5. 2020 | Level-crossing accident: km 125,250 between Hnojník – Dobruška u Frydku Mistku stations | partially implemented | 29. 9. 2020 |
| 22. 1. 2019 | Level-crossing accident: km 5,446 between Vesec u Liberce – Jablonec nad Nisou stations | partially implemented | 12. 2. 2021 |
| 1. 4. 2019 | Other: Collision of the trolleybus with the tram in The City of Brno – in the area of the road crossing Masná, Křenova and Kozeluzská streets | implemented | 10. 3. 2021 |
| 3. 11. 2019 | Train derailment: in Praha Malesice station | implemented | 17. 2. 2021 |
| 5. 11. 2019 | Other: Unauthorised train movement other than SPAD between Cachov – Skuteč stations | not implemented | 6. 1. 2021 |
| 9. 12. 2019 | Trains collision with an obstacle: in Zámorsk station | implemented | 16. 4. 2021 |
| 21. 2. 2020 | Level-crossing accident: km 3,119 between Dobruška – Malá Hradčice stations | partially implemented | 14. 1. 2021 |
| 20. 3. 2020 | Other: Collision of rolling stocks during shunting operation in Kolin station | implemented | 15. 3. 2021 |
| 7. 5. 2020 | Unauthorised movement of shunting operation other than SPAD with consequent collision with other rolling stock and derailment between Decín Prostejnská Záběhová - Decín východ stations | in progress | 28. 5. 2021 |
| 12. 6. 2020 | Train derailment: between Jindřichov – Blatná stations | implemented | 1. 2. 2021 |
| 29. 6. 2020 | Other: Unauthorised train movement other than SPAD in Světlá nad Sázavou station | partially implemented | 22. 2. 2021 |
| 7. 7. 2020 | Trains collision: between Pernink – Nové Hamry stations | implemented | 18. 1. 2021 |
| 10. 7. 2020 | Trains collision: in Praha Běchovice station | partially implemented | 16. 12. 2021 |
| 14. 7. 2020 | Trains collision: between Úvaly – Český Brod stations | partially implemented | 25. 11. 2021 |
| 15. 7. 2020 | Level-crossing accident: km 12,688 between Velké Opatovice - Sebetov stations | not implemented | 26. 3. 2021 |
| 21. 7. 2020 | Level-crossing accident: km 14,025 between Čermná nad Orlicí - Borohradec stations | partially implemented | 30. 6. 2021 |
| 22. 7. 2020 | Train derailment: in Lázně Kynžvart station | implemented | 14. 7. 2021 |
| 9. 9. 2020 | Trains collision: in Kdyně station | partially implemented | 29. 11. 2021 |
| 18. 9. 2020 | Level-crossing accident: km 100,674 in Kunovice station | in progress | 1. 7. 2021 |
| 19. 12. 2020 | Train derailment: in Hluboká nad Vltavou Záměstí station | partially implemented | 18. 10. 2021 |



| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location) | Status of implem. | Completed (date) |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| 15. 1. 2021 | Other: Tram trains collision in The City of Ostrava - between Elektra – Karolina stops | implemented | 24. 6. 2021 |
| 4. 3. 2021 | Level-crossing accident: km 71,113 between Slatinany – Chrast u Chrudimi stations | implemented | 14. 10. 2021 |
| 6. 11. 2020 | Derailment during shunting operation in Kolin station | in progress | 21. 1. 2022 |
| 3. 3. 2021 | Train derailment: in Namest nad Oslavou station | implemented | 14. 4. 2022 |
| 5. 5. 2021 | Trains collision with an obstacle: between Trebovice v Cechach – Ceska Trebova stations | partially implemented | 24. 5. 2022 |
| 6. 5. 2021 | Other: SPAD in Roztoky u Prahy station | in progress | 1. 4. 2022 |
| 10. 5. 2021 | Other: SPAD in Praha Masarykovo nadrazi station | not implemented | 10. 1. 2022 |
| 5. 6. 2021 | Trains collision with an obstacle: in Trinec station | in progress | 12. 7. 2022 |
| 18. 6. 2021 | Trains collision: Collision of shunting operation with standing passenger train in Cercany station | in progress | 16. 9. 2022 |
| 15. 7. 2021 | Train derailment: between Chvalkov – Vcelnicka stations | implemented | 22. 4. 2022 |
| 31. 7. 2021 | Trains collision: in Nemcice nad Hanou station | implemented | 21. 4. 2022 |
| 4. 8. 2021 | Train derailment: in Kralupy nad Vltavou station | partially implemented | 15. 12. 2022 |
| 22. 9. 2021 | Accident to person caused by RS in motion: in Bori les station | implemented | 15. 8. 2022 |
| 28. 10. 2021 | Level-crossing accident: km 18,495 between Sedlejev - Telc | partially implemented | 14. 7. 2022 |
| 31. 10. 2021 | Trains collision: Collision of shunting operation with standing freight train between Cesky Tesin – Albrechtice u Ceskeho Tesina stations | partially implemented | 7. 6. 2022 |
| 29. 12. 2021 | Level-crossing accident: km 69,846 between Rozna – Bystrice nad Pernštejnem stations | not implemented | 13. 9. 2022 |
| 1. 4. 2022 | Train derailment: in Bavorov station | implemented | 31. 10. 2022 |
| 4. 7. 2022 | Level-crossing accident: km 44,499 between Klatovy – Janovice nad Uhlovou stations | partially implemented | 23. 12. 2022 |
| 14. 8. 2020 | Other: Uncontrolled movement of rolling stocks from Keraclay Nehvizdy siding with consequent derailment and collisions with an obstacle in Mstetice station | in progress | 8. 8. 2023 |
| 14. 7. 2021 | Other: SPAD in Poricany station | in progress | 10. 1. 2023 |
| 13. 1. 2022 | Trains collision: in Prosenice station | partially implemented | 9. 1. 2023 |



| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location) | Status of implem. | Completed (date) |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| 29. 1. 2022 | Train derailment: in Teplice v Cechach station | in progress | 16. 2. 2023 |
| 18. 3. 2022 | Other: Derailment of rolling stock during shunting operation with consequent Accident to person caused by RS in motion, collision with standing rolling stock, collision with an obstacle and other derailment in Obrnice station | implemented | 12. 4. 2023 |
| 19. 5. 2022 | Other: Injury of the employee of IM by electric current during repair of damaged contact line in Kolin station | in progress | 29. 5. 2023 |
| 7. 6. 2022 | Other: Damage of contact line during ride of the train in Otrokovice station | in progress | 19. 6. 2023 |
| 27. 6. 2022 | Trains collision: in Bohumin station | not implemented | 16. 6. 2023 |
| 24. 7. 2022 | Level-crossing accident: km 6,557 between Zlin Malenovice – Zlin stred stations | implemented | 1. 8. 2023 |
| 15. 9. 2022 | Other: Unauthorised train movement other than SPAD in Hostejn station | not implemented | 29. 8. 2023 |
| 11. 10. 2022 | Level-crossing accident: km 3,779 between Stritez nad Becvou – Valasske Mezirici stations | implemented | 7. 6. 2023 |
| 26. 10. 2022 | Level-crossing accident: km 11,019 between Malsice – Sudomerice u Bechyně stations | partially implemented | 12. 5. 2023 |
| 9. 11. 2022 | Trains collision: Collision of shunting operation with freight train in Melnik station | in progress | 6. 11. 2023 |
| 8. 12. 2022 | Train derailment: in Brno Malomerice station | partially implemented | 15. 11. 2023 |
| 28. 5. 2023 | Level-crossing accident: km 89,133 between Krasna Lipa - Rumburk stations | partially implemented | 24. 11. 2023 |
| 5. 6. 2023 | Level-crossing accident: km 26,819 between Bystrice pod Hostynem - Holesov stations | in progress | 19. 12. 2023 |
| 10. 2. 2022 | Other: Unauthorised train movement other than SPAD in Decin Prostredni Zleb station | not implemented | 5. 9. 2024 |
| 17. 2. 2022 | Trains collision with an obstacle with consequent derailment: between Zdarec u Skutce - Hlinsko v Cechach stations | implemented | 10. 7. 2024 |
| 10. 3. 2022 | Trains collision: in Odbocka Skaly station | partially implemented | 11. 4. 2024 |
| 10. 10. 2022 | Trains collision with an obstacle with consequent derailment: in Poricany station | implemented | 25. 1. 2024 |
| 13. 2. 2023 | Trains collision with an obstacle: between Cervenka - Stepanov stations | not implemented | 9. 9. 2024 |
| 16. 2. 2023 | Other: Accident to person caused by RS in motion: in "LASSELSBERGER Chlumcany u Dobran" siding | partially implemented | 27. 2. 2024 |



| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location) | Status of implem. | Completed (date) |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| 10. 7. 2023 | Level-crossing accident: km 7,491 in Bozice u Znojma station | implemented | 12. 6. 2024 |
| 4. 8. 2023 | Other: SPAD in Dluhonice station | implemented | 30. 7. 2024 |
| 3. 10. 2023 | Accident to person caused by RS in motion: between Belcice - Blatna stations | partially implemented | 4. 6. 2024 |
| 17. 10. 2023 | Level-crossing accident: km 0,580 in Olomouc hlavní nadraží station | in progress | 12. 9. 2024 |
| 9. 11. 2023 | Level-crossing accident: km 18,441 in Pelhrimov station | not implemented | 7. 10. 2024 |
| 13. 12. 2023 | Train derailment: in Brumov station | partially implemented | 11. 12. 2024 |
| 16. 1. 2024 | Other: SPAD in Rynoltice station | in progress | 7. 6. 2024 |

4.2 Recommendations issued in 2024

| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation, Safety recommendation |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 10. 2. 2022 | Other: Unauthorised train movement other than SPAD in Decin Prostřední Zleb station |
| <p>Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">request a notification of a national requirement by the European Commission for an optical (light) and sound indication notifying that blinding is on and its inclusion in the TSI, specifically:<ul style="list-style-type: none">at relevant locomotives and driving trailers (where it is technically and economically possible), to require an optical (light) and sound indication warning that blinding is on:<ul style="list-style-type: none">if the blinding time is longer than 5 seconds, orif blinding is carried out during braking at a speed is lower than 20 km.h⁻¹, in accordance with the requirement to prohibit blinding except for emergency braking (in accordance with Annex No. 3, Part II, Point 18, Paragraph 2 letter d) Decree No. 173/1995 Coll.);for all other rolling stocks, require at least a simplified version of optical (light) and sound indication warning that blinding is on always (without advanced conditions), at least for pedal-activated blinding;to demand obligatory inspections of condition of regulation screw and bearing surface of regulation screw of blinding equipment of locomotives, alternatively introduction cyclic substitution this components; | |



| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation, Safety recommendation |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">consider implementation a memory aid for the area (e.g. part of station head, station approach limit, shunting perimeter) where shunting is allowed into the input computer of the unified control place, in which case the aid would be introduced voluntarily, alternatively obligatory, and canceled based on knowledge of the progress of the shunting, notification of the end of the shunting or notification of release tracks intended for the movement of trains, at infrastructure managers of national and regional railways;to prohibit or make impossible the creation of train routes by means of the automatic creation of train routes during shunting in areas (shunting perimeters) where are used track circuits to determine the clearance of track sections and to include this obligation in the internal regulations of the relevant infrastructure managers;ensure to return duty of announcement about finish shunting by employee who manage shunting without shunting gang, to internal regulation SŽ D1 as soon as possible. |
| 17. 2. 2022 | Trains collision with an obstacle with consequent derailment: between Zdarec u Skutce - Hlinsko v Cechach stations |
| Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): <ul style="list-style-type: none">to ensure that all infrastructure managers of national and regional railways adjust the technological procedures related to the adoption of measures in the event of a worsened weather situation, so that the station dispatcher has the obligation to consult the weather situation and the possible adoption of measures minimum with the station dispatcher in the nearest other operating point, where it is possible to issue the relevant order, and it was so ensured that measures for the movement of rolling stocks through the track section in both directions will be uniform and on the basis of all available information relevant for the entire section. | |
| 10. 3. 2022 | Trains collision: in Odbocka Skaly station |
| Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): <ul style="list-style-type: none">to ensure that all on-board radio stations uses on the national and regional railways send the confirmation code 1612 and it was possible effectively and provable perform check of success emergency calls in GSM-R network within control activity. | |
| 10. 10. 2022 | Trains collision with an obstacle with consequent derailment: in Poricany station |
| Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): | |



| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation, Safety recommendation |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | <p>within the framework of own activity as a national safety authority, to take own measures, which will ensure at infrastructure managers of railway (with the exception of special railways):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">to reassess (taking into account the local conditions) the installation of fixed buffer stops in safety tracks and in the future to use of such types of buffer stops, which, in the event of a collision with a rolling stock, have a lower risk of endangering the structure gauge of traffic tracks due to the consequences of this collision. |
| 13. 2. 2023 | Trains collision with an obstacle: between Cervenka - Stepanov stations |
| | <p>Addressed to the Czech Ministry of Agriculture:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">as the central authority for forest management, to ensure the adjustment of the relevant legal regulation [Act No. 289/1995 Coll., about forests and about the amendment of certain laws (Forest Act), as amended] so that the parts of the forests located in the railway protective area will be included in category „special purpose forests”, i.e. forests, where public interest (safe railway operating) requires different way of management. This integration will enable owners of forests management, that it will be grow only trees which will not fall-down to structure gauge of railway. <p>Addressed to the Czech Ministry of Transport and the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">until the time of implementation of the above safety recommendation to enter into negotiations with Czech Ministry of Agriculture as central organ of administration of forests, municipal authorities with extended province and regional authorities, that from own impulse part of forest vegetation which are locate in railway protective area integrate to category „forest of special purpose“, i.e. forests, where public interest (safe railway operating) requires different way of management. This integration will enable owners of forests management, that it will be grow only trees which will not fall-down to structure gauge of railway. |
| 16. 2. 2023 | Other: Accident to person caused by RS in motion: in “LASSELSBERGER Chlumcany u Dobran” siding |
| | <p>Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">within the framework of own activity as a national safety authority:<ul style="list-style-type: none">to adopt of measures to ensure the comply and feasibility of established technological procedures during mutual interaction on a common interface during the operation of sidings with a focus on their mutual compatibility at infrastructure managers and railway undertakings. |



| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation, Safety recommendation |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 10. 7. 2023 | Level-crossing accident: km 7,491 in Bozice u Znojma station |
| Addressed to the Municipal Authority of Znojmo as the Road Administration Office in the field of roads III. class: <ul style="list-style-type: none">to add traffic signing on the road III. class No. 3975 , which attentions drivers who turns left about ride to the level crossing No. P7118, i.e. put here at least vertical traffic signing A 31c „Signal board (80 m)” and A29 „Level crossing with barriers” in accordance with the technical conditions of TP 169 Principles for marking traffic situations on roads and TP 65 Principles for road markings on roads. | |
| 4. 8. 2023 | Other: SPAD in Dluhonice station |
| Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): <ul style="list-style-type: none">as part of own activity as a National Safety Authority, to adopt measures that will ensure at the IM Správa železnic, státní organizace:<ul style="list-style-type: none">to complex revision, addition and appropriate modification of technological procedures related to automatic warning system, which are of unquestionable safety importance (for example in the area of running at sight etc.);to adjust the position of the main (departure) signal devices L2, L4, L6, L8 and L10 of Dluhonice overtaking station, which are located on the signal bridge, by moving them to the right in relation to the axis of the station track (from the point of view of the movement of rolling stocks to Brodek u Přerova station) after assessing all relevant possibilities and circumstances. | |
| 3. 10. 2023 | Accident to person caused by RS in motion: between Belcice - Blatná stations |
| Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): <ul style="list-style-type: none">to adopt own measure that will ensure effective and consistent control activity over the fulfillment and observance of obligations determine to individual employees, especially in connection with ensuring the safety and health protection of employees in an operated traffic route at infrastructure manager SŽ and other infrastructure managers of national and regional railways. | |
| 17. 10. 2023 | Level-crossing accident: km 0,580 in Olomouc hlavní nadraží station |
| Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): <ul style="list-style-type: none">to take own measure to ensure addition of the level crossing No. P7519 which is secure by flashing light level crossing warning system to a level crossing system equipped with barriers which with regard to point of view of optical and manual barrier will reduce probability of the driver's entrance at the level crossing when he | |




| Date of occurrence | Title of the investigation, Safety recommendation |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| | does not respond to light signalization in the warning state. |
| 9. 11. 2023 | Level-crossing accident: km 18,441 in Pelhřimov station |
| Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> to initiate a meeting between the NSA, Municipality of Pelhřimov, Road and Motorway directorate and IM for the purpose to eliminate the identified risk which follow from configuration the level crossing No. P6353 and adjacent crossroad. | |
| 13. 12. 2023 | Train derailment: in Brumov station |
| Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> to ensure that infrastructure managers in all cases where is distantly available information about (un)achievement of preferential end position of spring switches on lines with a simplified train operation, determine to train dispatcher for a controlled line professional competence for interpretation of indication element and impose obligation to him to control achievement of this position and notify train driver in case unachievement this position by written order before permission for ride; to ensure that infrastructure managers in maximum possible amount expand equipment which enable distant accessibility of information about (un)achievement of preferential end position of spring switch on lines with a simplified train operation. | |
| 16. 1. 2024 | Other: SPAD in Rynoltice station |
| Addressed to the Czech Ministry of Transport in cooperation with Czech National Safety Authority (NSA) to specify by contents of legal regulation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> minimum range and way of perform familiarization with line conditions at railway lines and stations where train driver will be drive rolling stocks, e.g. determination of minimum numbers of travel on specified railway line or its part both directions during the day and at night; requirements on records and archiving documentations which prove real execution component parts of familiarization with line conditions at railway lines and stations where train driver will be drive rolling stocks, <p>so that was completely satisfy of requirement certainty, including legal assurance, and recipients this legal duty it was not hamper in practice in its consistent application for application duty from Article 35(1) of Decree No 173/1995 Coll., so that train drivers were demonstrably familiarization with line conditions at railway lines and stations where train drivers will be drive rolling stocks.</p> | |

ACCIDENT SUMMARY

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|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date and time: | 26 th September 2020, 8:35 (6:35 GMT). |
| Occurrence type: | train derailment. |
| Description: | derailment of 5 rolling stocks of the freight train No. 69071. |
| Type of train: | the freight train No. 69071. |
| Location: | Úpořiny station, station head in direction of Ohníč station, km 13,764. |
| Parties: | Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM); SD – Kolejová doprava, a. s. (RU of the freight train No. 69071). |
| Consequences: | 0 fatalities, 0 injuries; total damage CZK 42 327 033 Kč,- |
| Causal factor: | <ul style="list-style-type: none">broken axle of the third wheelset of in thirteenth rolling stock of the freight train No. 69071. |
| Contributing factor: | none. |
| Systemic factor: | none. |
| Recommendation: | not issued. |



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2024



ACCIDENT SUMMARY

Date and time: 10th February 2022, 4:51 (3:51 GMT).
Occurrence type: unsecured movement.
Description: unsecured movement of the freight train No. 45326 behind the main (departure) signal device L2 with signal „Go“ along settings train route made across track section between shunting signal devices Se14 and Se 15 which occupied by the shunting operation.
Type of train: the freight train No. 45326;
the shunting operation.
Location: Děčín-Prostřední Žleb station, the main (departure) signal device L2, km 4,419.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
IDS Cargo, a.s. (RU of the shunting operation);
DB Cargo Czechia s.r.o. (RU of the freight train No. 45326).
Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 5 000,-

Causal factors:

- loss shunt of the track circuit 2bK at Děčín-Prostřední Žleb station, which was occupied by the shunting operation due to failure sanding equipment of the shunting operation, which poured oversize amount of sand and at the same locomotive of the shunting operation operated sanding equipment during braking which is forbidden if the speed is smaller than 20 km.h⁻¹;
- setting the train route by the station dispatcher 2 SEVER across track section which was occupied by shunting operation in the course of ongoing shunting which was allowed by the station dispatcher 2 SEVER and it has not been finish yet in accordance with the technological procedures of the infrastructure manager.

Contributing factors:

- the station dispatcher 2 SEVER did not communicate time of end shunting on the running tracks during permission to shunting;
- non-existence indication of sanding on locomotive series 770.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation:

Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

- request a notification of a national requirement by the European Commission for an optical (light) and sound indication notifying that blinding is on and its inclusion in the TSI, specifically:

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2024

- at relevant locomotives and driving trailers (where it is technically and economically possible), to require an optical (light) and sound indication warning that blinding is on:
 - if the blinding time is longer than 5 seconds, or
 - if blinding is carried out during braking at a speed is lower than 20 km.h⁻¹, in accordance with the requirement to prohibit blinding except for emergency braking (in accordance with Annex No. 3, Part II, Point 18, Paragraph 2 letter d) Decree No. 173/1995 Coll.);
- for all other rolling stocks, require at least a simplified version of optical (light) and sound indication warning that blinding is on always (without advanced conditions), at least for pedal-activated blinding;
- to demand obligatory inspections of condition of regulation screw and bearing surface of regulation screw of blinding equipment of locomotives, alternatively introduction cyclic substitution this components;
- consider implementation a memory aid for the area (e.g. part of station head, station approach limit, shunting perimeter) where shunting is allowed into the input computer of the unified control place, in which case the aid would be introduced voluntarily, alternatively obligatory, and canceled based on knowledge of the progress of the shunting, notification of the end of the shunting or notification of release tracks intended for the movement of trains, at infrastructure managers of national and regional railways;
- to prohibit or make impossible the creation of train routes by means of the automatic creation of train routes during shunting in areas (shunting perimeters) where are used track circuits to determine the clearance of track sections and to include this obligation in the internal regulations of the relevant infrastructure managers;
- ensure to return duty of announcement about finish shunting by employee who manage shunting without shunting gang, to internal regulation SŽ D1 as soon as possible.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2024



ACCIDENT SUMMARY

Date and time: 17th February 2022, 7:32 (6:32 GMT).
Occurrence type: collision with an obstacle.
Description: collision of the regional passenger train No. 5315 with the obstacle – the fallen trees and its consequent derailment.
Type of train: the regional passenger train No. 5315.
Location: open line between Žďárec u Skutče and Hlinsko v Čechách stations, km 44,330.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 5315).
Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 709 247,-

Causal factor:

- disruption of the structure gauge of the open line track by the fallen trees which grew in the railway protective area in the impact distance from the structure gauge, as a result of negative meteorological conditions that took place before the day of the incident in combination with the extreme meteorological situation at the time of its occurrence. It was preceded by:
 - failure to long-term detection and evaluation of trees growing on a plot of a forest land, in the railway protective area and in the impact distance of a structure gauge of track, as a source of threat to the safety or continuity of railway traffic or the operability of the railway;
 - long-term non-elimination of the source of threat to the guideway and guideway transport, which was formed by trees in the track protective zone at the impact distance of the structure gauge;
 - failure to inform the train driver of the regional passenger train No. 5315 with an appropriate written order about the worsened weather situation and the danger of an obstacle on the track due to failure to determine this obligation by the technological procedures of the infrastructure manager.

Contributing factor: none.

Systemic factor:

- the safety management system of the participating infrastructure manager did not ensure the assessment of the weather situation and the adoption of measures for the movement of rolling stock in a specific section of the guideway in both directions uniformly and on the basis of all available information relevant for the entire section.

Recommendation:

Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

- to ensure that all infrastructure managers of national and regional railways adjust the technological procedures related to the adoption of measures in the event of a worsened weather situation, so that the station dispatcher has the obligation to consult the weather situation and the possible adoption of measures minimum with the station dispatcher in


Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2024

the nearest other operating point, where it is possible to issue the relevant order, and it was so ensured that measures for the movement of rolling stocks through the track section in both directions will be uniform and on the basis of all available information relevant for the entire section.



ACCIDENT SUMMARY

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|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date and time: | 10 th March 2022, 9:54 (8:54 GMT). |
| Occurrence type: | trains collision. |
| Description: | unauthorized movement of the freight train No. 60204 behind the signal device 1L with signal „Stop“, forced throw the switch No. 1XA, collision with the oncoming freight train No. 85012 and derailment first 2 wheelsets of the locomotive of the freight train No. 60204. |
| Type of train: | the freight train No. 60204; the freight train No. 85012. |
| Location: | Odbočka Skály junction point, the signal device 1L, km 22,607 (12,493), place of collision was in km 12,117. |
| Parties: | Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM); ČD Cargo, a. s. (RU of the freight trains No. 60204 and No. 85012). |
| Consequences: | 0 fatality, 1 injury; total damage CZK 16 474 121,- |
| Causal factor: | <ul style="list-style-type: none">failure to respect the signal „Stop“ of the main (entry) signal device 1L at Odbočka Skály junction point by the train driver of the freight train No. 60204. |
| Contributing factor: | none. |
| Systemic factor: | none. |
| Recommendation: | |
| Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): | <ul style="list-style-type: none">to ensure that all on-board radio stations uses on the national and regional railways send the confirmation code 1612 and it was possible effectively and provable perform check of success emergency calls in GSM-R network within control activity. |





ACCIDENT SUMMARY

Date and time: 10th October 2022, 17:06 (15:06 GMT).

Occurrence type: train collision with a railway technical device.

Description: unauthorized movement of the freight train No. 55098 behind the main (departure) signal device L4 with consequent collision with concrete buffer stop of the dead-end track No. 4a and derailment.

Type of train: the freight train No. 55098.

Location: Poříčany station, the main (departure) signal device L4, km 371,398. Place of the collision with concrete buffer stop was at the station track No. 4a, km 371,616.

Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
ČD Cargo, a. s. (RU of the freight train No. 55098).

Consequences: 2 injuries;
total damage CZK 32 959 867,-

Causal factor:

- failure to respect the signal „Stop” of the main (departure) signal device L4 by the train driver of the freight train No. 55098 due to fallacious perception of previous signal of the main (entry) signal device 2L and not stop in front of the main (departure) signal device L4 with signal „Stop”.

Contributing factor: none

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation:

Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

within the framework of own activity as a national safety authority, to take own measures, which will ensure at infrastructure managers of railway (with the exception of special railways):

- to reassess (taking into account the local conditions) the installation of fixed buffer stops in safety tracks and in the future to use of such types of buffer stops, which, in the event of a collision with a rolling stock, have a lower risk of endangering the structure gauge of traffic tracks due to the consequences of this collision.





ACCIDENT SUMMARY

Date and time: 13th February 2023, 19:22 (18:22 GMT).
Occurrence type: trains collision with an obstacle.
Description: collision of the long distance passenger train No. 895 with a full-grown tree which was uprooted across both operated line tracks from vegetation at plot in neighbourhood of railway.
Type of train: the long distance passenger train No. 895.
Location: open line between Štěpánov and Červenka stations, the line track No. 1, km 69,426.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the long distance passenger train No. 895).
Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 768 074,-

Causal factor:

- disruption of the structure gauge of both line tracks by an obstacle – uprooted tree which grew in the railway protective area in the impact distance from the structure gauge, as a result of static failure which caused by health condition (internal rot) of tree when the actual state of health could not be ascertained in this particular case by a non-destructive method (visual inspections) and also its asymmetrical treetop with one-sided weight direction above railway, in connection with:
 - failure to detection and evaluation of all tree growing on a plot of a forest land, in the railway protective area and in the impact distance of a structure gauge of track, as a source of threat to the safety or continuity of railway traffic or the operability of the railway;
 - non-elimination of the source of threat to the railway and railway transport, which was formed by tree in the track protective zone at the impact distance of the structure gauge.

Contributing factor: none.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation:


Addressed to the Czech Ministry of Agriculture:

- as the central authority for forest management, to ensure the adjustment of the relevant legal regulation [Act No. 289/1995 Coll., about forests and about the amendment of certain laws (Forest Act), as amended] so that the parts of the forests located in the railway protective area will be included in category „special purpose forests”, i.e. forests, where public interest (safe railway operating) requires different way of management. This integration will enable owners of forests management, that it will be grow only trees which will not fall-down to structure gauge of railway.

Addressed to the Czech Ministry of Transport and the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2024

- until the time of implementation of the above safety recommendation to enter into negotiations with Czech Ministry of Agriculture as central organ of administration of forests, municipal authorities with extended province and regional authorities, that from own impulse part of forest vegetation which are locate in railway protective area integrate to category „forest of special purpose“, i.e. forests, where public interest (safe railway operating) requires different way of management. This integration will enable owners of forests management, that it will be grow only trees which will not fall-down to structure gauge of railway.



ACCIDENT SUMMARY

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|---------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date and time: | 16 th February 2023, 7:08 (6:08 GMT). |
| Occurrence type: | train collision with an obstacle. |
| Description: | collision of the pushing shunting operation with an obstacle (euro pallets with flooring tiles) with consequent employee injury. |
| Type of train: | the shunting operation. |
| Location: | LASSELSBERGER Chlumčany u Dobřan siding, track No. 4, km 0,621. |
| Parties: | LASSELSBERGER, s.r.o. (the owner of the siding); Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM of the national railway); Dr. ZENKL s.r.o. (IM of the siding); ČD Cargo, a. s. (RU of the shunting operation). |
| Consequences: | 0 fatality, 1 injury; total damage CZK 614 057,- |
| Causal factors: | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• disrupt nominal structure gauge by due to the stored material and consequent failure to identify a long-lasting threat to the safe operation of the railway and railway transport;• failure to identify an obstacle in the structure gauge of the operated track before giving the guidance to set the shunting operation in motion. |
| Contributing factor: | none. |
| Systemic factor: | none. |
| Recommendation: | |
| Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• within the framework of own activity as a national safety authority:<ul style="list-style-type: none">◦ to adopt of measures to ensure the comply and feasibility of established technological procedures during mutual interaction on a common interface during the operation of sidings with a focus on their mutual compatibility at infrastructure managers and railway undertakings. |

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2024



ACCIDENT SUMMARY

| | |
|----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date and time: | 28 th March 2023, 15:56 (14:56 GMT). |
| Occurrence type: | unauthorized movement (SPAD). |
| Description: | unauthorized movement (SPAD) of the regional passenger train No. 2070 behind the main signal device L1 with signal „Stop“ and entry to the train route for the regional passenger train No. 2071. |
| Type of train: | regional passenger trains No. 2070 and No. 2071. |
| Location: | Vlastec station, the main (departure) signal device L1, km 45,220. |
| Parties: | Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM); České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger trains No. 2070 and No. 2071). |
| Consequences: | 0 fatality, 0 injury; total damage CZK 12 431,- |
| Causal factor: | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• failure to respect the signal „Stop“ of the main (departure) signal device L1 at Vlastec station by the train driver of the regional passenger train No. 2070. |
| Contributing factor: | none. |
| Systemic factor: | none. |
| Recommendation: | not issued. |





ACCIDENT SUMMARY

Date and time: 6th July 2023, 7:37 (5:37 GMT).

Occurrence type: unauthorized movement (SPAD).

Description: unauthorized movement of the freight train No. 55320 behind the main (route) signal device Lc205 and influencing of train route for the long distance passenger train No. 677.

Type of train: the freight train No. 55320;
the long distance passenger train No. 677.

Location: Ústí nad Labem hlavní nádraží station, district sever, the main (route) signal device Lc205, km 519,316.

Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
Retrack Czech s. r. o. (RU of the freight train No. 55320);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the long distance passenger train No. 677).

Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 0,-

Causal factor:

- the train driver of the freight train No. 55320 did operational error (he did not respect signal „Stop” of the main (route) signal device Lc205 at Ústí nad Labem hlavní nádraží station, district sever) after previously unauthorized set the train in motion without dispatching of train by signal allowing ride.

Contributing factor: none.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation: not issued.





ACCIDENT SUMMARY

Date and time: 10th July 2023, 6:21 (4:21 GMT).
Occurrence type: level crossing accident.
Description: collision of the regional passenger train No. 4505 with the lorry (combination of vehicles) with consequent derailment.
Type of train: the regional passenger train No. 4505.
Location: Božice u Znojma station, the level crossing No. P7118, km 7,491.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 4505);
driver of the lorry (level crossing user).
Consequences: 3 injuries;
total damage CZK 24 251 764,-

Causal factor:

- an unauthorized entrance of the combination of vehicles at the level crossing No. P7118 at the time when the regional passenger train No. 4505 was arriving, caused by behavior of the driver of the combination of vehicles, who did not respect the light and acoustic warning of the level crossing safety equipment and did not make sure whether he could safely pass the level crossing.

Contributing factor:

- worsened view to the level crossing warning road signal in direction ride of the combination of vehicles due to stopping other van truck on right shoulder of road in distance 12,5 metres from the level crossing (traffic sign A32a „Warning cross for level crossing single track“ and level crossing warning road signal) in combination with exceeding speed limit (about ca. 26 km.h⁻¹) by the driver of the combination of vehicles in front of the level crossing.


Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation:

Addressed to the Municipal Authority of Znojmo as the Road Administration Office in the field of roads III. class:

- to add traffic signing on the road III. class No. 3975 , which attentions drivers who turns left about ride to the level crossing No. P7118, i.e. put here at least vertical traffic signing A 31c „Signal board (80 m)” and A29 „Level crossing with barriers” in accordance with the technical conditions of TP 169 Principles for marking traffic situations on roads and TP 65 Principles for road markings on roads.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2024



ACCIDENT SUMMARY

| | |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date and time: | 18 th July 2023, 14:43 (12:43 GMT). |
| Occurrence type: | trains collision. |
| Description: | unsecured movement of the shunting operation, collision with detached rolling stocks with consequent derailment. |
| Type of train: | the shunting operation; detached rolling stocks. |
| Location: | the service and storage rails at Cerhenice railway test circuit, switch No. 7, km 0,097; place of collision was on station track No. 3, km 0,184. |
| Parties: | Výzkumný Ústav železniční, a. s. (IM and RU). |
| Consequences: | 1 injury; total damage CZK 153 624 341,- |
| Causal factors: | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• movement of the shunting operation behind the signal device Se2 without arrange of shunting;• failure to observe condition for running at sight by the train driver of the shunting operation;• the leader of shunting did not dedicate to ongoing shunting and he communicated of information about a shunting which caused a wrong perception about the next course of shunting route at the train driver. |
| Contributing factors: | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• unauthorized handling with station interlocking equipment at providing test routes on the great test circuit, by setting up a shunting path around the service signal device Se2 with signal „Shunting allowed”, non-cancellation this route and misleading the train driver of the shunting operation;• exceeding the maximum permitted speed by the train driver of the shunting operation. |
| Systemic factor: | none. |
| Recommendation: | not issued. |

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2024



ACCIDENT SUMMARY

Date and time: 4th August 2023, 0:15 (3rd August 2023 22:15 GMT).
Occurrence type: an unauthorized movement (SPAD).
Description: unauthorized movement of the freight train No. 61010 behind the main (departure) signal device L4 with consequent entry to the train route for the freight train No. 53446.
Type of train: the freight train No. 61010;
the freight train No. 53446.
Location: Dluhonice overtaking station, the station track No. 4, the main (departure) signal device L4, km 187,398.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
ČD Cargo, a. s. (RU of the freight trains No. 61010 and No. 53446).
Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 10 982,-

Causal factor:

- the train drivers of the freight train No. 61010 did operational error (he did not respect signal „Stop” of the main (departure) signal device L4 at Dluhonice overtaking station) due to his unconscious error, when following signals of the main (departure) signal devices located on the signal bridge, which was manifested by the confusion of the main (departure) signal device L6, which signaled the signal „Speed 120 km/h and go”, valid for the neighboring station track, for the main (departure) signal device L4, which signaled the „Stop” signal, and failure to take into account the facts resulting from the operation of the mobile part of the automatic warning system while driving along the station track of Dluhonice overtaking station.

Contributing factor: none.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation:


Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

- as part of own activity as a National Safety Authority, to adopt measures that will ensure at the IM Správa železnic, státní organizace:
 - to complex revision, addition and appropriate modification of technological procedures related to automatic warning system, which are of unquestionable safety importance (for example in the area of running at sight etc.);
 - to adjust the position of the main (departure) signal devices L2, L4, L6, L8 and L10 of Dluhonice overtaking station, which are located on the signal bridge, by moving them to the right in relation to the axis of the station track (from the point of view of the movement of rolling stocks to Brodek u Přerova station) after assessing all relevant possibilities and circumstances.



ACCIDENT SUMMARY

| | |
|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date and time: | 14 th September 2023, 16:19 (14:19 GMT). |
| Occurrence type: | trains collision. |
| Description: | unauthorized movement of the regional passenger train No. 6051, collision with the freight train No. 62422 and consequent derailment. |
| Type of train: | the regional passenger train No. 6051; the freight train No. 62422. |
| Location: | Bezděčín overtaking station, km 24,850 (place of collision). Place of unauthorized movement was at the main (departure) signal device S1, km 24,878. |
| Parties: | Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM); České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 6051); ČD Cargo, a. s. (RU of the freight train No. 62422). |
| Consequences: | 0 fatality, 3 injuries; total damage CZK 2 526 003,- *) <small>*) The amount of damage was not final at the date of the report publishing.</small> |
| Causal factor: | <ul style="list-style-type: none">failure to stop of the regional passenger train No. 6051 in front of the main (departure) signal device S1 at Bezděčín overtaking station with signal „Stop”, due to incorrect driving style of the train driver of the regional passenger train No. 6051 to the signal „Warning signal” signaled by the main (entrance) signal device S, which warning signalling the signal „Stop” at the following main signal device. |
| Contributing factor: | none. |
| Systemic factor: | none. |
| Recommendation: | not issued. |





ACCIDENT SUMMARY

Date and time: 3rd October 2023, 9:14 (7:14 GMT).
Occurrence type: an accident to a person caused by a rolling stock in motion.
Description: collision of the train set No. 98034 with four employees of infrastructure manager.
Type of train: the train set No. 98034.
Location: open line between Bělčice and Blatná stations, km 15,054.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the train set No. 98034).
Consequences: 2 fatalities, 2 injuries;
total damage CZK 25 469,-

Causal factor:

- performance of works by employees of the infrastructure manager in the operated non-excluded track line without ensuring safety and health protection at work, specifically without arrange the conditions of work on the equipment, without ensuring the safety of the workplace and without ensuring the safety of employees at the workplace.

Contributing factor: none.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation:

Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

- to adopt own measure that will ensure effective and consistent control activity over the fulfillment and observance of obligations determine to individual employees, especially in connection with ensuring the safety and health protection of employees in an operated traffic route at infrastructure manager SŽ and other infrastructure managers of national and regional railways.



ACCIDENT SUMMARY

Date and time: 6th October 2023, 19:51 (18:51 GMT).

Occurrence type: an accident to a person caused by a rolling stock in motion.

Description: collision of the freight train No. 82720 with the external worker.

Type of train: the freight train No. 82720.

Location: open line between Brno-Maloměřice station and Brno-Židenice junction point, the line track No. T4, km 158,353.

Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
ČD Cargo, a. s. (RU of the freight train No. 82720);
the external worker (employee of company CROSSROADS GATE s.r.o.).

Consequences: 1 fatality;
total damage CZK 0,-


Causal factors:


- failure to ensure the safety of members of the work group with consequent entrance of the external worker into the structure gauge of operated track while the freight train No. 82720 was moving;
- the security guard did not watch movement of rolling stocks in operated railway infrastructure and it was engaged in another activity.

Contributing factor: none.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation: not issued.





ACCIDENT SUMMARY

| | |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date and time: | 16 th October 2023, 17:17 (15:17 GMT). |
| Occurrence type: | an accident to person caused by the rolling stock in motion. |
| Description: | pressing the passenger in the boarding door of rolling stock of the regional passenger train No. 4219 with his consequent fall and collision with the freight train No. 45066. |
| Type of train: | the regional passenger train No. 4219; the freight train No. 45066. |
| Location: | open line between Moravský Písek and Nedakonice stations; place of falling out of the passenger from the regional passenger train No. 4219 was at km 127,733; place of the collision of the freight train No. 45066 with the passenger was at km 127,779. |
| Parties: | Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM); České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 4219); Rail Cargo Carrier – Czech Republic s. r. o. (RU of the freight train No. 45066). |
| Consequences: | 1 fatality; total damage CZK 0,- |
| Causal factor: | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• unauthorized way out of the passenger from rolling stock of the regional passenger train No. 4219 out of the areas specified for boarding and way out of passengers. |
| Contributing factor: | none. |
| Systemic factor: | none. |
| Recommendation: | not issued. |





ACCIDENT SUMMARY

Date and time: 17th October 2023, 8:20 (7:20 GMT).
Occurrence type: level crossing accident.
Description: collision of the regional passenger train No. 3542 with the lorry at the level crossing No. P7519 with consequent fire and derailment.
Type of train: the regional passenger train No. 3542.
Location: Olomouc hlavní nádraží station, the level crossing No. P7519, km 0,580.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 3542);
driver of the lorry (level crossing user).
Consequences: 0 fatality, 8 injuries;
total damage CZK 44 078 830,- *)
*) The amount of damage is not final at the date of the report publishing.

Causal factor:

- an unauthorized entrance of the lorry at the level crossing No. P7519 at the time when the regional passenger train No. 3542 was arriving, caused by behavior of the driver of the lorry, who did not respect the light and acoustic warning of the level crossing safety equipment and did not make sure whether he could safely pass the level crossing.

Contributing factor:


- failure to take an appropriate measure on the basis of the previous safety recommendation of The Rail Safety Inspection Office, i.e. failure to change the level crossing system of the level crossing No. P7519 to a level crossing system equipped with barriers, which from the point of view of the optical barrier, will reduce the probability of the driver's entrance to the railway crossing if a driver does not respond to the light and acoustic warning of the crossing safety equipment.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation:

Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

- to take own measure to ensure addition of the level crossing No. P7519 which is secure by flashing light level crossing warning system to a level crossing system equipped with barriers which with regard to point of view of optical and manual barrier will reduce probability of the driver's entrance at the level crossing when he does not respond to light signalization in the warning state.



ACCIDENT SUMMARY

Date and time: 19th October 2023, 12:15 (11:15 GMT).
Occurrence type: trains collision.
Description: collision of the tram No. 4 course 6 with standing tram No. 1 course 7.
Type of train: the tram No. 1 course 7;
the tram No. 4 course 6.
Location: Plzeň, the area behind the crossroad of Karlovarská and Bolevecká streets.
Parties: Plzeňské městské dopravní podniky, a. s. (the IM and the RU of the trams No. 1 and No. 4).
Consequences: 0 fatality, 19 injuries; *)
total damage CZK 1 363 771,- **)
*) The final number of injured was not specified as of the date of processing the Final report.
**) The final amount of damage was not calculated as of the date of processing the Final report.
Causal factor:

- failure to comply the conditions of running at sight at movement of the tram rolling stocks at mutual distance by the tram driver of the tram No. 4 course 6.

Contributing factor: none.
Systemic factor: none.
Recommendation: not issued.




ACCIDENT SUMMARY


Date and time: 9th November 2023, 8:16 (7:16 GMT).
Occurrence type: level crossing accident.
Description: collision of the regional passenger train No. 18404 with a lorry at the level crossing with consequent derailment.
Type of train: the regional passenger train No. 18404.
Location: Pelhřimov station, the level crossing No. P6353, km 18,441.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 18404);
driver of the lorry (level crossing user).
Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 4 197 840,-
Causal factor:

- entrance of the lorry at the level crossing No. P6353 at the time when the situation behind the level crossing did not allow its safe cross over and continuation in next ride.

Contributing factor: none.
Systemic factor: none.
Recommendation:
Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

- to initiate a meeting between the NSA, Municipality of Pelhřimov, Road and Motorway directorate and IM for the purpose to eliminate the identified risk which follow from configuration the level crossing No. P6353 and adjacent crossroad.





ACCIDENT SUMMARY

Date and time: 13th December 2023, 5:49 (4:49 GMT).
Occurrence type: train derailment.
Description: unsecured movement and consequent derailment of the regional passenger train No. 23203 at spring switch.
Type of train: the regional passenger train No. 23203.
Location: Brumov operating control point, the spring switch No. 4sv, km 5,683. Place of derailment was at km 5,678.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM); ARRIVA vlaky s.r.o. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 23203).
Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury; total damage CZK 3 612 390,-

Causal factor:

- the train driver of the regional passenger train No. 23203 did not respect instruction by IM of the signal device Sv4 before entering on the spring switch No. 4sv at Brumov operating control point, the regional passenger train No. 23203 did not stop in front of the spring switch No. 4sv and the train driver did not check correct position of the switch.


Contributing factor: none.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation:

Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

- to ensure that infrastructure managers in all cases where is distantly available information about (un)achievement of preferential end position of spring switches on lines with a simplified train operation, determine to train dispatcher for a controlled line professional competence for interpretation of indication element and impose obligation to him to control achievement of this position and notify train driver in case unachievement this position by written order before permission for ride;
- to ensure that infrastructure managers in maximum posible amount expand equipment which enable distant accessibility of information about (un)achievement of preferential end position of spring switch on lines with a simplified train operation.



ACCIDENT SUMMARY

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|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date and time: | 18 th December 2023, 13:53 (12:53 GMT). |
| Occurrence type: | train derailment. |
| Description: | unsecured movement of the regional passenger train No. 27307 with consequent derailment. |
| Type of train: | the regional passenger train No. 27307. |
| Location: | Stupno operating control point, switch No. 1sv, km 19,378; place of derailment was at km 19,384 in the switch No. 1sv. |
| Parties: | Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM); České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 27307). |
| Consequences: | 0 fatality, 0 injury; total damage CZK 321 600,- |
| Causal factor: | <ul style="list-style-type: none">the train driver of the regional passenger train No. 27307 did not respect instruction by IM of the signal device Sv1 before entering on the spring switch No. 1sv at Stupno operating control point, the regional passenger train No. 27307 did not stop in front of the spring switch No. 1sv and the train driver did not check correct position of the switch. |
| Contributing factor: | none. |
| Systemic factor: | none. |
| Recommendation: | not issued. |



ACCIDENT SUMMARY

Date and time: 16th January 2024, 18:55 (17:55 GMT).
Occurrence type: unauthorized movement.
Description: unauthorized movement of the long distance passenger train No. 1334 behind the single-aspect signal (fouling point indicator) with signal „End of the train route“ (and boundary of track) with consequent ride to preparing train route for the oncoming long distance passenger train No. 1333 and trailing of the switch No. 2.
Type of train: the long distance passenger trains No. 1334 and No. 1333.
Location: Rynoltice station, the single-aspect signal (fouling point indicator) with signal „End of the train route“ (and boundary of track) valid for station tracks No. 1 and 3, km 119,934.
Place of the trailing of the switch No. 2 was at station head in direction to Jablonné v Podještědí station.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
ARRIVA vlaky, s. r. o. (RU of the long distance passenger trains No. 1334 and No. 1333).
Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 23 315,-

Causal factor:

- the train driver of the long distance passenger train No. 1334 did not act during entry and while driving on the station track No. 3 as at the train which regularly stops at Rynoltice station, which is station without departure signal devices and where train must stopped if was not dispatched by station dispatcher.

Contributing factor: none.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation:

Addressed to the Czech Ministry of Transport in cooperation with Czech National Safety Authority (NSA) to specify by contents of legal regulation:

- minimum range and way of perform familiarization with line conditions at railway lines and stations where train driver will be drive rolling stocks, e.g. determination of minimum numbers of travel on specified railway line or its part both directions during the day and at night;
- requirements on records and archiving documentations which prove real execution component parts of familiarization with line conditions at railway lines and stations where train driver will be drive rolling stocks,

so that was completely satisfy of requirement certainty, including legal assurance, and recipients this legal duty it was not hamper in practice in its consistent application for application duty from Article 35(1) of Decree No 173/1995 Coll., so that train drivers were demonstrably familiarization with line conditions at railway lines and stations where train drivers will be drive rolling stocks.

