

3 Making the railway system
work better for society.

NSA Annual Report 2025

Norway

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Definitions and Abbreviations

AsBo	Assessment Body
CSI	Common Safety Indicator
CSM	Common Safety Method
CST	Common Safety Target
EC	European Commission
ECM	Entities in charge of maintenance
EMM	Enforcement Management Model
ERAIL	European Railway Accident Information Links
ERTMS	European Railway Traffic Management System
EU	European Union
FTE	Full Time Equivalent
IM	Infrastructure Manager
IOD	Interoperability Directive
IOP	Interoperability
NIB	National Investigation Body
NoBo	Notified Body
NSA	National Safety Authority
OSS	One-Stop Shop
OTM	On Track Machines
PRM TSI	Technical specifications for interoperability relating to accessibility of the Union's rail system for persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility
RSD	Railway Safety Directive
RU	Railway Undertaking
SMS	Safety Management System
TDD	Train Drivers Directive
TSI	Technical Specification for Interoperability
VA	Vehicle Authorisation

1. Introduction

1.1. Purpose, scope, and addressees of the report

The purpose of this report is to provide information about safety related results from 2025. It covers the main national railway network. Tramways and underground are excluded from the scope. The intended addressees of this report besides the ERA are the National Investigation Bodies (NIB) and the Ministry of Transport.

1.2. Main conclusions on the reporting year

In 2025, NSA Norway continued to implement its corporate strategy for 2025–2028, with the overarching objective of maintaining a high level of railway safety and contributing to a well-functioning railway market. NSA Norway's work was guided by the principles of relevance, efficiency and proactivity. Its supervision programme remained risk-based and dynamic, with priorities in 2025 including vulnerabilities in the railway system, emergency preparedness and cybersecurity. NSA Norway also continued its systematic guidance activities and close cooperation with the national safety authorities in Sweden and Denmark, including through the ERA NSA Subgroup on Supervision and the Nordic ERTMS Forum.

Safety performance in 2025 was mixed. The number of minor incidents increased to 25 061, the highest number recorded during the 2021–2025 period and 8.7% above the five-year average. By contrast, the number of major incidents decreased to 817, which was below the five-year average of 832. The number of significant accidents fell to 20, the lowest figure in the five-year period and six below the five-year average. Two fatalities occurred in level-crossing accidents, while no employees were killed in railway-related accidents. Level-crossing safety and the monitoring of trends in minor incidents will remain priorities for NSA Norway.

A total of 178 precursors to accidents were reported in 2025, compared with 153 in 2024. The increase was mainly driven by a substantial rise in track buckles and other track misalignments, while the number of broken rails decreased significantly. The number of signals passed at danger without passing a danger point continued to increase and remained above the five-year average. No wrong-side signalling failures, broken wheels or broken axles on rolling stock in service were reported.

Several EU acts, including amendments to technical specifications for interoperability, were incorporated into Norwegian law during 2025. NSA Norway adopted minor amendments to the regulations implementing the Interoperability Directive in Norway in order to ensure closer alignment with the Directive and the EEA Agreement. No derogations pursuant to Article 15 of the Railway Safety Directive were granted during the year.

NSA Norway issued three new single safety certificates, one amended SSC and one safety authorisation in 2025. In addition, 19 vehicle authorisation decisions were issued, including authorisations related to the retrofitting of on-board ETCS equipment under the Norwegian ERTMS implementation plan. NSA Norway issued 87 train driver licences and renewed 56 licences. At the end of 2025, 2,243 train driver licences were valid.

The assessment of SSC and safety authorisation applications identified recurring challenges relating to risk management, monitoring and continuous improvement. Smaller railway undertakings may have limited internal capacity and rely extensively on external consultants, while larger organisations may face challenges related to organisational complexity and the effective flow of safety information between operational and management levels. Across the sector, further improvement is needed in the development of measurable safety objectives, the consistent application of risk assessment processes, the management of shared risks and the monitoring of contractors, suppliers and other third parties.

NSA Norway conducted 14 railway safety audits in 2025 and identified 23 non-conformities, compared with 18 in 2024. The non-conformities primarily concerned risk assessment, monitoring and supplier management. Although the number of non-conformities increased, it should be noted that supervision is targeted at areas

where the expected impact and potential for improvement are considered greatest. The number of non-conformities identified therefore does not, on its own, provide a comprehensive representation of overall railway safety performance.

Supervision activities confirmed weaknesses in emergency preparedness for maintaining rail services following significant events. In particular, NSA Norway identified insufficient coordination of emergency preparedness among railway actors and an excessive reliance by railway undertakings on the infrastructure manager as the coordinating body. Route-specific risk analyses were also found to lack sufficient detail to identify risks specific to individual railway lines. NSA Norway organised a full-day workshop on emergency preparedness in autumn 2025 to support improvement in this area.

Overall, the sector applied the relevant Common Safety Methods broadly as expected. However, NSA Norway observed that organisations continue to take a predominantly reactive approach to safety management. Further development is required to strengthen proactive monitoring, the use of performance indicators, cooperation and coordination between actors, and the combined use of the CSM for Risk Evaluation and Assessment and the CSM for Monitoring.

NSA Norway did not carry out separate activities to evaluate safety culture in 2025, but safety culture was addressed indirectly through supervision activities. NSA Norway continued to use its adapted management maturity model to obtain indications of safety culture in the sector. Further experience and data are required before reliable conclusions can be drawn.

2. English summary

See chapter 1.2 Main conclusion on the reporting year.

3. NSA safety strategy, programs, initiatives and organizational context

3.1. Strategy and planning activities

NSA Norway's enterprise strategy (2025-2028) focus on the long-term goals given by the Ministry of Transport which shall ensure a high safety level for the Norwegian railways and also a well-functioning railway market.

In addition, the effect of NSA Norway's work related to three areas is focused on the following: relevance, efficiency and proactivity. These priorities are supported by the activities set out in the annual work programme.

To support the enterprise strategy, NSA Norway has developed a Supervision Strategy and a Strategy for Societal Security. The Strategy for Societal Security looks at safety and security from a civil protection point of view, but is relevant for railway safety as it gives attention to Cyber-security issues and also the prevention of major accidents with low probability.

Both selection of who that gets attention in NSA Norway's supervision program and which topics that are addressed are risk based. They are based on a risk picture established by the NSA looking at historic data, experience from authorisations and supervision, volume and type of transport and complexity of the organisations. The risk picture is normally updated three times a year. The annual supervision program is dynamic, so if risks appear during the year that require attention, reprioritizing of activities is considered.

In 2025 high priority was given to identification of vulnerabilities in the railway system, coordination of emergency preparedness and cyber security.

Regarding international cooperation we have close cooperation with our neighbouring countries Sweden and Denmark to exchange safety-related experiences. We have a cooperation agreement with Sweden and Denmark related to safety certification and supervision according to the requirements in The Fourth Railway Package.

NSA Norway has prioritised participating in the NSA subgroup supervision where NSAs exchange experience on risk-based supervision. This group will also be able to give valuable input to the next revision on CSM Supervision. We continue to follow the work with CSM ALSP, as Norway already have a well-functioning incident and accident reporting system. This system gives the NSA important input to our risk-based supervision activities. It is of strategic importance to us to be able to have access to this information on a similar level also in the future.

To help the sector to follow the established rules and regulations we have continued our systematic guidance of the requirements as a supplement to supervision activities.

3.2. Safety Recommendations

All recommendations issued by the National Investigation Bodies (NIB), are forwarded to the relevant railway undertakings (RUs) and infrastructure managers (IMs). The Ministry of Transport has delegated specific tasks to the NSA in this area.

NSA Norway may require the relevant RUs and IMs to provide an account of their plans for acting upon the recommendations from the NIB before a recommendation is closed. These plans of actions are also presented to the NIB by NSA Norway before recommending closure of the cases to the Ministry of Transport.

Twice a year, NSA Norway submits a status report to the Ministry of Transport covering all open recommendations and recommendations closed since the previous reporting period. The NIB is also informed. General meetings with the NIB are held at least twice a year to exchange information and lessons learned.

3.3. Safety measures implemented unrelated to the recommendations

Not applicable.

3.4. Safety Organisational context


The Ministry of Transport (Samferdselsdepartementet) has overall responsibility for the transport sector. The Ministry is responsible for the performance management of the Norwegian Railway Directorate (Jernbanedirektoratet) and the Norwegian Railway Authority (Statens jernbanetilsyn, NSA Norway). It also exercises the State's ownership interests in Bane NOR SF, Norske Tog AS and Entur AS.

Bane NOR SF is the infrastructure manager and is responsible for the operation, maintenance and development of the national railway infrastructure. Norske Tog AS owns and manages rolling stock for passenger train traffic in Norway. Entur AS is a state-owned technology company providing services for public transport. The Ministry of Transport also manages the State's ownership interests in Vy AS and Flytoget AS, both of which are railway undertakings.

The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries is responsible for the State's ownership interest in Mantena AS which provides railway vehicle maintenance services. The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority (NIB Norway) is an independent administrative agency organised under the Ministry of Transport.

NSA Norway is organised as shown in Figure 1. Staff responsible for the issuance of SSCs, vehicle authorisations and train driver licences are assigned to the Authorisations Department. Staff responsible for audits and inspections are assigned to the Supervision Department.

Figure 1: NSA Norway organizational chart.



4. Safety performance

Table 1: Number of minor and major incidents in the period 2021-2025.

Year	Number of minor incidents	Number of major incidents
2021	20 773	760
2022	22 498	844
2023	23 267	869
2024	23 712	868
2025	25 061	817
Average 2021-2025	23 062	832

Table 1 shows that the number of minor incidents increased from 23 712 in 2024 to 25 061 in 2025. This represents an increase of 1 349 incidents, or 5,7%, and is the highest number recorded during the five-year period. The number of minor incidents in 2025 was 8,7% higher than the 2021–2025 average of 23 062.

By contrast, the number of major incidents decreased from 868 in 2024 to 817 in 2025, a reduction of 51 incidents, or 5,9%. This was below the 2021–2025 average of 832, although the total remained within the range observed in previous years.

Overall, the figures for 2025 show a continued upward trend in minor incidents, while the number of major incidents declined slightly compared with 2024.

Reporting activity from the IM and the RUs increased during the period 2021–2025. According to analyses conducted by NSA Norway, the reported incidents indicate a growing proportion of safety-related challenges linked to infrastructure and rolling stock. This development appears to be explained not only by an actual

increase in such incidents, but also by improved awareness and clearer practices among the IM and RUs regarding what should be classified as reportable events. In 2025, approximately 66% of all reported major incidents were linked to level-crossing users and trespassers.




Figure 2: Significant accidents and average of significant accidents in the period 2021-2025.

Figure 2 shows that the number of significant accidents was 20 in 2025, a decrease of eight accidents compared with 2024. This was the lowest number recorded during the 2021–2025 period and was six accidents below the five-year average of 26. Overall, the number of significant accidents fluctuated during the period, ranging from 20 to 34 per year.




Figure 3: Significant accidents by type of accident in the period of 2021-2025.

Year	Embarking/ disembarking	Derailments of trains	Fire in rolling stock	Fire near tracks caused by rolling stock in motion	Level crossing accidents	Collision of train with obstacle within the clearance gauge	Accidents to persons caused by rolling stock in motion	Collision of train with rail vehicle
2021	0	3	0	2	1	17	1	0
2022	0	2	0	2	3	10	6	0
2023	1	4	0	0	4	25	0	0
2024	2	3	0	0	4	16	3	0
2025	0	3	0	0	2	11	4	0

Figure 3 provides an overview of significant accidents categorized by accident type. In 2025, 12 of these incidents involved passenger trains, four involved freight trains, and six pertained to other types of railway vehicles. Of the total, 11 accidents were classified as collisions with obstacles, with overhead contact lines being torn down in 8 cases. Notably, this accident type decreased from 12 occurrences in 2024 to eight in 2025; the underlying cause of this reduction remains unidentified by NSA Norway. In response to these risks, NSA Norway has emphasized emergency preparedness, aiming to improve evacuation protocols during such events.

Regarding other classifications: three accidents in 2025 involved train derailments, while two were level-crossing accidents. Both level-crossing accidents involved vehicles, and one occurred at a passive level crossing.

No serious accidents due to rail vehicles in motion were recorded in 2025.




Figure 4: Fatalities by type of accident in the period of 2021-2025.

As illustrated in Figure 4, two fatalities were associated with level-crossing accidents in 2025. The fatalities involved level-crossing users and occurred at passive level crossings following collisions between rail vehicles and road vehicles. No employees were killed in railway accidents in 2025. Two employees sustained serious injuries during shunting operations in 2025.

NSA Norway has continued to include level-crossing safety as a supervision priority and intends to maintain this focus throughout 2026 and 2027. Monitoring trends in minor incidents also remains a strategic priority.

Overall, the number of fatalities associated with railway operations in Norway remains low. Most fatalities arise from level-crossing accidents and incidents involving unauthorised persons trespassing on the railway.

Table 2: Indicators relating to precursors to accidents in period 2021-2025.

Indicators	2022	2022	2023	2024	2025	Average 2021-2025
Total number of precursors	177	135	140	153	178	157
Broken rails	103	43	53	50	31	56
Track buckles and other track misalignments	26	29	21	36	75	37
Wrong-side signalling failures	3	0	0	0	0	0,6

Signals passed at danger when passing a danger point	14	19	13	12	9	13
Signals passed at danger without passing a danger point	31	44	53	55	63	60
Broken wheels on rolling stock in service	1	0	0	0	0	0
Broken axles on rolling stock in service	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 2 shows that a total of 178 precursors were reported in 2025, compared with 153 in 2024. This was the highest number recorded during the 2021–2025 period and was 21 cases above the five-year average of 157.

The increase was primarily attributable to a marked rise in track buckles and other track misalignments, which increased from 36 cases in 2024 to 75 cases in 2025. This was 38 cases above the five-year average of 37. The increase may partly be explained by natural variation related to weather conditions and climate-related factors, as well as the condition of the infrastructure. By contrast, the number of broken rails decreased from 50 in 2024 to 31 in 2025, which was 25 cases below the five-year average of 56.

The number of signals passed at danger without passing a danger point increased from 55 to 63 and was slightly above the five-year average of 60. In contrast, the number of signals passed at danger while passing a danger point decreased from 12 to 9 and remained below the five-year average of 13.

No wrong-side signalling failures, broken wheels or broken axles on rolling stock in service were recorded in 2025.

5. EU legislation and regulation

5.1. Changes in legislation and regulations

On 16 June 2025, with effect from 1 July 2025, we made several minor amendments to the two regulations implementing the Interoperability Directive into Norwegian law. The amendments are meant to ensure greater alignment with the Directive and the EEA Agreement; however, they should not be of material consequence.

The following EU acts were incorporated into the EEA Agreement and implemented into Norwegian law (date of effect in parenthesis):

- Regulation 2023/1695 on a revised TSI CCS (15 March 2025).
- Regulation 2023/1694 amending several TSIs (15 March 2025)
- Decision 2023/1696 amending ERATV
- Regulation 2025/675 amending TSI LOC&PAS and ERATV

5.2. Derogation in accordance with Art. 15 RSD

No derogations in accordance with Art. 15 of the Railway Safety Directive were granted in 2025.

6. Safety Certifications, Safety Authorisations and other certificates issued by the NSA

6.1 Safety Single Certificates and Safety Authorisations

After implementing the 4th railway package in 2022, all first-time renewals of existing safety certificates and safety authorisations have been handled as new applications and are reported as new. No new RUs or IMs applied to operate in Norway in 2025.

As a result of the assessments carried out in 2025, several RUs and IM were required to prepare action plans for issues classified as type 3, with follow-up transferred to subsequent supervision activities.

The number of issues raised during the certificate/authorisation assessment vary considerably, but in general the main issues are related to CSM SMS chapters 3, 6 and 7 for risk management, monitoring and continuous improvement.

In general, small RUs often have relatively limited resources for safety-related work and less specialized expertise in railway safety management than larger operators, and the use of consultants is widespread. The SMS for smaller operators may therefore be more generic. At the same time, a small organisation can facilitate closer cooperation between management and employees and may enable smoother information flow and more practical implementation of procedures in a small organisation than in a large one. In large organisations, challenges can be related to organisational complexity and to ensuring that operational practices are effectively communicated between the operational level and the management, essential for the continuous improvement of the SMS.

Safety objectives are linked to the priority risks that influence the safety performance of the organisation. But objectives are often set at a high-level, and not specific enough to measure variance in the safety performance. There have been raised several issues due to the lack of sufficiently specific objectives and improvement is needed to ensure that development of objectives also is linked to the priority risks.

The application and consistent use of the risk assessment process are essential to maintaining a high level of safety. Risk assessment in change management is sometimes misunderstood as the operator fails to recognise the need for documented risk management when a change is assessed as non-significant. This is particularly evident in relation to operational and organisational changes in smaller RUs.

There is still a need for the RUs and IM to further develop their SMS on the involvement of third parties including how and when information on shared risks is monitored and communicated.

For continuous improvements the sector has challenges with monitoring both internally and for contractors, partners and suppliers. A systematic approach for planning and follow up of the revision program, can be further improved. Scheduled audits are sometimes postponed, possibly because operational tasks are given higher priority. Even though postponed revisions are being evaluated as deviations, the focus on continuous improvement is not seen as a sufficiently prioritised activity.

6.1.1 Status of the number and awardees

In 2025, three new SSCs, one amended SSC and one safety authorisation were issued, while three operators ceased operations.

Table 3: Valid safety certificates and safety authorisations in Norway 31.12.2025.

Operator name	Status	Issuing date	Type of certificate
BLS Rail AB	Amended	11/03/2024	<i>Ceased operation in 2025</i>
CargoNet AS	Renewed	11/03/2021	Type A/B (SSC renewed 19/02/2026)

Flytoget AS	New	10/10/2022	SSC
Go Ahead Norge AS	Amended	01/06/2025	SSC
Green Cargo AB	New	26/10/2023	SSC
Grenland Rail AS	Amended	20/03/2023	SSC
Hector Rail AB	Amended	15/11/2024	SSC
LKAB Malmtrafik	New	08/12/2023	SSC
Mantena AS	Amended	11/10/2019	<i>Ceased operation in 2025</i>
Norsk Jernbanemuseum	New	23/06/2022	SSC
OnRail AS	New	20/09/2024	SSC
Protrain Trafik AB	New	15/04/2025	SSC
Railcare T AB	Amended	28/10/2024	SSC
SJ AB	New	04/05/2023	SSC
SJ Norge AS	New	01/06/2025	SSC
Tågåkeriet i Bergslagen AB	Amended	13/06/2022	SSC
TM Togdrift AS	New	09/10/2023	SSC
Vy Tog AS	-	-	<i>Ceased operation in 2025</i>
Vygruppen AS	New	22/10/2025	SSC
Bane NOR SF	New	29/09/2025	Safety authorisation

6.1.2 Changes to strategy and procedure (shall only be included if relevant) related to the process of issuing safety single certificate/safety authorisation

After implementing the 4th railway package, all first-time renewals of existing safety certificates and authorisations have been handled as new applications and are reported as new.

There has been no change in strategy in 2025. Internal procedure for granting SSC and safety authorisation, related checklists and assessment reports are subject to continuously improved.

6.1.3 Outcomes of discussions of supervision results with other NSAs in the context of certification/authorisation

There was no specific activity in this area in 2025.

6.2. Vehicle Authorisations

In 2025, NSA Norway made 19 decisions regarding vehicle authorisations. The authorisations are both type authorisations (first authorisations and new authorisations) after retrofitting of ETCS on-board as part of the Norwegian ERTMS implementation plan, 8 cases, and authorisations for conformity to type, 11 cases.

6.3. Entities in Charge of Maintenance (ECM)

Not applicable.

6.4. Train drivers

In 2025, NSA Norway issued 87 train driver licences and renewed 56 licences. As of 31 December 2025, a total of 2,243 licences were valid. Several licences were temporarily suspended because the licence holders did not meet the applicable medical requirements. No changes have been made to the strategy or procedures governing the issuance of train driver licences

6.4.1 Approval of training centres for train driver certification

NSA Norway approves training centres that provide training for train drivers in subjects and competencies that form part of the train driver certificate according to the Norwegian regulation on the certification of train drivers on the national rail network (førerforskriften) § 21a and Commission Decision 2011/765/EU.

In the reporting year 2025, two companies were re-approved to provide train driver training in accordance with the Norwegian regulation. Of these, one company was approved as training centre authorised to provide general train driver training, while one obtained approval as part of their safety authorisation and are authorised only to train their own drivers.

Table 4: Training center.

Approved training center only for own drivers	Approved training center
BaneNOR SF	VYgruppen AS

6.5. Other type of authorisation/certifications

Not applicable.

6.6. Contacts with other National Safety Authorities

NSA Norway has a cooperation agreement on supervision and safety certification with the NSAs in Sweden and Denmark. The cooperation includes meetings and exchange of experiences with respect to safety certification and supervision processes. Two meetings were held in 2025.

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was updated in 2025 to be in line with The Fourth Railway Package. The updated MoU includes leading NSA.

Meetings have been held to appoint leading NSA for several RUs, and joint supervisions have been performed.

There is also more informal contact with other NSAs when needed. Topics discussed such as for example train driver certificates and requirement.

NSA Norway has also a meeting series with NSA Sweden and NSA Denmark twice a year called Nordic ERTMS forum, discussing interpretations of the legal framework related to ERTMS upcoming TSI change requests and other topics of mutual interest between the Nordic countries.

6.7. Exchange of information between NSA and railway operators

For the SSC applications Issues are addressed directly with the individual operators during the SSC process. Communication is then in most cases handled directly in OSS. For IM the communication during the safety authorisation assessment is handled through NSA Norway's case handling system Websak.

Upon request, NSA Norway offer guidance meetings with operators to support their understanding of regulatory requirements and associated processes. As the meetings are tailored to the individual needs of each operator, the content may vary.

Additionally, our website is updated with details regarding the approval processes and guidelines are continuously updated.

NSA Norway arranged a meeting for all RUs and IM where we informed about the forthcoming review of CSMs. Topics on this meeting were the "vision document" and the future work with the review.

7. Supervision

7.1. Strategy, plan, and decision-making

The supervision program is risk-based. This means that topics and operators are selected on the basis of where their anticipated impact is assessed to be most significant. The priority topics for 2025 were:

- Emergency preparedness
- Deficiencies and faults relating to rolling stock and infrastructure
- Training of personnel in RUs

In additional, high priority was also given to identification of vulnerabilities in the railway system and cyber security.

The supervision activities after accidents such as Romeriksporten, Randklev Bridge and on 1st Christmas Day 2024 confirmed that emergency preparedness for maintaining rail services after significant accidents was inadequate.

A clear improvement was observed following the landslide at Nesvatnet. On that occasion, IM promptly drew attention to the need to maintain adequate preparedness. This accident led NSA Norway to prioritise an audit and its implications for ongoing train operations.

NSA Norway concluded that the route-specific risk analyses do not provide a sufficient level of detail to identify risk conditions specific to individual railway lines. Instead, they largely present a generic risk picture for railway lines. This may affect the prioritisation of funding and may result in inadequate decision-making support for projects in this area.

The audit also confirmed previous findings that coordination of emergency preparedness among the parties is insufficient. Most RUs rely too heavily on IM as the coordinating body. To promote improvement in this area, NSA Norway organised a full-day workshop on emergency preparedness in autumn 2025. IM and RUs were invited to participate.

NSA Norway coordinate supervision with the NSA Sweden in order to avoid duplication for operators engaged in cross-border traffic. This coordination also clarifies which authority holds the coordinating responsibility for supervision of enterprises in possession of cross-border safety certificates. In 2025, NSA Norway did not participate in supervision activities conducted by the Swedish NSA.

7.2. Supervision results

NSA Norway conducted 14 audits regarding railway safety, and 23 non-conformities were identified in the railway sector in 2025. The number of non-conformities increased from 18 in 2024 to 23 in 2025. The identified non-conformities primarily concerned deficiencies in risk assessment, monitoring, and supplier management. NSA Norway will follow up on the identified non-conformities in 2026 to ensure that the IM and RUs implement appropriate and effective corrective measures. Overall, railway safety is considered satisfactory, subject to the implementation of the necessary corrective actions and the effective closure of the identified non-conformities.

NSA Norway also conducted an unannounced inspection to follow-up of decisions concerning the suspension of the use of railway staff performing safety-critical operational tasks. The outcome of the inspection demonstrated that the RU had submitted documentation confirming that such railway staff were not in use.

NSA Norway prioritises its supervisory activities in areas where the anticipated impact is considered greatest and the potential for improvement is highest. Consequently, the number of non-conformities identified depends on the themes selected for supervision and does not, in itself, provide a comprehensive representation of the overall development of railway safety.

7.3. Coordination and cooperation

NSA Norway has a cooperation agreement on supervision and safety certification with the NSAs in Sweden and Denmark. The cooperation includes meetings and exchange of experience with respect to safety certification and supervision processes.

8. Application of relevant CSMs by RUs and IMs

8.1. Application of the CSM on Safety Management System

In general, the sector has applied the regulation as expected.

CSM SMS essentially contains the same requirements as the previously applicable requirements for safety management systems in Norway but is now formulated at a more detailed level and new requirements have been introduced relating to the working environment, safety culture, and human and organisational factors.

The sector still struggles with working sufficiently proactive regarding safety management. The sector tends to work reactive, and this is seen both in the Single Safety Certificate (SSC) and safety authorisation process and in supervision.

See chapter 6.1 for further detail on issues raised during SSC/authorisation assessment process

8.2. Application of Regulation 402/2013 on the CSM for risk evaluation and assessment

In general, the sector, and in particular the national IM, have applied the regulation as expected. The main challenge is consistent application of the criteria for significance assessment. And the risk assessment of large projects is satisfactory. When it comes to smaller projects the quality of the risk assessments varies, but it is improving. The sector, in general, demonstrates satisfactory performance within the area of risk assessments when it comes to competence. However, there is still room for improvement, especially when it comes to system descriptions and consistent use of risk acceptance criteria. There is no evidence within SMSs of combined use of CSM RA and CSM Monitoring.

8.3. Application of Regulation 1078/2012 on the CSM for monitoring

There were no separate activities regarding the follow up of CSM Monitoring in 2025. The RUs and the IM still need to improve their understanding and importance of monitoring. The sector still struggles with working sufficiently proactive regarding safety management. The sector tends to work reactively, and without any proper cooperation or coordination.

The relatively good culture of reporting incidents could be used to establish indicators to monitor effectiveness of safety management, but this is not the case.

NSA Norway has also identified a need to improve the monitoring of contractors.

No material differences were identified between smaller and larger organisations in the application of the CSM for Monitoring.

8.4. Participation and Implementation of EU projects.

Norway takes part in the European Freight DAC Delivery Programme testing digital automatic couplers on 100 freight trains. NSA Norway is involved in the project as authorising entity in Norway and participates in ERAs Working group for the retrofitting of 100 freight trains with DAC.

9. Safety culture

9.1 Safety culture evaluation and monitoring

NSA Norway did not undertake separate activities in 2025 to evaluate safety culture in the railway sector. However, safety culture is a topic addressed indirectly in most supervision activities.

NSA Norway continues to use its own adaptation of the management maturity model and is expecting to gain indications on safety culture in the railway sector. Further experience is required before sufficient data are available to draw reliable conclusions.

9.2. Safety culture initiatives/projects

No separate initiatives or projects were ongoing in this area in 2025.

9.3. Safety culture communication

Some of the biggest companies focus on this topic. However, NSA Norway did not undertake dedicated communication activities for stakeholders on this topic in 2025.

Annex A: Progress with Interoperability**ANNEX: Progress with Interoperability**

Please provide the following information as it is at the 31st December of the reporting year (2025).

Please refer to the Appendix for definitions.

1. Lines excluded from the scope of IOP/SAF Directive (end of year)

1a	Length of lines excluded from the scope of application of the IOP Directive [km]	0
1b	Length of lines excluded from the scope of application of the SAF Directive [km]	0

Please provide the list of lines excluded:

2. Length of new lines authorized by NSA (during the reporting year)

2a	Total length of lines [km]	10
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3. PRM adapted stations (end of year)

3a	PRM TSI compliant railway stations	8
3b	PRM TSI compliant railway stations - partial TSI compliance	38
3c	Accessible railway stations	127
3d	Other stations	195

4. Train driver licenses (end of year)

4a	Total number of valid European licenses issued in accordance with the Directive 2007/59/EC (as amended)	2243
4b	Number of newly issued European licenses (first issuance)	98

5. Number of vehicles authorized under the interoperability Directive (EU) 2016/797 (during the reporting year)

5a	First authorization – total	1
5aa	Freight wagon	NA
5ab	Passenger coaches	NA
5ac	Thermal or electric traction units	NA
5ad	Self-propelling thermal or electric passenger trains	NA
5ae	Special vehicles/OTM	1
5b	Additional authorization – total	NA
5ba	Freight wagon	NA
5bb	Passenger coaches	NA
5bc	Thermal or electric traction units	NA
5bd	Self-propelling thermal or electric passenger trains	NA
5be	Special vehicles/OTM	NA
5c	Type authorization – total	NA
5ca	Freight wagon	NA
5cb	Passenger coaches	NA
5cc	Thermal or electric traction units	NA

5cd	Self-propelling thermal or electric passenger trains	NA
5ce	Special vehicles/OTM	NA
5d	Authorizations granted after upgrade or renewal - total	7
5da	Freight wagon	NA
5db	Passenger coaches	NA
5dc	Thermal or electric traction units	1
5de	Self-propelling thermal or electric passenger trains	1
5df	Special vehicles/OTM	5
5e	Authorisations in conformity to type (article 14(1)(e) Regulation (EU) – total	10
5ea	Freight wagon	NA
5eb	Passenger coaches	NA
5ec	Thermal or electric traction units	2
5ee	Self-propelling thermal or electric passenger trains	7
5ef	Special vehicles/OTM	1

6. ERTMS equipped vehicles (total fleet, end of year)

6a	Tractive vehicles including trainsets equipped with ERTMS Level 1	9
6b	Tractive vehicles including trainsets equipped with ERTMS Level 2	102
6c	Tractive vehicles including trainsets – no ERTMS installed	339

7. Number of NSA staff (full-time equivalent employees) by the end of year

7a	FTE staff involved in safety certification	2,5
7b	FTE staff involved in vehicle authorization	5,5
7c	FTE staff involved in supervision	4,2
7d	FTE staff involved in other railway-related tasks	2