



MINISTERUL TRANSPORTURILOR ȘI INFRASTRUCTURII
AGENȚIA DE INVESTIGARE FERROVIARĂ ROMÂNĂ - AGIFER



ROMANIAN RAILWAY INVESTIGATION AGENCY - AGIFER -

ANNUAL REPORT 2025



INTRODUCTION

This is the Annual Report of Romanian Railway Investigation Agency - AGIFER (hereinafter referred to as AGIFER) for 2025. It meets with the requirement of the Directive 2016/798/EC of European Parliament and Council, transposed into Romanian legislation by the Emergency Ordinance no.73/2019 *for railway safety*.

This reference legislation is uploaded also on AGIFER website www.agifer.ro.

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1 PRESENTATION

1.1 Foreword by the Director General of AGIFER

In 2025, the upward trend in the number of accidents and incidents occurring in train operations continued. This caused an increase in the workload relative to the number of investigators, while the applicable legislation, the institution's budgetary situation and salary levels limited the possibilities for increasing the number of specialist employees with the experience and level of training required by the legislation in force.

AGIFER initiated investigations into 61 accidents and incidents, of which 34 were initiated following a decision by the Director General (in accordance with the provisions of Government Emergency Ordinance No. 73/2019, which transposes Directive (EU) 2016/798), while investigations into the other 27 were opened as a result of obligations imposed by subsequent national legislation, namely the provisions of Government Decision No. 117/2010.

Compared with the previous year, the number of investigations opened by AGIFER into accidents involving fires breaking out on railway vehicles forming part of trains in operation doubled. Fortunately, these accidents did not result in any injuries or fatalities.

Of the 27 railway accidents for which the investigation was completed during the period under review, 1 case was a serious railway accident (occurring during shunting operations, through a collision between a light engine and a group of stationary wagons, resulting in four persons being injured, one of whom subsequently died); 2 cases were collisions, of which 1 occurred between a light engine running as a freight train and the last wagon of a stationary freight train, while the other occurred in the operations of SC TMB "METROREX" SA Bucharest, when a metro train passed a signal displaying a stop aspect and collided with another stationary metro train (with no other consequences apart from coupling with the stationary metro train); 21 were derailments and 5 were rolling-stock fires (3 involving multiple units, 1 involving a locomotive and 1 involving passenger coaches).

The causal factors identified in the 21 derailments revealed non-compliances concerning the condition of the track, in particular the improper condition of wooden sleepers (14 cases), non-compliances related to both the condition of the track and that of the rolling stock (2 cases), and problems with the rolling stock involved (5 cases).

The problems frequently identified in the investigations continued to be those related to insufficient resources allocated to maintenance and investment, which made it impossible to comply with repair deadlines for railway infrastructure and, in certain cases, for rolling stock (particularly in the case of state-owned railway operators). In addition, the shortage of specialised human resources has an adverse impact on the way activities are carried out. At the same time, the assessment, management and control of risks continue to require particular attention.

With regard to incidents occurring in train operations, there are certain categories in which a decrease can be observed (*8.1.4. striking engineering structures, constructions, installations or other railway vehicles by out-of-gauge consignments, by wagons with displaced loads or with ... 8.1.9. trains exceeding the maximum permitted line speeds, the speeds ...*), while there are also categories in which the number of incidents has increased (*8.1.1 dispatching or departure of trains when the track is occupied – train against train or train following train..., 8.1.2 reception or entry of trains into a station on an occupied or closed track...*), the latter in fact being precursors to possible accidents with serious consequences.

There remains a risk of a regulatory gap should the European Commission require the repeal of the current Regulation on the investigation of accidents and incidents and on the development and improvement of railway safety on the railways and the metro transport network in Romania (Regulation approved by Government Decision No. 117/2010), given that the draft submitted by AGIFER for a new regulation on notification and investigation has not yet been approved.

With regard to cooperation with the other investigation bodies within the network established at European level, AGIFER continued to participate actively in meetings and in the following working groups:

- Peer review working group, in accordance with the provisions of Article 22(7) of Directive (EU) 2016/798 on railway safety;
- Working group for the development of the guidelines of the Network of Investigation Bodies.

AGIFER was also represented at ESReDA – the European Safety, Reliability & Data Association – seminars, which bring together specialists in safety investigation from the aviation, maritime, land transport, chemical, nuclear and other sectors.

Cooperation with economic operators in the railway sector during the investigations, even though the conclusions of the investigation reports were not always easy or comfortable, as they highlighted real issues that must be kept carefully under control, was based on communication, namely listening to, analysing and openly presenting the views and arguments taken into consideration. This resulted in final conclusions that were better understood and more widely accepted, taking into account the common objective of improving railway safety and the lessons that can be learned.

For this reason, I would like to thank all railway operators, the infrastructure manager/infrastructure managers and the entities in charge of maintenance, as well as their employees, with whom we cooperated and communicated effectively during the investigations and who supported our efforts to increase the accuracy, efficiency and expected impact of measures aimed at improving railway safety.

Director General of AGIFER
Laurențiu Cornel DUMITRU

1.2 Role and purpose

Role of Romanian Railway Investigation Agency-AGIFER

AGIFER investigates all the accidents and incidents in the train running, on railway and metro networks, as well as the incidents that in slightly different conditions should have led to serious accidents, including the technical failures at the structural subsystems or at the interoperability constituents, parts of European conventional and high-speed system.

According to the provisions of the Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 *for the railway safety* and of the Government Decision no.117/02.03.2010 for the approval of the Regulation for the investigation of the accidents and incidents, for the development and improvement of Romanian railway and metro safety (hereinafter referred to as *Investigation Regulation*), in making the decision to start an investigation, AGIFER considers:

- seriousness of the accident or incident;
- if it is part of a series of accidents or incidents relevant for whole system;
- its impact on the community railway safety;
- requests of the infrastructure administrators, railway undertakings, Romanian Railway Safety Authority or of other member states of European Union

AGIFER purpose

Through the investigations of the accidents and incidents, AGIFER follows the improvement of the railway safety and prevention of some accidents and incidents similar to those investigated. The investigations, if necessary, have as final result safety recommendations, that are proposals for the improvement of the railway safety.

1.3 General data about AGIFER

Employees at the end of 2025

At the end of 2025, AGIFER had 42 employees.

Budget

For its activity in 2025, AGIFER had a budget of 11.190.871 RON, that is 2.194.934 EUR (considering an exchange rate at the 31th December 2025 1 € = 5,0895 lei).


1.4 Organization

The organogram of AGIFER was approved through the Order of Minister of Transports no.1204/18.06.2024 t, being presented below:


Romanian Railway Investigation Agency - AGIFER

Total number of employees = 50

Leading positions = 4



1.5 Organizational chart



2 THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS

The investigation aims the prevention of the accidents and incidents and includes the collection and analysis of the information, establishment of the conditions, including the determination of the causes and, if case, issuing of safety recommendations.

The investigators in charge fulfil their tasks as efficiently as possible and as soon as possible. The investigation is performed independently of any legal inquiry. The investigation does not aim any way the establish the guilty or responsibility.

The result of an accident or incident investigation is the object of the investigation report, worked out according to the seriousness of the accident or incident. The report presents the investigation objectives and includes, where appropriate, safety recommendations.

The investigation is carried out as open as possible, so all the parties can be heard and the results shared. The railway infrastructure administrator, the railway undertakings involved, Romanian Railway Safety Authority, European Union Agency for Railways, the victims and their relatives, the keepers of the goods damaged, the manufacturers, the emergency services involved, the representatives of the staff and the users have the possibility to supply technical information relevant for the improvement of the investigation report quality. So, in the last stage of the investigation process, AGIFER works out a draft report, that is sent to all mentioned before, in order to give them the possibility to send relevant technical information.

The technical information supplied, the opinions and comments are analyzed and if they are relevant for the investigation, they will be considered, being included in the final report. The investigation report is endorsed by the management of Romanian Railway Investigation Agency – AGIFER for publication and uploading on the website.


2.1 Rail events that have been investigated

In 2025, AGIFER staff investigated a number of **96** accidents/incidents, according to the provisions of *Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019* and of the *Investigation Regulation*. Of the **96** investigations, one was opened in 2023, **34** were opened in 2024, and the other **61** were opened during 2025.


In 2025, 53 investigations were also completed and closed, respectively:

- **27 railway accidents;**
- **26 railway incidents**, of which 25 were classified according to the provisions of Art. 8.1, Group A of the *Investigation Regulation*, for which the Romanian Railway Investigation Agency ensured the investigator in charge, and 1 was classified according to the provisions of Art. 8.2.5 of the *Investigation Regulation*, for which, by decision of the Director General, the investigation commission composed of AGIFER employees was appointed.


Investigations 2025




Investigations ended in 2025



Accidents investigations finised in 2025



Incidents investigations finished in 2025



8.1.1- dispatching or departures of trains when the track is occupied — train against train or train following train — without complying with the provisions of the specific regulations;

8.1.2- entry or reception of a train into the station on occupied track or closed with passing the switch that give access to the closed or occupied track, without observing the provisions of the specific regulations; reception of trains with the fouling point occupied at the entry end of the track;

8.1.6- departure of trains from a block post without having the right to occupy the running line and without complying with the provisions of the specific regulations;

8.1.7- passing on danger the fixed or mobile signals by trains, as well as indicators ordering „stop”, without observing the provisions of the specific regulations, or by metro with the ATP equipment isolated;

8.1.8- trains passing the fouling point in the case of group exit signals, without complying with the provisions of the specific regulations;

8.1.9- exceed the maximum speeds allowed by the track by the train, of the maximum speed set for that category of train in the working timetable or through running order, of the speed restrictions steps;

8.1.10- hitting works of art, constructions, equipment or other railway vehicles by transport with oversize gauge, by the wagons with oversize load or with the mobile parts uninsured or not closed, or by parts or railway vehicles parts or parts of their loads, after which there were no derailments;

8.1.13- incorrect performing of entry route, exit or passing of trains;

8.1.14- hitting by trains of railway vehicles that can be removed from the line on arms, equipment, machinery, devices, parts and equipment situated in the gauge of free passing, after which there were no derailments;

8.2.2- overrunning fixed or mobile signals which order “stop” or “shunting forbidden”, indicators prohibiting passage or fouling points by rakes of wagons, light engines or other railway vehicles during shunting, without complying with the provisions of the specific regulations.

2.2 Situation of the investigations opened/completed in the last 5 years


	Number of the opened investigations			Number of the completed investigations		
	Accidents	Incidents	TOTAL	Accidents	Incidents	TOTAL
Anul 2021	32	25	57	30	24	54
Anul 2022	33	20	53	34	22	56
Anul 2023	27	26	53	31	25	56
Anul 2024	29	31	60	29	29	58
Anul 2025	31	30	61	27	26	53

2.3 Institutions involved in the investigation (currently or exceptionally)

Since its establishment and up to now, during the course of the investigation, the Romanian Railway Investigation Agency - AGIFER has cooperated with the authorities responsible for the judicial investigation, as well as with other authorities with intervention duties at the scene of the accident/incident.

According to the provisions of the Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 on railway safety, the Romanian Railway Investigation Agency - AGIFER may, if necessary, call upon specialists from related fields to carry out investigations. During 2025, there were no cases of co-option in the railway accident investigation commissions of specialists from outside AGIFER.

2.4 The diagram of the investigation process



3 INVESTIGATIONS

3.1 Overview on the investigations completed in 2025 as against to 2024, identification of the main tendencies.

Type of the accidents investigated in 2025 ⁽¹⁾	Number of accidents	Number of victims		Damages including VAT ⁽²⁾ (lei)	Damages including VAT ⁽²⁾ (€)	Tendency of the accident number, as against to 2024 (difference percentage)
		Deaths	Seriously injured			
Trains collisions	3	1	3	3.248,23	637,10	+1 (+50%)
Trains derailments	21	-	-	10.320.149,51	2.024.154,07	-1 (-4,55%)
Level crossings accidents	0	-	-	-	-	0 (0%)
Fire in rolling stock	3	-	-	333.587,87	65.428,63	-2 (-40%)
Total	27	-	4	10.656.985,61	2.090.219,79	-2 (-6,90%)

(1) one took into account the year of the investigation completion;

(2) according to the documents submitted by the parties involved by the date of completion of the investigation.

3.2. Investigations completed and investigation started in 2025

In 2025, Romanian Railway Investigation Agency completed and closed **53** investigations (1 of which had been opened in 2023 and **34** of which were investigations opened in 2024) and started the investigation procedure in **61** cases. Of the **61** cases, **18** investigations were completed and closed in 2025, while the remaining **43** are expected to be completed and closed in 2026.

The table below presents the investigations and their legal basis, in accordance with the requirements of the European Railway Safety Directive and national legislation.

Investigations completed in 2025

No	Date of occurrence	Presentation	Legal basis of the investigation (1)	Date of completion
1	25.03.2023	In the railway county Galați, Galați railway station , during the shunting operation for introducing locomotive EC 91530430128-5 (got by railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători SA), onto line no. 4, occupied by passenger coach no. 50532616090-8, in order to form Regio passenger train no. 7576, the violent collision of this locomotive with the passenger coach occurred. As a result of the violent collision, 4 persons were injured, namely the engine driver driving locomotive EC 128, a conductor, a train inspector and a person who was in passenger coach no. 50532616090-8. Subsequently, after their transfer to	i	13.02.2025

		Galați County Emergency Clinical Hospital, the train inspector died.		
2	16.01.2024	In the railway county Craiova, track section Craiova – Caracal (electrified double-track line), at the Y end of Leu railway station , in the area of turnout no. 16, 11 wagons from the composition of freight train no. 68322, got by the railway undertaking Global Rail Solutions SRL, derailed, of which 2 overturned.	i	10.01.2025
3	07.02.2024	In the railway county București, track section București Băneasa – București Sud, in Pantelimon railway station , a violent collision occurred between light engine DA 180, which ran as train no. 86350, and the rear wagon of the freight train no. 58182106, stationary on track 2.	i	05.02.2025
4	27.02.2024	On the metro transport network, the train no. 04 (formed of electric metro trains 1121-2121) passed on danger the entry signal Y of Timpuri Noi metro station and entered on the diverging route on the track no. 1 of this station, where metro train no. 17, formed of electric metro trains 1117-2117, was stabled, fact which caused the coupling of the two trains.	ii	24.02.2025
5	01.03.2024	In the railway county Craiova, track section Strehaia – Motru Est (electrified single-track line), between Strehaia and Jirov railway stations , at km 12+012, in the running of freight train no. 65094 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA), the wagon no. 81536653508-7 (the 3 rd from the locomotive in the running direction) derailed of both axles of the first bogie, , of, located.	i	26.02.2025
6	13.03.2024	In the railway county Galați, Buzău – Mărășești track section (electrified double-track line), between Zoița and Râmnicu Sărat railway stations at km 158+875, the wagon no. 83537963122-8 of the freight train no. 66307, (got by the railway undertaking Grup Feroviar Român SA), derailed of, by the first bogie, in the running direction.	i	06.03.2025
7	26.03.2024	In the railway county Craiova, track section Băbeni – Alunu (non-electrified single-track line), between Berbești and Popești Vâlcea railway stations , at km 21+850, the wagon no. 81536653750-5 (the 13 th in the train composition) of the freight train no. 60566 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA), tderaiied by the first bogie, in the running direction, .	i	24.03.2025
8	21.04.2024	In the railway county Timișoara, track section Arad – Oradea (non-electrified double-track line), between Sântana and Utvinișu Nou railway stations , on running line II, at km 9+300, in the running of freight train no. 66290-020 (got by the railway undertaking SC Grup Feroviar Român SA),	i	16.04.2025

		a fire broke out at hauling locomotive DA 1544 of the train.		
9	15.05.2024	In the railway county Constanța, track section București – Constanța (electrified double-track line), on running line I, between Dorobanțu and Basarabi railway stations , at km 206+400, in the running of freight train no. 66363815 (got by the railway undertaking Grup Feroviar Român SA), a fire broke out at hauling locomotive DA 1504.	i	15.04.2025
10	08.06.2024	In the railway county București, track section Ploiești Sud - Buzău (electrified double-track line), during the stabling of freight train no. 77280 (got by the railway undertaking VEST TRANS RAIL SRL) on the deflecting track no. 10B in Ploiești Est railway station , the hauling locomotive of the train - DHC 938, derailed by all four axles, while passing over turnout no. 37, set in the “diverging” position.	i	08.05.2025
11	11.06.2024	In the railway county Craiova, track section Roșiori Nord – Videle (electrified double-track line), on running line II, between Roșiori Nord and Atârnați railway stations , at km 94+807, 2 wagons from the composition of the InterRegio passenger train no. 1596 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA), derailed by one bogie (namely the second bogie in the running direction of each wagon).	i	20.05.2025
12	13.07.2024	In the railway county Brașov, track section Brașov – Vânători (electrified double-track line), between Rupea and Racoș railway stations , the 3 rd wagon from the composition of passenger train no. 347, got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA, derailed of both axles of the first bogie, in the running direction of the train.	i	09.07.2025
13	19.07.2024	In the railway county București, in București Nord railway station , during the running around shunting operation of the Regio passenger train no. 11034 (got by the railway undertaking SC Regio Călători SRL), from line 11 to section 074, in order to reverse locomotive BB 576 and form Regio passenger train no. 11037, the violent collision occurred between the locomotive and the stationary rake of coaches. As a result of the impact, 8 persons were transported to hospital with minor injuries and panic attacks, and other 7 persons received medical care at the site of the incident.	i	03.07.2025
14	24.07.2024	In the railway county Craiova, on the running line, between Berbești and Popești Vâlcea railway stations , the locomotive DA 913 that hauled the freight train no. 60566, got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA derailed at km 18+600.	i	15.07.2025

15	25.07.2024	In the railway county Timișoara, track section Aradu Nou – Periam, non-interoperable section managed by SC RC-CF Trans Brașov SRL (non-electrified single-track line), between Aradu Nou and Zădăreni railway stations , the first wagon of the freight train no. 66143 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA) derailed at km 1+095.50, by both axles of the first bogie, in the running direction.	i	14.07.2025
16	14.08.2024	In the railway county Craiova, track section Alunu - Băbeni (non-electrified single-track line), between Popești and Berbești railway stations , the first locomotive of the freight train no. 86077, composed of two diesel locomotives, DA 913 and DA 1183, derailed by the first axle, in the running direction of the train.	i	11.08.2025
17	29.08.2024	In the railway county Craiova, track section Roșiori Nord – Videle, between Olteni and Ciolpani railway stations , in the running of passenger train no. 9900 (got by the SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA), a hydraulic damper originating from locomotive EA 397 struck 10 track inductors.	iii	15.07.2025
18	01.09.2024	In the railway county București, track section Giurgiu Nord - Videle (electrified single-track line), at the departure of freight train no. 40712 001 (got by the railway undertaking Rail Cargo Carrier – România SRL), from line no. 5, in Rădulești railway station , the the 7 th wagon of the train derailed of both axles of the last bogie, in the running direction.	i	25.08.2025
19	09.09.2024	In the railway county Constanța, track section Medgidia – Constanța (electrified double-track line), in Valu lui Traian railway station , at km 215+350, in the running of freight train no. 68205006 (got by the freight railway undertaking Constantin Grup Rail Logistic SRL), the wagon no. 37809341143-7 derailed occurred by the first bogie, in the running direction.	i	02.09.2025
20	12.09.2024	In the railway county Craiova, track section Alunu – Băbeni (non-electrified single-track line), between Berbești and Popești Vâlcea railway stations , the 21 st wagon (no. 81536654351-1) of freight train no. 60568 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA), derailed at km 30+520, of the first bogie, in the running direction.	i	11.09.2025
21	19.09.2024	In the railway county Timișoara, track section Timișoara Nord – Arad (electrified single-track line), on the entry route of Regio passenger train no. 2601 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA), in Șag railway station , the 2 nd wagon from the composition of the train derailed in the area of the switch no. 5.	i	25.08.2025

22	22.09.2024	In the railway county Craiova, track section Turceni – Gura Motrului (electrified double-track line), in Turceni railway station , at km 12+947, in the running of freight train no. 58490 (got by the railway undertaking Constantin Grup Rail Logistic), the first bogie and the first axle of the second bogie of locomotive LEMA 083 that hauled the train the derailed on the turnout no. 15 within cross-over 15/23.	i	15.09.2025
23	26.09.2024	In the railway county Craiova, track section Craiova – Filiași (electrified double-track line), in Craiova railway station , the light engine LEMA 006, which ran as train no. 86699, got by the railway undertaking Deutsche Bahn Cargo România SRL derailed.	i	08.09.2025
24	11.10.2024	In the railway county Craiova, track section Gura Motrului – Amaradia, in Turceni railway station , in the running of passenger train no. 2855 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA), a brake slack adjuster originating from locomotive EC 053 stroke pedestrian slabs between the rails.	iii	22.09.2025
25	17.10.2024	In the railway county Timișoara, track section Timișoara – Lugoj (electrified single-track line), in Belinț railway station , the cut out brake cock of the wagons in the composition of freight train no. 48431016, (got by the railway undertaking Deutsche Bahn Cargo România SRL) the stroke occurred of the peg related to track circuit 1-3Si3, located within the clearance gauge, by the isolating valve with feeder of the KE air distributors	iii	30.01.2025
26	19.10.2024	In the railway county București, track section Titu – Târgoviște (non-electrified double-track line), between Nucet and Târgoviște railway stations , on running line I, at km 29+850, a fire occurred at locomotive DA 011 which hauled the freight train no. 666251 (got by the railway undertaking Deutsche Bahn Cargo Romania SRL).	i	10.10.2025
27	20.10.2024	In the railway county București, track section București – Videle, on the Zăvestreni – Grădinari distance , a vertical hydraulic damper (related to bogie no. 2, axle no. 4) of locomotive EA 789, which hauled the passenger train no. 9002, stroke 17 track inductors.	iii	19.03.2025
28	29.10.2024	In the railway county Constanța, track section Palas – Năvodari (non-electrified single-track line), between Palas and Constanța Mărfuri railway stations , at km 1+040, the wagon no. 31536666192-6, (the 31 st in the composition of the train) of the freight train no. 66361829 (got by Grup Feroviar Român SA), derailed by the 2 nd bogie in the running direction, and the wagon no. 89536950046-0 (the	i	23.10.2025

		32 nd in the composition of the train), derailed by both bogies.		
29	04.11.2024	In the railway county București, track section Ploiești Sud - Buzău (electrified double-track line), in Ploiești Est railway station , during the stabling of freight train no. 58496 003 (got by the railway undertaking Constantin Grup Rail – Logistic SRL), three wagons from the composition of the train, namely the 3 rd , the 4 th and the 5 th derailed.	i	30.10.2025
30	05.11.2024	In the railway county Craiova, track section Filiași - Caransebeș (electrified single-track line), between Tâmba and Igiroasa railway stations , 7 wagons from the freight train no. 66078 004 (composed of 27 wagons loaded with gasoline - got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA) derailed, of which 2 overturned.	i	02.10.2025
31	15.11.2024	In the railway county Cluj, in railway station Carei , an open inspection door of the equipment loaded on the wagon no. 31804863701-7, in the composition of freight train no. 56522 016 (got by the railway undertaking Deutsche Bahn Cargo România SRL), stroke some elements of the railway signaling equipment.	iii	10.04.2025
32	20.11.2024	In the railway county Brașov, track section Brașov – Sighișoara (electrified double-track line), between Augustin and Racoș railway stations , the first bogie of EDK 2000 crane of 250 tf, which composed the freight train no. 67733 (got by the railway undertaking SC RAIL FORCE SRL Brașov) derailed.	i	13.10.2025
33	25.11.2024	In the railway county Craiova, track section Craiova - Roșiori Nord (electrified double-track line), between Măldăeni and Roșiori Nord railway stations , a part originating from diesel multiple unit AM 974 stroke the track inductor (1000/2000 Hz) of of signal BL 24. The diesel multiple unit was attached at the rear of Regio passenger train no. 9386.	iii	21.08.2025
34	11.12.2024	In the railway county Craiova, track section Piatra Olt – Podul Olt, in Lotru railway station , the freight train no. 57423 (got by the railway undertaking PSP Cargo Group SA), departs from line no. 2, without complying with the provisions of the instructions, resulting in the passing of the fouling point.	iii	10.07.2025
35	23.12.2024	In the railway county Constanța, track section Constanța – Medgidia, in Palas railway station , the wrong setting of the exit route of IR passenger train no. 1680023 (got by the passenger railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA), simultaneously with setting the shunting route from transit line L4 to line L1D, of a tower wagon.	iii	05.04.2025

36	15.12.2024	In the railway county București, in Pasărea railway station , the passenger train no. 8007015, got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA passed on danger the the exit signal of the railway station.	iii	18.11.2025
37	24.01.2025	In the railway county Brașov, in Augustin railway station , the freight train no. 57346 023 (got by the railway undertaking Rail Cargo Carrier Romania SRL) was dispatched towards Apața railway station, based on verbal communication block control on running line I, on the basis of the movement order issued by the movements inspector, before the arrival of freight train no. 66040 023 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA), in railway station Apața and before receiving the arrival confirmation.	iii	24.04.2025
38	29.01.2024	In the railway county Brașov, on the track section Vințu de Jos - Șibot, electrified double-track line under rehabilitation, in Șibot railway station , the IR passenger train no. 74110 was erroneously routed on running line I instead of running line II, towards railway station Aurel Vlaicu.	iii	14.04.2025
39	10.02.2025	In the railway county București, on the track section București – Ploiești (electrified double-track line), at PM Ploiești Triaj Branch Line , the route for the InterRegio passenger train no. 1665010 (got by the passenger railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA) was set incorrectly, towards Ploiești Vest railway station instead of Ploiești Sud railway station.	iii	26.06.2025
40	17.02.2024	In the railway county Brașov, track section Brașov – Siculeni (electrified single-track line), in Bicsadu Oltului railway station , the first wagon of the Regio passenger train no. 4504, got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA derailed of both axles of the first bogie, in the running direction.	i	12.12.2025
41	28.03.2024	In the railway county Craiova, track section Târgu Jiu - Livezeni (electrified single-track line), between Pietrele Albe and Lainici railway stations , at km 106+600, the locomotive EA 073 which hauled the freight train no. 56500, got by the railway undertaking Deutsche Bahn Cargo Romania SA struck a railway drilling machine (equipment of L5 Section Târgu Jiu).	iii	11.09.2025
42	02.04.2025	In the railway county Craiova, track section Piatra Olt – Pitești (non-electrified single-track line), in Fâlfani railway station , the passenger train no. 9479 001, was received the reception occurred of Regio, with call-on signal, on direct line I, occupied by Regio Express passenger train no. 9270 001, both trains got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA.	iii	05.12.2025

43	04.04.2025	In the railway county Braşov, track section Braşov – Sighişoara (electrified double-track line), between Racoş and Rupea railway stations, respectively between Beia and Mureni railway stations a strap originating from wagon no. 37805931550-7 which composed the freight train no. 58381, got by the railway undertaking TRAIN EUROPE Sucursala Craiova, struck several track inductors by.	iii	29.07.2025
44	28.04.2025	In the railway county Craiova, track section Filiaşi - Craiova (electrified double-track line), between Filiaşi and Craiova railway stations , a part originating from locomotive EC 032, in the composition of Regio passenger train no. 2092, got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA the struck occurred of several track inductors.	iii	27.11.2025
45	30.05.2025	In the railway county Bucureşti, track section Chitila - Goleşti (non-electrified double-track line), between Mătăsar and Găeşti railway stations , a part originating from diesel multiple unit AM 2120 which ran as train no. 9214, got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA struck o 3 track inductors.	iii	24.11.2025
46	11.06.2025	In the railway county Constanţa, track section Feteşti – Cernavodă, in Feteşti railway station , locomotive EA 1077 hauling freight train no. 58196010, got by the railway undertaking Rail Operations SRL struck a maintenance machine belonging to Arcada Company SA, stationary on-line no. 10 within the clearance gauge, by.	iii	07.08.2025
47	05.07.2025	In the railway county Bucureşti, on the track section Lehliu – railway station Pajura (electrified double-track line), at Pajura Branch Line , the route for InterRegio passenger train no. 11506005, got by the passenger railway undertaking Astra Trans Carpatic SRL was set wrong.	iii	23.12.2025
48	19.07.2025	In the railway county Galaţi, track section Adjud – Oneşti (electrified double-track line), on the traffic distances running line II Urecheşti – Adjud and running line I Urecheşti – Căiuţi , a damper (associated to axle no.3) of locomotive EA 403 which hauled the Regio passenger train no. 5202, got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA, struk and damaged a number of 4 track inductors, (associated to colour-light signal BL 23 – running line II Urecheşti – Adjud, XAP – running line II Urecheşti – Adjud, BL 11 – running line I Urecheşti – Căiuţi and BL 13 – running line I Urecheşti – Căiuţi).	iii	27.11.2025
49	06.09.2025	In the railway county Timişoara, track section Arad – Timişoara (electrified single-track line), in Timişoara Nord railway station , the freight train no. 66030004, hauled by locomotive ED 073, got by the freight railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR	iii	26.11.2025

		Marfă” SA passed on danger of the home signal YA, and forced the point switch no. 52.		
50	10.09.2025	In the railway county Constanța, track section București – Fetești, in Dor Mărunt railway station the connecting bar of the axle guidance – inductor assembly, post no. II, detached from locomotive EA 050 which hauled freight train no. 67612010, got by the railway undertaking Expres Forwarding SRL, the struck the cover of the point machine of turnout no. 10. .	iii	26.11.2025
51	12.09.2025	In the railway county București, track section Ploiești Nord – Măneciu, in Ploiești Nord railway station , the passenger train no. 10240012, composed of diesel multiple unit DH2 3220 (got by the railway undertaking Transferoviar Călători SRL) was received on the line no. II, occupied by locomotive EA 817.	iii	18.11.2025
52	06.11.2025	In the railway county Timișoara, track section Caransebeș – Orșova (electrified single-track line), between Topleț and Valea Cernei railway stations , at km 396+800, the freight train no. 57758, hauled by locomotive LEMA 086, got by the railway undertaking Transferoviar Grup SA, struck a metal lifting jack.	iii	29.12.2025
53	23.10.2025	In the railway county Craiova, track section Caracal - Craiova, between Malu Mare and Banu on the During of reading and interpreting the data of the non-volatile memory installation (DEUTA speed recorder) of locomotive ES 016 which hauled the freight train no. 67750 (got by the railway undertaking Transferoviar Grup SA), between Malu Mare and Banu Mărăcine railway stations , on running line I, between km 200+200 and km 200+400, Cârcea viaduct, was found exceeded the maximum admitted speed imposed by the speed restriction of 10 km/h.	iii	22.12.2025

- (1) **Legal basis of the investigation:** i= According to the Safety Directive, ii= Upon the national legal basis (that covers the possible areas excluded by the art.2, paragraph 2 of the Safety Directive), iii= Optional – other criteria (National norms/regulations, to which the Safety Directive does not refer).

Investigations opened in 2025, that are going to be completed in 2026

No	Date of occurrence	Presentation	Legal basis of the investigation (1)	Date of completion
1		In the railway county Iași, track section Adjud - Bacău (electrified double-track line), between Orbeni and Faraoani railway stations , the wagon no. 31539333345-7, the 20 th vehicle in the composition of the train no. 67204 016 (got by the railway undertaking Vest Trans Rail SRL) derailed	i	15.01.2026

		on running line I, at km 268+250, by the first bogie, in the running direction.		
2	12.02.2025	In the railway county Craiova, track section Caracal – Roşiori Nord (electrified double-track line), in Drăgăneşti Olt railway station , the locomotive LEMA 039 which hauled the freight train no. 66948, got by the railway undertaking SC CER Fersped SA derailed while passing over turnout no. 12.	i	28.02.2026
3	12.02.2025	In the railway county Constanţa, non-interoperable track section Năvodari – Constanţa Mărfuri (non-electrified single-track line), between Năvodari and Lumina railway stations , at km 17+550 the wagon no. 84537716048-4, the 20 th in the freight train composition no. 66294 012 (got by the freight railway undertaking Grup Feroviar Român SA) derailed by both axles of the second bogie, in the running direction.	i	02.02.2026
4	17.02.2025	In the railway county Craiova, track section Caracal - Roşiori Nord (electrified double-track line), between Mihăeşti and Radomireşti railway stations , in the running of InterRegio passenger train no. 1823 (got by the passenger railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA), a fire broke out at passenger coach no. 50532083026-6, the rear car of the train.	i	14.01.2026
5	19.02.2025	In the railway county Craiova, track section Roşiori Nord – Caracal, in railway station Mihăeşti , 4 wagons of the freight train no. 57306 (got by the railway undertaking SC Rail Cargo Carrier SRL) derailed and collided with locomotive ES 008 that hauled the freight train no. 58572 (got by the railway undertaking SC PIMK Rail SRL, resulting in the death of one person.	i	ongoing investigation
6	25.02.2025	In the railway county Constanţa, track section Palas – Constanţa, in Constanţa Mărfuri railway station , at km 1+040, the 14 th wagon (no. 89536950190-6) of the freight train no. 66362 (got by the railway undertaking Grup Feroviar Român SA), the derailed y the first axle of the first bogie.	i	10.02.2026
7	16.03.2025	In the railway county Cluj, track section Cluj Napoca - Oradea, between Tileagd and Oşorhei railway stations , the 14 th wagon (no. 31533541048-8) of the freight train no. 66103 d of (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA) derailed at km 642+500, by the second bogie, in the running direction.	i	10.03.2026
8	14.04.2025	In the railway county Craiova, track section Târgu Jiu - Filiaşi, in Turceni railway station , the 9 th wagon (no. 338739028714) of the of freight train no. 57106012 (got by the freight railway undertaking CARGO TRANS VAGON SA),	i	23.03.2026

		derailed by the first axle of the second bogie, in the running direction.		
9	04.05.2025	In the railway county Constanța, in Constanța railway station , during the shunting operation for pushing back of the rake of coaches of passenger train no. 1687 004, composed of 7 coaches + locomotive LEMA 004, onto line 1, occupied by the rake of coaches of passenger train no. 1586, composed of 5 coaches without locomotive, the violent collision occurred between the two rakes of coaches, got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA.	i	29.04.2026
10	10.05.2025	In the railway county Constanța, track section București - Constanța (electrified double-track line), in Fetești railway station , the 8 th wagon of the freight train no. 66090 009 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA), derailed by both axles of the first bogie, in the running direction.	i	06.05.2026
11	21.05.2025	In the railway county Craiova, track section Craiova - Caracal (electrified double-track line), in Leu railway station , 3 rd wagon (no. 81536652446-1) of the freight train no. 66062 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA), derailed.	i	31.03.2026
12	26.05.2025	In the railway county Galați, in Mărășești railway station , during the shunting operation for attaching locomotives EA 122 and EA 679 to the rake of coaches prepared for passenger train no. 5302026, located on track no. 2, the violent collision occurred between the two locomotives, and the group of coaches. The personnel who performed the shunting operation are employed by SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA.	i	ongoing investigation
13	07.06.2025	In the railway county Craiova, track section Roșiori Nord – Caracal (electrified double-track line), in Măldăeni railway station , in the running of freight train no. 66212 (got by the railway undertaking SC Grup Feroviar Român SA) and hauled by locomotive EA 571 the locomotive and the first two wagons of the train derailed.	i	04.06.2026
14	30.05.2025	In the railway county București, track section Ploiești Est – Buzău (electrified double-track line), in Valea Călugărească railway station , on line 3, in the running of freight train no. 66340 (got by the railway undertaking GRUP FERVIAR ROMÂN SA), a fire broke out at locomotive DA 1572 that hauled the train.	i	27.05.2026
15	13.07.2025	In the railway county Constanța, track section Ciulnița - București (electrified double-track line), on running line I, at km 85+300, between Dor Mărunt and Dragos-Vodă railway stations , in the running of freight train no. 60198 012 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă”	i	03.04.2026

		SA), a fire broke out at hauling locomotive DA 1362.		
16	13.07.2025	In the railway county București, track section București Nord - Videle (electrified double-track line), in Bucureștii Noi railway station , locomotive LEMA 014 that hauled the freight train no. 66528 011, got by the railway undertaking Deutsche Bahn Cargo Romania SRL derailed on track 2C, at km 0+483.5, by the first axle, in the running direction.	i	25.06.2026
17	24.07.2025	In the railway county Timișoara, track section Ronaț Triaj – Sânnicolau Mare (non-electrified, non-interoperable single-track line), between Biled and Dudeștii Noi railway stations , at km 18+376, both axles of the first bogie in the running direction of the last wagon from the freight train no. 77050 (got by the railway undertaking Tim Rail Cargo SRL).	i	27.05.2026
18	25.07.2024	In the railway county Craiova, track section Craiova - Calafat (non-electrified single-track line), on direct running line I in Sălcuța railway station , a fire broke out at hauling locomotive DA 1141 of the freight train no. 60555 225 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA).	i	ongoing investigation
19	25.07.2025	In the railway county București, in București Triaj railway station , Post 17, in the area of turnout no. 23, the first axle, in the running direction, of hauling locomotive EA 082 of freight train no. 66558 024 (got by the railway undertaking Deutsche Bahn Cargo Romania SRL) derailed.	i	ongoing investigation
20	27.07.2025	In the railway county București, in București Nord railway station , the connecting bar of the axle guidance detached from the locomotive EA 131 which hauled the Regio passenger train no. 9910 struck and damaged 2 track inductors.	iii	04.06.2026
21	01.08.2025	In the railway county Constanța, track section Constanța – Mangalia, in Agigea Ecluză railway station , in the area of the cross-over between turnouts no. 7 and no. 9, three wagons from the composition of the freight train no. 57754 030 (got by the railway undertaking TransFeroviar Grup SA), derailed.	i	26.06.2026
22	01.08.2025	In the railway county București, track section Ploiești – Brașov, in Florești Prahova railway station , the route for Regio passenger train no. 11032 (got by the railway undertaking Regio Călători SRL) was wrong set.	iii	21.01.2026
23	03.08.2025	In the railway county București, track section Ploiești Vest – Slănic, between Buda and Plopeni Sat railway stations , at Plopeni halt, a fire broke out at diesel multiple unit AM 3202/3203 which composed the passenger train no. 10234 003 (got	i	08.04.2026

		by the railway undertaking Transferoviar Călători SRL).		
24	04.08.2025	In the railway county Iași, track section Hârlău – Podu Iloaiei (non-electrified, non-interoperable single-track line, managed by RC-CF Brașov), between Hârlău and Belcești railway stations , the diesel multiple unit AMX 571 which composed the Regio passenger train no. 11400 004 (got by the passenger railway undertaking Regio Călători SRL), derailed by the 3 rd axle in the running direction.	i	ongoing investigation
25	04.08.2025	In the railway county București, in București Triaj railway station , Post 17, the locomotive EA 031 that hauled the freight train no. 56538 004 (got by the railway undertaking Deutsche Bahn Cargo Romania SRL) derailed in the area of turnout no. 23.	i	ongoing investigation
26	07.08.2025	In the railway county Craiova, track section Piatra Olt – Caracal (non-electrified single-track line), in Vlădueni railway station , the freight train no. 66316 006 (got by the railway undertaking Grup Feroviar Român SA), hauled by locomotive DA 1540, passed on the fouling mark at the X end of direct line II from the station, line provided with common exit signal, and forced the switch point no. 3.	iii	31.03.2026
27	13.08.2025	In the railway county Cluj, track section Cluj Napoca - Războieni (electrified double-track line), between railway stations Valea Florilor and Câmpia Turzii , on running line I, at km 456+700, the striking occurred of a rail section located within the clearance gauge of the track by locomotive EA 623 hauling Regio passenger train no. 3084 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA).	iii	29.06.2026
28	18.08.2025	In the railway county București, in Bucureștii Noi, railway station the hauling locomotive LEMA 090 of the freight train no. 67336 017 (got by the railway undertaking Rail Cargo Carrier Romania SRL), derailed by the first axle in the running direction on the track 2C.	i	ongoing investigation
29	19.08.2025	In the railway county Craiova, track section Craiova – Filiași (electrified double-track line), in Craiova railway station , at the dispatching of train no. 67010018 (got by the railway undertaking TIM RAIL CARGO SRL), 2 wagons loaded with cereals derailed.	i	ongoing investigation
30	31.08.2025	In the railway county Constanța, track section Constanța - Medgidia (electrified double-track line), on direct line I in Palas railway station , a fire broke out at hauling locomotive EA 922, that hauled the passenger train no. 1996 031 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA).	i	ongoing investigation

31	06.09.2025	In the railway county Galați, track section Făurei – Tecuci (non-electrified single-track line), between Jirlău and Făurei railway stations , at km 03+721, in the running of freight train no. 70490 706 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA), the wagon no. 31539335637-5 (the 8 th wagon in of the train) derailed of both axles of the first bogie.	i	ongoing investigation
32	08.09.2025	In the railway county Iași, track section Verești - Botoșani (non-electrified single-track line), between Leorda and Botoșani railway stations , at km 34+680, a fire broke out at hauling locomotive DHC 190 of the passenger train no. 5578 008 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA).	i	ongoing investigation
33	23.09.2025	In the railway county Craiova, track section Băbeni – Alunu (non-electrified single-track line), between Berbești and Popești Vâlcea railway stations , at km 24+833, the first bogie, in the running direction, of the diesel locomotive DA 1129 which hauled the freight train no. 60568 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA).	i	ongoing investigation
34	05.10.2025	In the railway county București, in București Nord railway station , the passenger train no. 10113 (got by the railway undertaking Transferoviar Călători SRL) was wrong dispatched in the direction of Chitila instead of Pajura.	iii	31.03.2026
35	10.10.2025	In the railway county București, track section Titan Sud - Oltenița (non-electrified, non-interoperable single-track line, managed by Transferoviar Infrastructură Neinteroperabilă SRL), between Oltenița and Budești railway stations , at the level crossing at km 76+220, provided with mechanical barriers type B that where in the “open” position, Regio passenger train no. 10291 (got by the railway undertaking Transferoviar Călători SRL), struck a car.	i	ongoing investigation
36	22.10.2025	In the railway county Cluj, track section Oradea – Aleșd (non-electrified double-track line), between Oradea and Oradea Est railway stations , on running line I, the freight train no. 67754, hauled by locomotive DA 1593 (got by the railway undertaking Transferoviar Grup SA) struck at km 651+522, a H 240-type metal profile used for supporting the track bed.	iii	ongoing investigation
37	29.10.2025	In the railway county Constanța, in Dragoș Vodă railway station , the freight train no. 56516028 (got by the railway undertaking DB Cargo România SRL) passed on danger the exit signal X1 (for line I Dragoș Vodă – Ciulnița) and forced the switch no. 10.	iii	14.01.2026

38	06.11.2025	In the railway county Craiova, track section Roşiori Nord – Costeşti (non-electrified single-track line), between Roşiori Nord and Balaci railway stations , at km 167+000, the first bogie of wagon no. 335593380058, the 10 th in the freight train no. 68424 (got by the railway undertaking Constantin Grup Rail Logistic SRL), derailed.	i	ongoing investigation
39	19.11.2025	In the railway county Craiova, between Gălăteni and Olteni railway stations , at km 71+800, on running line I, the freight train no. 67323019 (got by the railway undertaking Rail Cargo Carrier Romania), hauled by locomotive ES 109 passed on danger the distant signal PRX of railway station Olteni and subsequently approached from behind and slightly collided with freight train no. 57312018 (got by the same railway undertaking), hauled by locomotive ES 070.	i	ongoing investigation
40	13.12.2025	In the railway county Cluj, track section Şarmăşag - Carei (non-electrified single-track line), between Acâş and Tăşnad railway stations , at km 33+460, in the running of freight train no. 60705 413 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA), a fire broke out at hauling locomotive DA 1092.	i	ongoing investigation
41	13.12.2025	In the railway county Timişoara, track section Simeria - Arad (electrified double-track line), in Câmpuri Surduc railway station , the freight train no. 67426, hauled by locomotive EA 059 (got by the freight railway undertaking PSP Cargo Group SA) passed on danger the home signal X.	iii	20.03.2026
42	22.12.2025	In the railway county Bucureşti, in Bucureşti Nord railway station , the last wagon from the composition of passenger train no. 1654 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA) struck and damaged the distribution boxes related to point heaters no. 5, 9, 10 and 11, by.	iii	04.02.2026
43	28.12.2025	In the railway county Craiova, on the track section Caracal – Piatra Olt (non-electrified single-track line), in Romula railway station , the freight train no. 67216, hauled by locomotive DA 2008 (got by the railway undertaking Vest Trans Rail SRL)t passed on danger the exit signal Y, and continued its running on the open line Romula – Vlădueni, which was occupied by Regio passenger train no. 2522 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA).	iii	06.07.2026

(1) **Legal basis of the investigation:** i = According to the Safety Directive, ii= Upon the national legal basis (that covers the possible areas excluded by the art.2, paragraph 2 of the Safety Directive), iii= Optional – other criteria (National norms/regulations, to which the Safety Directive does not refer).

3.3. Researches (or safety surveys) completed or ordered in 2025 Surveys ordered in 2024 and completed in 2025

Order date	Study name (classification type, localization)	Legal basis of the investigation (1)	Complementary data
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(1) **Legal basis of the investigation:** i = According to the Safety Directive, ii= Upon the national legal basis (that covers the possible areas excluded by the art.2, paragraph 2 of the Safety Directive), iii= Optional – other criteria (National norms/regulations, to which the Safety Directive does not refer).

Surveys ordered in 2025 and completed in 2025

Order date	Study name (classification type, localization)	Legal basis of the investigation (1)	Complementary data
15.01.2025	Determination of the chemical composition, macroscopic analysis of the fracture surface and microscopic analysis for bogie no. 1 originating from freight wagon no. 37809341143-7. Expert analysis carried out as part of the investigation into the railway accident that occurred on 7 th September 2024, at 15:30 o'clock, in the railway county Constanța, track section Medgidia – Constanța (electrified double-track line), in Valu lui Traian railway station, at km 215+350, in the running of freight train no. 68205006 (got by the freight railway undertaking Constantin Grup Rail Logistic SRL), involving the derailment of wagon no. 37809341143-7, by the first bogie, in the running direction.	i	27.05.2025

Studies ordered in 2025 and remaining incomplete by the end of the year

Order date	Study name (classification type, localization)	Legal basis of the investigation (1)	Complementary data
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(1) **Legal basis of the investigation:** i = According to the Safety Directive, ii= Upon the national legal basis (that covers the possible areas excluded by the art.2, paragraph 2 of the Safety Directive), iii= Optional – other criteria (National norms/regulations, to which the Safety Directive does not refer).

3.4. Summary of the investigations completed and closed in 2025

During 2025, a number of **53** investigation actions were completed and closed, of which **1** was opened in 2023, **34** were investigations opened in 2024, the remaining **18** being opened during 2025.

A synthetic situation regarding the **53** investigation reports completed and closed during 2025 is presented below.

3.4.1. The railway accident occurred on 25th March 2023, at 19:20 o'clock, in the railway county Galați, in Galați railway station, during the shunting operation for introducing locomotive EC 91530430128-5 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFC „CFR CĂLĂTORI” SA “CFR Călători” SA – Galați engine shed), onto line no. 4, occupied by passenger coach no. 50532616090-8, in order to form Regio passenger train no. 7576, by the violent collision of the passenger coach by this locomotive.

The Investigation Report was completed on 13th February 2025.

Causal factor

The uncommanded and uncontrollable increase of the graduator steps and, implicitly, the increase of the speed of locomotive EC 128, during the shunting operation for introducing it onto line no. 4 of Galați railway station, occupied by coach no. 50532616090-8, due to the improper functioning of the SAGMA-type graduator operating equipment of the locomotive.

Contributing factors

- the use of the locomotive under the conditions in which the position of cut-out switch F2.8 (cut-out switch for short-circuiting pressure relays P5 and P6) no longer ensured the disconnection of the cut-out switch in the event of the pneumatic brake being operated;
- failure to disconnect the cut-out switch, in order to cancel the tractive effort upon the occurrence of the phenomenon of uncommanded and uncontrollable increase of the locomotive speed, after the controller was handled to the “0” position.

Systemic factor

the existence of deficiencies in the activity of identifying, assessing and keeping under control the hazards in the operation of locomotives.

Measures taken during the investigation

After the occurrence of the accident, SNTFC „CFR CĂLĂTORI” SA ordered the following measures:

on 28th March 2023, by document no. DMR2/2/116/28.03.2023, it ordered the retraining of the locomotive staff regarding the way to proceed in the event of failures in the control circuit of the graduator, when the effect of the commands for “Maintaining” or “Decreasing” the voltage steps for the traction motors is contrary to the commands given, and the electric locomotive remains in traction mode. In this situation, “soon after handling the driver’s automatic brake valve to the emergency braking position, the cut-out switch shall be disconnected by operating button F7, respectively F8”;

- on 31st March 2023, by document no. DMR2/2/119/31.03.2023, the withdrawal from operation of all electric locomotives fitted with SAGMA-type graduator operating equipment got by SNTFC „CFR CĂLĂTORI” SA was ordered, their use for hauling trains or in shunting operations being prohibited;

- considering the circumstances in which the railway accidents and incidents occurred, before the occurrence of the accident of 25th March 2023, at the level of SNTFC „CFR CĂLĂTORI” SA, the measure was taken to carry out risk analyses, in order to revise the safety measures.

Following the occurrence of this accident, considering the safety measures communicated by the Romanian Railway Safety Authority to SNTFC „CFR CĂLĂTORI” SA by document no. 2000/692/29.03.2023, for a safe operation of the railway system, the withdrawal from operation of all electric locomotives fitted with SAGMA-type graduator operating equipment belonging to SNTFC „CFR CĂLĂTORI” SA was ordered with immediate effect, by document no. DMR2/2/119/31.03.2023, their use for hauling trains or in shunting operations being also prohibited.

Additional remarks

During the course of the investigation, certain non-conformities were identified, without relevance to the causes and factors which led to the occurrence of the accident, as follows:

1. The scheduled repairs to locomotive EC 128 were not carried out in accordance with the provisions of Railway Standard 67-006:2011 “Railway vehicles. Types of scheduled inspections and repairs. Time norms or kilometre norms for carrying out scheduled inspections and repairs”, approved by Order of the Minister of Transport and Infrastructure no. 315/2011, amended and supplemented by Order of the Minister of Transport and Infrastructure no. 1359/2012, Order no. 1255/2014, Order no. 1187/2018, Order no. 1744/2020 and Order no. 2159/2020, respectively the time/kilometre norms at which they had to be carried out were not complied with.

2. On 31st October 2022, in the hauling of passenger train no. 5216 on the track section Adjud - Buzău, after the departure of the train from railway station Domnești Târg, around 17:11 o'clock, an exceeding by 17 km/h of the maximum admitted speed provided in the working timetable for that train, which was 100 km/h, was recorded.

3. This case represents a railway incident, in accordance with the provisions of the Investigation Regulation, and was dealt with within this report.

4. On 27th December 2022, in the hauling of passenger train no. 5302 on the track section Mărașești – Buzău, after the departure of the train from railway station Putna Seacă, about 07:12 o'clock, an exceeding by 13 km/h of the maximum admitted speed provided in the working timetable for that train, which was 80 km/h, was recorded.

5. This case represents a railway incident, in accordance with the provisions of the Investigation Regulation, and was dealt with within this report.

6. On the occasion of the checks carried out on locomotive EC 128, it was found that, in driving cab A, switch F2.8 was out of operation, but its position did not influence the functioning mode of the circuit of this button. This situation should have been remedied on the occasion of the scheduled inspections, according to the provisions of the technical specification Code: ST 31/2016 “Scheduled inspections type Pth3, RT, R1, R2, winter preparations and accidental repairs to 3400/3860/4400/5100/6600 kW electric locomotives”.

Safety recommendations

Considering the causal, contributing and systemic factors identified during the investigation, as well as the measures already adopted after the occurrence of the accident, in order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents or incidents in the future, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 26, paragraph (2) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 on railway safety, the investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendations, addressed to the Romanian Railway Safety Authority - ASFR -, which, within the limits of its competences, takes the necessary measures to ensure that the safety recommendations issued by AGIFER are taken into consideration and, where appropriate, are followed. According to the provisions of Art. 26, paragraph (3) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019, ASFR shall report periodically, at least once every 6 months, to AGIFER on the measures taken or planned as a consequence of the recommendations issued.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 452/1

Since, during the investigation, deficiencies were found regarding the way of functioning of the SAGMA equipment, which is a critical railway product classified since 2017 in risk class 1A – railway products whose improper functioning/failure entails a loss of transport safety and security, AGIFER considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 452/1

ASFR shall request all railway transport operators to identify whether there are locomotives in their own fleet fitted with SAGMA-type graduator operating systems produced by SC INDA SRL and to order the assessment/reassessment of the hazards generated by the use of this equipment and the taking of measures accordingly for keeping these hazards under control.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 452/2

Since, during the investigation, deficiencies were found within SNTFC „CFR CĂLĂTORI” SA “CFR Călători” SA regarding the activity of identifying, assessing and keeping under control the hazards in the operation of locomotives, AGIFER considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 452/2

SNTFC „CFR CĂLĂTORI” SA “CFR Călători” SA shall reassess the hazard represented by *“failure to comply with the obligations and responsibilities of the personnel with responsibilities in railway traffic safety”* and shall assess the hazard represented by *“improper functioning/failure of the gradiator operating equipment of electric locomotives and, in particular, of those fitted with SAGMA-type equipment”*, respectively shall order measures accordingly for keeping these hazards under control.

3.4.2. The railway accident occurred on 16th January 2024, at 01:23 o'clock, in the railway county Craiova, track section Craiova – Caracal (electrified double-track line) at the Y end of railway station Leu, in the area of turnout no. 16, by the derailment of a number of 11 wagons, of which 2 overturned, from the composition of freight train no. 68322 (got by the railway undertaking SC Global Rail Solutions SRL).

The Investigation Report was completed on 10th January 2025.

Causal factor

The multiple and complete breakage of the rail located on the right-hand running line, in the running direction of the train, of the first track panel related to turnout no. 16(from km 186+120.50 up to its last rail joint — the joint at the rear of turnout) under the action of the dynamic forces transmitted to the track by the rolling stock, breakage which was generated by keeping the rails in track far beyond their operating limit and by exceeding the regulated transport capacity of those rails.

Contributing factor

Exceeding the deadlines, provided by the applicable legislation, for carrying out the scheduled full track maintenance on the track in the area of the occurrence of the railway accident.

Systemic factors

- provision of an improper volume of material and human resources, in relation to the necessary one, for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the track and maintaining the track geometry within the accepted tolerances;
- ineffective management by the infrastructure manager of the risk associated with the hazard of keeping in track rails with category I defects or with exceeded accumulated tonnage.

Additional remarks

On the occasion of investigating this accident, on the section of line not affected by the derailment, preceding the multiple and complete breakage of the rail on the right-hand running line from the joint at km 186+120.50, several non-conformities were identified, representing deviations from the codes of practice, namely exceeding the admitted tolerances at the cross level, exceeding the admitted value of the track twist, exceeding the admitted value of 5 mm for the counter-cant of the outer rail, exceeding the track gauge variation of maximum 2 mm/m and the improper structure of the joints on the left-hand running line at km 186+121 and km 186+133, these being described in detail in Chapter 4 “Analysis of the accident”.

Considering the way in which the accident occurred, the investigation commission considers that the non-conformities presented above have no relevance in relation to the conclusions regarding the factors which determined the occurrence and the consequences of this railway accident.

Safety recommendations

Considering the causal, contributing and systemic factors identified during the investigation, as well as the measures already adopted after the occurrence of the incident, in order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents or incidents in the future, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 26, paragraph (2) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 on railway safety. According to the provisions of Art. 26, paragraph (3) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019, ASFR shall report periodically, at least once every 6 months, to AGIFER on the measures taken or planned as a consequence of the recommendations issued.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 477/1

Following the investigation carried out by AGIFER for the railway accident of similar nature presented in Chapter 4.e, accident which occurred in the railway county Craiova, on 17th February 2020, between railway stations Fărcașele and Drăgănești Olt, by the derailment of 13 wagons from the composition of freight train no. 34372 (got by the railway undertaking SC Constantin Grup SRL), the following safety recommendation was issued:

“The Romanian Railway Safety Authority - ASFR shall ensure that the public railway infrastructure manager assesses the risk associated with the hazard of failure to carry out on time the scheduled full track maintenance on the infrastructure, imposed by the codes of practice, and establishes measures for keeping it under control.”

By document no. 2330/40/27.04.2022, ASFR communicated the stage of implementation of the measures taken by the public railway infrastructure manager as a consequence of the safety recommendations issued by AGIFER, on the occasion of the completion of the investigation actions in 2021. Thus, the following measures taken were communicated:

Keeping under control the safety risks generated by the failure to carry out on time the scheduled full track maintenance requires the following measures:

- a) restriction of traffic speeds on areas with track gauge, level and alignment defects, according to the safety norms;
- b) limitation of the maximum running speeds of trains, with the inclusion of running-time allowances in the train diagram.

These measures, taken by railway county Craiova, although they have an influence on the impact, are not of such a nature as to reduce the probability of occurrence of accidents. At the same time, from the checks carried out, it resulted that in the Risk Register of railway county Craiova – Lines Division, document no. 22/3/11/04.01.2023, the risks associated with the hazard generated by the failure to carry out on time the scheduled full track maintenance on the infrastructure, imposed by the codes of practice, were not assessed. Considering the above-mentioned, AGIFER considers it appropriate to return to the safety recommendation issued on the occasion of the investigation of the accident which occurred on 17th February 2020 and to reissue the same safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 477/1

The public railway infrastructure manager shall reassess the risk associated with the hazard generated by the failure to carry out on time the scheduled full track maintenance on the infrastructure, imposed by the codes of practice, and shall establish measures which cause the reduction of the probability of occurrence of this hazard and keeping it under control.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 477/2

Following the analysis of the Risk Register – 2024 drawn up by the Lines Division – railway county Craiova for the lines department, the investigation commission found that no analysis was carried out regarding the assessment of the risk associated with the hazard generated by the failure to ensure the material and human resources for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the line and maintaining the track geometry within the accepted tolerances.

Considering the findings and conclusions of the investigation commission mentioned above, in order to prevent accidents which could occur under conditions similar to those presented in this report, AGIFER issues the following safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 477/2

The public railway infrastructure manager shall assess the risk associated with the hazard generated by the failure to ensure the material and human resources and shall establish viable safety measures for keeping these risks under control.

3.4.3 The railway accident occurred on 07th February 2024, in railway station Pantelimon, by the violent collision between light engine DA 180, which ran as train no. 86350, and the last wagon from the composition of freight train no. 58182106, stationary on track 2.

The Investigation Report was completed on 05th February 2025.

Causal factor

Failure to comply with the conditions for stabling train no. 86350 in the railway station and acceptance of the transition from the traffic system to shunting activity, without compliance with the conditions provided by the regulations in force.

Contributing factor

Not applicable.

Systemic factors

Not applicable.

Safety recommendations

Motivation for the absence of safety recommendations

The actions which constituted the causal factor represent deviations from the codes of practice and from keeping under control the risks associated with railway operations in connection with the application of the Safety Management System by the involved economic operators, which constitutes an obligation of each economic operator carrying out railway transport operations, once the Safety Authorization or the Single Safety Certificate has been obtained. Considering this aspect, the investigation commission does not consider that the issuing of safety recommendations is still necessary.

We mention that, even in the absence of safety recommendations, based on the findings made by the investigation commission, CNCF and GFR SA may order the safety measures which they consider necessary, for keeping under control the risk of occurrence of an accident as a result of failure to comply with the conditions for stabling a train in the station.²⁷

3.4.4. The accident occurred on the activity area of SC TMB “METROREX” SA, on 27th February 2024, at 19:06 o'clock, on metro line M1-M3, in the running of train no. 04, formed of electric metro trains 1121-2121, by passing entry signal Y of metro station Timpuri Noi in the stop position, the entry on the diverging section to line 1 of this station where metro train no. 17, formed of electric metro trains 1117-2117, was stabled, fact which caused the coupling of the two trains. The Investigation Report was completed on 24th February 2025.

Causal factors

- late taking of braking measures and carrying out a service braking an emergency braking of the train, fact which caused the passing of entry signal Y of metro station Timpuri Noi in the stop position, followed by the coupling of train no. 04 with train no. 17;
- wrong setting of the exit route for train no. 17, fact which allowed the entry of train no. 04 to line 1 of metro station Timpuri Noi, occupied by train no. 17, and then their coupling.

Contributing factors

- failure by the movement personnel to monitor the running of train no. 004 (which had the ATP equipment isolated);
- deficiencies which occurred in verbal communications through the radio communication equipment and through the operational telephone, under the conditions of the existence of a crisis situation.

Systemic factors

- failure by the designated personnel to apply the provisions of procedure PS – 1.1.2.1 – 07 – Internal and external communication, regarding the verification activities and the actions for improving the communication process;
- lack of detailed provisions regarding the way of carrying out verbal communications through the radio communication equipment and the operational telephone, which would cover the entire range of situations occurring in the operation of metro trains.

Safety recommendations

Considering the causal, contributing and systemic factors identified during the investigation, in order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents or incidents in the future, the investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendations, addressed to ASFR, which, within the limits of its competences, takes the necessary measures to ensure that the safety recommendations issued by AGIFER are taken into consideration and, where appropriate, are followed.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 480/1

As a result of the failure of train no. 42 at the exit from metro station Dristor 1, train no. 04 with passengers, which was running in ATP system between metro stations Mihai Bravu and Dristor 1, on running line I behind train no. 42, was stopped by the ATP-ATO equipment, in the subway, near metro station Dristor 1.

The movement personnel ordered the withdrawal from the subway of train no. 04 to metro station Mihai Bravu, to line 2.

The driver of train no. 04 changed the driving cab, departed in DEP mode, shunting, and after receiving the order from the head driver, isolated the ATP equipment of the train, so that the train

could be withdrawn from the subway in the shortest possible time, and ran up to line 2 of metro station Mihai Bravu.

After arriving in metro station Mihai Bravu, the driver of train no. 04 requested, through the radio communication equipment, the putting back into operation of the ATP equipment, without receiving any answer regarding its putting back into operation, so that train no. 04 remained further with the ATP equipment disconnected.

We mention that, at the moment of disconnecting the ATP equipment, there is no longer any technical barrier by which the train brakes automatically when passing a signal in the stop position.

Considering the above, the investigation commission analysed the existing regulations regarding the running of the train with the ATP equipment disconnected, finding that the disconnection of the ATP equipment and the running on certain distances are regulated only for the cases in which failures of the track circuits or failures of the on-board ATP equipment occur.

Safety recommendation no. 480/1

SC TMB “METROREX” SA shall carry out a risk analysis in order to assess the risks associated with the hazard represented by the running of trains with the on-board ATP equipment disconnected, for the cases in which the technical condition of the track circuits and of the ATP equipment is corresponding, and shall establish concrete measures for keeping these risks under control.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 480/2

The investigation revealed that the accident occurred as a result of errors, caused by communication deficiencies, both against the background of insufficient awareness by the execution personnel of the importance of complying with the communication formulas, and against the background of the lack of detailed regulations/procedures/guides regarding safety communication and the way of communication within its own railway traffic safety system (SPSC).

Safety recommendation no. 480/2

SC TMB “METROREX” SA shall carry out a risk analysis regarding errors in the safety communication process, following that, based on the results obtained, it shall draw up procedures/guides by which to ensure that the safety communication process is sufficiently detailed and effective, containing preset formulas and a hierarchy of those who communicate, and that the personnel who transmit and receive orders through the telephony and radio communication equipment are aware of the importance of complying with these formulas.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 480/3

The quality of communication through the radio communication equipment is dependent on the quality of the equipment used. The investigation showed that, in the case of this accident, soon after the failure of train no. 42, there were overlapping communications, on a single channel, between the shift supervisor for traffic and the drivers of the trains in running, the shift supervisors for traffic and the rescuers, the drivers supervisor and the drivers of train no. 42. Both from the recordings and from the statements of the questioned personnel, it resulted that, in situations of simultaneous communication on the same channel, the risk of misunderstanding a communication is high.

Safety recommendation no. 480/3

SC TMB “METROREX” SA shall analyse the possibility of equipping with radio communication equipment which ensures a higher quality of communication and the possibility of ensuring several communication channels, allocated for different types of communication.

3.4.5. The railway accident occurred on 01st March 2024, about 01:40 o'clock, in the railway county Craiova, track section Strehaia – Motru Est (electrified single-track line), between Strehaia and Jirov railway stations, at km 12+012, in the running of freight train no. 65094 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA), by the derailment of both axles of the first bogie, in the running direction, of wagon no. 81536653508-7, located the 3rd in the composition, from the locomotive.

The Investigation Report was completed on 26th February 2025.

Causal factor

The loosening of the connection between the bogie frame and the brake hanger, located on the left-hand side, relative to the running direction, of wheel no. 2 of freight wagon no. 81536653508-7, fact

which caused the detachment and falling of the brake beam of the wagon, followed by its striking by wheel no. 2 and the climbing by this wheel of the rail on the left-hand side of the track.

Contributing factor

The breakage of the safety strap for the brake beam related to wheel no. 2 during the running of freight train no. 65094.

Systemic factor

The lack of measures for keeping under control the risks associated with the hazard represented by the falling, during running, of a subassembly from a wagon in the composition of the train.

Additional remarks

On the occasion of carrying out the investigation action, the following safety issue was identified, which has no relevance to the conclusions regarding the causes of the accident:

- the admitted tolerances at the cross level were exceeded as follows: between reference points “-20” ÷ “-12”, the measured values being up to 8 mm higher than the maximum admitted limit, the maximum exceedance being recorded at point “-15”.

Safety recommendations

Considering the causal, contributing and systemic factors identified during the investigation, in order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents or incidents in the future, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 26, paragraph (2) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 on railway safety, the investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendations, addressed to the Romanian Railway Safety Authority - ASFR -, which, within the limits of its competences, takes the necessary measures to ensure that the safety recommendations issued by AGIFER are taken into consideration and, where appropriate, are followed. According to the provisions of Art. 26, paragraph (3) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019, ASFR shall report periodically, at least once every 6 months, to AGIFER on the measures taken or planned as a consequence of the recommendations issued.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 481/1

During the investigation action, it was found that the event occurred as a result of the falling of a subassembly (the brake beam) from wagon no. 81536653508-7, from the composition of freight train no. 65094, which was subsequently struck by wheel no. 2 of the same wagon. Considering the findings and conclusions of the investigation commission mentioned above, AGIFER considers it appropriate to address the following safety recommendation to ASFR:

Safety recommendation no. 481/1

The railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA shall reassess the risks associated with the hazard represented by the falling, during the running of the train, of a subassembly from a wagon in the composition of the train and shall order effective safety measures for keeping them under control.

3.4.6. The railway accident occurred on 13th March 2024, at 12:50 o'clock, in the railway county Galați, track section Buzău – Mărășești (electrified double-track line) between Zoița and Râmnicu Sărat railway stations, at km 158+875, in the running of freight train no. 66307 (got by the freight railway undertaking Grup Feroviar Român SA), by the derailment of wagon no. 83537963122-8, from the first bogie in the running direction.

The Investigation Report was completed on 06th March 2025.

Causal factor

The overheating of the axle box of wheel no. 2, which caused the liquefaction and burning of the grease, causing the seizing of the roller bearings, followed by the breakage of the axle journal due to the high temperature and the falling of the axle box of wheel no. 2 from wagon no. 83537963122-8, the 27th in the composition of the train, fact which caused the loss of the guiding capacity of the axle corresponding to wheels no. 1-2 and the derailment of both axles of the first bogie of this wagon.

Contributing factor

Failure to identify the overheated axle box by the traction personnel which serviced freight train no. 66307, on the occasion of the check carried out following the notification regarding the existence of a smoke emission at one of the wagons in the composition of the train, by the movements inspector from railway station Boboc.

Systemic factors

- omissions in the content of operational procedure “Risk Assessment of Relevant Processes”, code PS6.1-01, regarding the responsibilities of the driver and driver’s assistant positions, in connection with the risks generated by the hazard represented by abnormally heated axle boxes;
- absence from the lesson plan, for the driver and driver’s assistant positions, of the topic regarding the identification of the hazard represented by an abnormally heated axle box.

Additional remarks

On the occasion of carrying out the investigation action, the following safety issue was identified, which has no relevance to the conclusions regarding the causes of the accident:

The absence, from railway technical standard *NTF 81-003:2014 - Railway Vehicles. Technical Conditions for the Repair of Axle Boxes with Roller Bearings*, of provisions establishing the maximum service life for cylindrical roller bearings fitted to freight wagons (expressed in kilometric performance or years) although through UIC Leaflet 510-1, mentioned in the bibliography of *NTF 81-003:2014*, the service life of 40 years for 75% of the roller bearings is imposed as a reliability condition, and externally there are technical standards by which the duration of use of these roller bearings is limited (e.g. VPI maintenance technical standards).

Safety recommendations

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 482/1

During the investigation action, it was found that the railway undertaking Grup Feroviar Român SA did not identify the responsibilities of the driver and driver’s assistant positions, in connection with the risks generated by the hazard represented by abnormally heated axle boxes, and did not ensure the training of these positions in this field.

Safety recommendation no. 482/1

The railway undertaking Grup Feroviar Român SA shall carry out an analysis for establishing the necessary measures in order to improve the competence maintenance/improvement programme for the driver and driver’s assistant positions, in order to ensure that the operating staff will hold the necessary competences for detecting and recognizing the hazard represented by an abnormally heated axle box.

3.4.7. The railway accident occurred on 26th March 2024, at 15:25 o’clock, in the railway county Craiova, track section Băbeni – Alunu, non-electrified single-track line, between Berbești and Popești Vâlcea railway stations, at km 21+850, in the running of freight train no. 60566 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA), by the derailment from the first bogie, in the running direction, of freight wagon no. 81536653750-5, located the 13th wagon in the composition of the train. The Investigation Report was completed on 24th March 2025.

Causal factor

The existence, at the place of the occurrence of the accident, of improper wooden sleepers, which could no longer ensure the tightening of the coach screws for fixing the baseplates and preventing their displacement, thus favouring the increase of the track gauge value above the maximum value admitted in operation.

Contributing factor

Failure to replace the improper wooden sleepers identified on the curve where the accident occurred and recorded in the “record of sleepers with defects and wear and their replacement in 2023-2024”.

Systemic factors

- failure to carry out the periodic track overhaul works for ensuring the corresponding maintenance of the lines and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances;
- provision of an improper volume of material and human resources, in relation to the necessary one, for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the tracks;
- ineffective management of the risks associated with the hazard generated by keeping in track two or more neighbouring improper sleepers.

Measures taken during the investigation

CNCF informed that, following the occurrence of the railway accidents in 2024, a series of works were carried out for the restart of railway traffic, such as: replacement of wooden sleepers, switching

of worn rail in curve, lateral displacement, replacement of concrete sleepers, level correction by packing of sleepers, replacement of vertical bolts.

The Romanian Railway Safety Authority (ASFR) carried out, during the period 16th – 18th September 2024, a state inspection at railway county Craiova – L3 Râmnicu Vâlcea Section, following the occurrence of 5 railway accidents from the beginning of 2024 until the date of the inspection, on track section no. 204 Băbeni – Alunu.

CNCF “CFR” SA – railway county Craiova Lines Division, L3 Râmnicu Vâlcea Section, drew up and forwarded to ASFR a corrective measures plan with deadlines and responsibilities, measures plan no. 223/1/1322/15.10.2024, in which a series of actions at the level of railway county Craiova are presented. Measures plans for the improvement of railway safety were drawn up by RGSC București, measures plan no. 14/1202/05.09.2024, and RRSC Craiova, measures plan no. 201/1937/25.09.2024. The findings of the investigation commission on 16th July 2024, regarding the technical condition of the sleepers in the area of the occurrence of the investigated railway accident, highlighted that, after the reopening of traffic, neighbouring improper wooden sleepers and anchoring wires were kept in operation in order to block the displacement of the rail in the direction of increasing the track gauge value.

During the investigation action, it was found that the number of track workers within L Popești track district, on 01st January 2025, remained the same as the number of track workers on the date of the occurrence of the railway accident. In 2024, L Popești track district was supplied with 155 new wooden sleepers, and in October 2024 it registered 4508 improper wooden sleepers.

Additional remarks

On the occasion of carrying out the investigation action, the following *additional remarks* were made regarding certain deficiencies in the track maintenance activity:

1. the inspection and control programme at track district drawn up by L3 Râmnicu Vâlcea Track Section for 2024, cannot comply with Art. 2, Sheet no. 12 of Instruction no. 305/1997 regarding the establishment of the deadlines and the order in which track inspections must be carried out, which provides that the programme of detailed inspection of the track must be established so that the head of track section, together with the deputy head of track section, ensures, over a period of two months, the inspection of the entire maintenance section; because at the line maintenance section there is no personnel designated and authorised for the position of deputy head of track section;
2. the values of the superelevation of the track in curves were not determined by the public railway infrastructure manager, in accordance with the provisions of the “Instruction of norms and tolerances for the construction and maintenance of the track - standard-gauge lines no. 314/1989”.
3. the last verification of the track geometry with the track recording coach was carried out on 20th October 2022. In 2023 and 2024, until the date of the occurrence of the accident, verifications of the track geometry with the track recording coach or the track measurement trolley were not scheduled and carried out;
4. due to the lack of the necessary materials, on the date of the occurrence of the accident, on certain areas, the wear of the rails in track exceeded the admitted tolerances, km 15+000 ÷ km 15+380, km 18+300 ÷ km 18+600, km 24+400 ÷ km 24+870.

Safety recommendations

The railway accident occurred on 26th March 2024, at 15:25 o'clock, on track section Băbeni – Alunu, between Berbești and Popești Vâlcea railway stations was caused by the improper technical condition of the railway infrastructure, determined by the maintenance which was not carried out in accordance with the provisions of the codes of practice, reference/associated documents of the procedures within the Safety Management System at the level of the infrastructure manager.

From 2020 until the date of drafting the investigation report, on track section Băbeni – Alunu, 10 railway accidents occurred which had similar causes and factors.

One of the safety recommendations addressed to the Romanian Railway Safety Authority - ASFR was the analysis, through supervision actions, of the way in which CNCF “CFR” SA, as public railway infrastructure manager, ensures the conditions for the safety measures which it proposed for

keeping under control the associated hazards and risks, in connection with carrying out the maintenance of the public railway infrastructure, to be applicable.

Among the measures proposed by ASFR, following the state inspection at railway county Craiova – L3 Râmnicu Vâlcea Section, are:

- the organization shall act for maintaining and improving the Safety Management System, so that the railway safety processes are approached on the basis of managing the risks associated with them at all levels. In this respect, a corrective action plan shall be drawn up, with deadlines and responsibilities, which shall be forwarded to ASFR;
- the organization shall draw up and implement action plans for unacceptable cases of non-compliance with the requirements provided in the management system, in accordance with the provisions of Regulation (EU) no. 1078/2012, Art. 3, letters c) and d);
- the organization shall identify and analyses all operational, organizational and technical risks which are relevant for the nature and extent of the operations carried out. Among these risks are those generated by human and organizational factors, such as workload, work organization, fatigue or adequacy of procedures.

The investigation commission considers that the issuing of other recommendations is no longer necessary.

3.4.8. The railway accident occurred on 21st April 2024, at 01:35 o'clock, in the railway county Timișoara, track section Arad – Oradea (non-electrified double-track line) between Sântana and Utvinișu Nou railway stations, on running line II, at km 9+300, in the running of freight train no. 66290-020 (got by the railway undertaking SC Grup Feroviar Român SA), by a fire breaking out at hauling locomotive DA1544.

The Investigation Report was completed on 16th April 2025.

Causal factor

The occurrence of a short-circuit in the connection box of electric traction motor no. 4.

Contributing factors

- the presence, in the connection box of motor no. 4, of water, gas oil and oils originating from leaks in the diesel engine installations;
- the operation of locomotive DA1544 after exceeding the maximum time interval.

Systemic factors

- the ineffectiveness of the process of monitoring the measures established for keeping under control the risks corresponding to the hazard represented by “Flammable liquid leaks from locomotives”;
- the ineffectiveness of the process of monitoring the measures established for keeping under control the risks corresponding to the hazard represented by “Failure to comply with the time periods for carrying out scheduled repairs/inspections”;
- failure to identify the hazard related to “The operation of locomotives having an improper state of cleanliness in the area of the connection boxes of the traction motors of the locomotive”.

Safety recommendations

Considering the causal, contributing and systemic factors identified during the investigation, in order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents or incidents in the future, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 26, paragraph (2) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 on railway safety, the investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendations, addressed to ASFR, which, within the limits of its competences, takes the necessary measures to ensure that the safety recommendations issued by AGIFER are taken into consideration and, where appropriate, are followed.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 484/1

The fire breaking out at locomotive DA1544 occurred under the conditions in which the locomotive was operated with oil, gas oil and/or water leaks, thus increasing the probability of occurrence of a short-circuit followed by the ignition of these residues and the rapid spread of the fire.

Considering the fact that, during the investigation activity, it was found that the railway undertaking SC Grup Feroviar Român SA identified the hazard represented by “*The operation of locomotives with oil, gas oil and/or water leaks, respectively an improper state of cleanliness in the area of the*

connection boxes of the traction motors of the locomotive”, but the measures taken did not result in keeping this risk under control, in order to prevent accidents which could occur under conditions similar to those presented in this report, the investigation commission issues the following safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 484/1

Reassessment by the railway undertaking SC Grup Feroviar Român SA of the risk represented by *“The operation of locomotives with oil, gas oil and/or water leaks, respectively an improper state of cleanliness in the area of the connection boxes of the electric traction motors of the locomotive”* and establishment of effective measures for keeping under control this risk associated with the railway operations it carries out.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 484/2

The fire breaking out at locomotive DA1544 occurred under the conditions in which the locomotive was operated after exceeding the time norm for carrying out the scheduled repairs of the locomotive. Considering the fact that, during the investigation activity, it was found that the railway undertaking SC Grup Feroviar Român SA identified the hazard represented by *“Failure to comply with the time periods for carrying out scheduled repairs/inspections”*, but the measures taken did not result in keeping this risk under control, in order to prevent accidents which could occur under conditions similar to those presented in this report, the investigation commission issues the following safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 484/2

Reassessment by the railway undertaking SC Grup Feroviar Român SA of the risk represented by *“Failure to comply with the time periods for carrying out scheduled repairs/inspections”* and establishment of effective measures for keeping under control this risk associated with the railway operations it carries out.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 484/3

The fire breaking out at locomotive DA1544 occurred under the conditions in which the locomotive was operated having an improper state of cleanliness in the area of the connection box of electric traction motor no. 4, thus increasing the probability of occurrence of a short-circuit followed by a fire.

Considering the fact that, during the investigation activity, it was found that the railway undertaking SC Grup Feroviar Român SA did not identify the hazard represented by *“The operation of locomotives having an improper state of cleanliness in the area of the connection boxes of the electric traction motors of the locomotive”*, and the necessary measures for keeping this risk under control were not taken, in order to prevent accidents which could occur under conditions similar to those presented in this report, the investigation commission issues the following safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 484/3

Assessment by the railway undertaking SC Grup Feroviar Român SA of the risks associated with the railway operations it carries out and establishment of effective measures for keeping under control the risk represented by *“The operation of locomotives having an improper state of cleanliness in the area of the connection boxes of the traction motors of the locomotive”*.

We mention that, although the issued safety recommendations concern the activity of the railway undertaking SC Grup Feroviar Român SA, this being analysed during the investigation of this railway accident, and considering the existence of cases which had similar causes, presented in Chapter 4.e, these recommendations are not limitative and may also be extended to other railway undertakings where ASFR finds similar gaps on the occasion of supervision activities.

3.4.9. The railway accident occurred on 15th May 2024, at 20:25 o'clock, on track section București – Constanța (electrified double-track line), on running line I, between railway stations Dorobanțu and Basarabi, at km 206+400, in the running of freight train no. 66363815 (got by the railway undertaking Grup Feroviar Român SA), by a fire breaking out at hauling locomotive DA 1504.

The Investigation Report was completed on 15th April 2025.

Causal factor

The short-circuiting of the armature winding of the main generator, fact which caused the formation of the ring of fire in the collector chamber of the main generator.

Contributing factor

Failure to detect the existing failure at the armature of the main generator in the process of carrying out the R1-type scheduled inspection on locomotive DA 1504, inspection which had to ensure the technical potential necessary for carrying out railway transport in conditions of safety, comfort and traffic security.

Systemic factor

The ineffectiveness of the measures established for keeping under control the risks corresponding to the hazard of “insufficient monitoring of the processes of the function of carrying out maintenance by the performer”.

Measures taken during the investigation

According to document no. G.3.3.1/13513.02.2025, it communicated that it has under implementation, over a period of 5 years, 2021–2025, the following programme of measures:

1. carrying out the inspection programme;
2. reducing the fire risk by replacing the power cabling with new fire-resistant cabling.

Additional remarks

According to Railway Normative 67-006:2011 “Railway vehicles. Types of scheduled inspections and repairs. Time norms or kilometre norms for carrying out scheduled inspections and repairs”, approved by Order of the Minister of Transport and Infrastructure no. 315/2011, amended and supplemented by Order of the Minister of Transport and Infrastructure no. 1359/2012, Order no. 1255/2014, Order no. 1187/2018, Order no. 1744/2020 and Order no. 2159/2020, the scheduled inspections must be carried out at a maximum interval of 60 days or 15,000–25,000 km.

Considering that the locomotive carried out the RT-type scheduled inspection on 05th March 2024 and until 15th May 2024, when it carried out the R1-type scheduled inspection, a number of 70 days passed, of which 7 days it had stationary time, an exceedance by 3 days of the maximum admitted duration between two scheduled inspections is found.

Safety recommendations

Considering the causal, contributing and systemic factors identified during the investigation, as well as the measures adopted after the occurrence of the accident, in order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents or incidents in the future, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 26, paragraph (2) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 on railway safety, the investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendations, addressed to ASFR, which, within the limits of its competences, takes the necessary measures to ensure that the safety recommendations issued by AGIFER are taken into consideration and, where appropriate, are followed.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 485/1

Since, during the investigation, deficiencies were found regarding the process of monitoring the measures established for keeping under control the risks corresponding to the hazard of “failure to comply with the cycle of inspections and repairs to the rolling stock”, AGIFER considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 485/1

The freight railway undertaking Grup Feroviar Român SA shall reassess the risk associated with the hazard generated by “failure to comply with the cycle of inspections and repairs to the rolling stock”, imposed by the codes of practice, and shall establish concrete measures which cause the reduction of the probability of occurrence of this hazard.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 485/2

Since, during the investigation, deficiencies were found regarding the process of monitoring, by Grup Feroviar Român SA, of the activity of carrying out the maintenance of locomotives by Logistică Feroviară SRL, presented at point 4.d. “Feedback and control mechanisms, including risk management and safety management, as well as monitoring processes”, for keeping under control the risks corresponding to the hazard of “insufficient monitoring of the processes of the function of carrying out maintenance by the performer”, AGIFER considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 485/2

The freight railway undertaking Grup Feroviar Român SA shall reassess the risk associated with the hazard generated by “insufficient monitoring of the processes of the function of carrying out maintenance by the performer” and shall establish concrete measures which cause the reduction of the probability of occurrence of this hazard.

3.4.10. The railway accident occurred on 08th June 2024, at 12:55 o'clock, in the railway county București, track section Ploiești Sud – Buzău (electrified double-track line), during the stabling on line no. 10 B, on the diverging section, in railway station Ploiești Est, of freight train no. 77280 (got by the railway undertaking SC VEST TRANS RAIL SRL), by the derailment of hauling locomotive DHC 938 from all four axles, when passing over turnout no. 37 operated in the “diverging” position. The Investigation Report was completed on 08th May 2025.

Causal factor

The formation of a lateral joint mismatch of 20 mm due to the breakage of the lignofolium fishplates at the insulated joint on the closure rails within turnout no. 37, as a result of the existence within it of a group of consecutive improper special wooden sleepers, whose technical condition could no longer ensure a secure fastening of the baseplates which ensured the support of the rails and the maintaining of the track gauge.

Contributing factor

The inefficiency of the control activities carried out at Track District no. 4 Ploiești Est by the personnel with duties in this respect.

Systemic factors

- provision of an improper volume of material and human resources, in relation to the necessary one, for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the line and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances;
- ineffective management of the risk represented by “Derailment of rolling stock”, generated by “failure to carry out the necessary works” / “keeping in track improper sleepers”.

Measures taken during the investigation

After the occurrence of the railway accident on turnout no. 37 in railway station Ploiești Est, traffic was closed on line no. 10 B until the supply of special sleepers and the replacement of the improper ones.

Safety recommendations

Motivation for the absence of safety recommendations

The railway accident occurred on 08th June 2024, during the stabling of freight train no. 77280 on line no. 10 B, on the diverging section, in railway station Ploiești Est, on turnout no. 37, was generated by the improper technical condition of the railway infrastructure.

During the investigation, it was found that the improper technical condition of the track was determined by improper maintenance, which was not carried out in accordance with the provisions of the codes of practice, reference documents associated with the procedures within the Safety Management System at the level of the infrastructure manager.

Taking into consideration the railway events of similar nature which occurred on the railway network managed by CNCF, presented in Chapter 4.e “Previous accidents or incidents of similar nature”, and ASFR’s reply to the draft investigation report of this accident, sent to AGIFER by document no. 2010/943 of 28th April 2025, reply by which ASFR communicated that, in the case of the accident occurred on 01st April 2022 in railway station Turceni, in the area of cross-over no. 28-38/44, the issued recommendation was implemented, the investigation commission considers that the issuing of other recommendations of similar nature is no longer necessary.

We mention that, even in the absence of new railway safety recommendations, based on the analysis made by the investigation commission following the non-conformities found, CNCF may order the safety measures which it considers necessary for keeping under control the risk of occurrence of derailments.

3.4.11. The railway accident occurred on 11th June 2024, at 16:21 o'clock, in the railway county Craiova, track section Roșiori Nord – Videle (electrified double-track line), on running line II, between Roșiori Nord and Atârnați railway stations, at km 94+807, in the running of InterRegio

passenger train no. 1596 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA), by the derailment of 2 coaches from the composition of the train (each from one bogie — the second one in the running direction from each coach).

The Investigation Report was completed on 20th May 2025.

Causal factor

The loss of stability of the rail-sleeper frame, under the conditions of the increase of the temperature in the rail, due to the improper condition of the track on the section of line where the derailment occurred, condition generated by:

- the existence in track, at the place of the occurrence of the accident, of a group of consecutive improper normal wooden sleepers which did not ensure the fastening of the rails and the maintaining of the track geometry within the limits of the admitted tolerances;
- the lack of crushed stone ballast at the ends of the sleepers over the minimum distance established by the code of practice.

This caused the transversal deformation of the track (track buckling) by the lateral displacement of the rail-sleeper frame towards the outside of the track, on the right-hand side of the running direction of the train, with a chord length of the deformation wave of 20.00 m and with the maximum value of the deformation versine of 54.60 cm.

Contributing factors

- the existence, in the area where the derailment occurred, of counter-cant irregularities and track twist above the maximum value admitted in operation;
- exceeding the tolerances admitted in operation at the track gauge and at the track gauge variation in the area of the occurrence of the railway accident.

Systemic factors

1. provision of an improper volume of material and human resources, in relation to the necessary one, for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the line and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances;
2. failure by CNCF “CFR” SA to identify the hazards generated by:
 - the loss of stability of the rail-sleeper frame under the action of temperature variations at the continuously welded rail track;
 - the operation of the continuously welded rail track for sections fixed at temperatures higher than 27°C;
 - failure to ensure the corresponding dimensions of the crushed stone ballast prism.

Safety recommendations

Considering the causal, contributing and systemic factors identified during the investigation, as well as the measures already adopted after the occurrence of the incident, in order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents or incidents in the future, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 26, paragraph (2) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 on railway safety, the investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation, addressed to ASFR, which, within the limits of its competences, takes the necessary measures to ensure that it is taken into consideration and, where appropriate, followed.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 487/1

During the investigation, several non-conformities were found regarding the ensuring of a normal operating regime of the continuously welded rail track on the alignment section where the railway accident occurred. Upon checking the documents within the Safety Management System, it was found that CNCF “CFR” SA did not identify the hazards generated by:

- the loss of stability of the rail-sleeper frame under the action of temperature variations at the continuously welded rail track;
- the operation of the continuously welded rail track for sections fixed at temperatures higher than 27°C;
- failure to ensure the corresponding dimensions of the crushed stone ballast prism,

for which reason AGIFER considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 487/1

The public railway infrastructure manager - CNCF “CFR” SA shall assess the risks associated with the hazards generated by:

- the loss of stability of the rail-sleeper frame under the action of temperature variations at the continuously welded rail track;
- the operation of the continuously welded rail track for sections fixed at temperatures higher than 27°C;
- failure to ensure the corresponding dimensions of the crushed stone ballast prism and shall establish effective safety measures for keeping these risks under control.

3.4.12. The railway accident occurred on 13th July 2024, in the railway county Braşov, track section Braşov – Vânători (electrified double-track line), between railway stations Rupea and Racoş, by the derailment of both axles of the first bogie in the running direction of the train, of the 3rd coach from the composition of passenger train no. 347 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA).

The Investigation Report was completed on 09th July 2025.

Causal factor

The climbing of the outer rail of the left-hand curve, in the running direction of the train, by the guiding wheel of the first axle of coach no. 61532190038-8, due to the increase of the ratio between the guiding force and the load acting on this wheel, thus exceeding the derailment stability limit, as a result of the combination of the following non-conformities of the track geometry:

- the existence in track, in the area of the place of the occurrence of the accident, within the constant-radius curve, of a section where the track twist ramp exceeded the maximum value admitted for the running of trains, fact which caused the unloading of load of the right-hand wheel of the first axle;
- exceeding the track gauge variation between the points preceding the derailment point, fact which caused the increase of the guiding force;
- exceeding the tolerances admitted in operation for the values of the neighbouring versines and of the difference between the minimum and maximum versines on the curve, fact which caused the increase of the guiding force.

Contributing factors

- exceeding the deadlines provided by the applicable legislation for carrying out the periodic line overhaul works in the area of the occurrence of the accident, maintaining the high number of improper sleepers;
- carrying out the detailed inspection of the curves on the running lines and direct lines in railway stations by an incomplete commission, without the district inspector and the representative of the management of the line section being part of it, and at time intervals longer than those provided by the codes of practice, fact which favoured the decrease of the effectiveness of this activity and caused the existing defects of the track geometry not to be identified;
- failure to identify in due time the deficiencies in the track superstructure, as a result of the failure to carry out the measurements/checks of the track superstructure with a speed restriction of 30 km/h, by the personnel with responsibilities in railway traffic safety, within the deadlines and in the order specified in the codes of practice.

Systemic factors

- failure by CNCF “CFR” SA to ensure the necessary personnel for the positions with responsibilities in railway traffic safety (ganger, foreman gangers, district inspector);
- provision of an improper volume of material and human resources, in relation to the necessary one, for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the line and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances;
- defective/ineffective supervision/monitoring of the activity of the track district by the personnel with inspection and control responsibilities within L2 Sighişoara Section and railway county Braşov.

Additional remarks

On the occasion of carrying out the investigation action, the following additional remarks were made regarding certain deficiencies and shortcomings, without relevance to the causal, contributing or systemic factors of the occurrence of the accident:

1. In order to repair the line and remove the speed restriction of 30 km/h on the running line between railway station Racoş and railway station Rupea, between km 237+500 ÷ 238+450, area which includes the curve on which the railway accident occurred, CNCF “CFR” SA – railway county Braşov and SC SWIETELSKY CONSTRUCT SRL concluded, on **14th March 2024**, a contract for the consecutive replacement of wooden sleepers with concrete sleepers. In the contract, after the constitution of the performance guarantee by the performer, no concrete deadlines are provided for the purchaser for issuing the work commencement order, nor for handing over the site after issuing the work commencement order.
2. The investigation commission found the superficial drafting of the primary documents specific to railway maintenance, as follows:
 - following the works which destabilise the track, replacement of sleepers, rectification of track gauge, no measurements and interpretations of the expansion gaps were recorded in the site logbooks;
 - during the detailed inspections, for the works with heavy track machines, the measurements carried out were not entered in the permanent-way district logbook;
 - the values of the track gauge and cross level entered in the track district logbooks during the fortnightly inspections were not analysed, interpreted and are at different longitudinal measurement bases;
 - the defects recorded by the VMC - track recording coach - and TMC - testing and recording car - were not analysed on site, establishing the nature and causes which caused them; the evolution of the defects was not followed through measurements during the fortnightly inspections and the detailed inspections by the personnel with responsibilities in this respect;
 - during the detailed inspection of the curves, the vertical and lateral wear of the rails on the outer rail of the curve was measured, and the vertical wear of the rail on the inner rail was not measured. Also, the measured wear was not analysed, interpreted;
 - the working timetable sheets, Part II, from Racoş permanent-way district were not checked and signed in 2023 and 2024 by the person designated by the section management.
3. On the railway bridge at km 237+875 and on the track bed, check rails were not fitted and the bridge covering were incomplete.
4. According to the data communicated by Braşov Lines Division regarding the transported tonnage between railway station Racoş – railway station Rupea on running line II in 2022, it was 3.51 million gross tonnes, almost as much as between railway station Augustin – railway station Racoş, running line II, namely 3.53 million gross tonnes. For 2023, the transported tonnage between railway station Racoş – railway station Rupea, running line II, was 2.90 million gross tonnes, almost as much as between railway station Augustin – railway station Racoş, running line II, namely 2.91 million gross tonnes.

Running line II between railway station Racoş – railway station Rupea was permanently closed for works from 06th September 2022, the running of trains being carried out on running line I. The transported tonnage between railway station Racoş – railway station Rupea, running line I, in 2022 was 4.62 million gross tonnes, almost as much as between railway station Augustin – railway station Racoş, running line I, namely 4.63 million gross tonnes. For 2023, the transported tonnage between railway station Racoş – railway station Rupea, running line I, was 4.04 million gross tonnes, almost as much as between railway station Augustin – railway station Racoş, running line I, namely 4.05 million gross tonnes, without a significant increase compared to the line where the running was carried out on the two running lines.

The transported tonnage between railway station Racoş – railway station Rupea, running line I, should have been more than 4.62 million gross tonnes in 2022, considering that for almost 4 months, 06.09.2022 – 31.12.2022, the line was closed. The tonnages transported on the two running lines I and II between railway station Augustin – railway station Racoş, starting with 06.09.2022, between railway station Racoş – railway station Rupea, were carried out only on running line I.

The transported tonnage between railway station Racoş – railway station Rupea, running line I, should have been more than 4.04 million gross tonnes in 2023, considering that from 06.09.2022 – 31.12.2023 the line was closed. The tonnages transported on the two running lines I and II between railway station Augustin – railway station Racoş, starting with 01.01.2023, between railway station Racoş – railway station Rupea, were carried out only on running line I. The transported tonnage

between railway station Racoş – railway station Rupea on running line II should have been close to 0.

5. System Procedure “Drafting and Management of Job Descriptions” PS 0-5.3-01, edition 2, revision 1, dated 10.10.2018, is not complied with, in the sense that the job descriptions of the foreman gangers and of the track inspector from D1 Racoş were drafted and approved by the same person, head of track section.

Also, the personnel seconded from RLU Braşov Section for filling the vacant positions at D1 Racoş (L district inspector and L foreman ganger), were not handed over the job descriptions for the new positions from the district, for acknowledgement.

Safety recommendations

Motivation for the absence of safety recommendations

Both the factor which caused the accident and those which increased the probability of its occurrence by accelerating the effect in time represent deviations from the codes of practice and from keeping under control the risks associated with railway operations in connection with the application of the Safety Management System.

During the investigation, it was found that the improper technical condition of the track was determined by improper maintenance, which was not carried out in accordance with the provisions of the codes of practice (documents associated with the procedures within the Safety Management System at the level of the infrastructure manager).

Taking into consideration the above, as well as the railway events of similar nature which occurred, presented in Chapter 4.e, and taking into account the fact that, in those cases, safety recommendations were issued, of which 2 are under implementation, the commission considers that the issuing of other recommendations of similar nature is no longer necessary.

3.4.13. The railway incident occurred on 19th July 2024, in railway station Bucureşti Nord, during the running around shunting movement of the rake of coaches from which Regio passenger train no. 11034 had been formed (got by the railway undertaking SC Regio Călători SRL), from line no. 11 to section 074, in order to reposition locomotive BB 576 and form Regio passenger train no. 11037, by the violent collision between the locomotive and the stationary rake. Following the impact, 8 persons were transported to hospital with minor injuries and panic attacks, and another 7 persons received medical care at the scene of the incident.

The Investigation Report was completed on 03rd July 2025.

Causal factor

The human error which occurred in the process of driving and servicing locomotive BB 576 during the last shunting movement carried out, manifested by the delayed taking of braking measures in order to stop before the train rake which was stationary.

Contributing factor

The time constraints, generated by the delay in relation to the train diagram, increased the stress level on the driver and influenced his behaviour during the coupling shunting movement to RIO 05 rake.

Additional remarks

On the occasion of carrying out the investigation action, the following safety issues were identified, which have no causal or contributing connection with the occurrence of the accident:

1. The running around shunting movement of the locomotive of passenger train no. 11034 was carried out without drawing up a written shunting plan, the shunting movement being carried out following communication by radio communication station between the movements inspector on duty and the engine driver.
2. The hazard record register drawn up by the railway undertaking Regio Călători Braşov does not include any hazard related to the failure by the personnel who drive and service trains to comply with the obligations regarding the immediate notification of the occurrence of accidents/incidents.

Safety recommendations

Considering the findings included under point “5.b. Additional remarks”, in order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents or incidents in the future, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 26, paragraph (2) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 on railway safety, the

investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation, addressed to ASFR, which, within the limits of its competences, takes the necessary measures to ensure that the safety recommendations issued by AGIFER are taken into consideration and, where appropriate, followed.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 489/1

During the investigation, it was found, as mentioned under point “5.b. Additional remarks”, that the railway undertaking Regio Călători SRL did not identify and assess certain hazards which could have caused the increase of the severity of the incident, for which reason AGIFER considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 489/1

The reassessment by the railway undertaking Regio Călători Braşov of the risks associated with its own railway operations and the establishment and implementation of effective measures for keeping under control the hazards related to the failure by the personnel who drive and service trains to comply with the obligations regarding the immediate notification of the occurrence of accidents/incidents.

3.4.14. The railway accident occurred on 24th July 2024, about 11:10 o'clock, in the railway county Craiova, on the running line, between Berbeşti and Popeşti railway stations, at km 18+600, by the derailment of locomotive DA 913 hauling freight train no. 60566, got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA.

The Investigation Report was completed on 15th July 2025.

Causal factor

The climbing of the outer rail of the right-hand curve, in the running direction of the train, by the guiding wheel of the first axle of train engine DA 913, due to the increase of the ratio between the guiding force and the load acting on this wheel, thus exceeding the derailment stability limit, as a result of the combination of the following non-conformities of the track geometry:

- the existence in the area of the occurrence of the accident (within the constant-radius curve) of a section where the track twist ramp exceeded the maximum value admitted for the running of trains, fact which caused the unloading of weight of the right-hand wheel of the first axle;
- exceeding the tolerances admitted in operation for the values of the lateral wear of the rail on the outer rail of the curve, fact which caused the increase of the guiding force;
- exceeding the track gauge value and the track gauge variation in the area of the occurrence of the accident, within the constant-radius curve, fact which caused the increase of the guiding force;
- exceeding the tolerance admitted in operation for the difference between the minimum and maximum versines on the curve, fact which caused the increase of the guiding force.

Contributing factor

Exceeding the deadlines provided by the applicable legislation for carrying out the periodic line overhaul works in the area of the occurrence of the accident.

Systemic factors

- provision of an improper volume of material and human resources, in relation to the necessary one, for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the line and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances;
- ineffective management by the infrastructure manager of the risk associated with the hazard of exceeding the admitted tolerances of the track geometry.

Measures taken during the investigation

CNCF informed that, following the occurrence of the railway accidents in 2024, a series of works were carried out for resuming railway traffic, such as: replacement of wooden sleepers, inversion of worn rail in curve, lateral displacement of the line, replacement of concrete sleepers, level correction by packing of sleepers, replacement of vertical bolts.

Following the occurrence of 5 railway accidents from the beginning of 2024 until the date of the inspection, on track section no. 204 Băbeni – Alunu, the Romanian Railway Safety Authority - ASFR - carried out, during 16-18.09.2024, a state inspection at railway county Craiova – L3 Râmnicu Vâlcea Section.

CNCF “CFR” SA - railway county Craiova, Lines Division, L3 Râmnicu Vâlcea Section drew up and submitted to ASFR a corrective measures plan with deadlines and responsibilities, measures plan no.

223/1/1322/15.10.2024, in which a series of actions at the level of railway county Craiova are presented. Measures plans for improving railway safety were drawn up by RGSC București, measures plan no. 14/1202/05.09.2024, and RRSC Craiova, measures plan no. 201/1937/25.09.2024.

Additional remarks

On the occasion of carrying out the investigation action, the following *additional remarks* were made regarding certain deficiencies in the track maintenance activity:

1. the inspection and control programme at districts, drawn up by L3 Râmnicu Vâlcea Section for 2024, cannot comply with Art. 2, Sheet no. 12 of Instruction no. 305/1997 on establishing the deadlines and the order in which track inspections must be carried out, which provides that the programme of detailed inspection of the track must be established so that the head of track section, together with the deputy head of the track section, ensures, over a period of two months, the inspection of the entire maintenance section; because at the line maintenance section there is no personnel designated and authorised for the position of deputy section chief;
2. the values of the cant of the track in curves were not determined by the public railway infrastructure manager, in accordance with the provisions of “Instruction on norms and tolerances for track construction and maintenance - standard gauge lines no. 314/1989”;
3. the last verification of the track geometry with the track recording coach was carried out on 20.10.2022. In 2023 and 2024, until the date of the occurrence of the accident, verifications of the track geometry with the track recording coach or the track measurement trolley were not scheduled and carried out;
4. due to the lack of the necessary materials, on the date of the occurrence of the accident, in certain areas, the wear of the rails in track exceeded the admitted tolerances, km 15+000 ÷ km 15+380; km 18+300 ÷ km 18+600; km 24+400 ÷ km 24+870.

Safety recommendations

Motivation for the absence of safety recommendations

The railway accident occurred on 24th July 2024, in the running of freight train no. 60566, was caused by the improper technical condition of the railway infrastructure.

During the investigation, it was found that the improper technical condition of the track was determined by improper maintenance, which was not carried out in accordance with the provisions of the codes of practice (reference/associated documents of the procedures within the Safety Management System at the level of the infrastructure manager), against the background of the provision of an improper volume of material and human resources, in relation to the necessary one. Taking into consideration the railway events of similar nature which occurred in the railway county Craiova, presented in *Chapter 4.e Previous accidents or incidents of similar nature*, for which AGIFER also issued safety recommendations, as well as the measures taken after the occurrence of the accident, presented in *Chapter 5.b Measures taken since the occurrence of the accident*, the investigation commission considers that the issuing of other recommendations of similar nature is no longer necessary.

We mention that, even in the absence of new safety recommendations, based on the remarks made by the investigation commission following the non-conformities found, CNCF may order the safety measures which it considers necessary for keeping under control the risk of occurrence of a derailment.

3.4.15. The railway accident occurred on 25th July 2024, in the railway county Timișoara, track section Aradu Nou – Periam (non-interoperable section managed by SC RC-CF Trans Brașov SRL - non-electrified single-track line), between Aradu Nou and Zădăreni railway stations, at km 1+095.50, in the running of freight train no. 66143 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA), by the derailment of both axles of the first bogie, in the running direction, of the first wagon from the composition of the train.

The Investigation Report was completed on 14th July 2025.

Causal factor

The existence in track, at the place of the occurrence of the railway accident, of a group of consecutive improper normal wooden sleepers, whose technical condition could no longer ensure a secure

fastening of the baseplates, resulting in the exceeding of the maximum admitted limit of the track gauge in operation, thus causing the loss of the supporting and guiding capacity of the rails under the dynamic action of the rolling stock.

Contributing factor

Carrying out the inspections and checks without recording all deficiencies, without establishing the appropriate measures and deadlines for remediation, fact which caused the keeping in track of a group of improper normal wooden sleepers.

Systemic factor

- provision of an improper volume of material and human resources, in relation to the necessary one, for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the line and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances;
- ineffective management by the infrastructure manager of the risk associated with the hazards of “Exceeding the maximum admitted value of the track gauge” and “Keeping improper wooden sleepers in track”.

Safety recommendations

Motivation for the absence of safety recommendations

The railway accident occurred on 25th July 2024, in the running of freight train no. 66143, between railway station Aradu Nou and railway station Zădăreni, at km 1+095.50, by the derailment of both axles of the first bogie, in the running direction, of the first wagon from the composition of the train, was caused by the improper technical condition of the railway infrastructure.

During the investigation, it was found that the improper technical condition of the track was determined by improper maintenance, which was not carried out in accordance with the provisions of the codes of practice, reference/associated documents of the procedures within the Safety Management System at the level of the infrastructure manager.

Taking into consideration that, in the case of the railway event occurred on 18th April 2023 between railway station Sânnicolau Mare and railway station Cenad, presented in *Chapter 4.e Previous accidents or incidents of similar nature*, AGIFER identified similar issues and issued a safety recommendation, for which ASFR, on 20th January 2025 (about 6 months after the occurrence of the accident which took place between railway station Aradu Nou and railway station Zădăreni) by letter no. 2010/69, communicated that the issued recommendation had been implemented, the investigation commission considers that the issuing of other recommendations of similar nature is no longer necessary.

We mention that, in the absence of safety recommendations, based on the remarks made by the investigation commission following the non-conformities found, the non-interoperable railway infrastructure manager RC-CF Trans may order the safety measures which it considers necessary for keeping under control the risk of occurrence of a derailment.

3.4.16. The railway accident occurred on 14th August 2024, at 14:55 o'clock, in the railway county Craiova, track section Alunu – Băbeni (non-electrified single-track line), between railway stations Popești and Berbești, in the running of train no. 86077, formed of two light engines, DA 913 and DA 1183, by the derailment of the first engine - DA 913 by the first axle, in the running direction of the train.

The Investigation Report was completed on 11th August 2025.

Causal factor

The climbing of the outer rail of the left-hand curve, in the running direction of the train, by the guiding wheel of the first axle of the first engine DA 913, occurred due to exceeding the derailment stability limit, as a result of the combination of the following non-conformities of the track geometry:

- the existence in track, in the area of the occurrence of the accident (within the constant-radius curve) of a section where the track twist ramp exceeded the maximum value admitted for the running of trains;
- exceeding the tolerances admitted in operation for the difference between the measured values of the neighbouring versines and between the maximum and minimum versines;
- the existence on the outer rail of a lateral wear of the rail head whose height exceeded the starting point of the connection of the side face with the rail head shoulder;

- exceeding the tolerances admitted in operation for the value of the track gauge and its variation.

Contributing factor

Failure to carry out the periodic line overhaul works for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the lines and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances.

Systemic factors

- provision of an improper volume of material and human resources, in relation to the necessary one, for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the line and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances;
- ineffective management of the risk associated with the hazard of exceeding the admitted tolerances of the track geometry.

Measures taken during the investigation

CNCF informed that, after the occurrence of the railway accidents in 2024, on this track section, a series of works were carried out for resuming railway traffic, such as: replacement of wooden sleepers, inversion of worn rail in curve, lateral displacement of the line, replacement of concrete sleepers, level correction by packing of sleepers, replacement of vertical bolts.

The Romanian Railway Safety Authority - ASFR - carried out, during 16-18.09.2024, a state inspection at railway county Craiova – L3 Râmnicu Vâlcea Section, following the occurrence of 5 railway accidents from the beginning of 2024 until the date of the inspection, on track section no. 204 Băbeni – Alunu.

CNCF “CFR” SA - railway county Craiova, Lines Division, L3 Râmnicu Vâlcea Section drew up and submitted to ASFR a corrective measures plan with deadlines and responsibilities, measures plan no. 223/1/1322/15.10.2024, in which a series of actions at the level of railway county Craiova are presented. Measures plans for improving railway safety were drawn up by RGSC București, measures plan no. 14/1202/05.09.2024, and RRSC Craiova, measures plan no. 201/1937/25.09.2024.

Additional remarks

On the occasion of carrying out the investigation action, the following *additional remarks* were made regarding certain deficiencies in the track maintenance activity:

1. the inspection and control programme at districts, drawn up by L3 Râmnicu Vâlcea Section for 2024, cannot comply with Art. 2, Sheet no. 12 of Instruction no. 305/1997 on establishing the deadlines and the order in which track inspections must be carried out, which provides that the programme of detailed inspection of the track must be established so that the section chief, together with the deputy section chief, ensures, over a period of two months, the verification of the entire maintenance section; because at the line maintenance section there is no personnel designated and authorised for the position of deputy section chief;
2. the values of the cant of the track in curves were not determined by the public railway infrastructure manager, in accordance with the provisions of “Instruction on norms and tolerances for track construction and maintenance - standard gauge lines no. 314/1989”;
3. the last verification of the track geometry with the track recording coach was carried out on 20.10.2022. In 2023 and 2024, until the date of the occurrence of the accident, no verifications of the track geometry with the track recording coach or the track measurement trolley were scheduled or carried out;
4. due to the lack of the necessary materials, on the date of the occurrence of the accident, in certain areas, the wear of the rails in track exceeded the admitted tolerances, km 15+000 ÷ km 15+380; km 18+300 ÷ km 18+600; km 24+400 ÷ km 24+870.

Safety recommendations

Motivation for the absence of safety recommendations

The railway accident occurred on 14th August 2024, in the running of freight train no. 86077, was caused by the improper technical condition of the railway infrastructure.

During the investigation, it was found that the improper technical condition of the track was determined by improper maintenance, which was not carried out in accordance with the provisions of the codes of practice (reference/associated documents of the procedures within the Safety

Management System at the level of the infrastructure manager), against the background of the provision of an improper volume of material and human resources, in relation to the necessary one. Taking into consideration the railway events of similar nature which occurred in the railway county Craiova, presented in Chapter 4.e *Previous accidents or incidents of similar nature*, for which AGIFER also issued safety recommendations, as well as the measures taken after the occurrence of the accident, presented in Chapter 5.b *Measures taken since the occurrence of the accident*, the investigation commission considers that the issuing of other recommendations of similar nature is no longer necessary.

3.4.17. The railway incident occurred on 29th August 2024, in the railway county Craiova, on the distance Olteni – Ciolpani, in the running of passenger train no. 9900, got by SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA, by the striking of 10 track inductors by a damper originating from locomotive EA 397. The Investigation Report was completed on 15th July 2025.

Direct cause

The direct cause of the occurrence of the railway incident is represented by the detachment from the weld and the coming out of the fastening bolt from the support of the body frame, from the upper part of the vertical hydraulic damper of axle no. 6, left-hand side of locomotive EA 397, followed by the 180° rotation of the vertical hydraulic damper and its entry into the gauge for elements of railway installations, fact which finally caused the striking of 10 track inductors.

Contributing factors

- material fatigue in the weld bead of the bolt from the fastening support of the vertical damper of axle no. 6, as a result of bending stresses in oscillatory regime during the process of damping the oscillations produced during running by the irregularities of the running track;
- the occurrence and development over time of cracks in the material of the weld bead of the bolt from the upper fastening support of the damper, as a result of taking over the loads transmitted by the irregularities of the running track and the locomotive body;
- failure to identify the old cracks existing in the weld bead of the bolt from the upper fastening support of the vertical damper of axle no. 6, left-hand side, of locomotive EA 397, during the RT-type scheduled inspection carried out on 12th July 2024 and the PTH3-type inspection of 27th August 2024.

Underlying causes

Defective application of the provisions of Technical Specification Code: ST 31 – 2016, regarding the obligation to check, during the R1-type scheduled inspection, the fastening method of the dampers.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Additional remarks

On the occasion of carrying out the investigation action, other deficiencies were identified, without relevance to the causes of the occurrence of the incident, as follows:

Failure to comply with the provisions of Order no. 315/2011 approving the “Railway Normative Railway vehicles. Types of scheduled inspections and repairs. Time norms or kilometre norms for carrying out scheduled inspections and repairs”, Chapter 3, Table 3.1, regarding the failure to carry out the scheduled repairs for which locomotive EA 396 was due.

The detachment/coming out of the fastening bolt from the support of the solebare of the body frame, from the upper part (Figure no. 9) of the vertical hydraulic damper of axle no. 6, left-hand side of hauling locomotive EA 397, was also influenced by the fact that, since 2009, the due periodic overhauls had no longer been carried out on locomotive EA 397, repairs in which works involving the checking of the fastening supports of the dampers and the remediation of the defects found should have been included.

Safety recommendations

The issuing of safety recommendations was not necessary.

3.4.18. The railway accident occurred on 01st September 2024, in the railway county Bucuresti, track section Giurgiu Nord – Videle (electrified single-track line), at the exit of freight train no. 40712 001 (got by the railway undertaking SC Rail Cargo Carrier România SRL), from line no. 5 of railway

station Rădulești, by the derailment of both axles of the last bogie, in the running direction, of the 7th wagon from the composition of the train.

The Investigation Report was completed on 25th August 2025.

Causal factor

The existence in track, at the place of the occurrence of the railway accident, of an area where the track twist ramp and the cross-level value exceeded the maximum admitted value, respectively the tolerances admitted in operation, fact which caused the derailment stability limit to be exceeded.

Contributing factor

The lack of the polyamide wear plates from the centre castings of bogies A and C, the first and the third bogie in the running direction of the train, of wagon no. 31564962069-9, fact which increased the rigidity degree of the bogie–wagon body assembly, thus causing the increase of the lateral guiding force.

Systemic factors

- provision of an improper volume of material and human resources, in relation to the necessary one, for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the line and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances;
- ineffective management of the risks associated with the hazards of failure to ensure the level in cross-section and failure to comply with the tolerances regarding the level and track position in plan;
- failure to comply with the provisions of the regulations in the field regarding the minimum thickness of the steel wear plates between the centre castings of the wagon.

Safety recommendations

Considering the causal, contributing and systemic factors identified during the investigation, as well as the measures already adopted after the occurrence of the incident, in order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents or incidents in the future, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 26, paragraph (2) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 on railway safety, the investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation, addressed to ASFR, which, within the limits of its competences, takes the necessary measures to ensure that it is taken into consideration and, where appropriate, followed.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 493/1

During the investigation, several non-conformities were found regarding the condition of the track superstructure on the section of line where the railway accident occurred. Upon checking the documents within the Safety Management System, it was found that railway county București carried out, for the objective “*Maintaining the technical parameters of the track infrastructure in operation, maintenance, monitoring*”, an assessment of the risk “*Derailments of railway vehicles from the composition of trains in running*”; however, the risk management measure adopted, namely the monitoring of risks, is not sufficient for keeping the identified risk under control, for which reason AGIFER considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 493/1

The public railway infrastructure manager - CNCF “CFR” SA shall reassess the risks associated with the objective “*Maintaining the technical parameters of the track infrastructure in operation, maintenance, monitoring*” and shall establish effective safety measures for keeping these risks under control.

3.4.19. The railway accident occurred on 07th September 2024, at 15:30 o’clock, in the railway county Constanța, track section Medgidia – Constanța (electrified double-track line), in railway station Valu lui Traian, at km 215+350, in the running of freight train no. 68205006 (got by the freight railway undertaking Constantin Grup Rail Logistic SRL), by the derailment of wagon no. 37809341143-7, from the first bogie in the running direction.

The Investigation Report was completed on 02nd September 2025.

Causal factor

The existence in track, at the place of the occurrence of the railway accident, of a group of consecutive improper normal wooden sleepers, whose technical condition could no longer ensure the corresponding fastening of the rails and the maintaining of the track gauge within the limits of the

tolerances admitted by the regulatory framework, having as effect the exceeding of the maximum admitted limit of the track gauge in operation, thus causing the loss of the supporting and guiding capacity of the rails, under the dynamic action of the rolling stock.

Contributing factor

Keeping a high degree of clogging of the crushed stone ballast prism and abundant vegetation caused the premature degradation (rotting) of the wooden sleepers.

Systemic factor

- provision of an improper volume of material and human resources, in relation to the necessary one, for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the line and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances;
- ineffective management of the risks associated with the hazard generated by keeping in track two or more neighbouring improper sleepers.

Measures taken during the investigation

On 17th February 2025, by telegram no. 40, the regional line closure commission within railway county Constanța informed the investigation commission that the total closure of train traffic on lines 5-8 in railway station Valu lui Traian was approved for the period 18.02.2025 – 01.09.2026, in order to carry out the modernisation works of the railway infrastructure, according to contract no. 131 dated 15.03.2024.

Safety recommendations

Motivation for the absence of safety recommendations

Considering the measures taken during the investigation by CNCF “CFR” SA, namely that, starting with 18.02.2025, modernisation works of the railway infrastructure were started, according to contract no. 131 dated 15.03.2024, on lines 5-8 in railway station Valu lui Traian, the investigation commission considers that the issuing of any recommendation for this case is no longer necessary.

3.4.20. The railway accident occurred on 12th September 2024, at 19:45 o'clock, in the railway county Craiova, track section Alunu – Băbeni (non-electrified single-track line), between Berbești and Popești Vâlcea railway stations, at km 30+520, in the running of freight train no. 60568 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA), by the derailment from the first bogie, in the running direction, of wagon no. 81536654351-1, the 21st in the composition of the train.

The Investigation Report was completed on 11th September 2025.

Causal factor

Exceeding the maximum admitted limit of the track gauge in operation, thus causing the falling of the right-hand wheel of the first axle of wagon no. 81536654351-1 from the rail gauge of the inner rail of the curve, between the running rails, due to the improper condition of the track.

Contributing factor

Failure to replace the improper concrete sleepers identified on the curve where the accident occurred and recorded in the “*record of sleepers with defects and wear and their replacement in 2023-2024*”.

Systemic factors

- failure to carry out the periodic line overhaul works for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the lines and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances;
- provision of an improper volume of material and human resources, in relation to the necessary one, for carrying out the line maintenance activity;
- ineffective management of the risks associated with the hazard generated by keeping in track two or more neighbouring improper sleepers.

Measures taken during the investigation

CNCF informed that, following the occurrence of the railway accidents in 2024, a series of works were carried out for resuming railway traffic, such as: replacement of wooden sleepers, inversion of worn rail in curve, lateral displacement, replacement of concrete sleepers, level correction by packing of sleepers, replacement of vertical bolts.

The Romanian Railway Safety Authority ASFR carried out, during 16-18.09.2024, a state inspection at railway county Craiova – L3 Râmnicu Vâlcea Section, following the occurrence of 5 railway accidents from the beginning of 2024 until the date of the inspection, on track section no. 204 Băbeni – Alunu.

CNCF “CFR” SA - railway county Craiova, Lines Division, L3 Râmnicu Vâlcea Section drew up and submitted to ASFR a corrective measures plan with deadlines and responsibilities, measures plan no. 223/1/1322/15.10.2024, in which a series of actions at the level of railway county Craiova are presented. Measures plans for improving railway safety were drawn up by RGSC București, (measures plan no. 14/1202/05.09.2024) and RRSC Craiova (measures plan no. 201/1937/25.09.2024).

The findings of the investigation commission regarding the technical condition of the line in the area of the occurrence of the investigated railway accident were hampered by the ballast prism clogged with coal, which covered both the space between the running rails and the ends of the sleepers. The clogged ballast exceeded the level of the upper face of the sleepers, preventing the visualisation of the technical condition of the sleepers in the area where displacements of the rail in the worn baseplates may occur, along the sleeper.

On this section of line, inspections cannot be carried out, the concrete sleepers cannot be recorded, and the verification of the rail baseplates and of the track fastenings cannot be carried out.

Additional remarks

On the occasion of carrying out the investigation action, the following *additional remarks* were made regarding certain deficiencies in the track maintenance activity:

1. the inspection and control programme at permanent-way districts, drawn up by L3 Râmnicu Vâlcea Section for 2024, cannot comply with Art. 2, Sheet no. 12 of Instruction no. 305/1997 on establishing the deadlines and the order in which track inspections must be carried out, which provides that the programme of detailed inspection of the track must be established so that the section chief, together with the deputy section chief, ensures, over a period of two months, the verification of the entire maintenance section; because at the line maintenance section there is no personnel designated and authorised for the position of deputy section chief;
2. the values of the cant of the track in curves were not determined by the public railway infrastructure manager, in accordance with the provisions of “Instruction on norms and tolerances for track construction and maintenance - standard gauge lines no. 314/1989”;
3. the last verification of the track geometry with the track recording coach was carried out on 20.10.2022. In 2023 and 2024, until the date of the occurrence of the accident, no verifications of the track geometry with the track recording coach or the track measurement trolley were scheduled or carried out.

Safety recommendations

Motivation for the absence of safety recommendations

The railway accident occurred on 12th September 2024, at 19:55 o'clock, on track section Alunu – Băbeni, between railway station Popești Vâlcea and railway station Berbești, was caused by the improper technical condition of the railway infrastructure, determined by maintenance which was not carried out in accordance with the provisions of the codes of practice, reference/associated documents of the procedures within the Safety Management System at the level of the infrastructure manager.

From 2020 until the date of drafting the Investigation Report, on track section Băbeni – Alunu, 13 railway accidents occurred which had similar causes and factors.

One of the safety recommendations addressed to the Romanian Railway Safety Authority ASFR was the analysis, through supervision actions, of the way in which CNCF “CFR” SA, as public railway infrastructure manager, ensures the conditions so that the safety measures proposed by it for keeping under control the hazards and associated risks, in connection with carrying out the maintenance of the public railway infrastructure, are applicable.

Among the measures proposed by ASFR, following the state inspection at railway county Craiova – L3 Râmnicu Vâlcea Section, are:

- the organisation shall act for maintaining and improving the Safety Management System, so that the railway safety processes are approached based on the management of the risks associated with them at all levels. In this respect, a corrective action plan, with deadlines and responsibilities, shall be drawn up and submitted to ASFR;

- the organisation shall develop and implement action plans for unacceptable cases of non-compliance with the requirements provided in the management system, in accordance with the provisions of Regulation (EU) no. 1078/2012, Art. 3, letters c) and d);
- the organisation shall identify and analyse all operational, organisational and technical risks which are relevant to the nature and scale of the operations carried out. These risks include those generated by human and organisational factors, such as workload, work organisation, fatigue or adequacy of the procedures.

The investigation commission considers that issuing other recommendations is no longer necessary.

3.4.21. The railway accident occurred on 19th September 2024, at 06:59 o'clock, in the railway county Timișoara, track section Timișoara Nord – Arad (electrified single-track line), on the entry route of Regio passenger train no. 2601 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA), in Șag railway station, in the area of the point switch of turnout no. 5, by the derailment of both axles of the last bogie, in the running direction, of the 2nd coach from the composition of the train.

The Investigation Report was completed on 25th August 2025.

Causal factor

The transverse fracture of the right point switch (on the right-hand side in the running direction of the train) corresponding to the point switch of turnout no. 5, which was in the inactive position (detached from the stock rail). The fracture occurred in the section at the bolt fixing hole of the connecting arm of the spring-loaded auxiliary manoeuvring device in the base of the point switch and caused the derailment of the last bogie of coach no. 50532296005-3 (the 2nd in the composition of the train), by the climbing of the wheel on the right-hand side of the first axle corresponding to the second bogie on the broken portion of the point switch, from the fracture section towards the heel of blade. The climbing occurred as a result of the inactive point switch returning to the position tightened to the stock rail on this portion, following the complete fracture of the point switch.

The fracture of the point switch under the action of the forces transmitted by the wheels of the rolling stock in motion was generated as a result of the decrease of the fatigue resistance of the material from which the point switch was made, due to the wear over time of the material structure, following the long-term cyclic stresses to which both the point switch and the fixing bolt of the spring-loaded auxiliary manoeuvring device were subjected during operation. The deformations in the crystals caused a widening of the sliding areas, generating conditions for the occurrence of microcracks characteristic of fatigue fracture, which extended around the bolt fixing hole in the base of the point switch, with the effect of a stress concentrator, causing brittle fracture in the area of maximum stress concentration.

Contributing factor

Not applicable.

Systemic factors

- failure to carry out the scheduled full track maintenance works for bringing the component elements of the railway track back to the designed parameters of the line, in order to ensure the running of trains in safe conditions, at the established running speeds and tonnages;
- provision of an improper volume of human resources, in relation to the necessary one, for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the line;
- ineffective management by the infrastructure manager of the risk associated with the hazard of keeping in track rails with exceeded stored tonnage.

Measures taken during the investigation

After the occurrence of the railway accident on 19th September 2024, the flexible point switch corresponding to turnout no. 5 in railway station Șag was replaced.

Additional remarks

On the occasion of carrying out the investigation action, the following additional remarks were made regarding certain deficiencies, without relevance to the causes of the occurrence of the accident: ensuring a line closure interval below the lower limit provided in the *Technical Prescriptions for the joint execution of biannual/annual inspection works on point motors, checking the point locks and checking the hidden parts of points and crossings no. 3/4/1/55/14.02.2024*, for the line closure carried out on 17.09.2024 for the joint L+CT works of checking hidden parts and biannual inspection of the

point motor at turnout no. 5 in railway station Şag, and carrying out these works with a reduced number of employees, below that provided by the codes of practice for these works.

On 17.09.2024, joint L+CT works of checking hidden parts and biannual inspection of point motors and point locks were carried out. The works were carried out in accordance with the programme for checking the hidden parts of points and crossings within the area of L3 Timișoara Section no. 3/3/1/3/4957 of 06.09.2024, drawn up by L3 Timișoara Section and approved by the management of railway county Timișoara, with Technical Prescriptions no. 3/4/1/55/14.02.2024, drawn up by the Installations Division, Signalling Installations Service and approved by the management of railway county Timișoara, and with line closure approval telegram no. 25 of 13.08.2024.

The execution of the joint L+CT works of checking hidden parts and biannual inspection of point motors was recorded in the Register for the Inspection of Lines and Railway Traffic Safety Installations on 17.09.2024, at 11:25 o'clock, the closure of the line for carrying out the works being requested for the interval 11:30 – 13:00, respectively for 90 minutes. According to the provisions of the Technical Prescriptions drawn up for carrying out the works, Chapter II Work Scheduling, point 2.5 specifies: *“For the complete execution of the provided technological operations, it is necessary to take the point motor out of service and close the line for checking the hidden parts for 90-120 minutes for the simple turnout, respectively 120-180 minutes for the diamond crossing with double slip.”*

After sending to the RC operator the request for the closure of the line for the works and after receiving the RC order regarding the approval of the works, the movements inspector recorded in the Register for the Inspection of Lines and Railway Traffic Safety Installations the fact that the RC operator approved the line closure from 11:38 o'clock until 13:00 o'clock, respectively for a duration of 82 minutes, below the lower limit necessary for the complete execution of the technological operations for the works of checking hidden parts of points and crossings.

The working team within Track district no. 9 Aradu Nou, which participated in the execution of the works, was composed of two workers, one track worker and one unskilled worker, below the number provided by the Code of Practice *Time Norms for Routine Maintenance Works and Periodic Repair of Standard Gauge Railway Lines*, 1990 edition, for the execution of biannual inspection works on points and crossings – single turnout type 49 and higher, for which a minimum team of 4 track workers and 2 workshop workers is provided.

Safety recommendations

Considering the causal, contributing and systemic factors identified during the investigation, as well as the measures already adopted after the occurrence of the incident, in order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents or incidents in the future, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 26, paragraph (2) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 on railway safety, the investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation, addressed to ASFR, which, within the limits of its competences, takes the necessary measures to ensure that it is taken into consideration and, where appropriate, followed.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 496/1

Following the analysis of the Risk Register - 2024, drawn up by the Lines Division-railway County Timișoara for the lines department, the investigation commission found that no analysis had been carried out regarding the assessment of the risk of rail fracture identified in the “Record of railway safety hazards - Lines”, associated with the hazard “*Category I defective rails or rails with exceeded stored tonnage, kept in track*”.

Considering the findings and conclusions of the investigation commission mentioned above, in order to prevent accidents which could occur in conditions similar to those presented in this report, AGIFER issues the following safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 496/1

The public railway infrastructure manager shall assess the risk associated with the hazard generated by keeping in track Category I defective rails or rails with exceeded stored tonnage and shall establish viable safety measures for keeping this risk under control.

3.4.22. The railway accident occurred on 22nd September 2024, at 18:05 o'clock, in the railway county Craiova, track section Turceni – Gura Motrului (electrified double-track line), in Turceni railway

station, on turnout no. 15 within cross-over 15/23, at km 12+947, in the running of freight train no. 58490 (got by the railway undertaking SC Constantin Grup Rail Logistic), by the derailment of the first bogie and of the first axle of the second bogie, in the running direction, of locomotive LEMA 083 hauling the train.

Causal factor

The leaving of the running track by the right-hand wheel of the first axle, in the running direction, of locomotive LEMA 083 occurred under the conditions of the breakage of a rail section, of about 230 mm, within the joint at the switch end of turnout no. 15, fact which caused the creation of a gap having the dimension of 230 mm, thus causing the loss of the supporting and guiding capacity of the rails.

Contributing factor

The existence in track, at the place of the occurrence of the railway accident, of a rail defect within the joint at the switch end of turnout no. 15, which presented the following aspects:

- an old transverse crack from the running surface up to beyond the second fixing hole of the joint at the switch end, about 2 mm;
- an old longitudinal crack on the web of the rail, starting from the joint gap, passing through the first hole at the joint up to the middle of the distance between holes.

Systemic factors

- failure to identify and keeping within turnouts of Category I defective rails;
- failure to carry out the scheduled full track maintenance works and the periodic line overhaul works for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of lines and points and crossings, in order to maintain the track geometry within the admitted tolerances, under the conditions of the provision of an insufficient volume of material and human resources for these activities;
- ineffective management of the risks associated with the hazard generated by keeping in track Category I defective rails within points and crossings.

Safety recommendations

Motivation for the absence of safety recommendations

The railway accident occurred on 22nd September 2024, in the running of freight train no. 58490020, on turnout no. 15 within cross-over 15/23, railway station Turceni, at km 12+916, was caused by the improper condition of the railway infrastructure.

During the investigation, it was found that the improper technical condition of the track was determined by improper maintenance, which was not carried out in accordance with the provisions of the codes of practice, reference/associated documents of the procedures (within the Safety Management System at the level of the infrastructure manager).

Taking into consideration the railway events of similar nature which occurred in the railway county Craiova, presented in Chapter 4.e *Previous accidents or incidents of similar nature*, and taking into account the fact that, for the similar accident occurred on 13.04.2022 in railway station Drăgotești on direct line II, at km 40+830, a recommendation was issued and is under implementation, in this respect, the investigation commission considers that the issuing of other recommendations of similar nature is no longer necessary.

We mention that, even in the absence of new railway safety recommendations, based on the remarks made by the investigation commission following the non-conformities found, CNCF may order the safety measures which it considers necessary for keeping under control the risk of occurrence of a derailment.

3.4.23. The railway accident occurred on 26th September 2024, at 16:55 o'clock, in the railway county Craiova, track section Craiova – Filiași (electrified double-track line), in railway station Craiova, by the derailment of light engine LEMA 006, which was running as train no. 86699 (got by the railway undertaking SC Deutsche Bahn Cargo România SRL).

The investigation report was completed on 8th September 2025.

Causal factor

The climbing of the gauge face of the rail head of the closure rail, corresponding to the curved switch blade of turnout no. 10, due to the improper technical condition of locomotive LEMA 006, influenced

by the presence, on the flange face of the wheel, over an area of about half of the tyre circumference, of edges, as well as by a roughness higher than 12.5 μ on the flange face of the wheels of axle no. 1.

Contributing factors

- the absence of greasing of the contact area between the wheel and the rail as a result of the malfunctioning of the wheel flange greasing system on the locomotive, at the time of the accident, with the effect of increasing the friction coefficient between the two contact surfaces and implicitly of increasing the guiding force;
- the improper geometry of the track in the area of the closure rails of turnout no. 10.

Systemic factor

The failure to identify and assess the risks associated with the hazards represented by: “roughness on the flange face of the wheel higher than 12.5 μ after carrying out the re-profiling operations by turning the tyres” and “malfunctioning of the wheel flange greasing system”.

Additional remarks

During the investigation, some non-compliances were identified, without relevance to the causes and factors which led to the occurrence of the accident, as follows:

- the absence of the mention “Locomotive fit for running” on the JOURNEY REPORT when the locomotive left the Locomotive Repair Company “CFR IRLU Craiova” after carrying out the re-profiling operations by turning the axles;
- the re-profiling operations by turning the axles of locomotive LEMA 006 were carried out on 25th September 2024, between 14:30 and 22:30 o'clock, on the HEGENSCHIEDT MFD type 106 CNC 101177 ground wheel-lathe, without dismantling the axles. Upon completion thereof, according to DGT Order no. 310/4a/2800/1993, load balancing on the wheels of the locomotive should have been carried out on electric locomotive LEMA 006, but this was not performed.

According to DGT Order no. 310/4a/2800/1993 – Technical operating conditions for the axles of electric locomotives – CFR, point 1.1 – The verification and adjustment of the suspension, namely the balancing of loads on axles and wheels, shall be carried out in the following cases:

- if one or more metalastics or silent blocks of the suspension have been replaced;
- when reversing the axles, including the replacement of axles or turning of bogies;
- if the tyres of one or more wheelsets have been turned, with entry on the running tread;
- after derailment;
- when reported by the locomotive staff that the locomotive has a tendency to skid;
- at each R2 type inspection, but not more than one year from the last adjustment, in the case of long-term immobilisation of the locomotive;
- whenever interventions have been carried out on the mechanical allowances of the bogies and of the body.

Also, according to DGT Order no. 310/4a/2800/1993, point 1.5 – Upon completion of the suspension adjustment operation, the values of the static loads on the axles and wheels of the locomotive must meet the following conditions:

- the load measured on each axle must not exceed by more than 2% the average value resulting from the measurements of all axles;
- the total load of one row of wheels must not differ by more than 4% from the average measured on both rows of wheels;
- the load measured on the wheels of the same wheelset must not differ by more than 4% from the average load per wheel of the same axle.

In the case of locomotive LEMA 006, the verification and adjustment of the suspension, (the balancing of loads on axles and wheels) after the re-profiling operations by turning the axles, was not performed because it was not separately requested in the work order.

Safety recommendations

Considering the causal, contributing and systemic factors identified during the investigation, as well as the additional remarks presented in this investigation report, in order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents or incidents in the future, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 26, para. (2) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 on railway safety, the investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendations, addressed to ASFR, which,

within the limits of its competences, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the safety recommendations issued by AGIFER are taken into consideration and, where appropriate, followed.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 452/1

Since, during the investigation, deficiencies were found within SC Deutsche Bahn Cargo Romania SRL, regarding the activity of identifying, assessing and keeping under control the hazards represented by “roughness on the flange face of the wheel higher than 12.5 μ after carrying out the re-profiling operations by turning the tyres” and “malfunctioning of the wheel flange greasing system”, AGIFER considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 452/1

Deutsche Bahn Cargo Romania SRL shall identify and assess the risks associated with the hazards represented by “roughness on the flange face of the wheel higher than 12.5 μ after carrying out the re-profiling operations by turning the tyres” and “malfunctioning of the wheel flange greasing system”, respectively shall order measures and ensure their application in order to keep these hazards under control.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 452/2

Since, during the investigation, deficiencies were found within Deutsche Bahn Cargo Romania SRL, mentioned in chapter 5.c. Additional remarks, regarding the activity of identifying, assessing and keeping under control the hazard represented by “failure to balance the loads on wheels and axles after carrying out the re-profiling operations by turning the tyres”, AGIFER considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 452/2

Deutsche Bahn Cargo Romania SRL shall identify and assess the risks associated with the hazard represented by “failure to balance the loads on wheels and axles after carrying out the re-profiling operations by turning the tyres”, respectively shall order measures and ensure their application in order to keep this hazard under control.

3.4.24. The railway incident occurred on 11th October 2024, in the railway county Craiova, track section Gura Motrului – Amaradia (electrified double/single-track line), in Turceni railway station, in the running of passenger train no. 2855 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA), by the striking of the pedestrian concrete slabs between the running rails by a SAB brake slack adjuster originating from locomotive EC 053.

The investigation report was completed on 22nd September 2025.

Direct cause

The direct cause of the occurrence of the railway incident was the detachment from the screwed connection and coming out of the body of the adjusting part from the threaded part of the nut of the fixing lug of the automatic brake slack adjuster from axle no. 2 of locomotive EC 053, followed by the rotation by 45° of the body of the adjusting part, its entering into the clearance for elements of railway constructions or installations, as well as the rotation by 90° of the fixing lug with nut.

Contributing factors

Due to the taking over of the axial loads transmitted during the braking/releasing processes by the automatic brake-rod adjuster, over time, wear developed on the threaded part of the body of the adjusting part and on the threaded part of the nut of its fixing lug.

Underlying causes

Failure to comply with the provisions of Order no. 315/2011 approving the “Railway Normative Railway Vehicles. Types of scheduled inspections and repairs. Time norms or norms of kilometres run for carrying out scheduled inspections and repairs”, Chapter 3, Table 3.1, regarding the failure to carry out the scheduled repairs due for locomotive EC 053.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Safety recommendations

The issuing of safety recommendations was not necessary.

3.4.25. The railway incident occurred on 17th October 2024, at 17:25 o'clock, in the railway county Timișoara, track section Timișoara – Lugoj (electrified single-track line), in railway station Belinț,

by the striking of junction box corresponding to track circuit 1-3Si3, located within the CFR structure clearance, by cut out cock of the KE air distributors of the wagons from the composition of freight train no. 48431016 (got by the railway undertaking Deutsche Bahn Cargo România SRL).

The investigation report was completed on 30th January 2025.

Direct cause

The direct cause of the occurrence of the railway incident was the striking of the junction box corresponding to track circuit 1-3Si3, located within the structure clearance, by the cut out cock of the KE air distributors of the wagons from the composition of the train.

Contributing factors

The installation of the junction box corresponding to track circuit 1-3Si3, following the works for modernisation of the railway infrastructure in railway station Belinț (relocation of CSST cables in order to ensure the work front for machinery), without observing the structure clearance.

Underlying causes

- The failure to record in the RRLISC from railway station Belinț, by the AFER-authorized traffic safety person in charge of the contractor, the works for relocating the peg corresponding to track circuit 1-3Si3;
- The failure to ensure the structure clearance of the lines open to train traffic during the relocation works for elements of railway installations, in railway station Belinț.

Primary causes

The absence of regulations regarding the manner of carrying out works on railway tracks and installations, on lines or parts of installations in operation, not handed over to the contractor from the point of view of railway traffic safety.

Additional remarks

Following the verification of the documents existing at the contractor carrying out the modernisation works in railway station Belinț, the investigation commission found that, at the time of the occurrence of the incident, it did not hold “Regulations regarding the manner of carrying out works on lines and installations, on lines or parts of installations in operation, not handed over to the contractor from the point of view of railway traffic safety”.

Measures taken during the investigation

After the occurrence of the incident, SRCF Timișoara, as beneficiary, sent to the contractor carrying out the modernisation works in railway station Belinț the “Regulations regarding the manner of carrying out works on lines and installations, on lines or parts of installations in operation, not handed over to the contractor from the point of view of railway traffic safety”; the latter acknowledged and appropriated them.

FCC CONSTRUCCION SA, as Contractor within the Contract for Design and Execution of works related to the investment objective “Modernisation of the Caransebeș – Timișoara – Arad railway line” – lot 2, Lugoj – Timișoara Est, concluded a subcontracting contract with HITACHI RAIL GTS ROMÂNIA SRL for all signalling and telecommunications works related to the mentioned contract.

The process person in charge for the organisation and carrying out of the construction activity for SCB installations on behalf of the Subcontractor HITACHI RAIL GTS ROMÂNIA SRL was appointed, authorisation no. 18158/22.09.2022. Also, the traffic safety process persons in charge on behalf of FCC CONSTRUCCION S.A. were appointed, authorisation no. 154821 and authorisation no. 173705.

As measures for improving railway traffic safety, the staff with traffic safety duties were reinstructed so that all requests for taking signalling and telecommunications installations out of service should be carried out with the record, supervision and coordination of the traffic safety person in charge appointed by the specialised Subcontractor HITACHI RAIL GTS ROMÂNIA SRL and of the traffic safety person in charge of the Contractor FCC CONSTRUCCION SA.

Soon after the occurrence of the railway incident in railway station Belinț, all scheduled works were suspended and a verification was carried out of all equipment and installations that had been relocated following the execution of the temporary works in all stations and sections on lot 2, from Lugoj to Remetea Mare.

The verification period lasted 2 days, the site activities being resumed after confirmation that the structure clearance was ensured according to the instructions and regulations in force.

It was ordered and carried out an additional training of the staff involved in the execution of outdoor works, with emphasis on those which may affect the structure clearance on the lines in traffic.

Also, it was additionally ordered that any team carrying out outdoor works should have a nominated chief who, at the end of the working day, should verify the condition of the installations located in the vicinity of the lines remaining in operation/open to traffic, respectively the ensuring of the structure clearance on them. Only after carrying out these verifications, as well as after confirmation from the duty movements inspector that the installations operate normally, may the activity for that day be completed.

Safety recommendations

Considering the measures taken, the investigation commission considers that it is not appropriate to issue safety recommendations.

3.4.26. The railway accident occurred on 19th October 2024, at 01:12 o'clock, in the railway county București, track section Titu – Târgoviște (non-electrified double-track line), between Nucet and Târgoviște railway stations, on running line I, at km 29+850, in the running of freight train no. 666251 (got by SC Deutsche Bahn Cargo Romania SRL), by the occurrence of a fire at locomotive DA 011. The investigation report was completed on 10th October 2025.

Causal factor

The appearance, over time, of an imperfect contact at the terminal connection board of the coupling box of the power supply cabling of helical electro compressor 22SCE10, fact which caused the overheating and melting of this board, followed by the occurrence of a short circuit between the cables existing in this box, with the effect of igniting the insulation of the electric cabling.

Contributing factor

Not applicable.

Systemic factors

Not applicable.

Measures taken during the investigation

According to SC Deutsche Bahn Cargo Romania SRL document no. SC 33/2025, following the accident of 19th October 2024, the staff carrying out inspections on locomotives were reinstructed to pay particular attention to the manner of fixing the cables in the terminal connection boards of the motors for auxiliary services, when carrying out scheduled inspections of type RT/R1/R2 on locomotives.

Safety recommendations

Motivation for the absence of safety recommendations

Considering the manner in which the accident occurred, the causal factor identified, as well as the measures taken by SC Deutsche Bahn Cargo Romania SRL following the occurrence of this accident, the investigation commission does not consider it necessary to issue safety recommendations.

3.4.27. The railway incident occurred on 20th October 2024, in the railway county București, track section București – Videle, by the striking of a number of 17 track inductors on the Zăvestreni – Grădinari distance by the vertical damper corresponding to bogie no. 2, axle no. 4, of locomotive EA 789, which was hauling passenger train no. 9002.

The investigation report was completed on 19th March 2025.

Direct cause

The direct cause of the occurrence of this railway incident was the entry of the locomotive damper, corresponding to bogie no. 2, axle no. 4, on the right-hand side in the running direction, into the "CLEARANCE FOR ELEMENTS OF RAILWAY INSTALLATIONS" (plank no. 4 of Instructions no. 328/2008). This was possible as a result of the rotation of the damper around the lower fastening support, due to the breakage of its upper fastening end.

Contributing factors

The factor which contributed to the occurrence of the railway incident was the occurrence and development over time of a crack in the material of the upper fastening support of the damper, as a result of taking over the loads transmitted by the locomotive body.

Underlying causes

The partial application of the provisions of Technical Specification ST31/2016, for achieving, through maintenance, the general objective regarding the operational reliability of locomotive EA 789, by the fact that, during the verification of the technical condition of the upper fastening and fixing system on the locomotive body of the vertical damper corresponding to axle no. 4, on the right side in the running direction, the occurrence of a crack was not identified.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Safety recommendations

No safety recommendations were identified.

3.4.28. The railway accident occurred on 29th October 2024, at 16:30 o'clock, in the railway county Constanța, track section Palas – Năvodari (non-electrified single-track line), between Palas and Constanța Mărfuri railway stations, at km 1+040, in the running of freight train no. 66361829 (got by the freight railway undertaking Grup Feroviar Român SA), by the derailment of wagon no. 3153666192-6 (the 31st in the composition of the train, derailed from the 2nd bogie in the running direction) and of wagon no. 89536950046-0 (the 32nd in the composition of the train, derailed from both bogies).

The investigation report was completed on 23rd October 2025.

Causal factor

The overheating, followed by the breakage of the axle journal corresponding to wheel no. 1 of wagon no. 89536950046-0 (the 32nd in the composition of the train), fact which caused the loss of the guiding capacity of the wheelset with wheels 1–2.

Contributing factor

The long service life of the roller bearings mounted in the axle box corresponding to wheel no. 1 of this wagon (WJ bearing – 45 years from the date of manufacture, and WJP bearing – 55 years from the date of manufacture).

Systemic factor

The failure to identify the risks associated with the hazard represented by the use of roller bearings in the axle box, subassembly of the critical component wheelsets, without establishing a maximum service life.

Additional remarks

During the investigation, the following safety issue was identified, which has no relevance to the conclusions regarding the causes of the accident:

The absence from the railway technical standard *NTF 81-003:2014 – Railway Vehicles. Technical conditions for the repair of axle boxes with roller bearings* of provisions establishing the maximum service life for cylindrical roller bearings fitted to freight wagons (expressed in kilometeric performance or years), although by UIC leaflet 510-1, mentioned in the bibliography of *NTF 81-003:2014*, a service life of 40 years for 75% of the bearings is imposed as a reliability condition, and abroad there are technical standards limiting the service life of these bearings (e.g. VPI – Association of Private Wagon Owners maintenance technical standards).

Safety recommendations

Considering the causal, contributing and systemic factors identified during the investigation, in order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents or incidents in the future, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 26, para. (2) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 on railway safety, as well as the aspects presented in chapter 4.e. *Previous accidents or incidents of a similar nature*, for the improvement of railway safety, the investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue a safety recommendation addressed to the Romanian Railway Authority – AFER, similar to the one issued for the railway accidents occurred on 6th September 2015, at 22:04 o'clock, in the railway county Timișoara, between railway stations Vălișoara and Valea Timișului, in the running of freight

train no. 80368-1, got by the railway undertaking GFR, and on 8th May 2018, at 06:14 o'clock, in the railway county Timișoara, in railway station Simeria, in the running of freight train no. 80432-1, got by the railway undertaking GFR, safety recommendation which was not implemented. The Romanian Railway Safety Authority – ASFR, within the limits of its competences, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the safety recommendations issued by AGIFER are taken into consideration and, where appropriate, followed.

Safety recommendation no. 500/1

The Romanian Railway Authority – AFER shall analyse the opportunity to supplement the railway technical standard regarding the repair of axle boxes with roller bearings with provisions establishing the maximum service life for cylindrical roller bearings fitted to freight wagons (expressed in kilometric performance or years).

3.4.29. The railway accident occurred on 4th November 2024, at 04:08 o'clock, in the railway county București, track section Ploiești Sud – Buzău (electrified double-track line), in railway station Ploiești Est, during the stabling of freight train no. 58496 003 (got by the railway undertaking Constantin Grup Rail – Logistic SRL), by the derailment of three wagons from the composition of the train (the 3rd, the 4th and the 5th in the composition).

The investigation report was completed on 30th October 2025.

Causal factor

The cumulative effect of the non-conformities existing at wagons no. 37804850796-6 and no. 37804850795-8 (the 3rd and the 4th in the composition of freight train no. 58496 003) which caused difficulties in the curve negotiation of turnout no. 29, located on the entry route into railway station Ploiești Est, in the “diverging” position.

Contributing factors

Not applicable.

Systemic factor

The absence of an assessment, at the level of railway undertaking Constantin Grup Rail – Logistic SRL, of the risks associated with the hazard represented by the failure of the buffing gear (buffers) of a freight wagon.

Safety recommendations

Considering the systemic factor identified during the investigation, in order to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents or incidents in the future, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 26, para. (2) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 on railway safety, the investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation, addressed to ASFR, which, within the limits of its competences, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the safety recommendations issued by AGIFER are taken into consideration and, where appropriate, followed.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 501/1

During the investigation, it was found, as mentioned in point “4.d. *Feedback and control mechanisms, including risk management and safety management, as well as monitoring processes*”, that railway undertaking Constantin Grup Rail – Logistic SRL did not identify and assess the hazard represented by the failure of the buffing gear (buffers) of a freight wagon, a hazard which manifested itself within this accident, reason for which AGIFER considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation:

Safety recommendation no. 501/1

The railway undertaking Constantin Grup Rail – Logistic SRL shall assess the associated risks, establish and implement effective measures for keeping under control the hazard represented by the failure of the buffing gear (buffers) of a freight wagon.

3.4.30. The railway accident occurred on 5th November 2024, at 17:37 o'clock, in the railway county Craiova, track section Filiași – Caransebeș (electrified single-track line), in the running of freight train no. 66078 004, consisting of 27 wagons loaded with petrol (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA), between railway stations Tâmba and Igroasa, by the derailment of 7 wagons from its composition, of which 2 overturned.

The investigation report was completed on 2nd October 2025.

Causal factors

- The horizontal deformation existing at the frame of the first bogie, in the running direction of the train (with wheels 1÷4), of wagon no. 31537855997-7;
- Exceeding the maximum limit admitted in operation for the total allowance between the side bearers on both sides of the second bogie, in the running direction (with wheels 5÷8), of the same wagon.

Contributing factors

- the long service life (45 years) of the bogie frame corresponding to the first bogie, in the running direction of the train (with wheels 1÷4), of wagon no. 31537855997-7;
- carrying out the inspection in transit of the train involved by a single examiner.

Systemic factors

Ineffective management of the risk associated with the hazards generated by carrying out the inspection by a single wagon examiner.

Safety recommendations

The railway accident occurred on 5th November 2024, between railway stations Tâmbna and Igiroasa, was caused by the defects existing at wagon no. 31537855997-7, the 20th in the composition of the train.

During the investigation, it was found that the works within the inspection in transit carried out on the train involved, in railway station Craiova, were carried out by a single examiner, fact which influenced the correct determination of the values of the total allowances between the side bearers on both sides of the bogies.

Considering the findings and conclusions of the investigation commission mentioned above, in order to improve railway safety and prevent similar occurrences, the investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendation, addressed to ASFR, which, within the limits of its competences, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the safety recommendations issued by AGIFER are taken into consideration and, where appropriate, followed.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 502/1

The investigation commission found that the railway undertaking did not effectively manage the risk associated with the hazards generated by carrying out the inspections of trains by a single examiner.

Safety recommendation no. 502/1

The railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA shall reassess the risks associated with the hazards generated by carrying out the inspections of trains by a single examiner and shall order and implement effective safety measures for keeping them under control.

3.4.31. The railway incident occurred on 15th November 2024, in the railway county Cluj, in railway station Carei, manifested by the striking of some elements of railway installations by an open inspection door from the equipment loaded on wagon no. 31804863701-7, which was in the composition of freight train no. 56522 016, got by SC Deutsche Bahn Cargo România SRL.

The investigation report was completed on 10th April 2025.

Direct cause

The absence of the locking pin of the inspection door from the equipment loaded on the wagon, the opening of the door and its entry into the clearance for elements of railway installations.

Contributing factor

The falling, during running, of the locking pin which was intended to lock the inspection door from the equipment loaded on the wagon in the closed position.

Underlying causes

Not applicable.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Safety recommendations

The investigation commission considers that the issuing of safety recommendations is not required.

3.4.32. The railway accident occurred on 20th November 2024, at 17:37 o'clock, in the railway county Braşov, track section Braşov – Sighişoara (electrified double-track line), between railway stations

Augustin and Racoş, in the running of freight train no. 67733 (got by the freight railway undertaking RAIL FORCE SRL Braşov), by the derailment from the first bogie, in the running direction, of the 250 tf EDK 2000 crane which was in the composition of the train.

The investigation report was completed on 13th October 2025.

Causal factor

The accidental longitudinal displacement of the pinion of the reducer used to transmit the motion from the electric motor to axle no. 5 for the crane's own movement and its coming into contact with the ring gear on this axle, while running on a track area (within the constant-radius curve) where there was a transverse unevenness exceeding the tolerances and sections where the track twist ramp exceeded the maximum value admitted for trains running at $V = 65$ km/h.

Contributing factors

- Failure to remedy, within the regulated deadlines, the defects recorded following the verification of the track geometry with the TMC track recording car;
- Failure to carry out measurements/verifications at the track superstructure in the areas with defects reported by the TMC track recording car, by the personnel with traffic safety duties.

Systemic factors

- Provision of improper volume of material and human resources, in relation to the necessary one, for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the line and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances;
- Defective/inefficient supervision/monitoring of the activity of the permanent-way district by the personnel with inspection and control duties within Section L2 Sighişoara and the railway county Braşov.

Measures taken during the investigation

After the occurrence of the accident, the personnel belonging to the Railway Intervention District - DIF – Braşov took the measure of securing the shaft of the pinion involved against accidental transverse displacements.

Safety recommendations

Considering the causal, contributing and systemic factors identified during the investigation, in order to prevent the occurrence of similar incidents or accidents in the future, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 26, para. (2) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 on railway safety, the investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendations, addressed to ASFR, which, within the limits of its competences, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the safety recommendations issued by AGIFER are taken into consideration and, where appropriate, followed.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 503/1

During the investigation, several deficiencies were found regarding the carrying out of maintenance on the railway vehicle — the EDK 2000 crane — involved in the accident: the scheduled inspection works are carried out monthly by the employees of DIF Braşov within SRLU Braşov, although the section does not hold/is not included in an ECM (Entity in Charge of Maintenance) certificate for carrying out the maintenance function, and the internal instructions with the works to be carried out during the periodic technical inspections of the crane are not endorsed by AFER, contrary to the provisions of RET, Art. 207.

Safety recommendation no. 503/1

CNCF “CFR” SA shall take the necessary steps for the endorsement by AFER of the instructions providing the works to be carried out during the technical inspections of the crane and for obtaining an ERI certificate for carrying out the maintenance function for the Line and Equipment Repair Section Braşov – Railway Intervention District Braşov or for outsourcing this function to an economic operator holding such a certificate.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 503/2

During the investigation, it was found that, for the activity “Maintenance, mechanised track maintenance and railway interventions, train hauling”, for the risk “Derailment of railway vehicles”, no cause regarding the technical condition of the crane was identified, although in the activity of the Railway Intervention District Braşov, 2 accidents were recorded which had, as direct cause, irregularities regarding the technical condition of the crane involved.

Safety recommendation no. 503/2

CNCF “CFR” SA shall reanalyse the activity of identifying the risks associated with its own railway operations for the activity of railway interventions, establishing and implementing effective measures to ensure that the activity of the railway vehicles in the composition of intervention trains — including the movement to the intervention site — is carried out in good railway traffic safety conditions.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 503/3

Following the analysis of the Risk Register – 2024 drawn up by the Lines Division within the railway county Braşov for the lines department, the investigation commission found that no analysis had been carried out regarding the assessment of the risk associated with the hazard generated by the improper management of the defects recorded by the TMC (track recording car), namely:

- a) failure to take safety measures regarding the remedying of grade 5 and 6 defects detected during the verification of the track with the TMC track recording car;
- b) failure to introduce the regulated speed restriction steps in case of detection of defects in lines resulting from the measurements carried out with the TMC track recording car;
- c) failure to remedy the defects resulting from the measurements carried out with the TMC track recording car, within the regulated deadlines for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the line and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances.

Safety recommendation no. 503/3

CNCF “CFR” SA shall reanalyse the activity of identifying the risks associated with its own railway operations and shall assess the risks associated with the hazards generated by:

- a) failure to take safety measures regarding the remedying of grade 5 and 6 defects detected during the verification of the track with the TMC track recording car;
- b) failure to introduce the regulated speed restriction steps in case of detection of defects in lines resulting from the measurements carried out with the TMC track recording car;
- c) failure to remedy the defects resulting from the measurements carried out with the TMC track recording car, within the regulated deadlines for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the line and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances, in order to establish and apply viable safety measures for keeping these risks under control.

3.4.33. The railway incident occurred on 25th November 2024, in the railway county Craiova, between Măldăeni and Roşiori Nord railway stations, by the striking of the 1000/2000 Hz track inductor corresponding to signal BL 24 by a part coming from diesel multiple unit AM 974, which was attached at the rear of Regio passenger train no. 9386.

The investigation report was completed on 21st August 2025.

Direct cause

The direct cause of the occurrence of the incident was the loss of the fixing capacity by the detachment from the weld, from the supporting brackets, of the radiator of the Diesel Engine (MD) cooling plant of the diesel multiple unit, fact which resulted in the striking and breaking of the 1000/2000 Hz track inductor corresponding to signal BL 24 and the damage of the impedance bond.

Contributing factor

The existence of an old fracture of about 35% of the welded fastening surface, on the supporting brackets of the Diesel Engine (MD) cooling radiator.

Underlying causes

Not applicable.

Primary causes

The absence of proper documentation (technical drawings/sketches endorsed by AFER) regarding the manner of mounting and securing the Diesel Engine (MD) cooling radiators for series 900 diesel multiple units.

Measures taken during the investigation

After the start of the investigation, the transport operator SRTFC Craiova ordered the Craiova wagon repair and maintenance depot, the Piatra Olt wagon repair and maintenance depot and Piteşti Depot to implement a Plan of Measures regarding the verifications to be carried out on diesel multiple units of the type involved in the incident, concerning the manner of fixing the radiator of the MD cooling plant and of the other subassemblies fixed by welding, as well as other measures:

- verification with special attention, during intermediate overhaul and all scheduled inspections, of the manner of fixing the radiator of the MD cooling plant and of the other subassemblies fixed by welding;
- verification of all diesel multiple units arrived after hauling passenger trains, by placing them on the inspection pits, of the parts supporting the radiator by welding, taking measures for corresponding fastening by welding, if applicable;
- strict observance of the provisions of Technical Specifications ST7/2019 and ST8/2004;
- the locomotive and diesel multiple unit staff shall be reinstructed, through the Staff School, to verify the technical condition of locomotives and diesel multiple units, when taking them over, in traction units and in train formation stations, of all subassemblies and especially of the railway safety part.

Safety recommendations

Considering the measures taken by the economic operators involved in the incident after the start of the investigation, the commission considers that it is no longer necessary to issue any safety recommendation.

3.4.34. The railway incident occurred on 11th December 2024, at 18:40 o'clock, in the railway county Craiova, track section Piatra Olt – Podul Olt, manifested by the departure of freight train no. 57423 (got by the railway undertaking PSP Cargo Group SA) from line no. 2 in railway station Lotru, without observing the instructional provisions, resulting in passing beyond the fouling point.

The investigation report was completed on 10th July 2025.

Direct cause

The direct cause was the failure to observe the conditions for occupying the running line by running freight train no. 57432, without the “train departure” signal given by the movements inspector from beside the train locomotive or without being in possession of a train order in the case where the train departure cannot be given by the movements inspector.

Contributing factors

The physical and mental condition of the staff who drove and served freight train no. 57423, which was affected by the stress and fatigue accumulated as a result of exceeding the maximum admitted continuous service on the locomotive and of failing to ensure the corresponding duration of rest time.

Underlying causes

- failure to comply with the provisions of the Instructions for the activity of locomotive staff in railway transport no. 201/2007, Art. 92, para. (1), letter d, para. (2), regarding the regulations concerning the occupation of the running line;
- failure to comply with the provisions of the Instructions for the activity of locomotive staff in railway transport no. 201/2007, Art. 119 (2) and (4), regarding the obligations of locomotive staff for occupying the running line;
- failure to comply with the provisions of MTI Order no. 256 of 29th March 2013, regarding the maximum admitted continuous service duration on the locomotive and the ensuring of rest for locomotive staff.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Additional remarks

- According to minutes no. SC2/IVMS/321/13.12.2024, drawn up following the reading of the recordings of the IVMS (speed measuring and safety installation) on locomotive DA 1246, it resulted that, on the Râureni – Lotru distance, it ran with the INDUSI (intermittent speed control installation) and the DSV (safety and vigilance installation) taken out of service;
- According to the mentions in Chapter C.5.5. Human-machine-organisation interface, the staff who performed service during the period 02.12.2024 ÷ 03.12.2024, respectively 04.12.2024 ÷ 06.12.2024, with locomotive DA 1289, did not comply with the provisions of MTI Order no. 256 of 29th March 2013, regarding the maximum admitted service duration on the locomotive and the ensuring of rest for locomotive staff.

Measures taken during the investigation

Following the occurrence of the railway incident, PSP Cargo Group SA took its own measures for improving railway traffic safety, namely the briefing of the locomotive staff within the company regarding the conditions under which the incident occurred and the suspension of the engine driver's licence for a period of 2 months.

Safety recommendations

Considering that the measures communicated by PSP Cargo Group SA were taken during the investigation activity, the investigation commission does not consider it necessary to issue a safety recommendation.

3.4.35. The railway incident occurred on 23rd December 2024, at 05:45 o'clock, in the railway county Constanța, track section Constanța – Medgidia, in railway station Palas, by the erroneous execution of the exit route of IR passenger train no. 1680023 (got by the passenger railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA), concomitantly with the shunting route from L4 Tranzit to L1D, in order to carry out the backing-into-siding operation of a tower wagon.

The investigation report was completed on 15th April 2025.

Direct cause

The direct cause of the occurrence of the railway incident was the human error occurred within the train traffic management process, by the dispatch of IR train no. 1680023 from railway station Palas, without its route being performed in accordance with the direction in which it was to run.

Contributing factors

The failure to withdraw and stop the shunting of the tower wagon in order to execute the exit route for IR train no. 1680023.

Underlying causes

Failure to comply with the provisions of Art. 208(2), letters *c* and *f* of the “Regulation for train traffic and railway vehicle shunting” no. 005/2005, regarding the obligation of the regulating movements inspector to withdraw and stop the shunting of the tower wagon, to execute the exit route for IR train no. 1680023 and to verify on the illuminated track-diagram or on the display whether it corresponds to the train, line and ordered direction.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Measures taken during the investigation

Following the occurrence of the railway incident, SRCF Constanța took the following measures in order to avoid, in the future, the occurrence of incidents/accidents with similar causes:

1. Monitoring by the heads of subunits of the topic causing the hazard, “erroneous execution of the receiving-dispatching route”, in order to avoid the occurrence of railway accidents/incidents by the personnel from the traffic department responsible for carrying out train traffic under safety conditions.
2. Briefing of the personnel from the traffic department with the Incident Report at the first scheduled traffic safety meeting.

Safety recommendations

Considering the measures communicated by SRCF Constanța, measures which were taken during the investigation activity, the investigation commission does not consider it necessary to issue a safety recommendation.

3.4.36. The railway incident occurred on 15th December 2024, in the railway county București, in Pasărea railway station, by the passing of the exit signal by passenger train no. 8007015, got by the railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA.

The investigation report was completed on 18th November 2025.

Direct cause

The failure of the duty movements inspector in railway station Pasărea to operate point switch no. 10 in the corresponding position, the minus position (“diverging”), and the failure to verify the entire route on the illuminated track-diagram before handing over the driver's cautious running slip and dispatching train no. 8007015 from line no. 1 of railway station Pasărea towards running line I Pasărea

– Brănești, corroborated with the erroneous entries in the driver's cautious running slip, fact which resulted in the trailing-point movement of point switch no. 10.

Contributing factors

- Failure to comply with the provisions of the instruction for operating the CED CR 3 installation in railway station Pasărea, regarding the manner of operating the BAT installation at km 23+801, which was out of order, by failing to break the seal of the bell button warning that the barrier was out of order (without control), and by failing to operate the button for interrupting the operation of the bell indicating the failure of the BAT barrier;
- Failure of the duty movements inspector to verify the position of the point switches on the dispatch route from line no. 1 towards running line I Pasărea – Brănești for train no. 8007015;
- Handing over the train order form for train no. 8007015 and dispatching it without complying with the provisions of the regulations and service instructions, respectively the train order did not indicate the running line on which it was to run on the basis of clear line, did not contain mentions regarding the ensuring of the route at the exit of the train from line no. 1, did not indicate the failure of the BAT barrier at km 23+801, erroneously mentioned the passing of exit signal Y1 instead of X1, and contained the formula "Clear to Voluntari railway station", subsequently modified to "Clear to Brănești railway station";
- The acknowledgement by the engine driver of the train order which did not comply with the conditions on site, respectively the passing of exit signal Y1 instead of signal X1.

Underlying causes

- Failure to comply with Art. 205, letter "f", of the "Regulation for train traffic and railway vehicle shunting" no. 005/2005 — the movements inspector must verify on the illuminated track-diagram the correct execution of the exit route;
- Failure to comply with Art. 79(2), letters "d" and "e", Art. 79(4), of the "Instructions for the activity of locomotive staff in railway transport" no. 201, regarding the conditions which must be entered in the train order form;
- Failure to comply with the provisions of the instruction for operating the CED CR3 installation regarding the manner of carrying out traffic under failure conditions, provided in Art. 55, Art. 73, Art. 75, Art. 84 and Art. 86;
- Failure to comply with Art. 127, letter "d", of the "Instructions for the activity of locomotive staff in railway transport" no. 201 — the engine driver should have noticed the contradiction between the exit signal which he passed and the conditions entered in the train order form.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Additional remarks

During the investigation, it was found that:

- a) the duty movements inspector of railway station Pasărea on 15th December 2024 proceeded similarly also when dispatching train no. 1589015;
- b) the duty movements inspector subsequently filled in another train order, at the repeated telephone request of the driver of train no. 8007015, who requested the express entry of the mention regarding the signal which had to be passed under normal conditions (X1) and the formula "route secured".

Safety recommendations

No safety recommendations were identified for preventing similar incidents.

3.4.37. The railway incident occurred on 24th January 2025, in the railway county Brașov, by the routing of freight train no. 57346 023 (got by Rail Cargo Carrier Romania SRL) on the basis of line clear from railway station Augustin towards railway station Apața on running line I, based on the train order issued by the movements inspector, before the arrival of freight train no. 66040 023 (got by the railway undertaking SNTFM "CFR Marfă" SA) in railway station Apața and the receipt of the arrival re-notice.

The investigation report was completed on 24th April 2025.

Direct cause

The direct cause of the occurrence of the incident was the human error occurred in the process of coordinating the operating activity in railway station Augustin, manifested by the routing of a train

under the train order operation system, without all the necessary conditions being met, respectively the receipt of the arrival re-notice for the previously dispatched train, requesting and obtaining line clear for the train concerned — under the conditions in which the first dispatched train stopped unscheduled in the running line due to the failure of the hauling locomotive.

Contributing factor

Not applicable.

Underlying cause

Failure to comply with some provisions of the regulations in force, respectively the *Regulation for train traffic and railway vehicle shunting no. 005, Art. 205*, regarding the obligations of the movements inspector when dispatching trains in the case of traffic under the telephone agreement system.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Additional remarks

During the investigation, the following additional remarks were made regarding some deficiencies and gaps, without relevance to the direct cause of the occurrence of the incident:

1. The stopping of train no. 57346 in railway station Augustin in order to receive a train order was carried out without observing the conditions for stabling a train in the station. The movements inspector did not request the driver to carry out the stabling of the train in compliance with the instructions.
2. The setting back of train no. 57346 from the running line into railway station Augustin was carried out although the last wagon of the train was not equipped with an emergency signal, contrary to the instructional provisions in force which prohibited this.
3. Although he agreed with the setting back of train no. 57346 from the running line, the movements inspector from railway station Augustin did not issue an order with a number from the Unified Register of Line Clears and Movements of the station.
4. After the occurrence of the incident, due to the fact — declared by the two persons — that the radio signal was not corresponding, the conversations between the engine driver and the movements inspector were carried out by mobile phones.

Safety recommendations

Considering the manner in which the incident occurred and the findings made during the investigation, the investigation commission considers that it is not necessary to issue any safety recommendation.

3.4.38. The railway incident occurred on 10th February 2025, in the railway county Braşov, in railway station Şibot, by the erroneous routing of IR passenger train no. 74110 on running line I instead of running line II, in the direction of railway station Aurel Vlaicu.

The investigation report was completed on 14th April 2025.

Direct cause

The erroneous execution, by the regulating movements inspector of railway station Şibot, of the passing route for the running of IR train no. 74, hauled by an electric locomotive, towards railway station Aurel Vlaicu, with access over sections 2 and 034 de-energised.

Contributing factors

- Failure of the regulating movements inspector of railway station Şibot to carefully monitor, on the monitors, the passing route (exit route) of IR passenger train no. 74 and failure to activate the ING command — Catenary Group Introduction — for protecting the area with the de-energised LC contact line against the execution of accidental routes in that area.
- The RC traffic controller for running line 3 from RC Sibiu – SRCF Braşov did not transmit to the RC traffic controller for running line 2 from RC Deva – SRCF Timișoara the information that LC works were being carried out in railway station Şibot, which restricted the running of trains hauled by electric locomotives on running line I.

Underlying causes

The underlying causes of the occurrence of the incident were the failure to comply with some provisions of the regulations in force, respectively:

- The instruction for operating the SMARTLOCK-IXL electronic interlocking installation and the related BLAI and BAT installations in railway station Şibot, Art. 5.9.1.1, regarding commands for the catenary group — failure to activate the ING command, Catenary Group Introduction, for protecting the area with the de-energised LC contact line, “against the execution of accidental routes in that area”.
- The Regulation for train traffic and railway vehicle shunting no. 005/2005, Art. 186, point (2), letter b), regarding the completion of the departure notice with electric locomotive, in the case of the electric locomotive hauling system.
- The Regulation for train traffic and railway vehicle shunting no. 005/2005, Art. 208, point (2), letter f), regarding the verification of the train route on the illuminated track-diagram or on the display, whether it corresponds to the train, line and ordered direction.
- The Regulation for train traffic and railway vehicle shunting no. 005/2005, Art. 254, point (1), regarding the orders of the RC operator to the subordinate staff and to the RC operators managing traffic on the neighbouring running lines.
- Operational Procedure PO 0-8.5-19 — “Management of train traffic by the traffic operator” of 17.05.2024, point 5.2.1, para. (3), letter d), regarding the obligation of the traffic operator to maintain systematic communication with the traffic operators on the neighbouring running lines, informing each other about the regularity of train traffic.

Primary causes

No primary causes were identified.

Additional remarks

During the investigation, the following additional remarks were made regarding some deficiencies and gaps, without relevance to the direct cause of the occurrence of the incident:

- The hauling locomotive of train no. 74 carried out its last scheduled repair in 2008, without observing the time norm imposed by the railway normative “Railway Vehicles. Types of scheduled inspections and repairs. Time norms or norms of kilometric performance for carrying out scheduled inspections and repairs”, approved by Order of the Minister of Transport and Infrastructure no. 315/2011, with subsequent amendments and completions.
- After striking the short-circuiting device and the disappearance of voltage in the contact line, the engine driver did not stop the train soon, as he should have done according to the specific regulations.

Measures taken during the investigation

The public railway infrastructure manager CNCF “CFR” SA, through SRCF Braşov, drew up the “Plan of measures regarding the improvement of railway safety” and the “Monitoring of the staff involved in the occurrence of incidents”, by which additional safety measures were ordered in order to avoid the occurrence of similar incidents.

Safety recommendations

Considering the manner of occurrence of the incident and the measures taken by the public railway infrastructure manager CNCF “CFR” SA, the investigation commission did not consider it necessary to issue safety recommendations.

3.4.39. The railway incident occurred on 10th February 2025, in the railway county Bucureşti, track section Bucureşti – Ploieşti, at Ploieşti Triaj Branch Line PM, by the erroneous execution of the passing route of Interregio passenger train no. 1665010.

The investigation report was completed on 26th June 2025.

Direct cause

The direct cause of the occurrence of the railway incident was the human error occurred in the exercise of the traffic duties of the duty movements inspector in Crivina railway station, by omitting to transmit to the movements inspector in Brazi railway station the passing advice for IR train no. 1665010, respectively to report the traffic data in the IRIS workstation, which caused the routing of the train towards Ploieşti Vest instead of Ploieşti Sud.

Contributing factors

- the deviation of trains from the ideal train diagram, as a result of the railway accident occurred in the running of IC train no. 538 at the level crossing in stopping point Scroviște, which caused the closure of train traffic on both running lines between railway stations Crivina and Periș;
- the failure of the traffic controller to transmit the traffic controller order regarding the delay minutes which, at that time, the trains running on the București – Ploiești track section had;
- defective communication through the RTF workstation between the regulating movements inspector in railway station Brazi and the engine driver of IR train no. 1665010 when giving the command for passing through the station.

Underlying causes

Failure to comply with the provisions of:

- Art. 208, letter j), of the “Regulation for train traffic and railway vehicle shunting” no. 005/2005, regarding the obligation to transmit the departure advice to the neighbouring station, and Art. 260, letter a), of the “Regulation for train traffic and railway vehicle shunting” no. 005/2005, regarding the obligation to report the traffic data in the IRIS workstation soon after entering them in the Unified Register of Line Clears, Orders and Movements;
- the job description of the regulating movements inspector of railway station Crivina:
 - point 6.43, regarding the timely transmission of train traffic data;
 - point 6.44, regarding the recording of train traffic data and the specific reports of the IRIS application with all its components, in accordance with the regulations in force;
- Art. 121, point 5, of the “Regulation for train traffic and railway vehicle shunting” no. 005/2005, regarding the obligation to advise, by written order, the running of trains at other times than those provided in the daily traffic programme;
- Art. 189, letter a), of the “Regulation for train traffic and railway vehicle shunting” no. 005/2005 and Art. 136, para. (1), letters “a”, “b”, “c”, para. (2) and (3), of the “Instructions for the activity of locomotive staff in railway transport” no. 201, regarding the obligation of the movements inspector and the engine driver to communicate and mutually confirm, by radiotelephone, the conditions for entry, passing, stopping and exit in/through/from the railway station and for running between railway stations.

Primary causes

No primary causes were identified.

Measures taken during the investigation

Following the occurrence of the railway incident, CNCF “CFR” SA ordered, by plan no. 14/1202/2024, the following measures in order to avoid, in the future, the occurrence of incidents/accidents with similar causes and to improve railway safety:

- monitoring of the movements inspector in railway station Crivina involved in the incident;
- scheduling the movements inspector in railway station Crivina involved in the incident for an additional theoretical training meeting;
- the Traffic Division București ordered an additional theoretical training programme no. TR3B/79/2025;
- the employees with training and control duties from the Traffic Division București shall verify how the monitoring, respectively the additional theoretical training, was carried out.

Safety recommendations

Considering the manner of occurrence of the incident and the measures taken by the public railway infrastructure manager CNCF “CFR” SA, the investigation commission did not consider it necessary to issue safety recommendations.

3.4.40. The railway accident occurred on 17th February 2025, in the railway county Brașov, track section Brașov – Siculeni (electrified single-track line), in railway station Bicsadu Oltului, by the derailment of both axles of the first bogie, in the running direction, of the first wagon in the composition of Regio passenger train no. 4504, got by the passenger railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA.

The investigation report was completed on 12th December 2025.

Causal factor

A combination of the following conditions:

- the breaking of the horizontal bolts of the cranked fish-plates which formed the extreme joint of the turnout, due to incomplete fastening and the dip at that rail joint;
- the entering into the structure clearance of the outer cranked fish-plate and its striking by wheel no. 7 on the right-hand side of the first axle of the first bogie, in the running direction of the wagon.

Contributing factors

- The existence on the track, in the area where the accident occurred (at the heel of the turnout), of a section where the track twist gradient exceeded the maximum value admitted for train traffic, and of a joint formed on wooden and concrete sleepers at the extreme end of the turnout.
- The performance of the thorough inspection of the points and crossings on the running and direct lines in railway stations, by an incomplete commission, at time intervals longer than those provided by the codes of practice, favoured the decrease of the effectiveness of this activity and caused the existing defects in the track geometry not to be identified.
- The failure to carry out measurements/verifications at the track superstructure, at the points and crossings, by the staff with duties in traffic safety.

Systemic factors

- Provision of improper volume of material and human resources, in relation to the necessary one, for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the line and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances;
- Defective/inefficient supervision/monitoring of the activity of the track district by the staff with inspection and control duties within Track Section L6 Gheorgheni and the railway county Braşov.

Additional remarks

During the investigation, the following additional remarks were made regarding certain deficiencies and shortcomings, without relevance to the causal, contributing or systemic factors of the occurrence of the accident:

In the autumn of 2024, the engineer responsible for the welded track was absent for a long period of time, and his tasks for carrying out the welded track census, according to *Instruction no. 305 of 1997 regarding the setting of the deadlines and the order in which the track inspections must be carried out, file no. 1, Art. 1*, were divided among the staff within L6 Gheorgheni Section (section head, deputy section head, L instructor, track geometry engineer, mechanisation engineer), while in the job description of the engineer responsible for the welded track it is stated that the replacement is the deputy section head.

Safety recommendations

Considering the causal, contributing and systemic factors identified during the investigation, in order to prevent similar incidents or accidents from occurring in the future, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 26, para. (2) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019 on railway safety, the investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendations, addressed to ASFR, which, within the limits of its competences, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the safety recommendations issued by AGIFER are taken into consideration and, where appropriate, followed.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 507/1

After analysing the Risk Register – 2024 drawn up by the Tracks Department of the railway county Braşov for the tracks department, the investigation commission found that no analysis had been carried out regarding the assessment of the risk generated by the hazard manifested by maintaining the track geometry beyond the tolerances admitted in operation and maintaining incomplete or inactive fastenings.

Safety recommendation no. 507/1

CNCF “CFR” SA shall reanalyse the action of identifying the risks associated with its own railway operations and shall assess the risks generated by the following hazards:

- a) maintaining the track geometry beyond the tolerances admitted in operation;
- b) maintaining incomplete or inactive fastenings,

in order to establish and apply viable safety measures for keeping them under control.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. 507/2

During the investigation, it was found that after the introduction of turnout no. 1R, it was not of the same type as the rail on the tracks to which it is connected, the transition from one rail type to another being carried out with cranked fish-plates instead of connecting panels. It was also found that in the railway county Braşov, there are other such situations in which the transition from the rail type of the turnout to the rail type of the tracks to which it is connected is carried out with cranked fish-plates instead of connecting panels.

Safety recommendation no. 507/2

On the occasion of the supervisory activities carried out, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 17(1) and Art. 9(d) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019, the Romanian Railway Safety Authority – ASFR shall request CNCF “CFR” SA to identify all similar situations at network level (in which the transition from the rail type of the points and crossings to another rail type is carried out without complying with the provisions of Art. 15, point 5, of Instruction no. 314/1989 on standards and tolerances for the construction and maintenance of standard gauge track), and to establish the necessary measures for eliminating them.

3.4.41. The railway incident occurred on 28th March 2025, at 10:55 o'clock, in the railway county Craiova, track section Târgu Jiu – Livezeni (electrified single-track line), between Pietrele Albe and Lainici railway stations, at km 106+600, by the striking of a rail drill from the equipment of L5 Târgu Jiu Section, by locomotive EA 073 which was hauling freight train no. 56500, got by the freight railway undertaking Deutsche Bahn Cargo Romania SA.

The investigation report was completed on 11th September 2025.

Direct cause

The direct cause of the incident was the leaving in the structure clearance, in the area of km 106+600, of a rail drill which belonged to and was handled by the employees of District 5, L5 Târgu Jiu Section, followed by its striking by locomotive LEMA 073, which hauled freight train no. 56500.

Contributing factors

- the movement of the permanent-way gang to the intervention site without the running line being closed;
- the failure to ensure the corresponding conditions for carrying out the works in order to remedy the rail defect at km 106+600.

Underlying causes

- failure to advise the movements inspector and failure to enter in the RRLISC (Register for the Inspection of Lines and Traffic Safety Installations) of the railway stations delimiting the respective area the information regarding the need for the accidental closure of the running line, with the advising of the staff concerned, according to the provisions of Art. 322 – (1), (2), of the Regulation for train traffic and railway vehicle shunting, approved by Order of the minister no. 1816 of 26th October 2025;
- allowing the movement of workers within the track clearance, in areas with reduced clearance where movement is forbidden, without safety measures being taken and without the staff being instructed and equipped with signalling equipment, contrary to the provisions of the Own Occupational Safety and Health Instructions on the railway infrastructure/2024, subchapter 4.3, Art. 306.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Measures taken during the investigation

Following the occurrence of the railway incident, CNCF “CFR” SA took measures to improve traffic safety, briefing of staff and introduction in the risk register of the hazard “the striking by trains of railway vehicles that can be removed from the line by hand, of materials, equipment, devices, parts and installations located in the structure clearance, following which no derailments of railway vehicles occurred”.

Safety recommendations

Considering the measures communicated by the railway county Craiova, which were taken during the investigation, the investigation commission does not consider it necessary to issue a safety recommendation.

3.4.42. The railway incident occurred on 2nd April 2025, in the railway county Craiova, in railway station Fâlfani, by accepting Regio passenger train no. 9479 001 into the station, with calling-on signal, to direct line no. I, occupied by Regio Expres passenger train no. 9270 001, both trains being got by the passenger railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA.

The investigation report was completed on 5th December 2025.

Direct cause

The human error occurred by reversing points 1/5 with access to line no. I and by the erroneous accepting of Regio passenger train no. 9479 001 into the station, to direct line no. I, a line which was occupied by Regio Expres passenger train no. 9270 001.

Contributing factor

- the movements inspector did not wait for the completion of the entry route of R train no. 9479 001, accepted with calling-on signal X, to the diverging track no. 2;
- he did not make sure that R train no. 9479 001 had been fully stabled on the diverging track no. 2, between the fouling points;
- he did not verify on site the clear condition of insulated section 5-7, before reversing points 1/5 with access to direct line no. I;
- he executed the exit route from line no. I in the direction of Costești for RE train no. 9270 001, a line on which R train no. 9479 001 was also running.

Underlying causes

Failure to comply with some provisions of the codes of practice, as follows:

- Point A of minutes no. 323/9/50/25.03.2024, annex to Disposition no. 1/503/2011, regarding the drawing up of minutes between the Station Head and the Head of the SCB District, regarding the manner of executing the routes over the insulated sections taken out of service, which specifies the obligation of the movements inspector to verify on site the clear condition of insulated sections 5-7 before executing the route;
- Art. 19 of the “Regulations regarding the operation of the signalling, interlocking and block installations - SCB - in railway station Fâlfani”, which regulates the manner of proceeding when: a) the insulated point section is clear on site and shown occupied on the illuminated track-diagram and b) the insulated point section is occupied on site and shown clear on the illuminated track-diagram, by complying with all the operations that must be carried out by the movements inspector;
- Art. 21 of the “Regulations regarding the operation of the signalling, interlocking and block installations - SCB - in railway station Fâlfani”, which specifies that, before using the calling-on signals, the movements inspector is obliged to verify on site the defective insulated sections and not to reverse any points in the route or in the covering route until the train is stabled on the stabling line.

Primary causes

No primary causes were identified.

Measures taken during the investigation

Following the occurrence of the railway incident, in order to prevent similar incidents, CNCF “CFR” SA, through RGSCF București, by document no. 14/553/07.04.2025, ordered the taking of its own measures to improve traffic safety, as follows:

1. Additional training of the staff from the Traffic department:

Measure 1: within the first practical service training meeting, for function groups B and C, an additional topic is introduced:

- for CED (electrodynamical interlocking of points and signals)/CE stations: “Accepting two trains from opposite directions into the station, when an insulated section is shown occupied on the illuminated track-diagram”;
 - for CEM stations and similar stations: “Accepting two trains from opposite directions into the station, when an insulated fouling point section is shown occupied on the point operating apparatus”;
- Measure 2: within the first theoretical professional training meeting, for function group B, the role play is additionally introduced:

- for CED (electrodynamical interlocking of points and signals)/CE stations: “Accepting two trains from opposite directions into the station, when an insulated point section is shown occupied on the illuminated track-diagram”;

- for CEM stations and similar stations: “Accepting two trains from opposite directions into the station, when an insulated fouling point section is shown occupied on the point operating apparatus”;
- 2. *Establishing the level of training of the traffic controllers;*
- 3. *Analysing the organisation and carrying out of practical service training in the Traffic department and other measures with evaluation and sending the results to RGSC.*

Safety recommendations

No safety recommendations were identified.

3.4.43. The railway incident occurred on 4th April 2025, in the railway county Braşov, between Racoş and Rupea railway stations, respectively between Beia and Mureni railway stations, by the striking of several track inductors by a belt coming from wagon no. 37805931550-7, in the composition of freight train no. 58381 (got by the freight railway undertaking TRAIN EUROPE Sucursala Craiova). The investigation report was completed on 29th July 2025.

Direct cause

The direct cause was the coming out of the “cfr wagon loading gauge” (Plate no. 1 of Instructions no. 328/2008) of an anchoring and securing belt for goods from wagon no. 37805931550-7, in the composition of freight train no. 58381, and its entering into the “clearance for elements of railway installations” (Plate no. 4 of Instructions no. 328/2008).

Contributing factors

Not applicable.

Underlying causes

Not applicable.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Additional remarks

During the investigation, the following additional remark was made regarding certain deficiencies and shortcomings, without relevance to the direct cause of the occurrence of the incident:

In railway station Beia, in some situations, due to the lack of staff residing in Beia locality, the crew change is carried out during the standstill of a passenger train in the station, namely 1 minute, as in the investigated case. This time is insufficient for carrying out a corresponding crew change, in accordance with the provisions of the Regulations and the job descriptions for the position of movements inspector.

Safety recommendations

Considering the manner of occurrence of the incident and the findings made during the carried-out activity, the investigation commission considers that it is not necessary to issue any safety recommendation.

3.4.44. The railway incident occurred on 28th April 2025, in the railway county Craiova, track section Filiaşi – Craiova (electrified double-track line), between railway stations Filiaşi and Craiova, by the striking of several track inductors by a part from locomotive EC 032, in the composition of Regio passenger train no. 2092, got by the passenger railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA. The investigation report was completed on 27th November 2025.

Direct cause

The detachment from the weld of the fixing support from the upper part of the vertical oil damper of axle no. 4 on the right-hand side of locomotive EA 032, followed by its rotation by 180° and its entering into the clearance for elements of railway installations, fact which finally caused the striking of several track inductors.

Contributing factors

- the occurrence and development over time of a crack in the material of the upper fastening support of the oil damper, as a result of taking over the loads transmitted by the irregularities of the running track and the locomotive body;
- maintaining locomotive EC 032 in traffic, after identifying a crack in the fixing support from the upper part of the vertical oil damper of axle no. 4 on the right-hand side of locomotive EA 032, fact mentioned by the locomotive staff in the he incident record of the locomotive.

Underlying causes

Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter II, Art. 40 letter d) and Art. 46 – (5) letter k), of the “Instructions for the activity of locomotive staff in railway transport” no. 201 of 2006, regarding the checks that must be carried out at the locomotive when leaving the traction units and during en-route inspections.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Additional remarks

During the investigation, without having relevance to the causes of the occurrence of the incident, other deficiencies were also identified:

- the staff who performed service with locomotive EC 032 did not draw up Event Reports for the advising of the defects found;
- after the occurrence of the incident, locomotive EC 032 was introduced into Craiova Technical Group, where the damper from axle no. 4 was dismantled, after which it was routed to haul trains no. 2021 and no. 2022 with deficiencies in the locomotive suspension (vertical damper), which prohibited its putting into service.

Measures taken during the investigation

Locomotive EC 032 was introduced into the technical group of Craiova wagon repair and maintenance depot on 28th April 2025 in order to remedy the defects found, being put into service after hauling the passenger trains.

Safety recommendations

No safety recommendations were identified.

3.4.45. The railway incident occurred on 30th May 2025, at 19:57 o'clock, in the railway county București, track section Chitila – Golești (non-electrified double-track line), between railway stations Mătășaru and Găești, by the striking of 3 track magnets by a part from diesel multiple unit AM 2120, which ran as train no. 9214, got by the passenger railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA. The investigation report was completed on 24th November 2025.

Direct cause

The detachment and entering into the “clearance for elements of railway installations” of the hydrostatic oil cooling radiator corresponding to cab no. I of Desiro SR 20 D diesel multiple unit no. 2120, fact which caused the striking of 3 track inductors on the left-hand side in the running direction.

Contributing factors

Improper fixing of the hydrostatic oil cooling radiator corresponding to cab no. I, respectively the absence of the fixing screws on the left-hand side (upper and lower) and its tying with wire on the upper right-hand side.

Underlying causes

Deficient application of the provisions of the List of Works no. DT5/1/36/21.01.2019 regarding the obligation to verify, within the intermediate overhaul Ri 7 of DESIRO SR 20 D diesel multiple units, the manner of fixing the radiators (water, oil and air).

Primary cause

Not applicable.

Safety recommendations

Considering the causes identified during the investigation, in order to prevent similar incidents or accidents from occurring in the future, the investigation commission considers it appropriate to issue the following safety recommendations, addressed to ASFR, which, within the limits of its competences, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the safety recommendations issued by AGIFER are taken into consideration and, where appropriate, followed.

Preamble to safety recommendation no. I287/1

During the verifications carried out after the occurrence of the accident, the investigation commission found that Desiro SR 20 D diesel multiple unit no. 2120 ran for a long period of time without the hydrostatic oil cooling radiator MD 1 being fastened with all 4 fixing screws, and one of the screws was replaced with wire, although, during the Ri 7 overhaul works, the fixing of this subassembly should have been verified.

Safety recommendation no. I287/1

SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA shall urgently establish a plan of measures aimed at verifying all DESIRO SR 20 D diesel multiple units regarding the manner of fixing the water, oil and air radiators and the manner of complying with the requirements of the List of Works no. DT5/1/36/21.01.2019 regarding the fixing of these subassemblies, in order to avoid similar incidents.

3.4.46. The railway incident occurred on 11th June 2025, at 10:20 o'clock, in the railway county Constanța, in railway station Fetești, by the striking of a machine belonging to Arcada Company SA, which was standing on line no. 10 in the structure clearance, by locomotive EA 1077 which was hauling freight train no. 58196010.

The investigation report was completed on 7th August 2025.

Direct cause

Failure to ensure the structure clearance between lines no. 10 and no. 11, beyond signal RX11, fact which allowed that, during the running without stopping of freight train no. 58196010 on line no. 11 in railway station Fetești, the locomotive which hauled the train, EA 1077, struck ballast plough no. 99539425001-4, which was on line no. 10.

Contributing factors

- the standing of ballast plough no. 99539425001-4 on line no. 10, in the area where the structure clearance between lines no. 10 and no. 11 was not ensured;
- failure to ensure L agents at the work execution site on line no. 10.

Underlying causes

- Failure to comply with the conditions established by railway county Constanța – Regional Committee for Line Closures, SDST and RV, in telegram no. 83 of 17th June 2024, by which Arcada Company SA had to ensure persons responsible for SC, SSM, SU, signalling, clearance and reopening.
- Failure to comply with the conditions established in the “WORK REGULATIONS” for rehabilitation works of lines 7-10 in railway station Fetești, in the sense that Arcada Company SA had to comply with the requirement according to which, “The work execution sites shall be protected by red discs doubled by L agents nominated by the executor of the works”.

Primary causes

No primary causes were identified.

Measures taken during the investigation

By document no. 741 of 30th June 2025, in order to prevent the occurrence of incidents similar to this one, ARCAD A COMPANY SA ordered the following measures:

1. *Organisational*
 - verification and updating of internal procedures;
 - additional training of the operating staff;
 - carrying out additional medical and psychological testing;
 - reassessment of the working programme of the staff.

Completion deadline: 60 days

Responsible: the head of the workplace

2. *Disciplinary*

application of sanctions according to the Labour Code and the Internal Regulation.

Completion deadline: 60 days

Responsible: Human Resources Inspector.

3. *Preventive and training measures*

- organisation of a collective training programme;
- briefing all employees of the company on the Investigation Minutes;
- verification of the professional competences of the staff.

Completion deadline: 60 days

Responsible: the head of the workplace.

Safety recommendations

Considering that, during the investigation of the railway incident, ARCADIA COMPANY SA ordered the corrective measures mentioned under point “**D. Measures taken**”, the investigation commission considers that it is not necessary to issue safety recommendations.

3.4.47. The railway incident occurred on 5th July 2025, at 18:38 o'clock, in the railway county București, on track section Lehliu – Pajura railway station (electrified double-track line), at Pajura Branch Line, by the erroneous execution of the passing route of Interregio passenger train no. 11506005 (got by the passenger railway undertaking Astra Trans Carpatic SRL).

The investigation report was completed on 23rd December 2025.

Direct cause

The direct cause was the human error occurred in the exercise of the traffic duties of the duty movements inspector in railway station București Băneasa, by erroneously transmitting the departure advice for IR train no. 11086005 instead of the passing advice for IR train no. 11506005 to the regulating movements inspector in railway station Pajura, which caused the routing of the train towards Chitila instead of București Nord.

Contributing factors

- the erroneous recording in the operating statement of railway station București Băneasa of the passing advice for IR train no. 110860051 instead of train no. 1506005, as it was transmitted by railway station Pantelimon;
- the failure of the traffic controller to transmit the traffic controller order regarding the delay minutes recorded at that time by IR train no. 11086005, running on track section Lehliu – București;
- defective communication through the RTF workstation between the regulating movements inspector in railway station București Băneasa, the movements inspector in railway station Pajura and the engine driver of IR train no. 11506005, when giving the command for passing through railway station București Băneasa and railway station Pajura;
- the failure of the movements inspector in railway station București Băneasa to receive the data of IR train no. 11506005 on the IRIS workstation, transmitted through the IRIS system by the movements inspector in railway station Pantelimon, and the failure to enter soon after, the data of this train in the operating statement.

Underlying causes

Failure to comply with the provisions of:

- Art. 121 point 5 of the “Regulation for train traffic and railway vehicle shunting” no. 005/2005, regarding the obligation to advise, by written order, the running of trains at other times than those provided in the daily traffic programme;
- Art. 189 letter a) of the “Regulation for train traffic and railway vehicle shunting” no. 005/2005 and Art. 136 point (1) letters “a”, “b”, “c”, points (2) and (3), of the “Instructions for the activity of locomotive staff in railway transport” no. 201, regarding the obligation of the movements inspector and the engine driver to communicate and mutually confirm, by radiotelephone, the conditions for entry, passing, stopping and exit in/through/from the station and for running between stations;
- Art. 260 of the “Regulation for train traffic and railway vehicle shunting” no. 005/2005, regarding the obligation of the movements inspector to report train traffic data through the IRIS workstation.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Additional remarks

During the investigation, deficiencies were identified, without relevance to the causes of the incident, as follows:

The regulating movements inspector in railway station Pajura carried out shunting with IR train no. 11506005 without the approval of the traffic controller.

Measures taken during the investigation

Following the occurrence of the railway incident, CNCF “CFR” SA ordered, by plan no. 14/1202/2024, the following measures in order to avoid, in the future, the occurrence of incidents/accidents with similar causes and to improve railway safety:

- Traffic Division București, by document no. 122/12.11.2025, ordered an additional internal evaluation for the movements inspector in railway station București Băneasa involved in the occurrence of the railway incident;
- scheduling the movements inspector in railway station București Băneasa involved in the incident for an additional theoretical training meeting;
- practical monitoring of the movements inspector in railway station București Băneasa involved in the incident;
- Traffic Division București requested SC Informatica Feroviară to solve the problem found at railway station București Băneasa regarding the fact that, when transmitting the departure/passing advice by railway station Pantelimon in the IRIS workstation, railway station București Băneasa does not view the departure/passing advice.

Safety recommendations

Considering the manner of occurrence of the incident and the measures taken by the public railway infrastructure manager CNCF “CFR” SA, the investigation commission did not consider it necessary to issue safety recommendations.

3.4.48. The railway incident occurred on 19th July 2025, at 12:30 o'clock, in the railway county Galați, track section Adjud – Onești (electrified double-track line), on running line II Urechești – Adjud and running line I Urechești – Căiuți, by the striking and damaging of 4 track inductors (corresponding to colour-light signals BL 23 – running line II Urechești – Adjud, XAP – running line II Urechești – Adjud, BL 11 – running line I Urechești – Căiuți and BL 13 – running line I Urechești – Căiuți) by the damper detached from the upper part and remained suspended by the lower support of axle no. 3 of locomotive EA 403, which was hauling Regio passenger train no. 5202, got by the passenger railway undertaking SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA.

The investigation report was completed on 27th November 2021.

Direct cause

The breaking of the fixing support from the upper part of the vertical oil damper of axle no. 3 of locomotive EA 403, followed by its rotation by 180° under the action of gravity and its entering into the clearance for elements of railway installations, fact which finally caused the striking of several track inductors.

Contributing factors

- the occurrence and development over time, since the last scheduled repair carried out, of a crack in the material of the upper fastening support of the damper, as a result of taking over the loads transmitted by the locomotive body;
- maintaining locomotive EA 403 in operation after reaching the time norm provided for scheduled repair type RG/RR, for which this locomotive had been due since 2015/2016, followed, according to the normative, by another scheduled repair in 2020/2022.

Underlying causes

Failure to comply with the provisions of Railway Normative code NF 67-006:2011 “Railway vehicles. Types of scheduled inspections and repairs. Time norms or kilometric performance norms for carrying out scheduled inspections and repairs”, Table 3.1 “Norms for carrying out scheduled inspections and repairs at powered railway vehicles”, approved by Order of the Minister of Transport and Infrastructure no. 315/2011, amended and supplemented by Order of the Minister of Transport and Infrastructure no. 1359/2012, regarding the time/km norm at which the withdrawal of locomotive EA 403 from operation was required for carrying out periodic technical repairs.

Primary causes


Not applicable.

Measures taken during the investigation

Following the occurrence of similar incidents, before the occurrence of this railway incident, SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA took and ordered some additional measures, as follows:

- On 9th October 2024, from the SC Service of SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA, the technical proposal by which the securing against falling of the dampers could be achieved following the breaking of their upper fastenings was transmitted to the Rolling Stock Headquarters of the same operator, as follows:

- Mounting by welding, on each upper support (on the locomotive body) for fixing the pin of the vertical dampers, of one metal ring (nut);
- Mounting by welding, on the upper part, on each fixing lug of the vertical damper, of one metal ring (nut);
- Mounting between the two metal rings (nuts) of a securing cable in the form of a loop;



This technical proposal was taken into consideration and, after the date of issue, put into practice as follows:

- On 13th November 2024, from the Rolling Stock Headquarters of SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA, document no. SIRM/8/833/13.11.2024 regarding the technical solution for securing the dampers on Co-Co type electric locomotives, proposed by the SC Service, was transmitted to all Passenger Railway Transport Regional Branches 1-8, including SCRL Brașov, for implementation;
- On 28th April 2025, from the Rolling Stock Headquarters – Rolling Stock Maintenance and Repair Service of SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA, the document without number regarding the technical solution for securing the dampers on Bo-Bo type electric locomotives, proposed by the SC Service, was transmitted to the Passenger Railway Transport Regional Branches Craiova, Timișoara, Iași and Galați, including SCRL Brașov, for implementation.

Safety recommendations

No safety recommendations were identified.

3.4.49. The railway incident occurred on 6th September 2025, at 03:05 o'clock, in the railway county Timișoara, track section Arad – Timișoara (electrified single-track line), in Timișoara Nord railway station, by passing entry signal YA in the stop position.

The investigation report was completed on 26th November 2025.

Direct cause

The human error occurred within the process of driving and operating locomotive ED 073, manifested by the failure to carefully observe the position of entry signal YA of railway station Timișoara Nord and the delayed taking of braking measures in order to comply with the displayed position, respectively to stop before it.

Contributing factors

- the advanced state of fatigue of the locomotive staff, as a result of failure to comply with the regulated rest period, as well as of exceeding the maximum admitted service duration on the locomotive;

- lack of communication between the driver and the duty movements inspector through the RER workstation (radio-transmission-reception station).

Underlying causes

Failure by the locomotive staff to comply with the following guides of practice/instructions/regulations:

- “Instructions for the activity of locomotive staff in railway transport” no. 201/2007, Art. 127 (1), letter a), regarding the careful observation of the positions of fixed and mobile signals and of the indicators installed in accordance with the specific regulations in force;
- “Instructions for the activity of locomotive staff in railway transport” no. 201/2007, Art. 136 (1): before entering the station, the engine driver must receive by radiotelephone, from the movements inspector in the railway stations through which he is to pass or stop, with the indication of the train number, the following information:
 - a) the conditions for entry and stopping in the station, for the train hauled by him;
 - b) the line serving a siding in the station, specifying whether it is main line or deflecting section;
- “Railway Technical Operation Regulation” no. 002/2001, Art. 59 (4), regarding the prohibition to pass a signal ordering stop or to exceed the speed ordered by the signal;
- “Signalling Regulation” no. 004/2006, Art. 161 (2), regarding the compliance with the indication of the marker of the colour-light entry, exit, route and branch signals, which indicates the fact that the respective colour-light signal, if ordering stop, cannot be passed by the train except under the conditions established by the respective regulation;
- Order of the Minister of Transport no. 256/2013 for the approval of the Norms regarding the maximum admitted continuous service on the locomotive, performed by the staff who drive and/or operate locomotives in the railway system in Romania.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Additional remarks

The continuation of running and the trailing-point movement of point switch no. 52 by freight train no. 66030004, after passing entry signal YA of railway station Timișoara Nord, which had the position “stop without passing the signal”, was possible under the conditions of the improper operation of the installation for automatic train speed control and automatic train stop (1000/2000 Hz track inductors), corresponding to entry signal YA.

Safety recommendations

No safety recommendations were identified.

3.4.50. The railway incident occurred on 10th September 2025, at 19:10 o’clock, in the railway county Constanța, track section București – Fetești, in railway station Dor Mărunt, by the striking of the cover of the point motor of turnout no. 10 by the connecting bar of the axle guidance – inductor assembly, post no. II, detached from locomotive EA 050, which hauled freight train no. 67612010, got by the freight railway undertaking Expres Forwarding SRL.

The investigation report was completed on 26th November 2025.

Direct cause

The direct cause of the occurrence of this railway incident was the detachment of the connecting bar of the axle guidance – inductor assembly post no. II of locomotive EA 050, followed by its entering into the “clearance for elements of railway installations”, fact which finally caused the striking of the point motor of turnout no. 10.

Contributing factors

The breaking of 2 fixing screws of the connecting bar of the axle guidance from post no. II, on the driver’s side, due to bumps in the track, and the absence of two fixing screws, confirmed by the existence of 100% old fractures.

Underlying causes

Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter II, Art. 37 (3), letter a), Chapter III, Art. 44 (3), letter a), and Art. 46 (7), of the “Instructions for the activity of locomotive staff in railway transport” no. 201 of 2006, regarding the checks that must be carried out at the locomotive on the occasion of putting the locomotive into service, of intermediate overhauls and en-route inspections.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Measures taken during the investigation

Following the occurrence of the railway incident on 10th September 2025 in railway station Dor Mărunt, in order to avoid the occurrence of similar incidents, by document no. 433/SC/30.09.2025, EXPRESS FORWARDING SRL ordered the following measures:

- revision of procedure PO-02 – “Control of the railway undertaking staff”, application of the control norms and methodology provided by the general procedure, incorporation in the control objectives of the increase in exigency of the activity of taking over railway vehicles - VF - from ERI-certified maintenance units;
- revision of procedure PSSF-38 – “Verification and control of the results of the inspections, maintenance and repairs carried out, in order to establish whether they are compliant with the standards in force”, in the sense of increasing the exigency of the staff appointed for the acceptance of maintenance works, with emphasis on inspections and accidental works, namely where AFER inspectors do not reach;
- planning and carrying out second-party audits at maintenance suppliers, in order to select the accepted suppliers, or to supervise those already accepted if there are reasonable suspicions regarding the maintaining of the maintenance quality;
- inclusion in contracts, even orders, concluded for the provision of maintenance services for railway vehicles - VF -, of a clause allowing Express Forwarding to carry out second-party audits and in-process inspections where there are suspicions or findings regarding the maintaining of the quality of maintenance services for railway vehicles - VF -;
- continuation of the action of identifying the hazards and associated risks, which may cause the occurrence of railway accidents and incidents, as a result of improper maintenance of railway vehicles - VF - or deficient acceptance of railway vehicles - VF - subject to maintenance;
- re-briefing, within the theoretical training meetings, of the educational materials and investigation reports drawn up on the occasion of the occurrence of railway accidents and incidents, in order for the employees to know the causes which caused their occurrence, with emphasis on the cases of detachments or falling of parts;
- additional supervision of the employees who caused railway accidents and incidents, who have panic and blockage reactions in critical situations or family problems which could cause the decrease of those employees’ capacity to carry out their activity properly, as the case may be, even requesting an unscheduled psychological examination;
- detection and treatment, on the occasion of the controls carried out, of wrong working methods;
- re-briefing of the locomotive staff regarding strict compliance with the specific regulations regarding railway safety in connection with train traffic and the execution of shunting. Observation of the position of fixed signals and keeping them and the line indicators under permanent supervision. Observation of the shunting route, adjustment of the speed depending on visibility and the space reserved for shunting;
- re-briefing of the locomotive staff regarding paying special attention to following the elements from the working timetable, the train sheet, BAR – Speed Restrictions Advice Bulletin, the driver’s cautious running slip, the established speeds or restrictions, when observing an indication ordering the reduction of speed at a certain point or on a certain line section; the driver shall adjust the train speed so that the train speed at the respective point or line section is 2-3 km/h lower than the ordered one;
- re-briefing regarding the compliance by the locomotive staff with the provisions regarding the verification of traffic safety installations, running gear, wheels, tyres, the condition of the marks of the wheel discs, of the tyres, if applicable, the suspension and the mechanical part, with recording under signature in the incident record of the locomotive/diesel multiple unit;
- drawing the attention of engine drivers that, when carrying out technical checks in stations, they should not stop the Diesel Engine until they have carried out a thorough check in order to detect any visible, palpable defects, those which can be heard, or noticeable leaks;

- re-briefing of the locomotive staff from Instructions no. 201/2006, Chapter II – “Putting the locomotive into service”, Art. 37-41;
- re-briefing of the locomotive staff from Instructions no. 201/2006, Chapter III – “Inspections and repairs of locomotives. Technical checks carried out by locomotive staff en route”, Art. 42, 46-48;
- renewal of the locomotive fleet (starting with December).

The measures for improving the prevention activity have permanent character.

Additional remarks

During the investigation, the following findings were made regarding certain deficiencies and shortcomings, without relevance to the causes of the incident, mentioned in Chapters “**C.5.4.3. Data found at the rolling stock**” and “**C.5.5. Human-machine-organisation interface**”, namely:

- the unjustified isolation of the INDUSI installation before the dispatch of trains;
- exceeding the maximum admitted service duration on the locomotive and failure to ensure the rest of the locomotive staff, contrary to the provisions of Order no. 256/2013 for the approval of the “Norms regarding the maximum admitted continuous service on the locomotive, performed by the staff who drive and/or operate locomotives in the railway system in Romania”.

Safety recommendations

In the case of this incident, no safety recommendations were issued.

3.4.51. The railway incident occurred on 12th September 2025, at 05:14 o'clock, in the railway county București, track section Ploiești Nord – Măneciu, in railway station Ploiești Nord, by accepting passenger train no. 10240012, consisting of DH2 3220 (got by the passenger railway undertaking Transferoviar Călători SRL) into the station, to line no. II, occupied by locomotive EA 817.

The investigation report was completed on 18th November 2025.

Direct cause

The direct cause of the occurrence of the railway incident was the clearing of entry signal D1/2 and the accepting of R train no. 10240012 into the station, to line no. II, occupied by EA 817.

Contributing factors

- the point switch examiner from signal box no. 1 did not observe the train stabling table 2024/2025 displayed at signal box no. 1 and did not request, on his own initiative, information regarding the running of R train no. 10240012;
- the regulating movements inspector transmitted the entry/exit command for R train no. 10240012 without the point switch examiner from signal box no. 1 also participating in receiving the command;
- the point switch examiner from signal box no. 2 received and accepted the entry/exit command from the regulating movements inspector, under the conditions in which he should have refused receiving this command because the point switch examiner from signal box no. 1 did not answer the telephone;
- the regulating movements inspector did not give the command for withdrawal and stopping of shunting, and the regulating movements inspector and the point switch examiners from signal boxes no. 1 and no. 2 did not verify the clear condition of line no. II assigned, according to the train stabling table, for the receiving-dispatching of R train no. 10240012;
- the regulating movements inspector did not request the point switch examiner from signal box no. 1 to transmit, with number and time, the operation and securing of derailleurs S XI (on line no. 10), respectively S XIII (on line no. 11), in normal position (placed on the rail), a fact which the movements inspector had to confirm as received, with number and time. Only in this case was the shunting considered completed;
- the regulating movements inspector did not make sure that signal box no. 1 had received the written command for the backing-into-siding operation of locomotive EA 817 from line no. II to line no. 11 LFI Vega. The command to signal box no. 1 was entered in the register of the signal box retroactively at 05:10 o'clock;
- the regulating movements inspector communicated the carrying out of the movements for shunting EA 817 from line no. 3 to line no. II only to the point switch examiner from signal box no. 2, without also communicating to the point switch examiner from signal box no. 1;

- the regulating movements inspector took measures on his own initiative and established that locomotive EA 817, arrived with delayed train no. 66262010, should be shunted from line no. 3 to line no. II for introduction on line no. 11 LFI Vega, without communicating this to the traffic controller;
- the regulating movements inspector did not comply with the provisions of traffic controller order no. 37, at 22:18 o'clock — he did not dispatch L train no. 87440012 (EA 817) to railway station Brazi, respectively he did not request from the traffic controller a new order corresponding to the real situation at the time of arrival of freight train no. 66262010, delayed by +1164 minutes.

Underlying causes

Failure to comply with the provisions of the Regulation for train traffic and railway vehicle shunting no. 005/2005:

- Art. 132, according to which, “In case the movements inspector did not give the entry/exit/passing command of the expected train according to the arrival, departure and stabling table of trains or according to the advising order for the running of an additional, early or delayed train, the pointsman, the point switch examiner, the barrier post agent inside the station, respectively the barrier keeper on the running line, are obliged to request from the movements inspector, on their own initiative, information regarding the running of that train.”;
- Art. 138 – (3), according to which, “The regulating movements inspector is obliged to give the commands provided in paragraph 1 (the command for entry of trains) only if all established agents — from the signal boxes provided in the Technical Operation Plan - PTE - are present to receive that command, and if one of the established agents is absent, the other agents shall refuse receiving the command.”;
- Art. 130 – (3), according to which, “In order not to delay the execution of the entry-exit or passing commands of a train, the regulating movements inspector gives the order in due time for the withdrawal and stopping of shunting, the verification of the clear condition of the line and of the entry-exit route. These operations are carried out before giving the entry, exit or passing commands of the train.”;
- Art. 45 – (1), letter c), according to which the movements inspector must verify whether “the staff responsible for operating the point switches ... is present at the post”.

Failure to comply with the provisions of the Technical Operation Plan - PTE - of railway station Ploiești Nord:

- Sheet no. 18, para. 7, according to which the shunting is considered completed only after the transmission to the movements inspector, with number and time, by the point switch examiner from signal box no. 1, of the operation and securing of derailleurs S XI (on line no. 10), respectively S XIII (on line no. 11), in normal position, and the movements inspector confirms receipt with number and time.

Failure to comply with the provisions of Operational Procedure PO 0-8.5-19 “Train Traffic Management”:

- Art. 5.2.4 (8), according to which, “The orders of the traffic controller in connection with train traffic must be executed unconditionally by all staff on the respective track section.”;
- Art. 5.2.4 (10), according to which, “When, for justified reasons, the order given by the traffic controller cannot be executed, the person to whom it is addressed, instead of confirmation, is obliged to answer soon to the traffic controller by a telephone gram, indicating the causes which oppose its execution.”.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Safety recommendations

No safety recommendations were identified.

3.4.52. The railway incident occurred on 6th November 2025, at 12:11 o'clock, in the railway county Timișoara, track section Caransebeș – Orșova (electrified single-track line), between railway stations Topleț and Valea Cernei, at km 396+800, by the striking of a metal jack by freight train no. 57758 hauled by locomotive LEMA 086.

The investigation report was completed on 29th December 2025.

Direct cause

The direct cause of the incident was the leaving in the clearance, at km 396+800, of a metal jack belonging to Track District no. 1 Orșova, L1 Caransebeș Section, followed by its striking by locomotive LEMA 086, which hauled freight train no. 57758.

Contributing factors

The execution of works on the running line under traffic without their recording in the RRLISC (Register for the Inspection of Lines and Traffic Safety Installations) of railway station Topleț, by the safety responsible person within Track District no. 1 Orșova, L1 Caransebeș Section, and without informing the movements inspectors in railway stations Topleț and Valea Cernei regarding the presence of workers on the running line.

Underlying causes

Failure by the safety responsible person within Track District no. 1 Orșova, L1 Caransebeș Section, to comply with the provisions of Art. 319, Chapter 6.2 *Execution of works within the railway clearance*, of the “Own Occupational Safety and Health Instructions on the railway infrastructure, 2024 edition”, regarding the fact that the execution of any activity within the railway clearance (works, inspections, measurements etc.) is allowed only after informing the movements inspector by entering the activity in the RRLISC.

Primary causes

No primary causes were identified.

Additional remarks

During the investigation, the following findings were made regarding certain nonconformities, without relevance to the conclusions on the causes of the incident:

- At the time of the occurrence of the incident, the locomotive staff who drove and operated locomotive LEMA 086, which hauled freight train no. 55758 on 6th November 2025, had exceeded the maximum admitted continuous service on the locomotive by 7 hours and 41 minutes (departure of the locomotive from the control post of railway station Curtici on 5th November 2025, at 18:30 o'clock, until 6th November 2025, at 12:11 o'clock, the time of occurrence of the incident), as a result of failure to comply with the specific regulations regarding the rest of locomotive staff, this being carried out on the locomotive and not in specially arranged train-crew dormitories or accommodation units, as provided in the Instructions for the activity of locomotive staff in railway transport no. 201/2007.

Measures taken during the investigation

Following the occurrence of the railway incident, railway county Timișoara ordered the taking of its own measures to improve traffic safety, as follows:

1. re-briefing of all staff concerned from IPSSMIF – 2024 edition, from Articles 26-30, 64-74, 417, 419-431, 626-636 and 1250-1303;
2. introduction, as an additional topic, in the Lesson Plans corresponding to the first quarter of 2026 for the positions of ganger, respectively L, LA gang foreman, of Articles 26-30, 64-74, 417, 419-431, 626-636 and 1250-1303 of IPSSMIF – 2024 edition;
3. verification of workers upon entering service, from the physical point of view and whether they are equipped with work equipment and protective equipment;
4. before starting work with manual jacks, the verification of their integrity shall be mandatory carried out (absence of cracks, deformations or fractures etc.);
5. before starting the works, the head of the working team shall inform the workers regarding the work, the correct manner of carrying it out and shall verify the condition of the work equipment used.

Safety recommendations

No safety recommendations were identified.

3.4.53. The railway incident occurred on 23rd October 2025, in the railway county Craiova, track section Caracal – Craiova, between Malu Mare and Banu Mărăcine railway stations, on running line I, between km 200+200 and km 200+400 (Cârcea viaduct), and was found on the occasion of the reading and interpretation of the data of the installation with non-volatile memory (DEUTA speed recorder) of locomotive ES 016, which hauled freight train no. 67750 (got by the freight railway

undertaking Transferoviar Grup SA), regarding the exceeding of the maximum admitted speed, imposed by the speed restriction of 10 km/h.

The investigation report was completed on 22nd December 2025.

Direct cause

The human error occurred within the process of driving and operating the locomotive, manifested by the failure to adapt the speed of the train according to the limitation existing on site, in order to comply with it over the entire length of the train.

Contributing factors

The state of fatigue affecting the locomotive staff, as a result of the service period performed beyond the regulated service duration.

Underlying causes

Failure to comply with some provisions of the codes of practice, as follows:

- Art. 125 – (3) of the “Instructions for the activity of locomotive staff in railway transport” no. 201/2007, regarding compliance, during the route, by the locomotive staff, with the provisions entered in the driver’s cautious running slip and BAR – Speed Restrictions Advice Bulletin;
- Art. 125 – (4) of the “Instructions for the activity of locomotive staff in railway transport” no. 201/2007, regarding the observation of an indication ordering the reduction of speed at a certain point or on a certain line section, where the engine driver shall adjust the speed of the train so that the speed of the train at the respective point or on the respective line section is 2–3 km/h lower than the ordered one;
- Art. 159 of the “Instructions for speed restrictions, line closures and de-energisations” no. 317/2001, in the sense that the speed restrictions specified in BAR shall be complied with over the entire length of the train;
- Art. 3 of Order no. 256/2013 for the approval of the Norms regarding the maximum admitted continuous service on the locomotive, performed by the staff who drive and/or operate locomotives in the railway system in Romania / 7th June 2013, regarding the duration of the maximum admitted continuous service on the locomotive in the case of driving/operating the locomotive in simplified system.

Primary causes

Not applicable.

Additional remarks

We mention that the incident in question occurred on 23rd October 2025 and the statement was made on 7th November 2025.

The freight railway undertaking Transferoviar Grup SA held operational procedure PO – 8.3 – 0.3 “Accident/incident statement and record”, but in this case, the initiative for making the railway incident statement belonged to railway county Craiova, which, on 25th October 2025, by the Information Note regarding the railway incidents and accidents that occurred from 24th October 2025, at 05:00 o’clock, until 25th October 2025, at 05:00 o’clock, stated for information purposes that on 23rd October 2025, at 14:45 o’clock, on the Malu Mare – Banu Mărăcine distance, “According to the entry made on 24th October 2025 by the Head of L District in the RRLISC (Register for the Inspection of Lines and Traffic Safety Installations) of railway station Banu Mărăcine, on 23rd October 2025, at about 14:45 o’clock, train 67750 022 (TFG) did not comply with the speed restriction of 10 km/h when passing over Cârcea viaduct”.

The railway incident statement was made on 7th November 2025 by the Regional Railway Traffic Safety Inspectorate of railway county Craiova, the time difference being justified by the need to download the data from the DEUTA installation of locomotive ES 106 and to interpret them, requested from TFG by railway county Craiova by letter no. 7/9/2025, followed by TFG’s reply through telephone statement no. 138/07.11.2025 to railway county Craiova, as it results from the RRSCF Statement Sheet.

Safety recommendations

It was not necessary to issue safety recommendations.

3.5. Accidents and incidents investigated over the last 5 years

Investigations performed between 2021-2025:

Accidents investigated ⁽¹⁾		2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	TOTAL
Accidents (Art.19, 1 + 2)	Train collisions	1	1	1	2	3	8
	Collisions between trains and obstacles	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Train derailments	22	25	26	22	21	116
	Level crossing accidents	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Accident to persons involving rolling stock in motion	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Fires in rolling stock	7	8	4	5	3	27
	Accidents involving dangerous goods	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other accidents (Art.21.6)	Train collisions	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Collisions between trains and obstacles	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Train derailments	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Level crossing accidents	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Persons injured caused by rolling stock in motion	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Fires in rolling stock	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Accidents involving dangerous goods	-	-	-	-	-	-
Incidents		24	22	25	29	26	126
TOTAL		54	56	56	58	53	277

- the year of completion of the investigation was taken into consideration;

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. Brief presentation and an analysis of the safety recommendations issued in 2025

Through the issued recommendations, Romanian Railway Investigation Agency-AGIFER aimed the improvement of the railway safety and the prevention of the accidents/incidents.

No	Train/ rolling stock involved		Details about the occurrence			Date of the report completion	Type of railway event	
	No of train	Type of train	Occurrence site	Occurrence date	Time			
1.	68322	freight	Leu	16.01.2024	01:23	10.01.2025	accident	derailment of 11 freight wagons
		In the railway county Craiova, track section Craiova – Caracal (electrified double-track line), the derailment occurred of a number of 11 wagons, of which 2 overturned.						
		recommendations issued	2	477/1. The public railway infrastructure manager shall reassess the risk associated with the hazard generated by the failure to carry out on time the scheduled full track maintenance on the infrastructure, imposed by the codes of practice, and shall establish measures which cause the reduction of the probability of occurrence of this hazard and keeping it under control.				
				477/2. The public railway infrastructure manager shall assess the risk associated with the hazard generated by the failure to ensure the material and human resources and shall establish viable safety measures for keeping these risks under control.				
		recommendation implemented (close)	2	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendations no. 477/1 and no. 477/2 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that they had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they had been implemented.				
2.	7576	passenger train	Galați	25.03.2023	19:20	13.02.2025	accident	severe collision between a locomotive and a passenger coach
		In the railway county Galați, during the shunting operation for introducing locomotive EC 91530430128-5 onto line no. 4, occupied by passenger coach no. 50532616090-8, in order to form Regio passenger train no. 7576, the violent collision of the passenger coach by this locomotive occurred.						
		recommendations issued	2	452/1. ASFR shall request all railway transport operators to identify whether there are locomotives in their own fleet fitted with SAGMA-type graduator operating systems produced by SC INDA SRL and to order the assessment/reassessment of the hazards generated by the use of this equipment and the taking of measures accordingly for keeping these hazards under control.				

				452/2. SNTFC „CFR CĂLĂTORI” SA “shall reassess the hazard represented by “failure to comply with the obligations and responsibilities of the personnel with responsibilities in railway traffic safety” and shall assess the hazard represented by “improper functioning/failure of the graduator operating equipment of electric locomotives and, in particular, of those fitted with SAGMA-type equipment”, respectively shall order measures accordingly for keeping these hazards under control.				
		recommendatio n implemented (close)	2	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 2010/943/28.04.2025, communicated, regarding safety recommendations no. 452/1 and no. 452/2 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that they had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they had been implemented.				
3.	04-07	metro	Timpuri Noi	27.02.2024	19:06	24.02.202 5	accident	head-on collision between two metro trains
		On the railway transport network of the metro managed by SC TMB “METROREX” SA, in the running of train no. 04, the passing of entry signal Y of Timpuri Noi station in the stop position occurred, followed by the entry on the diverging line no. 1 of this station, where metro train no. 17 was stabled, fact which caused the collision of the two trains.						
		recommendatio ns issued	3	480/1. SC TMB “METROREX” SA shall carry out a risk analysis in order to assess the risks associated with the hazard represented by the running of trains with the on-board ATP equipment disconnected, for the cases in which the technical condition of the track circuits and of the ATP equipment is corresponding, and shall establish concrete measures for keeping these risks under control.				
				480/2. SC TMB “METROREX” SA shall carry out a risk analysis regarding errors in the safety communication process, following that, based on the results obtained, it shall draw up procedures/guides by which to ensure that the safety communication process is sufficiently detailed and effective, containing preset formulas and a hierarchy of those who communicate, and that the personnel who transmit and receive orders through the telephony and radio communication equipment are aware of the importance of complying with these formulas.				
				480/3. SC TMB “METROREX” SA shall analyse the possibility of equipping with radio communication equipment which ensures a higher quality of communication and the possibility of ensuring several communication channels, allocated for different types of communication.				
		recommendatio n implemented (close)	2	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendations no. 480/1 and no. 480/2 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that they had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they had been implemented.				
recommendatio n under implementation (open)	1	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendation no. 480/3 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that it is under analysis.						

4.	65094	freight	Jirov	01.03.2024	01:40	26.02.2025	accident	freight wagon derailment
		In the railway county Craiova, track section Strehaia – Motru Est (electrified single-track line), the derailment occurred of both axles of the first bogie, in the running direction, of wagon no. 81536653508-7, located the 3rd in the composition, from the locomotive.						
		recommendation issued	1	481/1. The railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA shall reassess the risks associated with the hazard represented by the falling, during the running of the train, of a subassembly from a wagon in the composition of the train and shall order effective safety measures for keeping them under control.				
		recommendation implemented (close)	1	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendation no. 481/1 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that it had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they had been implemented.				
5.	66307	freight	Zoița-Râmnicu Sărat	13.03.2024	12:50	06.03.2025	accident	freight wagon derailment
		In the railway county Galați, track section Buzău – Mărășești (electrified double-track line), the derailment occurred of wagon no. 83537963122-8, from the first bogie in the running direction.						
		recommendation issued	1	482/1. The railway undertaking Grup Feroviar Român SA shall carry out an analysis for establishing the necessary measures in order to improve the competence maintenance/improvement programme for the driver and driver’s assistant positions, in order to ensure that the operating staff will hold the necessary competences for detecting and recognizing the hazard represented by an abnormally heated axle box.				
		recommendation implemented (close)	1	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendation no. 481/1 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that it had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they had been implemented.				
6.	66363815	freight	Dorobanțu-Basarabi	15.05.2024	20:22	15.04.2025	accident	fire on a diesel locomotive
		In the railway county Constanța, a fire occurred at hauling locomotive DA 1504.						
		recommendations issued	2	485/1. The freight railway undertaking Grup Feroviar Român SA shall reassess the risk associated with the hazard generated by “failure to comply with the cycle of inspections and repairs to the rolling stock”, imposed by the codes of practice, and shall establish concrete measures which cause the reduction of the probability of occurrence of this hazard.				
				485/2. The freight railway undertaking Grup Feroviar Român SA shall reassess the risk associated with the hazard generated by “insufficient monitoring of the processes of the function of carrying out maintenance by the performer” and shall establish concrete measures which cause the reduction of the probability of occurrence of this hazard.				

		recommendation implemented (close)	2	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendations no. 485/1 and no. 485/2 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that they had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they had been implemented.				
7.	66290-020	freight	Sântana-Utvișu Nou	21.04.2024	01:35	16.04.2025	accident	fire on a diesel locomotive
		In the railway county Timișoara, a fire broke out at locomotive DA1544 hauling the train.						
		recommendations issued	2	484/1. Reassessment by the railway undertaking SC Grup Feroviar Român SA of the risk represented by “The operation of locomotives with oil, gas oil and/or water leaks, respectively an improper state of cleanliness in the area of the connection boxes of the traction motors of the locomotive” and establishment of effective measures for keeping under control this risk associated with the railway operations it carries out. 484/2. Reassessment by the railway undertaking SC Grup Feroviar Român SA of the risk represented by “Failure to comply with the time periods for carrying out scheduled repairs/inspections” and establishment of effective measures for keeping under control this risk associated with the railway operations it carries out.				
		recommendation implemented (close)	2	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendations no. 484/1 and no. 484/2 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that they had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they had been implemented.				
8.	1596	passenger train	Roșiori Nord-Atârnați	11.06.2024	16:21	20.05.2025	accident	derailment of 2 passenger coaches
		In the railway county Craiova, the derailment occurred of 2 coaches from the composition of the train (each from one bogie — the second one in the running direction from each coach).						
		recommendation issued	1	478/1. The public railway infrastructure manager - CNCF “CFR” SA shall assess the risks associated with the hazards generated by: - the loss of stability of the rail-sleeper frame under the action of temperature variations at the continuously welded rail track; - the operation of the continuously welded rail track for track sections fixed at temperatures higher than 27°C; - failure to ensure the corresponding dimensions of the crushed stone ballast prism and shall establish effective safety measures for keeping these risks under control.				
		recommendation under implementation (open)	1	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendation no. 478/1 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that it had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they are under implementation.				

9.	11034	passenger train	București Nord	19.07.2024	18:45	03.07.2025	incident	severe collision between a locomotive and a stationary trainset
		In the railway county București, during the setting-back shunting movement of the rake from which passenger train no. 11034 had been formed, in order to form passenger train no. 11037, while introducing locomotive BB 576 onto RIO 05 rake, the violent collision between the locomotive and the stationary rake occurred.						
		recommendation issued	1	489/1. The reassessment by the railway undertaking Regio Călători Brașov of the risks associated with its own railway operations and the establishment and implementation of effective measures for keeping under control the hazards related to the failure by the personnel who drive and service trains to comply with the obligations regarding the immediate notification of the occurrence of accidents/incidents.				
		recommendation implemented (close)	1	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendation no. 489/1 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that it had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they had been implemented.				
10.	40712 001	freight wagon derailment	Rădulești	01.09.2024	15:30	25.08.2025	accident	freight wagon derailment
		In the railway county București, track section Giurgiu Nord – Videle (electrified single-track line), the derailment occurred of both axles of the last bogie, in the running direction, of the 7th wagon from the composition of the train.						
		recommendation issued	1	493/1. The public railway infrastructure manager - CNCF “CFR” SA shall reassess the risks associated with the objective “Maintaining the technical parameters of the track infrastructure in operation, maintenance, monitoring” and shall establish effective safety measures for keeping these risks under control.				
		recommendation implemented (close)	1	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendation no. 493/1 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that it had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they had been implemented.				
11.	2601	passenger train	Șag	19.09.2024	06:59	25.08.2025	accident	derailment of a passenger coach
		In the railway county Timișoara, track section Timișoara Nord – Arad (electrified single-track line), the derailment occurred of both axles of the last bogie, in the running direction, of the 2nd coach from the composition of the train.						
		recommendation issued	1	496/1. The public railway infrastructure manager shall assess the risk associated with the hazard generated by keeping in track Category I defective rails or rails with exceeded stored tonnage and shall establish viable safety measures for keeping this risk under control.				

		recommendation implemented (close)	1	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendation no. 496/1 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that it had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they had been implemented.				
12.	86699	freight	Craiova	26.09.2024	16:55	08.09.2025	accident	derailment of an electric locomotive
		In the railway county Craiova, track section Craiova – Filiași (electrified double-track line), the derailment occurred of light engine LEMA 006.						
		recommendations issued	2	452/1 Deutsche Bahn Cargo Romania SRL shall identify and assess the risks associated with the hazards represented by “roughness on the flange face of the wheel higher than 12.5 μ after carrying out the re-profiling operations by turning the tyres” and “malfunctioning of the wheel flange greasing system”, respectively shall order measures and ensure their application in order to keep these hazards under control. 452/2. Deutsche Bahn Cargo Romania SRL shall identify and assess the risks associated with the hazard represented by “failure to balance the loads on wheels and axles after carrying out the re-profiling operations by turning the tyres”, respectively shall order measures and ensure their application in order to keep this hazard under control.				
		recommendation implemented (close)	2	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendations no. 452/1 and no. 452/2 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that they had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they had been implemented				
13.	66078004	freight	Tîmna-Igiroasa	05.11.2024	17:37	02.10.2025	accident	derailment of 7 freight wagons
		In the railway county Craiova, track section Filiași – Caransebeș (electrified single-track line), the derailment occurred of 7 wagons from its composition, of which 2 overturned.						
		recommendation issued	1	502/1. The railway undertaking SNTFM “CFR Marfă” SA shall reassess the risks associated with the hazards generated by carrying out the inspections of trains by a single examiner and shall order and implement effective safety measures for keeping them under control.				
		recommendation implemented (close)	1	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendation no. 502/1 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that it had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they had been implemented.				
14.	67733	freight	Augustin-Racoș	20.11.2024	08:05	13.10.2025	accident	derailment of a 250 tf EDK 2000 crane
		In the railway county Brașov, track section Brașov – Sighișoara (electrified double-track line), the derailment occurred from the first bogie in the running direction of the 250 tf EDK 2000 crane, which was in the composition of the train.						

		recommendations issued	3	503/1. CNCF “CFR” SA shall take the necessary steps for the endorsement by AFER of the instructions providing the works to be carried out during the technical inspections of the crane and for obtaining an ERI certificate for carrying out the maintenance function for the Line and Equipment Repair Section Braşov – Railway Intervention District Braşov or for outsourcing this function to an economic operator holding such a certificate. 503/2. CNCF “CFR” SA shall reanalyse the activity of identifying the risks associated with its own railway operations for the activity of railway interventions, establishing and implementing effective measures to ensure that the activity of the railway vehicles in the composition of intervention trains — including the movement to the intervention site — is carried out in good railway traffic safety conditions. 503/3. CNCF “CFR” SA shall reanalyse the activity of identifying the risks associated with its own railway operations and shall assess the risks associated with the hazards generated by: a) failure to take safety measures regarding the remedying of grade 5 and 6 defects detected during the verification of the track with the TMC track recording car; b) failure to introduce the regulated speed restriction steps in case of detection of defects in lines resulting from the measurements carried out with the TMC track recording car; c) failure to remedy the defects resulting from the measurements carried out with the TMC track recording car, within the regulated deadlines for carrying out the corresponding maintenance of the line and maintaining the track geometry within the admitted tolerances, in order to establish and apply viable safety measures for keeping these risks under control.				
		recommendations under implementation (open)	3	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendations no. 503/1, no. 503/2 and no. 503/3 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that they had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they are under implementation.				
15.	66361829	freight	Palas–Constanţa Mărfuri	29.10.2024	16:30	23.10.2025	accident	derailment of 2 freight wagons
		In the railway county Constanţa, track section Palas – Năvodari (non-electrified single-track line), the derailment occurred of wagon no. 31536666192-6 (the 31st in the composition of the train, derailed from the 2nd bogie in the running direction) and of wagon no. 89536950046-0 (the 32nd in the composition of the train, derailed from both bogies).						
		recommendation issued	1	500/1. The Romanian Railway Authority – AFER shall analyse the opportunity to supplement the railway technical standard regarding the repair of axle boxes with roller bearings with provisions establishing the maximum service life for cylindrical roller bearings fitted to freight wagons (expressed in kilometric performance or years).				
		recommendation implemented (close)	1	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 2010/69/20.01.2025, communicated, regarding safety recommendation no. 467/1 issued following the investigation of this				

				railway accident, that it had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they had been implemented.				
16.	58496 003	freight	Ploiești Est	04.11.2024	04:08	29.10.202 5	accident	derailment of 3 freight wagons
		In the railway county București, track section Ploiești Sud – Buzău (electrified double-track line), the derailment occurred of three wagons from the composition of the train (the 3rd, the 4th and the 5th in the composition).						
		recommendatio n issued	1	501/1. The railway undertaking Constantin Grup Rail – Logistic SRL shall assess the associated risks, establish and implement effective measures for keeping under control the hazard represented by the failure of the buffing gear (buffers) of a freight wagon.				
		recommendatio n under implementation (open)	1	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendation no. 501/1 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that it had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they are under implementation.				
17.	9214	passenger train	Mătăsar u-Găești	30.05.2025	19:57	24.11.202 5	incident	collision with railway installations
		In the railway county București, track section Chitila – Golești (non-electrified double-track line), the striking occurred of 3 track magnets by a part coming from diesel multiple unit AM 2120.						
		recommendatio n issued	1	I.287/1 SNTFC “CFR Călători” SA shall urgently establish a plan of measures aimed at verifying all DESIRO SR 20 D diesel multiple units regarding the manner of fixing the water, oil and air radiators and the manner of complying with the requirements of the List of Works no. DT5/1/36/21.01.2019 regarding the fixing of these subassemblies, in order to avoid similar incidents.				
		recommendatio n implemented (close)	1	The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendation no. I287/1 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that it had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they had been implemented.				
18.	4504	passenger train	Bixadu Oltului	17.02.2025	08:20	12.12.202 5	accident	derailment of a passenger coach
		In the railway county Brașov, track section Brașov – Siculeni (electrified single-track line), the derailment occurred of both axles of the first bogie in the running direction of the first wagon from the composition of the train.						
		recommendatio ns issued	2	507/1. CNCF “CFR” SA shall reanalyse the action of identifying the risks associated with its own railway operations and shall assess the risks generated by the following hazards: a) maintaining the track geometry beyond the tolerances admitted in operation; b) maintaining incomplete or inactive fastenings, in order to establish and apply viable safety measures for keeping them under control.				

			507/2 On the occasion of the supervisory activities carried out, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 17(1) and Art. 9(d) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 73/2019, the Romanian Railway Safety Authority – ASFR shall request CNCF “CFR” SA to identify all similar situations at network level (in which the transition from the rail type of the points and crossings to another rail type is carried out without complying with the provisions of Art. 15, point 5, of Instruction no. 314/1989 on standards and tolerances for the construction and maintenance of standard gauge track), and to establish the necessary measures for eliminating them.
		recommendation under implementation (open)	1 The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendation no. 507/1 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that it had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they are under implementation.
		recommendation implemented (close)	1 The Romanian Railway Safety Authority, by the reply formulated in document no. 1040/470/02.02.2026, communicated, regarding safety recommendation no. 507/2 issued following the investigation of this railway accident, that it had been analysed, the measures to be taken had been identified and they had been implemented.

4.2. Implementation of the safety recommendations issued within the last 5 years

Investigations completed in	Number of the issued recommendations	Number of the issued recommendations	Number of the recommendations in implementation process	Number of the recommendations about which ASFR communicated that they should not be implemented	Number of the recommendations without answer
2021	52	44	4	3	1
2022	31	26	5	0	0
2023	25	13	12	0	0
2024	33	27	5	1	0
2025	28	20	7	1	0
TOTAL	169	130	33	5	1

Director General
Laurențiu Cornel DUMITRU