



ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ
HELLENIC REPUBLIC

NIB GREECE – HARSIA / RAILWAY SECTOR
Hellenic Air & Rail Safety Investigation Authority

Εθνικός Οργανισμός Διερεύνησης Αεροπορικών και
Σιδηροδρομικών Ατυχημάτων Και Ασφαλείας Μεταφορών
ΕΟΔΑΣΑΑΜ / EODASAAM



ANNUAL REPORT 2025

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Hellenic Air & Rail Safety Investigation Authority (HARSIA)

Railway Sector

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PREFACE TO THE REPORT

The **Hellenic Air and Rail Safety Investigation Authority (HARSIA)** serves as the National Investigation Body of the Hellenic Republic and is responsible for conducting independent safety investigations in the railway sector. The Authority carries out investigations into the causes and circumstances of railway accidents and incidents in full compliance with the provisions of **Directive (EU) 2016/798**, the principles and requirements of which have been duly transposed into the national legal order through **Law 5014/2023**, as currently in force. The overarching purpose of these investigations is not the attribution of fault or liability, but rather the identification of causal factors and circumstances with a view to strengthening the overall safety performance of the Greek railway system.

The present **Annual Report for the year 2024**, issued by the Railway Sector of HARSIA in accordance with **Article 24(3) of Directive (EU) 2016/798**, sets out consolidated information concerning:

- the organisational structure and role of the National Investigation Body,
- the framework and methodology governing the investigation of railway accidents and incidents,
- the investigations that were concluded during the reporting year, and
- the safety recommendations formulated on the basis of the Authority's findings.

Through the publication of this Report, HARSIA seeks to contribute to transparency, the dissemination of safety-related knowledge, and the continuous improvement of railway safety both at national and Union level.




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HARSIA	Hellenic Air & Rail Safety Investigation Authority (Greek: ΕΟΔΑΣΑΑΜ/ΕΟΔΑΣΑΑΜ)
HARSIA/RS	Railway Sector of HARSIA
NIB	National Investigation Body
EU	European Union
IM	Infrastructure Manager (in Greece, since 2025: Sidirodromoi Ellados, ex-OSE)
RU	Railway Undertaking
NSA	National Safety Authority (in Greece: Regulatory Authority for Railways, ΠΑΣ / RAS)
ERA	European Union Agency for Railways
LC	Level Crossing
RS	Rolling Stock
SA	Serious Accident
A	Accident
I	Incident
SR	Safety Recommendation
KM	Kilometer position of the railway line
SPAD	Signal passed at danger



The Greek Railway Network



1. INTRODUCTION TO THE INVESTIGATION BODY

1.1 Legal Framework

Until January 2023, the Hellenic Republic maintained two separate entities responsible for the investigation of air and rail accidents:

- A) The Air Accidents and Flight Safety Investigation Committee (EDAAP), established by Law 2912/2001 in alignment with Directive 94/56/EC, which operated in a fully functional manner until 2023; and
- B) The Railway Accident and Incident Investigation Committee, established by Law 3710/2008 pursuant to Directive 2004/49/EC, which, however, never became operational due to the absence of appointed investigators.

In January 2023, Law 5014/2023 established a unified national framework for the investigation of both air and rail accidents. This Law merged the two pre-existing committees into a single body, the Hellenic Air and Rail Safety Investigation Authority (HARSIA). Part D of Law 5014/2023 constitutes a direct transposition of Chapter V “Accident and Incident Investigation” of Directive (EU) 2016/798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on railway safety (recast).

Law 5014/2023 was further amended through Laws 5167/2024 and 5220/2025, introducing measures related to the restructuring of the railway sector, the enhancement of railway safety, the strengthening of regulatory and oversight functions, and the reinforcement of accident investigation capabilities.

The Railway Sector of HARSIA (HARSIA/RS) is entrusted with the investigation of accidents and incidents which, according to their nature and consequences, are classified into the following categories:

- Serious accidents,
- Accidents, and
- Incidents

Investigations conducted by HARSIA are independent of any other inquiry, particularly those undertaken by judicial authorities or by infrastructure managers (IMs) and railway undertakings (RUs) within the scope of their respective responsibilities.

1.2 Role and Aim

HARSIA was formally established on **21 January 2023** by Law 5014/2023 (Official Gazette FEK A 14/21.01.2023) as an autonomous public authority under the supervision of the Minister of Infrastructure and Transport. The Authority enjoys



operational and organisational independence from any natural or legal person whose interests could compromise the impartiality and objectivity of its mandate.

Its statutory mission is to ensure independent investigation of the causes and circumstances of railway accidents and incidents. The remit of HARSIA/RS covers the national railway network, while incidents involving metro systems, trams, trolleybuses or cableways fall outside its legal competence.

The overarching objective of the Railway Sector is the prevention of future occurrences. To this end, HARSIA/RS:

- investigates the causal and contributory factors underlying railway accidents and incidents,
- issues final investigation reports and formulates safety recommendations addressed to the National Safety Authority (NSA), infrastructure managers, railway undertakings or other relevant bodies.

1.3 Organisation

HARSIA is a dual-mode authority, comprising two distinct investigative divisions: the Aviation Accident Investigation Sector and the Railway Accident Investigation Sector. Its Management Board (MB), appointed on 19 September 2023, consists of five members, including the President and the Deputy President. The President and two members possess scientific expertise and professional experience in the field of aviation, while the Deputy President and one member bring corresponding expertise in the railway sector.

For investigations concerning railway accidents and incidents, the powers of the President are delegated to the Deputy President, who acts as President of the Railway Sector, held by Mrs. Sophia Sotiropoulou since 18 July 2025. She has an extensive judicial background and in-depth experience in EU legislative and policy matters.

A particularly significant event was the railway accident of 28 February 2023 near Tempi, the deadliest such occurrence in the history of the Hellenic Republic. Passenger train IC 62 (Athens–Thessaloniki), carrying 344 passengers, was erroneously routed onto the same track as freight train 63503 (Thessaloniki–Athens). The two trains collided head-on at kilometre 371+600, just outside the Tempi railway tunnel.

At the time of the accident, HARSIA had not yet established its Management Board and had no railway investigators in place. Following its appointment on 19 September 2023, the new Management Board requested immediate assistance from the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA). In December 2023, ERA responded by establishing a “Support to Greece Task Force,” staffed by Mr. Bart Accou and Mr. Fabrizio Carpinelli.



The first railway investigator was formally transferred to HARSIA on 15 March 2024, at which time the Management Board appointed an Accident Investigation Committee composed of K. Kapetanidis, B. Accou and F. Carpinelli. The Final Report on the Tempi accident was issued on 27 February 2025, coinciding with the second anniversary of the event. The report is available in English at:

<https://www.harsia.gr/index.php/2025/02/25/prosechos-to-porisma-gia-ta-tempi-stis-27-2-2025/>



2. INVESTIGATION PROCESSES

2.1 Cases Subject to Investigation

In accordance with European requirements, HARSIA/RS is empowered to investigate the causes and circumstances of serious accidents occurring on main and regional railway lines, cross-border railways and sidings. National legislation does not extend this mandate to accidents and incidents occurring on metro systems, tramways, trolleybuses or cableways.

In deciding whether to open an investigation, HARSIA/RS considers the criteria laid down in Directive (EU) 2016/798, namely the seriousness of the occurrence, its potential repetitiveness, its impact on railway safety, formal requests from IMs, RUs, the NSA or other Member States, as well as the possibility of deriving safety-relevant lessons.

2.2 Institutions Involved in Investigations

Following the occurrence of a railway accident or incident, several parallel investigations may be initiated by different institutions depending on the nature and consequences of the event:

- Infrastructure Managers (IMs) and Railway Undertakings (RUs), within the framework of their Safety Management Systems (SMS);
- HARSIA/RS, which conducts independent investigations focused on the determination of causal and contributory factors, with the sole objective of preventing recurrences and enhancing railway safety. These investigations do not apportion blame, establish liability or pursue prosecutions;
- The Hellenic Police, Fire Service or other competent authorities, which investigate in order to determine potential responsibilities for offences or criminal acts.

2.3 Investigation process and approach of the NIB

The objective of investigations conducted by HARSIA/RS is to derive knowledge that contributes to the prevention of accidents and incidents, the mitigation of consequences, and the enhancement of railway safety.

Investigations typically focus on:

- the independent analysis of the causes and circumstances of serious accidents and selected other occurrences;
- ensuring that infrastructure managers and railway undertakings comply with their legal obligations, including timely notification of accidents, preservation of the accident site and related procedural requirements.

Upon notification of an occurrence, HARSIA/RS decides whether immediate on-site presence is required. Investigations may be launched immediately or at a later



stage, depending on the specific circumstances. Where an investigation is initiated, HARSIA/RS notifies the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA) within seven days. All matters concerning the conduct of investigations are set out in the EODASAAM Procedures manual, which contains a total of 19 procedures.

The conclusions are published in investigation reports structured in line with the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2020/572. Where occurrences reveal no infringement of legislation or internal rules by IMs or RUs, HARSIA/RS may nonetheless issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing similar future events. Recommendations may also be issued based on other safety-relevant findings identified during an investigation.



3. INVESTIGATIONS

HARSIA/Railway Sector has established the possibility of 24/7 contact through telephone and has notified this contact option to the IM and the RU's safety officers. The aim is to be able to react as soon as possible to incoming incidents/accidents and perform, when necessary, an onsite investigation. Furthermore, the IM and the RUs inform HARSIA (on gram@harsia.gr) about the daily incidents and accidents that have occurred on the Greek railway network during the previous day.

In 2025 we received a total of 124 notifications of incidents in the Greek railway system, of which 2 notifications referred to serious accidents. The corresponding figures for 2024 were 214 notifications of which 5 referred to serious accidents.

Year	Notifications	Serious accidents
2024	214	5
2025	124	2

The notifications received in 2025 are recorded into the Database of received notifications. Since HARSIA/RS has been active since 3/2024, there is no data from previous years, except for incidents and investigation reports that we receive in retrospect.

Following the notifications received in 2025, HARSIA decided to commence 7 preliminary investigations, none of which resulted in us proceeding with a full investigation. These decisions were taken in accordance with HARSIA procedure DA-4 "Decision to investigate" due to lack of resources.

3.1 Overview of investigations completed in 2025, identifying key trends

Trends of completed investigations in 2025

Type of accidents investigated	Number of accidents	Number of victims		Damages	Trends in relation to previous year
		Fatalities	Ser. Injured		
Collisions	1	57	60	>150.000	No data
Deraillments	-	-	-		ND
LC accidents	1	1	-	<150.000	ND



Accidents to people involving RS in motion	1	1		<150.000	ND
Fire in RS	-	-			ND
Other					

3.2 Investigations completed and commenced in 2025

Investigations completed in 2025

Date of Occurrence	Title of the investigation (occurrence type, location)	Type of Occurrence	Completed
28/2/2023	Tempi accident collision of two trains (a passenger and a freight train), Larisa	Serious Accident	27/2/2025
17/1/2024	Person fatally struck by Train 1327 while trespassing on railway premises (Zevgolatio, Peloponnese)	Serious Accident	3/11/2025
5/9/2025	Person fatally struck by Train 1304 on LC (Konstantinoupoleos Athens) <i>(preliminary investigation)</i>	Serious Accident	28/11/2025

Investigations commenced in 2025

There was no full accident investigations commenced in 2025, but there are 7 preliminary investigations, as described below.

Date of Occurrence	Title of the investigation (occurrence type, location)	Type of Occurrence	Completed
13/1/2025	Detachment of a train's pantograph at the Athens Airport Station.	Incident	18/3/2026
14/1/2025	LC Bekiri Patra - accident between Suburban train 11352 and a road vehicle.	Accident	----
11/2/2025	Derailment of freight train 45201, which was operating near Idomeni Station.	Accident	----
17/7/2025	LC Anthias, Patra - accident between Suburban train 11352 and a road vehicle.	Accident	14/9/2026
5/9/2025	Person fatally struck by Train 1304 on LC (Konstantinoupoleos Athens)	Serious Accident	28/11/2025



25/9/2025	LC km 71+200 Alex.- Ormenio- accident between train 1681 and road vehicle	Accident	16/3/2026
30/12/2025	St. Ano Liossion – Train 1301 running over Person	Serious Accident	----

3.3 Research studies (or safety related research) commissioned and completed in 2025

Research studies (or safety related research) completed in 2025

Date of occurrence	Title of the studies (occurrence type, location)	Type of occurrence	Date Completed
Accident 28/2/2023, Study 27/12/2024	«Assessment of the validity of the use of CFD with FDS in the analysis of the Railway accident on 28/02/2023 in Tempi (Greece) by HARSIA» & «Review the current CFD analysis as executed thus far» by Ghent University, Belgium	Serious Accident	28/01/2025
Accident date: 28/2/2023 Date of test assignment 15-1-2025	“Evaluation of the fire safety of passenger seat tests in accordance with standard ISO 5660-1 T03.02, as described in requirement R21 of standard DIN EN 45545-2.” By RST (Rail System Testing) Labs, Germany.	Serious Accident	25/8/2025

Research studies (or safety related research) commenced in 2025

Date of occurrence	Title of the studies (occurrence type, location)	Type of occurrence	Date Completed
Accident date: 28/2/2023 Date of test assignment 15-1-2025	“Evaluation of the fire safety of passenger seat tests in accordance with standard ISO 5660-1 T03.02, as described in requirement R21 of standard DIN EN 45545-2.” By RST (Rail System Testing) Labs, Germany.	Serious Accident	25/8/2025



3.4 Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

See the Annex of this annual report.

3.5 Accidents and incidents investigated during last years

HARSIA/Railway Sector commenced its work in March 2024, so there are no investigations initiated before 2024.

The table group investigations by year of their completion

Accidents Investigated		2024	2025	TOTAL
Serious Accidents	<i>Train collision</i>	0	1	1
	<i>Train collision with an obstacle</i>	0	0	0
	<i>Train derailment</i>	0	0	0
	<i>LC accident</i>	0	1	1
	<i>Accidents to person by RS in motion</i>	0	1	1
	<i>Fire in RS</i>	0	0	0
	<i>Dangerous goods</i>	0	0	0
	<i>Other</i>	0	0	0
Accidents	<i>Train collision</i>	0	0	0
	<i>Train collision with an obstacle</i>	0	0	0
	<i>Train derailment</i>	0	0	0
	<i>LC accident</i>	0	0	0
	<i>Accidents to person by RS in motion</i>	0	0	0
	<i>Fire in RS</i>	0	0	0
	<i>Dangerous goods</i>	0	0	0
	<i>Other</i>	0	0	0
<i>Incidents</i>		0	1	1
TOTAL		0	4	4



4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Short review and presentation of recommendations

A safety recommendation is issued on the basis of an independent investigation conducted by the Railway Sector of HARSIA (HARSIA/RS). Such recommendations are generally formulated in cases where an accident has occurred without any breach of legislation or internal regulations on the part of infrastructure managers (IMs) or railway undertakings (RUs), or where other findings of relevance to railway safety have been identified.

In accordance with both European Union and Hellenic legislation, the issuance of a safety recommendation shall not, under any circumstances, imply an attribution of fault or liability for an accident or incident.

Once a recommendation is issued, the concerned IMs and RUs are required to determine and implement their own preventive safety measures, taking due account of the content of the recommendation. The Hellenic Railways Regulatory Authority (RAS), acting in its capacity as the National Safety Authority, is responsible for supervising and ensuring the proper implementation of the safety recommendations issued.

In September 2025, six months after the issuance of the first 17 Safety Recommendations arising from the Tempi accident investigation, HARSIA contacted the relevant stakeholders and requested information on the measures already implemented, as well as those planned, in response to the recommendations.

Implementation of safety recommendations during 2024-2025

Recommendation issued		Recommendations implementation status					
		implemented		In progress		Not implemented	
Year	No	No	%	No	%	No	%
2024	1			1	70%		
2025	17			17	60 %		

Accidents with safety recommendations issued in 2024-2025

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (occurrence type, location)	Status of implementation	Completed
28/2/2023	Head-on collision of two trains at Tempi (SR: 2024-RL01-001)	Accepted	Not yet



4.2 Safety recommendations issued in 2025

A summary of the safety recommendations issued in 2025 and the status of their follow-up is provided below.

Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-001	
Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi
Addressed to the IM	
SUBJECT: A better understanding of the risks associated with the operational reality of the current Greek railway system.	
Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. The revised SMS was approved on 29 May 2026, with staffing, training and infrastructure improvement measures underway and further actions still under development.

Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-002	
Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi
Addressed to the IM	
SUBJECT: Optimizing performance and reliability and managing security risks associated with physical infrastructure assets.	
Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. Infrastructure asset registers have been established and are being further developed, while maintenance, performance monitoring and risk management processes are being applied through the revised SMS.

Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-003	
Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi
Addressed to the IM	
SUBJECT: Ensuring that personnel performing security-related duties are prepared for the task.	



Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. A staff competence management programme is being implemented, with key milestones scheduled for 2026 and completion of the psychometric assessment framework planned for March 2027.
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Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-004	
Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi
Addressed to the IM	
SUBJECT: The IM should detect any deterioration in the performance of safety-related duties.	
Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. Implementation is progressing through the revised SMS, the introduction of enhanced governance and risk-management processes, and systematic traffic-operation audits, while full operational capability of the Unified Supervision Centre is planned by end-2027.

Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-005	
Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi
Addressed to the IM	
SUBJECT: The IM must develop a system for reporting, recording, investigating, and analyzing accidents and incidents.	
Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. The revised SMS includes arrangements for incident reporting, investigation and safety learning, while a formal mechanism for monitoring corrective actions is being established.

Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-006	
Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi
Addressed to the Hellenic Train (RU)	



SUBJECT: Train drivers (and other staff, where necessary) who perform safety-related tasks must be prepared for them.

Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. The Crew Skills Plan and revised recruitment procedures were completed in 2025, while enhanced driver training and recurrent training measures are being implemented with completion targeted in 2026.
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Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-007

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
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28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi
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Addressed to the Hellenic Train (RU)

SUBJECT: Hellenic Train must monitor any deterioration in the performance of safety-related tasks concerning the activities of train drivers.

Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. The Crew Skills Plan was completed in 2025, with training enhancements scheduled for completion in 2026.
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Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-008

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
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28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi
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Addressed to the NSA (RAS)

RAS should develop an incident reporting system which should be followed by all stakeholders.

Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. Implementation has progressed through preparations for participation in ERA's Information Sharing System (ISS), the development of a standardised occurrence reporting and risk-classification framework, and establishment of a unified reporting system in 2026.
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Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-009

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
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28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi
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Addressed to the NSA (RAS)	
SUBJECT: RAS shall develop and implement the necessary supervision activities, so that it can be assessed whether the safety management system of IM & RUs is operating effectively.	
Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. A risk-based supervision strategy for 2026-2028 has been adopted, with a comprehensive railway safety assessment system scheduled for implementation in 2026.

Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-010	
Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi
Addressed to the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure	
SUBJECT: The Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure shall, within the limits of its competences, ensure that railway safety is generally maintained and, where reasonably practicable, continuously improved.	
Status	Implemented within the scope of the Ministry's legislative competence, with the enactment of Law 5220/2025. Not all provisions of the law have been fully implemented to date.

Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-011	
Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi.
Addressed to ERA	
SUBJECT: The purpose of this recommendation is ERA to bring about a faster implementation of the action plans for Single Safety Certificates (SSCs).	
Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. ERA and the European Commission are developing enhanced SSC assessment, supervision data-sharing and certificate restriction criteria.

Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-012	
Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi.



Addressed to the ERA	
SUBJECT: ERA should assist in the more rapid implementation of the National Safety Authorities' (NSAs) action plans regarding identified deficiencies that hinder an NSA from effectively monitoring Safety Management Systems.	
Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. ERA is developing a deficiency classification framework and on-site audit criteria to strengthen the monitoring of NSA action plan implementation.

Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-013	
Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi.
Addressed to the DG-MOVE	
SUBJECT: Support the timely implementation of action plans associated with Single Safety Certificates (SSCs).	
Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. The European Commission and ERA are considering a Country Priority Programme and enhanced monitoring arrangements for NIBs and Member States, alongside a possible revision of the ERA Regulation.

Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-014	
Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi.
Addressed to the DG-MOVE	
SUBJECT: Support the timely implementation of action plans issued by National Safety Authorities (NSAs).	
Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. The European Commission and ERA are considering a Country Priority Programme and enhanced monitoring arrangements for NIBs and Member States, alongside a possible revision of the ERA Regulation.

Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-015	
Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation



28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi.
Addressed to the Ministry of Climate Crisis and Civil Protection	
SUBJECT: Enable the rapid and coordinated provision of assistance in the event of a major railway accident by issuing a common emergency plan.	
Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. A national railway emergency and accident management plan was mandated in 2025, developed by a multi-agency committee in 2026, and has been submitted for ministerial approval.

Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-016	
Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi.
Addressed to the Ministry of Climate Crisis and Civil Protection	
SUBJECT: Ensure the proper investigation of railway accidents by including HARSIA in crisis management plans.	
Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. HARSIA will work with the Civil Protection on its institutional framework, cooperation arrangements and investigation procedures to support HARSIA inclusion in national emergency response plans.

Recommendation no.: 2025-RL01-017	
Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi.
Addressed to the IM	
SUBJECT: Develop a system for reporting, recording, investigating, and analyzing accidents and incidents.	
Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. Communication recording and data management measures have been introduced, while the Unified Supervision Centre is scheduled to become operational by the end of 2027 and arrangements for investigation data access remain pending.



4.3 Follow up on older Safety Recommendations

No. of the recommendation: 2024-RL01-001 Urgent SR	
Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation
28/2/2023	Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi.
Addressed to: all stakeholders (IM, RUs, NSA, Rolling Stock Keeper, Ministry of Transport)	
SUBJECT: All concerned parties should work together without delay towards the implementation in the Greek railway system of 1. A safety related communication methodology that respects the requirements of Commission Regulation ..., 2. A communication means that allows for direct one-on-one contact between station masters and train drivers for all safety related communication.	
Status	Accepted but not yet fully implemented. Action plans have been launched for communication management and GSM-R deployment, with major deliverables scheduled for Q1 2027 and Q3 2027 respectively.



5. OTHER ACTIVITIES

5.1 Organisational and Administrative Developments

Mrs. Sophia Sotiropoulou was appointed Deputy President, also acting as President of the Railway Sector, on 18 July 2025. She has an extensive judicial background, culminating in her service as Presiding Judge of a division of the Athens Court of Appeal and in-depth experience in EU legislative and policy matters gained through years of service at the Permanent Representation of Greece to the European Union.

In 2025, four experienced railway professionals from Hellenic Railways applied for secondment to HARSIA. Subsequently, two of these applicants would joined HARSIA in 2026 under an initial one-year secondment arrangement, with the possibility of renewal for a further year and eligibility for permanent transfer following two years of service.

The Internal Rules of Procedure were approved by the HARSIA Board on 4 December 2025 and were subsequently published in the Official Government Gazette. The Procedures Manual for the railway sector were under development in 2025, and were subsequently approved and incorporated as an annex to the Internal Rules of Procedure in 2026.

5.2 Training and competence development

Throughout the Tempi accident investigation and up to the publication of the report on 27-02-2025, practical on-the-job training and methodological support was provided by both ERA experts. This covered all key stages of the safety investigation process, including evidence collection for a cold case, witness interviews, reconstruction of the sequence of events, analysis of causal and contributing factors, development of safety recommendations, stakeholder consultation, the preparation and structure of the investigation report. The support provided was instrumental in building HARSIA's railway investigation capability from the ground up and the application of European good practice in railway accident investigation.

Additionally, HARSIA railway investigators participated in the “Organisational Just Culture Training (Support to Greece)” course organised by the ERA in Athens on 10-11 November 2025. In addition, investigators remotely attended the proceedings of the European Rail Safety Days 2025 event, held from 1 to 3 October 2025 under the auspices of the ERA.

5.3 Cooperation with the NIB Network

Following the establishment and staffing of the Railway Sector, HARSIA engaged actively with the NIB Network and began participating in its meetings and working



groups. During 2025, HARSIA attended the 57th and 59th NIB Network meetings held remotely and the 58th meeting held in Valenciennes, France. At meetings, HARSIA presented its establishment and initial activities, together with the findings of the Tempi accident investigation.

In addition, HARSIA joined the NORDIC subgroup of the NIB Network (due English being its working language) and participated in its May 2025 meeting. Participation in NIB Network and NORDIC activities has supported investigator development, knowledge sharing and the adoption of good investigative practices.

At the initiative of HARSIA in 2025, the second NIB Network meeting of 2026 was scheduled to be hosted in Athens in June 2026, further strengthening cooperation with peer investigation bodies across Europe. HARSIA also volunteered to be subjected to the NIB Network peer review process.

5.4 Cooperation with other entities and authorities

A Memorandum of Cooperation was signed with the Hellenic Police. In addition, draft cooperation agreements with the Ministry of Justice, the Hellenic Fire Service and the Hellenic Armed Forces were prepared and remained under consultation in 2025.

Contacts were established with Greek universities and technical institutions to support future cooperation in railway safety, investigation and research activities. A Memorandum of Cooperation with the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA) was drafted.

5.5 The difficulties NIB faces that prevent it from properly carrying out its duties

- There is no financial incentive for new (or existing investigators) to join to the NIB. Although a specific allowance for investigators has been enacted into law 5220/202 followed by a corresponding Ministerial Decision (7/2025) which determines the allowance amounts, in practice it has never been implemented. As a result, an accident investigator engineer receives the same salary as any state administrative office engineer.
- Sufficient funding for the needs of the NIB. HARSIA budget is part of the budget of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport. That is not enough funding for all Procedures that a NIB must perform in order to operate satisfactorily:
 - assignment of tests to a laboratory,
 - hiring of external experts,
 - training of investigators,
 - equipment for investigation.
 - Suitable car for investigations (mini-van type with loading space). The currently available car is a 30 year old obsolete model.




- Investigation equipment: personal investigation & protection equipment, track measurement equipment, etc.
 - Technical Support on computer issues (Hardware & Software).
- The recruitment procedures are not carried out directly by the NIB, but are carried out through a central nationwide system, with the recruitment procedures taking 2-3 years. In addition, without actually implemented allowance for investigators, the motive for new investigators is non-existent.
- Procedure & compensation for off-site investigations. The standard procedures of the public sector cannot deal with the extraordinary, unplanned and urgent off-site needs for travel of an investigator. Therefore, when there is an immediate need for on-site inspectors to travel to an accident site, the investigators should first cover part of the costs required by their own means (travel, accommodation, food, etc.). A procedure should be implemented for the immediate compensation of the railway investigator and the corresponding extraordinary expenses and travel expenses.

5.6 Future priorities

- **Securing sustainable funding** to support core operations, investigator training, specialist expertise and accident investigation activities.
- **Strengthening investigation capacity** through additional staffing, competence development, specialized training program, and participation in European cooperation activities.
- **Improving operational capability** through dedicated investigation equipment, vehicles and arrangements for rapid deployment to accident sites.

6. ANNEX

6.1 ANNEX 1. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATIONS COMPLETED IN 2025

Serious Accident, Head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train at Tempi. 28/2/2023


Type of Occurrence	Serious Accident , Frontal Collision between two trains
Description	On the evening of February 28, 2023, passenger train IC-62, with 352 persons on board and en route from Athens to Thessaloniki, departed Larissa station at 23:05, with a delay of 48 minutes. At almost the same time, freight train 63503 left the station Neoi Poroi towards Larissa, also with a delay on the planned schedule. Shortly after 23:18 both trains collided head-on, with the freight train registering a speed of almost 90 km/h while the passenger train was travelling at an estimated speed of 150 km/h, both well within the allowed speed restrictions. The shock was violent and while the two locomotives of the freight train were pushed to the




	adjacent track to come to a crash against the vertical retaining wall, the locomotive and the first-class passenger car of the passenger train were catapulted to the other side of the track, where they landed on the ground below, completely destroyed. In total, 57 people, of which 11 staff members or subcontractors working for Hellenic Train, lost their life in the accident, 81 people were seriously injured, and 99 had minor physical injuries. A substantial number of people, directly or indirectly involved with the accident, suffered shock and/or emotional trauma.
Type of Train	Passenger train IC-62 and freight train 63503
Location	Tempi valley in Larisa area
Participants	IM (OSE) and RU (Hellenic Train)
Consequences	57 fatalities and about 60 seriously injured
Direct cause	The Larisa station manager put IC-62 in the opposite track
Safety Recommendations	Eighteen (17) Safety Recommendations were issued. The Recommendations are listed below, more details in chapter 4.2 (above) • 2025-RL01-001 addressed to IM • 2025-RL01-002 addressed to IM • 2025-RL01-003 addressed to IM • 2025-RL01-004 addressed to IM • 2025-RL01-005 addressed to IM • 2025-RL01-006 addressed to RU • 2025-RL01-007 addressed to RU • 2025-RL01-008 addressed to NSA • 2025-RL01-009 addressed to NSA • 2025-RL01-010 addressed to Min. Transport • 2025-RL01-011 addressed to ERA • 2025-RL01-012 addressed to ERA • 2025-RL01-013 addressed to DG Move • 2025-RL01-014 addressed to DG Move • 2025-RL01-015 addressed to Min. Of Climate Crisis and Civil Protection



	• 2025-RL01-016 addressed to Min. Of Climate Crisis and Civil Protection • 2025-RL01-017 addressed to IM
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Serious Accident, Person fatally struck by Train 1327 while trespassing on railway premises (Zevgolatio, Peloponnese), 17/1/2024



Type of Occurrence	Serious Accident, Person hit by Rolling Stock in motion
Description	This investigation concerns an accident that occurred on 17/1/2024 in Zevgolatio, Corinth, in which the train 1327 (Hellenic Train) hit a pedestrian trespasser, resulting in his fatal injury. The accident occurred because the pedestrian entered the track at kilometer 118+400 of the SKA – Kiato line and attempted to cross the railway line, at a place without a level crossing for pedestrians or vehicles. The



	investigation determined that the train driver acted in accordance with the applicable operating rules and traffic regulations. No defects or abnormalities were identified in the rolling stock or track. OSE (IM) has initiated actions to resolve the issue of vandalism of the railway fencing. Since the cause of the accident is outside the railway system no safety recommendations arise.
Type of Train	Suburban Passenger train 1327
Location	Zevgolatio, Corinth
Participants	RU (Hellenic Train)
Consequences	1 fatality
Direct cause	The pedestrian was using unauthorized passage to cross the track
Safety Recommendations	No Safety Recommendations were issued.

