

Annual Railway Safety Report 2025

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1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose, scope and target group of the Annual Railway Safety Report

This Annual Railway Safety Report by the Finnish Transport and Communications Agency Traficom (hereinafter Safety Report) describes the status of railway safety in Finland in 2025. The Annual Railway Safety Report additionally describes the central issues of Traficom's permit, oversight and regulatory activities related to railways in 2025. The Annual Railway Safety Report is Traficom's annual report on railways referred to in section 17 of the Rail Transport Act (1302/2018). Under the Rail Transport Act, Traficom must each year prepare a report on its operations and the development of railway safety in Finland in the previous year and submit the report to the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA) by the end of September. The Safety Report is also submitted to the Ministry of Transport and Communications and published on Traficom's website.

The main sources of the safety information presented in this report include the safety reports of infrastructure managers and railway undertakings, railway operators' accident and incident reports, and the investigation reports of the Safety Investigation Authority. Information on Traficom's operations has been gathered from documents related to its activities as well as from Traficom experts. The structure of the Annual Railway Safety Report follows the latest version of ERA's reporting guidelines issued in April 2020.

1.2 Summary of the safety situation in 2025

The volume of train traffic continued to increase in 2025¹. A total of 50.6 million train kilometres were operated on Finnish railways, compared to 48.6 million a year earlier. Growth was recorded in both passenger and freight traffic. In passenger transport, the number of passenger kilometres already exceeded the levels recorded before the COVID-19 pandemic. A record 16.1 million journeys were made in domestic long-distance passenger services². The level of passenger safety remained excellent.

The number of significant accidents as defined by the EU³ on Finnish railways increased slightly from the previous year (11 accidents in 2024

¹ Source: Statistics Finland, railway statistics. Main data on train stock performance, 2005–2025.

² Source: Statistics Finland, railway statistics. Passenger transport by mode of transport, 2009–2025.

³ Significant accident: any accident involving at least one rail vehicle in motion, resulting in at least one killed or seriously injured person, or in significant damage to stock, track, other installations or environment (causing costs of at least EUR 150,000), or extensive disruptions to traffic (lasting at least six hours), excluding accidents in workshops, warehouses and depots.

compared with 15 accidents in 2025) (Figure 1). However, the number of significant accidents in 2025 remained below the average for the preceding ten years (16.3). Compared to the previous two years, the number of collisions in particular decreased. On the other hand, increases were observed in accidents to persons involving rolling stock in motion and in level crossing accidents.




Figure 1. Number of significant railway accidents by accident type in 2016–2025.

Eight people were killed and three were seriously injured in significant railway accidents in 2025. Five accidents to persons involving rolling stock in motion occurred, resulting in three fatalities and two serious injuries. Both serious injuries occurred in station areas.

During the year, six significant level crossing accidents occurred, four of which took place at different level crossings within a period of three days from 3 to 5 August. Five of these accidents resulted in casualties, causing a total of five fatalities and one serious injury. One level crossing accident was classified as significant due to the costs incurred (more than EUR 150,000).

In addition to the accidents referred to above, two rolling stock fires and two derailments during shunting occurred. One of the fires was classified as significant due to the costs incurred (more than EUR 150,000), while the other was classified as significant because it caused a prolonged traffic interruption lasting more than six hours. Similarly, one of the derailments during shunting resulted in considerable costs and the other caused a significant disruption to traffic. Although the two shunting derailments were classified as significant on the basis of their consequences, the overall number of derailments during shunting remained at the same level as in the previous year. The number of collisions decreased slightly.

A large share of the fatalities in rail transport occur when persons are run over by a train as a result of trespassing on railway premises. On average, 50 to 60 people are fatally injured in such incidents each year, and most of these cases are considered intentional. The annual number of persons being run over by a train has remained relatively stable for a long time.

The safety of work carried out on tracks remained generally stable in 2025. The number of key safety occurrences decreased compared to previous years, although the success rate in relation to track work permits declined slightly due to a reduction in the number of permits issued. However, two accidents occurred during the year in which a freight train collided with a machine working near an operational track. The expert working group established in 2023 continued its work to improve the safety of track work and the related traffic management activities. In 2025, the number of protection errors attributable to traffic management began to decline.

A great deal of systematic work is being done to improve railway safety. In recent years, operators have increased their efforts to address human and organisational factors (HOFs) in their operations. To support this development, Traficom has for several years also focused on operators' safety culture in its oversight activities. In 2025, Traficom launched the development of a self-assessment tool on safety culture characteristics intended for rail transport operators. The purpose of the tool, which is based on the ERA's safety culture model, is to support organisations in identifying the strengths and development areas of their safety culture and in systematically assessing safety culture as part of their self-monitoring activities. Another objective is to promote a more consistent handling of safety culture-related observations and improvement measures across the sector.

At the end of 2024, Finland's first National Rail Safety Plan was completed under the leadership of Traficom, setting out common guidelines for the development of rail transport safety. The aim is for stakeholders to take the vision, objectives and measures of the safety plan into account in their own safety management activities and to actively participate in its implementation and further development. Based on the 2025 safety reports, progress has been made in implementing the National Rail Safety Plan. However, further efforts are still needed to strengthen the practical deployment and integration of its objectives and measures across the sector.

2 Traficom's safety operations and organisation

2.1 Safety strategy and plans

The objectives for Traficom's Rail Transport Department in 2025 were linked to Traficom-wide strategic priorities defined as part of the agency's strategy work in autumn 2024. The strategic priorities are as follows: (1) We build sustainable economic growth together with our stakeholders, (2) People, goods and information move sustainably, smoothly and safely, (3) Our success is based on skilled and motivated personnel, and (4) We are a pioneer in secure digitalisation. The strategy defined in autumn 2024 extends until 2029.

Based on these strategic priorities, a total of 19 objectives were defined for the Rail Transport Department. These objectives were grouped into the following categories: development of customer communications (1), influencing regulation (2), monitoring the development of the railway system (1), ensuring the quality of operations (4), development of departmental preparedness (3), systematic competence development (3), common operating procedures (3), and utilisation of digitalisation (2).

The implementation of the objectives and related measures was monitored quarterly at department level. The person responsible for each objective and the measures associated with it reported on progress to the department's management team.

At the end of 2024, the annual safety plan required by the Railway Safety Directive ((EU) 2016/798) was completed. The plan serves as Finland's first National Rail Safety Plan. It was prepared for a three-year period covering 2025–2027, making 2025 its first year of implementation. Based on an operator survey conducted in autumn 2025, implementation of the plan has started well. In the future, progress in implementing the plan will be monitored annually through the safety reports submitted by railway operators.

The need to update the Rail Safety Plan will be assessed annually. For 2025, the operator survey did not identify any specific update needs. As a result, Traficom decided to continue implementation of the plan without amendments. The next more comprehensive review of update needs will be carried out at the end of 2026, when updates to the national Traffic Safety Strategy can also be taken into account.

2.2 Safety recommendations

Figure 2 presents the annual number of rail safety recommendations issued by the Safety Investigation Authority during the last ten years and their implementation status. The majority (75.2%) of the safety

recommendations issued have been implemented. Some recommendations have been decided not to be implemented, while the implementation of others is still in progress. As shown in Figure 2, approximately half of the rail safety recommendations issued in 2023 and 2024 remain under implementation, while the implementation of all recommendations issued in 2025 is still ongoing.




Figure 2. Annual number and status of rail safety recommendations issued by the Safety Investigation Authority in 2016–2025 (situation on 7 April 2026).

In 2023 and 2025, the Safety Investigation Authority issued a total of ten safety recommendations, none of which concerned railway transport. Instead, all of the recommendations were addressed to urban rail transport (metro and tramway systems). By contrast, all safety recommendations issued in 2024 concerned railway transport.

2.3 Actions taken on the basis of safety recommendations

The realisation of actions taken on the basis of safety recommendations is monitored in an annual recommendation monitoring meeting led by the Safety Investigation Authority⁴. All parties to whom safety recommendations have been addressed are invited to attend the meeting, including railway operators, rescue services, the police, municipalities and road infrastructure managers. The meeting reviews the current implementation status of all open safety recommendations.

For railway transport, the implementation of a safety recommendation issued in 2020 remained pending at Traficom for a long time. The recommendation concerned the development of an information system

⁴ According to the Finnish Safety Investigation Act (525/2011), the Safety Investigation Authority monitors the implementation of the safety recommendations issued in its investigation reports. <https://www.finlex.fi/fi/lainsaadanto/2011/525>

supporting the management of safety occurrences and ensuring the effectiveness of operators' occurrence management processes. Development work related to these themes has been ongoing within Traficom for several years and continues to this day. The recommendation was considered implemented at the recommendation follow-up meeting held in June 2026. At present, there are no pending safety recommendations addressed directly to Traficom.

2.4 Organisation of railway operations in central government administration and the Finnish Transport and Communications Agency

In 2025, transport policy matters in Finland fell within the remit of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, which is responsible for preparing transport-related policy and strategic guidelines as well as legislation. The Finnish Transport and Communications Agency Traficom served as the national railway safety authority. The railway regulatory body, responsible for ensuring the proper functioning of the market and the equal and non-discriminatory treatment of operators, also operated in conjunction with Traficom. As of the beginning of 2026, the railway regulatory body was transferred to the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA). This change was linked to the upcoming liberalisation of competition in passenger rail services and the planned transfer of responsibility for the procurement of public service passenger rail transport from the Ministry of Transport and Communications to Traficom.

The Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency acted as the infrastructure manager of the state-owned rail network and was also responsible for roads and waterways. In addition to the state-owned rail network, Finland had approximately 130 track networks owned by industrial facilities, ports and municipalities that were connected to the state-owned railway network. This represented a decrease of approximately twenty operators compared with previous years. The size of private sidings varies from short spur tracks of less than one hundred metres to railway networks extending tens of kilometres. Operations on private sidings are, in practice, almost exclusively shunting operations. Traffic management services were provided by the state-owned Fintraffic Ltd, whose subsidiary Fintraffic Rail Ltd is responsible for railway traffic management. Other subsidiaries of Fintraffic provide traffic management services for maritime transport, road transport and aviation.

In 2025, the largest railway undertaking operating on Finnish railways was VR Group Plc, which provided both passenger and freight transport services. Freight transport services (other than shunting) were also provided by North Rail Oy, Fenniarail Oy and ArcticRail Oy, while passenger services were operated by heritage railway operators. Other railway

operators included local shunting operators, track maintenance contractors and operators moving rolling stock on tracks closed to traffic.

Railway accident investigations in Finland were conducted by the Safety Investigation Authority, which operates under the administrative branch of the Ministry of Justice. Serious road traffic accidents occurring at level crossings were also investigated by regional road accident investigation teams coordinated by the Finnish Crash Data Institute (OTI)⁵.

In 2025, Traficom's Rail Transport Department was responsible for rail transport permitting, oversight, regulatory and registration tasks. In addition, the department was responsible for national and international advocacy activities in the railway sector and stakeholder cooperation. The Rail Transport Department consisted of three units with the following responsibilities:

- The Rail Transport Processes Unit was primarily responsible for coordination and development tasks related to oversight and permit management (including risk management), safety monitoring and analysis, reliability and cyber security, eastern traffic, safety culture, human and organisational factors (HOF), and the rail transport management system and quality management.
- The Rail Transport Operations and Rolling Stock Unit was responsible for permit, oversight and registration tasks related to railway undertakings, urban rail transport, railway training institutions, competence assessors and train drivers, as well as permit, oversight and registration tasks related to rolling stock.
- The Railway Network Unit was responsible, among other things, for permit and oversight tasks related to infrastructure managers.

At the end of 2025, Traficom employed approximately 1,144 people and operated in 14 locations across Finland. At the end of the year, 31 employees worked on railway matters within Traficom.

Russia's continuing and prolonged war of aggression against Ukraine continued to have a significant impact on the transport system. Consequently, preparedness, reliability and cyber security remained key focus areas in the work of the Rail Transport Department.

At the same time, development projects related to rail transport continued. These included initiatives aimed at improving oversight and the management of operator information, as well as developing customer communications. At the end of 2025, the first rail transport newsletter was launched. Published three times a year, the newsletter brings together

⁵ More information: <https://www.lvk.fi/en/the-finnish-crash-data-institute-oti/oti/>

topical issues that Traficom wishes to communicate to operators in the railway and urban rail sectors. In addition, the progress of the Digirail project was closely monitored.

Advocacy work related to the railway system continued to focus particularly on working groups operating under the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA). Traficom experts actively participated in these working groups, contributing for example to the further development of Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs) and to regulatory developments concerning railway safety.

3 Status of railway safety

3.1 Safety of train traffic

Accidents in train traffic

The safety of train traffic remained at a good level in 2025. No collisions between trains or between trains and other railway vehicles occurred during the year. Two derailments occurred in train traffic in 2025. In the first case, the bogie of the last wagon of a departing freight train derailed due to a stop block that had been left on the track. In the second case, a track maintenance machine operating as a train derailed at a level crossing because the flangeway gaps at the crossing were filled with ice and sand⁶.

In 2025, 34 collisions with obstacles were reported in train traffic. This was almost half the number recorded during the previous two years (60 in 2024 and 66 in 2023). In earlier years, the annual number of collisions with obstacles has fluctuated considerably, largely due to changes in reporting practices. One factor that may partly explain the decrease in 2025 is that only four collisions with snow banks were reported, whereas snow banks had been among the most common collision objects in previous years. Two of these cases were reported as level crossing incidents rather than collisions with obstacles.

The most common type of obstacle was a tree that had fallen onto the track (14 cases). Other obstacles included a buffer stop and a log that had fallen from a load. In two cases, a train collided with a track maintenance machine operating near the railway line.

In addition to the cases described above, collisions occur in train traffic with a variety of objects and items found on or near the track. In some cases, it

⁶ The Safety Investigation Authority Finland's investigation into the derailment of a track maintenance machine is available here: <https://www.turvallisuustutkinta.fi/turvallisuustutkinnat/selvitykset/selvitys-ratatyokoneen-suistuminen-torniossa-17-12-2025/>

remains unclear whether these objects ended up on railway premises as a result of vandalism or negligence. Statistics related to vandalism incidents are presented in more detail in Chapter 3.6 of this report.

In 2025, seven fires in rolling stock occurred in train traffic. Two of these were classified as significant accidents: one due to a traffic disruption lasting more than six hours and the other due to costs exceeding EUR 150,000. The number of rolling stock fires was one higher than in the previous year but remained below the average for 2020–2024, during which approximately ten such fires occurred annually.

Incidents in train traffic

Accidents in train traffic are relatively rare, meaning that annual figures are strongly affected by random variation. For this reason, year-to-year changes in accident numbers do not necessarily provide the most reliable indication of changes in safety performance over the short term.

Incidents occur more frequently than accidents, and monitoring their number and severity provides a more detailed picture of safety trends. However, it should be noted that changes in the annual number of reported incidents may reflect not only changes in the actual safety situation but also changes in occurrence reporting practices and reporting culture.

In 2025, a total of 41 incidents meeting the criteria of the EU Common Safety Indicators occurred on Finnish railways (Figure 3), which is clearly fewer than in 2022–2024, when the annual number ranged from 72 to 79.




Figure 3. Number of incidents on railways by precursor according to the EU Common Safety Indicators in 2016–2025. Numbers below ten are not shown on the chart columns.

In 2025, there were 12 cases of signal passed at danger (SPAD) in train traffic, which is clearly fewer than in previous years. The number of SPADs

has decreased significantly in recent years. Between 2020 and 2024, an average of 22 such incidents occurred annually, whereas the corresponding average for 2016–2019 was 48. The factors contributing to this reduction are not known.

SPADs typically occur at low speeds, and the automatic train protection (ATP) system stops the train immediately after the signal has been passed. The risks associated with SPADs are particularly significant when operations are conducted without ATP protection.

In 2025, the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency was notified of 20 broken rails and six track buckles. The number of broken rails was significantly lower than in the previous three years, during which approximately twice as many cases were recorded annually. As in previous years, the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency supported rail condition management through initiatives aimed at improving welding quality, including dedicated welding days and enhanced supervision of welding activities. In addition, the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency organised inspection workshops for ultrasonic testing personnel to address current issues related to inspection activities.

A total of six track buckles were reported in 2025, one more than in the previous year. However, the figure remained clearly below the levels recorded in earlier years. The track buckles reported in 2025 were concentrated during the July heatwave period. When a track buckle is detected, railway traffic is typically restricted by imposing a temporary speed limit of 10 km/h until repairs have been completed.

3.2 Safety of shunting

Shunting refers to the movement of rolling stock units in support of train operations. More accidents and incidents typically occur during shunting than in train traffic. Unlike train operations, technical safety systems play only a limited role in shunting, and safety relies largely on the actions of personnel carrying out the work. Due to the low operating speeds involved, the consequences of accidents during shunting are typically less severe than those occurring in train traffic. However, because of the large masses involved and the potential presence of dangerous goods, very serious accidents may also occur during shunting operations.

In 2025, 32 derailments and 18 collisions involving rolling stock were reported during shunting operations. The number of derailments remained at approximately the same level as in 2024 (30 cases), while the number of collisions decreased from 25 to 18. Two of the derailments that occurred during shunting were classified as significant accidents. One was classified as significant due to the costs incurred (exceeding EUR 150,000), while the

other was classified as significant because it caused a prolonged traffic disruption lasting more than six hours.

The most common individual contributing factor in shunting derailments in 2025 was related to brake shoes and stop blocks. Typically, a brake shoe or stop block had been left on the rail or underneath a wagon and was not detected during operational inspections. Other common contributing factors included the actions of unloading operators and shunting robots, incorrectly set switches, obstacles on the track, and deficiencies in track condition.

Of the collisions reported during shunting operations, one occurred between rolling stock units, while the remainder were collisions with various obstacles, such as a buffer stop or a building door. Other frequently reported safety occurrences in shunting included incidents at level crossings, of which 47 were reported in 2025, and signal passed at danger (SPAD) events, of which 33 were reported. The most common contributing factors in level crossing incidents were failure to comply with STOP signs, disregard for level crossing warning devices, and misjudgements concerning the speed or distance of an approaching shunting movement. In addition to these incidents, eight cases were reported in which a level crossing barrier was damaged after being struck by a road vehicle.

Three level crossing accidents also occurred during shunting operations in 2025. These accidents are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.5 of this report. One person sustained serious injuries and two persons sustained minor injuries in these accidents.

3.3 Safety of transport of dangerous goods

In 2025, approximately 2.3 million tonnes of dangerous goods were transported on Finnish railways. This was slightly higher than in the previous year, when approximately 2.2 million tonnes were transported. From a longer-term perspective, however, the volume of dangerous goods transport remained relatively low. As recently as the 2010s and the early 2020s, around 5 million tonnes of dangerous goods were transported annually. The decline in transport volumes has been influenced by factors including the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.

The majority (87%) of dangerous goods transported on Finnish railways were carried by VR Group Plc. In addition, dangerous goods transport services were provided by North Rail Oy in 2025.

According to information received by Traficom, no collisions or derailments resulting in leaks of dangerous goods occurred during 2025. A train carrying dangerous goods was involved in one accident in which the train

collided with a car that had entered the tracks. The collision caused damage to the car, but no leakage of dangerous goods occurred.

During 2025, four leaks associated with the transport of dangerous goods were reported. In addition, a small number of other incidents occurred, none of which resulted in a leak.

Safety practices related to the transport of dangerous goods were also further developed during the year. As one safety measure, a speed limit of 20 km/h was introduced on 1 June 2025 for shunting operations involving dangerous goods at operating points on the state-owned railway network.

The approval procedure for internal emergency plans required under the Act on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (541/2023) continued in 2025. During the year, Traficom approved dozens of internal emergency plans covering loading, unloading and temporary storage sites for dangerous goods on both the state-owned railway network and private sidings. Infrastructure managers are responsible for preparing these plans in cooperation with operators active in the area.

3.4 Safety of work on tracks

Track work refers to work carried out on or near the railway that may affect the safety of train operations. Ensuring the safe coordination of track work and train traffic therefore remains one of the key challenges of railway safety.

In its safety report, the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency evaluates developments in the safety of work carried out on tracks using the number of key occurrences and the success rate of track work activities (Figure 4). The success rate describes the proportion of track work completed without occurrences in relation to all track work permits issued. In 2025, the number of key safety occurrences related to work on tracks decreased compared to previous years, while the success rate relative to the number of track work permits declined slightly. This was due to a reduction in the number of track work permits issued. As shown in Figure 4, the safety of work on tracks improved between 2017 and 2021, after which it has remained largely stable.




Figure 4. Development of the safety of work on tracks (number of key occurrences and success rate) in 2017–2025 (Annual Railway Safety Report 2025 of the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency).

In 2025, the most common safety occurrences related to work on tracks were unauthorised passing of a track work area, errors in closing out track work, unauthorised track work activities, and errors in safety guard operations. In addition, two accidents occurred in which a freight train collided with a machine working near an operational track. No similar collisions had occurred during the period 2020–2024. In both cases, the accident was caused by the machine crossing the boundary of the track work area.

The number of track work protection errors attributable to traffic management increased significantly in 2023 compared with previous years. As a result, the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency and Fintraffic Rail Ltd established an expert working group in 2023 to develop measures for improving the safety of track work and related traffic management activities. The group continued its work in 2025, and the number of protection errors began to decline. During the year 2025, progress was made in areas including a pilot project on urgent track work capacity and the development of a long-term safety vision for improving the safety of work carried out on tracks.

3.5 Level crossing safety

Level crossing safety has shown a positive long-term trend, and the number of level crossing accidents continued to decrease in 2025. During the year, ten level crossing accidents occurred, compared with eleven in the previous year (Figure 5). Although the number of accidents was historically low, their consequences were exceptionally severe. In 2025, level crossing accidents resulted in five fatalities, one serious injury and four minor injuries. No fatalities occurred in level crossing accidents in 2024.




Figure 5. Numbers of level crossing accidents and resulting casualties in 2011–2025.

Of the level crossing accidents that occurred in 2025, three took place at level crossings equipped with half-barriers, while the remaining accidents occurred at passive level crossings, some of which were equipped with STOP signs. Nine of the accidents occurred on the state-owned railway network. The accident that occurred on a private siding took place on the Pansio port railway, where an empty freight train being moved in shunting operations collided with a passenger car at a level crossing equipped with half-barriers.

In one of the fatal accidents, the other party involved was a pedestrian. In the remaining accidents, the other party was a passenger car or van, and the fatalities were drivers or passengers of the road vehicle.

Six of the level crossing accidents that occurred in 2025 took place within a period of less than two weeks at the turn of July and August. These accidents resulted in four fatalities, one serious injury and two minor injuries.

In addition to the cases discussed above, two level crossing accidents not included in the statistics occurred during the year. These accidents took place at level crossings with restricted use, for example in port or industrial areas. In 2025, both of these accidents occurred in port areas. In one case, a shunting unit collided with a straddle carrier, resulting in minor material damage to the shunting unit. In the other case, a locomotive collided with a shunting foreman, resulting in material damage and minor injuries to one person.

A key actor in improving level crossing safety is the infrastructure manager of the state-owned railway network, the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency. In recent years, efforts to improve level crossing safety have

focused on the programme for removing and upgrading level crossings launched in 2018. The programme is implemented by the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency, while Traficom is responsible for approving the railway plans related to the removal of level crossings. In addition to the programme, level crossing safety has also been improved through other railway infrastructure projects and track maintenance measures. According to the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency, 53 level crossings were removed and safety improvements were implemented at 34 level crossings during 2025.

The three-year level crossing safety campaign launched in 2024 continued under the leadership of the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency in 2025. The objective of the campaign is to remind road users of safe behaviour at level crossings. During the campaign, communication activities were carried out through several channels, including social media, cinemas and radio, using campaign materials tailored to different target groups⁷.

3.6 Personal injuries in railway accidents

Eight people were killed in railway accidents in 2025 (Figure 6). In each of the three preceding years, four fatalities were recorded. The unusually high number of fatalities in 2025 was attributable to the large number of deaths resulting from level crossing accidents.




Figure 6. Number of people who died in railway accidents by type of accident in 2017–2025.

Three people sustained serious injuries in railway accidents in 2025 (Figure 7). Two of them were passengers and one was a level crossing user. The number of seriously injured persons was higher than in 2024, but from a longer-term perspective it remained within the normal range. Between

⁷ More information: <https://vayla.fi/-/tasoristeyskampanja-pysayttavan-huonot-vitsit-muistuttavat-vakava-vasta-aiheesta>

2019 and 2023, the annual number of serious injuries varied between three and eight.




Figure 7. Number of people who sustained serious injuries in railway accidents by type of accident in 2017–2025.

Table 1 presents safety occurrences related to trespassing on railway premises in 2020–2025 compiled by the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency. Accidents in which persons trespassing on railway premises are struck by rolling stock in motion almost invariably result in a fatality. A large proportion of these cases are believed to be intentional. The annual number of persons being struck by trains has remained at a very similar level for several years, and no clear long-term trend can be identified. In 2021, the number of such cases was somewhat lower than in previous years, but in 2022 it returned to the longer-term average level.

Table 1. Safety occurrences related to trespassing on railway premises in 2020–2025 (Annual Railway Safety Report 2025 of the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency).

Accidents leading to personal injuries and trespass	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Accident involving persons and rolling stock in motion	56	38	59	59	65	67
Incident involving persons and rolling stock in motion	9	19	53	59	189	172
Trespassing on railway premises	194	254	82	75	519	429
Other personal injury ¹	32	10	9	1	2	1
Vandalism	394	251	166	161	248	462
Total	685	572	369	355	1 023	1 131

¹ Includes all other accidents involving personal injury associated with the railway system excluding accidents involving a person being run over.

The annual numbers of reports concerning incidents involving persons and rolling stock in motion, trespassing on railway premises and vandalism have shown considerable variation. This variation appears to be largely

attributable to changes in reporting activity rather than changes in the actual frequency of such events. A reporting campaign carried out in 2024 increased the reporting of occurrences related to trespassing on railway premises, and its effects remained visible in 2025. For this reason, the figures reported for 2024 and 2025 are likely to provide a more realistic picture of the prevalence of these phenomena than the figures reported in earlier years.

4 Changes to legislation

The Rail Transport Act (1302/2018) was amended in 2025 to take into account the implementation of the NIS2 Directive⁸. The Act was also amended in relation to the extension of the derogation concerning the use of OSJD/GOST rolling stock and the activities of the rail regulatory body. In connection with the reform of regional state administration, new transport-related responsibilities were assigned to the Finnish Transport and Communications Agency Traficom through legislation. The Finnish Rail Regulatory Body will continue to operate independently in connection with the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority with regard to public rail passenger transport procurement.

In 2025, Traficom issued four regulations concerning rail transport. The regulation on the transport of dangerous goods by rail contributes to the implementation of Directive 2008/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, as most recently amended by Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2025/149. The other rail transport regulations issued in 2025 concerned the reporting of disruptions in rail transport, the organisation of preparedness planning in the transport system, and the colours, structures and dimensions of road and tram traffic control devices. The update of the regulation concerning preparedness planning in the transport system also took into account the coordination of preparedness planning with national legislation implementing the NIS2 Directive (2022/2555) and the CER Directive (2022/2557).

As in previous years, Traficom organised a regulatory information session (*Säädösinfo*) to ensure that legislative drafting and communication on regulatory changes remained as open and transparent as possible. In addition, Traficom organised its second annual safety information session (*Turvallisuusinfo*), which addressed topics including safety culture, risk management, and current issues related to the transport and oversight of dangerous goods. Cooperation with stakeholders was once again

⁸ The NIS2 Directive is the EU cybersecurity directive that strengthens organisations' cybersecurity risk management, preparedness for disruptive incidents, and the reporting of cybersecurity incidents.

constructive and valuable both in developing operations and regulation and in addressing issues related to the safety situation.

5 Certificates and authorisations

5.1 Safety certificates and authorisations

Safety certificates

In 2025, Traficom renewed the safety certificates of the following seven railway undertakings: Fenniarail Oy, FGG Finngas GmbH, Mantsinen Group Ltd Oy, North Rail Oy, Prorata Oy, Valtasiirto Oy and Destia Oy. In addition, Traficom issued a new safety certificate to ArcticRail Oy.

Safety authorisations

In 2025, Traficom renewed the safety authorisations of two infrastructure managers: Port of Kokkola Ltd and Vaasan Satamapalvelut Oy.

5.2 Authorisations for placing in service or on the market of rolling stock

Since mid-2019, Traficom has primarily granted authorisations for placing vehicles on the market in accordance with the new Directive, with applications processed through the One-Stop Shop (OSS) of the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA). For vehicles subject solely to national regulations, authorisations for placing in service may still be granted. However, a large proportion of authorisations based on national requirements were also processed through the OSS. No rolling stock authorisations were revoked in 2025.

In 2025, rolling stock authorisations were granted to three applicants as follows (number of vehicles):

- Sundström Infra AB Oy: One application for a first authorisation and one application for an authorisation for placing on the market based on conformity to type. In total, authorisations were granted for eight vehicles.
- VR Group Plc: One application for a first authorisation and four applications for authorisations for placing on the market based on conformity to type. In total, authorisations were granted for 17 vehicles.
- Siemens Mobility GmbH: One application for an authorisation for placing on the market based on conformity to type. In total, authorisations were granted for two vehicles

5.3 Entities in Charge of Maintenance (ECMs)

At the end of 2025, there were six certified Entities in Charge of Maintenance (ECMs) operating in Finland. In addition, one ECM operated in Finland that maintains rolling stock exclusively for its own operations and is exempt from certification under the derogation provided for in the ECM Regulation (EU) 2019/779. Furthermore, five entities responsible for the maintenance of heritage rolling stock operated in Finland in 2025. These entities are exempt from certification under a national derogation provided for in section 74 of the Rail Transport Act (1302/2018).

In 2025, ECM certificates and maintenance function certificates were granted to three new operators: Avesco Oy, Arctic Rail Oy and Prorata Oy. No critical non-conformities were identified or reported during the certification processes.

Part of the railway traffic operated in 2025 consisted of railway transport between Finland and Russia carried out under the agreement concerning direct international railway transport between the two countries. In accordance with this agreement, freight wagons used in traffic between the countries are inspected at the border station before being placed into operation on the Finnish railway network.

As no Entity in Charge of Maintenance has been designated under EU legislation for rolling stock approved and registered in Russia, derogations from the ECM requirements pursuant to Article 15 of the Railway Safety Directive have been granted in Finland to three railway undertakings: VR Group Plc, Fenniarail Oy and North Rail Oy.

5.4 Train driving licences

In 2025, Traficom issued ten new train driving licences and renewed 149 licences. In addition, amendments were made to four licences and seven licences were revoked. The licences were revoked because the drivers no longer met the applicable medical requirements.

By the end of 2025, a total of 3,055 train driving licences had been issued in Finland, of which 1,991 remained valid at the end of the year

5.5 Authorisations for placing structural subsystems in service

In 2025, Traficom granted 42 authorisations for placing structural subsystems in service, which was broadly in line with the number granted in previous years.

The projects requiring authorisation included improvements to railway connections, development of railway yards, technical upgrades to existing railway sections, and smaller-scale measures affecting individual tracks. No authorisations for placing in service were granted for new railway functional routes during 2025.

The processing of authorisations for placing structural subsystems in service is based on the Interoperability Directive ((EU) 2016/797), the Rail Transport Act (1302/2018), and the Government Decree on the Interoperability of the Railway System (284/2019).

5.6 Information exchanges between Traficom and operators

Efforts have been made to maintain a low threshold for information exchange between Traficom and railway operators. Communication takes place through several channels, including information events organised by Traficom, bilateral meetings between Traficom and operators, and direct discussions between Traficom officials and representatives of operators. In addition, joint industry events and forums provide opportunities for dialogue and information sharing.

With larger operators, Traficom holds regular bilateral cooperation meetings addressing current safety-related issues and other topical matters. For smaller operators, cooperation meetings are typically organised as broader events for specific categories of operators, such as heritage railway operators and private siding managers. Cooperation also takes place informally whenever necessary, for example in connection with oversight activities. In particular, communication with VR Group Plc and the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency is regular and close.

Traficom coordinates a number of cooperation groups that discuss current topics and facilitate information exchange across the sector. These include the network for Human and Organisational Factors, the cooperation group for Safety Monitoring and Risk Management, the working group for the Prevention of Train-pedestrian collisions, the Rolling Stock cooperation group, and the Operations and Competence cooperation group. In addition to these cooperation groups, Traficom engaged with stakeholders on practical matters related to safety authorisations, safety certificates and various other permits.

6 Monitoring

6.1 Strategy, plan and decision-making

Rail transport oversight is guided by a three-year Rail Transport Oversight Strategy, which serves as the high-level document for planning and implementing oversight activities. The strategy describes and guides Traficom's rail transport oversight and sets out the key principles that influence oversight activities. In addition, it defines the objectives, principles, arrangements, focus areas, methods and implementation of oversight.

The oversight activities carried out in 2025 were guided by the Rail Transport Oversight Strategy for 2025–2027⁹, the primary objective of which is to ensure that rail transport oversight conducted by Traficom promotes safe and responsible operation within the Finnish rail transport system.

The Rail Transport Oversight Strategy for 2025–2027 includes a more comprehensive assessment of risks within the railway system than previous strategies. This risk picture served as one of the key starting points for defining the strategic focus areas. The strategy development process also drew on the National Rail Safety Plan for 2025–2027¹⁰.

In previous years, Traficom defined the focus areas guiding practical oversight activities on an annual basis. In the latest oversight strategy, however, the focus areas have been defined for the entire strategy period and may be updated during the period if necessary.

The primary focus of Traficom's rail transport oversight is the supervision of the effectiveness of safety management systems and safety control systems. In addition, the following oversight priorities were defined for the period 2025–2027:

- Risk management and its effectiveness
- Reliability
- Safety culture

These priorities were taken into account on an operator-specific basis when planning oversight activities.

⁹ Rail Transport Oversight Strategy 2025–2027: <https://www.traficom.fi/sites/default/files/media/file/Raideliikenteen%20valvontastrategia%20vuosille%202025-2027.pdf>

¹⁰ National Rail Safety Plan 2025–2027: <https://traficom.fi/fi/liikenne/raideliikenne/raideliikenteen-turvallisuustoiminta/raideliikenteen-turvallisuussuunnitelma>

In addition to the oversight strategy, Traficom prepares an annual oversight plan specifying the oversight activities to be carried out during the year. The plan takes account of the resources available for oversight and the requirements imposed by legislation to ensure that regulatory obligations are fulfilled. The target set in the 2025 oversight plan was the completion of 63 audits or inspections across all operator groups¹¹.

Traficom's principal oversight tools include audits, inspections and requests for clarification. These are complemented by oversight methods such as safety discussions, safety dialogues, observation of safety culture characteristics and various surveys. Oversight activities primarily focus on the safety management systems of railway undertakings and infrastructure managers, together with inspections of their operations. In addition, Traficom oversees, among other things, the activities of Entities in Charge of Maintenance (ECMs), railway training institutions, and railway doctors and psychologists.

The implementation of the Rail Transport Oversight Plan is monitored quarterly within Traficom. At these review points, any additional measures necessary to ensure implementation of the plan are assessed.

In addition to oversight carried out by Traficom, operators are required to implement self-monitoring. The practices related to self-monitoring are described in more detail in Chapter 7.3 of this Safety Report.

6.2 Oversight results

A total of 55 oversight activities were carried out in 2025. As a new approach, Traficom introduced combined oversight activities, in which two or more oversight areas were assessed during the same oversight event. Some development needs were identified in the procedures applied to combined oversight activities in order to ensure their smooth implementation.

In 2025, Traficom conducted four audits of infrastructure managers' safety management systems and 14 inspections of private siding managers based on national legislation. The audits and inspections were carried out in a constructive atmosphere, and the interaction between the parties was considered beneficial. Relatively few non-conformities were identified. Areas requiring further development included risk management, compliance with dangerous goods legislation (including the identification of dangerous

¹¹ Rail Transport Oversight Plan 2025: <https://www.traficom.fi/sites/default/files/media/file/Raideliikenteen%20valvontasuunnitelma%202025.pdf>

goods transport operations, related risks and the need for security plans), and maintenance activities.

In 2025, Traficom conducted ten audits of railway undertakings' safety management systems. The audits indicated that several operators had significantly improved their operating practices, although further refinement is still required in some areas to ensure that fundamental requirements are fully met. The audits identified a number of good practices (15 in total), and their number increased compared with previous years. The non-conformities identified were mainly related to risk management and self-monitoring. No non-conformities were identified in the audits of four operators.

Rolling stock experts and the findings of rolling stock inspections were utilised in some of the audits. During 2025, seven rolling stock inspections were carried out. In addition, other rolling stock-related case-specific investigations were conducted, mainly in connection with the examination of reported safety occurrences.

Three audits were conducted on certified Entities in Charge of Maintenance (ECMs). Rolling stock safety was found to be at a good level, although individual procedural shortcomings were identified. The deficiencies detected in the audits mainly concerned the outsourcing of maintenance activities, risk management and self-monitoring.

Eight inspections related to the transport of dangerous goods were carried out in 2025, three of which concerned the state-owned railway network and five private sidings. In addition, two inspections were conducted on railway undertakings. Overall, the integration of dangerous goods matters into operators' safety management practices continued to improve. Based on the inspections performed, the requirement to appoint a safety adviser was generally fulfilled, although some shortcomings were still identified in relation to the appointment of safety advisers. From a business continuity perspective, operators should remember to appoint a deputy safety adviser. It is also recommended that the annual report prepared by the safety adviser be incorporated into the operator's railway safety report, which was generally the case. Training requirements related to the transport of dangerous goods were largely met. Some shortcomings were identified in training concerning radioactive materials and security-related requirements. Compliance with the requirements concerning internal emergency plans was also generally good. However, several inspections revealed that not all railway sites had the first-response firefighting equipment specified in their internal emergency plans.

Three reliability audits were carried out in 2025. The audits indicated that operators had recognised the importance of preparedness in the current security environment and that progress had been made in strengthening

preparedness, for example through improved system redundancy. Nevertheless, further work remains necessary. Key development areas included ensuring and overseeing the preparedness of subcontractors, recognising the need for emergency exercises, organising and participating in such exercises, and defining concrete plans for different types of emergency situations. From the preparedness perspective, the identification and management of key operational risks remain essential. This message was also highlighted in Traficom's updated regulation issued at the end of 2025¹².

Three cyber security audits were also carried out in 2025. These audits focused on high-level governance procedures, and the most significant non-conformities identified concerned the scope of management frameworks and risk management procedures.

During 2025, requests for clarification were addressed to five operators. These resulted in safety discussions, additional inspections and, in some cases, enforcement measures such as the revocation of safety certificates or the issuance of written warnings. Such measures were typically associated with recurring non-conformities that had not been adequately addressed.

6.3 Supervisory cooperation with national railway authorities in other EU Member States

Traficom did not carry out direct oversight activities jointly with the national railway authorities of other EU Member States in 2025. However, Traficom actively participated in cooperation led by the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA), the objective of which was to further develop oversight practices applied by national safety authorities.

In addition, Traficom held discussions with the Swedish national safety authority concerning an agreement between the authorities on oversight cooperation related to railway operations in the Tornio-Haparanda area, as well as other practical arrangements between the authorities.

¹² Traficom Regulation on Emergency Preparedness Planning in the Transport System (TRAFI-COM/240833/03.04.04.00/2025): <https://www.finlex.fi/fi/viranomaiset/maarayksokoelmat/traficom-rautatieliikenne/2025/51222>

7 Application of Common Safety Methods

7.1 Application of the Common Safety Method for safety management systems

The level of safety management among railway operators varies, as the Finnish railway sector is diverse and consists of operators of very different sizes. A particular feature of the Finnish railway sector compared with many other European countries is that it includes one infrastructure manager that is significantly larger than the others and one railway undertaking whose operations are considerably larger than those of other railway undertakings.

In addition, the Finnish Rail Transport Act allows private siding managers to use a notification procedure instead of applying for a safety authorisation. Private siding managers operating under the notification procedure are required to maintain a safety control system rather than a safety management system. This reduces the responsibilities, obligations and administrative burden of smaller infrastructure managers. Despite this possibility, several private siding operators ceased railway operations on their networks during 2025. The most common reason was the low volume of transport operations, which in turn was linked to the weak economic situation and the decline in traffic connected with Russia.

The level of safety management is influenced by factors such as the resources available for safety work, the role of railway activities within the organisation as a whole, and the organisation's willingness to invest in railway safety. Although the documentation of safety management systems, particularly among larger operators, is generally of a high standard, the challenges associated with safety management are often similar regardless of the size of the organisation.

Key challenges include the effectiveness of risk management, the risk-based nature of self-monitoring, and the extent to which the procedures described in the system are embedded in day-to-day operations. The effectiveness of risk management is one of the focus areas of the current oversight strategy, and it therefore received particular attention during safety management system oversight activities carried out in 2025.

During 2025, a particular challenge identified in the development of safety management systems concerned descriptions of the organisation's activities and operating environment, which were incomplete in several cases. These descriptions are important because they provide the foundation for identifying and managing operational risks.

The identification and management of risks should therefore be the primary starting point for the development of a safety management system, rather

than merely ensuring compliance with regulatory requirements. It is also important to integrate the procedures of the safety management system into the organisation's other management systems so that they do not remain separate from day-to-day operations. This risk is particularly evident in situations where the development of the safety management system has been outsourced to external consultants.

In recent years, operators have increased their efforts to address human and organisational factors (HOFs) in their activities. To support this development, Traficom has for several years incorporated a safety culture perspective into its oversight activities. Oversight findings have shown that the documentation of safety management systems and practical operations do not always correspond. In some cases, documentation presents a more favourable picture of safety management than is reflected in practice, whereas in other cases practical implementation has been more advanced than the documentation suggests. Oversight activities have also identified challenges related to safety management in multi-actor operating environments.

7.2 Application of the Common Safety Method for risk evaluation and assessment

Traficom continued the activities of the Rail Sector Risk Management cooperation group in 2025. The purpose of the group is to develop risk management practices within the sector and to promote cooperation between operators. During the year, discussions focused on topics such as the assessment of the significance of changes, the development of assessment procedures, and the role of risk management in the forthcoming CSM ASLP Regulation¹³.

The application of the Common Safety Method (CSM) for risk evaluation and assessment was discussed with railway sector operators. These discussions highlighted that the threshold for classifying a change as significant may be high. Considerable variation was also observed between operators in recognising the need to assess the significance of a change in the first place. Increasing awareness of the procedure through targeted information sessions and similar activities was considered necessary. At the same time, it was noted that the competence requirements for those carrying out the assessments, as well as the scope of application of the assessment process, remain difficult to define unambiguously.

¹³ EU regulation on the common safety method for assessing the safety level and safety performance of railway operators. More information: <https://www.era.europa.eu/domains/safety-management/common-safety-methods-csms/common-safety-methods-assessment-safety-level>

The quality of significance assessments carried out by the infrastructure manager of the state-owned railway network was generally good. In 2025, the infrastructure manager conducted 72 significance assessments of changes, of which 11 resulted in the change being classified as significant. Most significant changes were related to railway projects, although some concerned competences and training arrangements.

Among other operators, changes are only rarely assessed as significant. In 2025, one change related to operational control systems was classified as significant. The Common Safety Method for risk evaluation and assessment was also applied to rolling stock-related changes, but none of these changes were assessed as significant.

Two assessment bodies operate in Finland and carry out the vast majority of independent assessments concerning compliance with the CSM Regulation. However, foreign assessment bodies have also entered the market, increasing competition in the provision of assessment services.

7.3 Application of the Common Safety Method for self-monitoring

Traficom's guidance on railway safety reporting describes the information that railway undertakings and infrastructure managers are required to include in their annual safety reports concerning self-monitoring. Based on the safety reports submitted for 2025, the vast majority of operators (more than 90%) had carried out self-monitoring activities. The remaining operators did not report the implementation of self-monitoring in their safety reports.

However, there is still room for improvement in describing how the results of self-monitoring are utilised. Slightly fewer than half of the operators that carried out self-monitoring reported both the implementation of self-monitoring and how the findings had been taken into account in their operations. For more than half of the operators, the safety reports did not clearly describe how the results of self-monitoring had been used in practice. Railway undertakings generally provided somewhat clearer descriptions of the use of self-monitoring results than infrastructure managers.

The safety reports frequently described the implementation of self-monitoring and the areas monitored, but they did not always explain what findings were made, what actions were taken on the basis of those findings, or how the implementation and effectiveness of the actions were monitored. Assessing the effectiveness of self-monitoring is also made more difficult by reports that merely state that no deficiencies were identified. In such cases, the reports may provide little information on the

scope of monitoring activities, the areas covered or the assessment criteria applied.

The observations made on the basis of the safety reports are consistent with the views formed through Traficom's assessment and oversight activities. Differences remain between operators with regard to the risk-based nature of self-monitoring and the utilisation of findings generated through self-monitoring and internal audits. In all cases, the connection between self-monitoring activities and the operator's most significant safety risks, as well as the monitoring of the effectiveness of risk control measures, is not sufficiently evident.

In Traficom's view, self-monitoring should focus on the most significant risks associated with an operator's activities and on assessing the effectiveness and functionality of the measures implemented to control those risks. The role of internal audits, in turn, is to assess the suitability of safety management system procedures and their implementation in practice. Both processes should generate information that supports the continuous improvement of the safety management system and operational activities.

A key area for further development is the transition from describing the implementation of procedures to systematically evaluating their outcomes and effectiveness. Safety reports should describe the targets of self-monitoring and the reasons for their selection, the main findings identified, the actions decided upon as a result of those findings, and the monitoring of the implementation and effectiveness of those actions. Traficom will continue to promote the risk-based nature and effectiveness of self-monitoring through its assessment and oversight activities as well as through joint events organised for operators.

7.4 Participation in EU-wide activities

Traficom did not participate in any EU-wide projects during 2025.

8 Safety culture

8.1 Evaluation and monitoring of safety culture

In 2025, safety culture observations were carried out in two companies. In addition, follow-up interviews with auditors conducted by safety culture specialists were planned in connection with four audits.

The safety culture observations were conducted as part of audits. No separate safety culture assessments were carried out due to resource

constraints. During the audits, safety culture specialists made observations using a form that condenses the core elements of the ERA's safety culture model into ten open-ended questions. Following the audit, the auditors themselves were also interviewed using the same form. Two safety culture specialists always participated in the observations.

In 2025, the observations were supplemented with interviews based on an interview framework developed by an expert. For each audited organisation, five to six individuals representing senior management, middle management and operational personnel were interviewed. The combination of interviews and observations was considered to provide a relatively comprehensive picture of the strengths and development needs of the organisation's safety culture.

The reporting of observation results has been based on grouping observations under the ten questions included in the assessment framework. This reporting approach will be further developed. The aim is to highlight observations that help operators focus their own improvement efforts. However, observations that remain uncertain are also recorded, as they may represent signals of latent or emerging cultural risks. Positive observations are also included in the reports.

8.2 Safety culture development projects

In 2025, the development of a self-assessment tool for safety culture characteristics intended for rail transport operators was launched. In addition to Traficom, the development work involved a number of experts in human and organisational factors (HOF) and safety culture from across the rail sector.

The tool is based on the ERA's safety culture model. Supporting questions were developed to make the safety fundamentals and cultural enablers of the model easier to understand and apply in practice. The intention is that operators can use the Excel-based self-assessment tool to evaluate the characteristics, strengths and areas for improvement of their own safety culture as part of their self-monitoring activities.

The tool will be completed during 2026. Reporting on safety culture characteristics will be included in annual safety reporting from the beginning of 2027.

8.3 Communication about safety culture development projects

Progress in the development of the self-assessment tool for safety culture characteristics has been communicated through the rail sector HOF network

coordinated by Traficom. Members of the network have also been given opportunities to comment on the tool during different stages of its development. In addition, the development of the tool was presented at the rail transport Regulatory and Safety Information Event organised for the sector in autumn 2025.

Dedicated web pages on safety culture and human and organisational factors (HOF) were created on Traficom's website during 2025 to improve the availability of information and increase the visibility of these topics.

A blog series focusing on human and organisational factors (HOF) was launched within the HOF network in 2025. The first blog post in the series, addressing situational awareness, was published on Traficom's safety culture website at the beginning of 2026.

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