



Bureau d'Enquêtes sur les Accidents
de Transport Terrestre



ANNUAL REPORT 2025



Director's Foreword

In 2025, the BEA-TT was informed of nearly 2,700 accidents or incidents, conducted a preliminary analysis on over 700, and opened 9 investigations:

- 2 in road transport, including the school bus accident in Jallans which led to the "Joana Plan";
- 4 in heavy rail, including a head-to-head situation and an unsecured track return;
- 1 involving a bus at a level crossing;
- 2 in guided transport.

These choices may take severity into account, but they are primarily based on the perceived potential for learning and issuing new recommendations.

In 2025, the BEA-TT published 13 investigation reports and 1 study:

- 2 in road transport, including a tanker truck explosion;
- 7 in heavy rail, including one event in the Fréjus tunnel in cooperation with our Italian colleagues, one regarding a rolling stock testing sequence, and another on the suicide of a TGV driver;
- 1 on level crossings, also involving a school bus;
- 2 in inland waterways, one of which concerned a collision between two tourist boats in Paris;
- 1 in ski lifts / ropeways.

The study focused on road accidents involving vehicle immersion in a body of water—a salutary read for all.

These 14 reports contain a total of 74 recommendations, which are highly diverse, reflecting the accidents and their multiple causes.

The BEA-TT website provides access to all investigations since its inception: the report, the recommendations issued, and the responses from recipients announcing the actions they will take.

The appendices to this annual report outline the actions actually taken by each recommendation recipient. These actions are monitored by the EPSF and STRMTG within their scopes, as well as the DSR, DGEC, and DGITM in their areas of competence. The appendices are posted on our website as tracking tables are received by the BEA-TT.

The BEA-TT conceives, presents, and must act as a safety partner—this is a key condition for its effectiveness. In particular, we safeguard the distinction between our prevention mission and the role of the judicial system when it intervenes.

The relationship of trust between the BEA-TT and sector operators is established in principle. However, it can erode because our analyses touch upon sensitive balances between safety stakes and other considerations.

Our reports must enable a clear understanding of how an accident occurred and how to prevent its recurrence, all without weakening the stakeholders involved. This is what I have strived to do since my initial appointment in March 2021. It is what I will continue to do after

March 2026, as the Minister of Transport has agreed to entrust me with a second term.

Promoting our website is part of our mission. It expands as new investigations are published (272 by the end of 2025). In 2025, we recorded over 110,000 visits and 33,000 document downloads. We passed the 6,000-subscriber mark on LinkedIn, and our posts were viewed over 460,000 times.

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1 ACCIDENTS OF THE YEAR 2025

1.1 Sources of Information on Accidents and Incidents

As required by the Transport Code, land transport incidents and accidents are reported to the BEA-TT as soon as possible after occurrence. In practice, this reporting is mainly provided by the Ministerial Operational Monitoring and Alert Center (CMVOA) of our ministerial department, as well as daily alerts and reports from major transport operators.

Monitoring consists of analyzing this information in real time. Following an initial screening, a brief analysis of selected accidents is conducted to understand the circumstances and assess whether opening an investigation is warranted.

It should be recalled that the BEA-TT does not produce statistics nor is it responsible for conducting accidentology studies, unlike its close partners (EPSF, STRMTG, ONISR, etc.). The selection of accidents to be investigated is driven by the goal of producing new safety recommendations. Severity is not the primary criterion.

The BEA-TT's scope focuses primarily on transport "conducted by professionals." Thus, in the road sector, selected events often involve a goods transport vehicle or passenger transport vehicle. However, passenger car accidents may be of renewed interest when involving new energy systems or driver assistance features.

The summary of this analysis for 2025 is as follows:

Sector	Reported Events	Analyzed Events	Opened Investigations
Road, Inland Waterways & Level Crossings	1,251	501	3
Rail, Guided Transport & Ski Lifts	1,420	214	6
Total	2,671	715	9

1.2 Investigations opened in 2025

The BEA-TT initiated 9 investigations in 2025:

- α 2 in Road Transport: a school bus running off the road in Jallans, and a head-on collision on the A28 motorway between two light vehicles (one driving wrong-way) in Parçay-Meslay;
- α 1 in Level Crossings: a coach crossing an active level crossing with lowered half-barriers in Brison-Saint-Innocent;
- α 4 in Rail Transport: partial derailment of TGV 8517 in Tonneins, derailment and initial fire of TER 849 902 in Laon, a non-collision "head-to-head situation" between two SNCF Voyageurs trains in Marseille, and side-friction contact between two SNCF Voyageurs trains at Paris-Est station;
- α 2 in Guided Transport: a collision between two tramway units in Strasbourg, and a runaway followed by derailment of a Panoramique des Dômes train unit in Orcines.

Road Transport

1) School coach running off the road on January 30, 2025, in Jallans (Eure-et-Loir - 28)



On Thursday, January 30, 2025, a coach operated by Cars Dunois on behalf of the Centre-Val de Loire region was transporting 35 middle and high school students to their schools in Châteaudun. Around 7:30 a.m., as it approached the roundabout at the entrance of the municipality on departmental road D 927, the coach ran off the road at the entry of a left-hand curve. It encroached on the grassy, muddy shoulder and slid into the roadside ditch, causing it to roll onto its right side. A 15-year-old girl seated in a rear right seat died, and about twenty other youths sustained minor injuries. A major emergency response was deployed, involving around forty firefighters, SAMU medical teams, and thirty gendarmes.

2) Fatal collision on the A28 motorway involving two light vehicles (one wrong-way) on November 10, 2025, in Parçay-Meslay (Indre-et-Loire - 37)



On Monday, November 10, 2025, at around 6:15 p.m., in Parçay-Meslay, a light vehicle driving the wrong way on the A28 (Tours to Le Mans direction) collided with another light vehicle traveling in the correct direction. It was dark, weather conditions were mild, and the road surface was wet. A first motorist traveling from Le Mans toward Tours spotted the wrong-way driver at kilometer post (PK) 32 near the Chénardière rest area and attempted to warn the driver using the horn and flashing headlights. A gendarme on intervention at PK 23 also spotted the vehicle and alerted Cofiroute's traffic control center. Unfortunately, 5 km further at PK 18, the wrong-way vehicle violently struck the vehicle traveling in the correct direction at a speed of around 100 km/h. The wrong-way driver, a woman in her fifties, was killed instantly, while the other driver sustained minor injuries.

Level Crossings

1) Coach crossing an active level crossing with lowered half-barriers in Brison-Saint-Innocent (Savoie - 73)

On Friday evening, June 6, while Level Crossing No. 7 had been active for about an hour due to a broken-down train (circumstances to be confirmed), a coach carrying numerous passengers—including children—traversed the level crossing in a slalom pattern between

the two lowered half-barriers. This occurred after tens of minutes of waiting without receiving information about the situation. Given the road geometry and surroundings, the coach could not turn around. The event was filmed by bystanders and shared on social media.



Rail Transport

1) Partial derailment of TGV 8517 on May 19, 2025, in Tonneins (Lot-et-Garonne - 47)



The event occurred on the conventional line from Bordeaux Saint-Jean to Sète-Ville, a few hundred meters downstream from Tonneins station. At the derailment site, the tracks curve to the right in the Bordeaux-to-Toulouse direction with superelevation, running adjacent to a parallel road. Météo France had issued a Weather Surveillance Bulletin (MSB) indicating a red "thunderstorm-hail" risk level for the monitored area from Agen to Bordeaux, placing the entire department under an orange "rain-flooding" alert that Monday evening. Late in the afternoon, heavy rainfall hit Lot-et-Garonne, particularly the Tonneins area.

While several trains passed early in the storm, track sections quickly became flooded. At 8:37 p.m., traffic was halted on Track 2 upstream of Tonneins station. Traffic on Track 1 remained authorized under "cautious running" (*marche prudente*), requiring the driver to pass a designated section at reduced speed. At 8:55 p.m., approximately 800 meters past Tonneins station, the driver of TGV No. 8517 traveling at low speed on Track 1 felt abnormal track movement and applied emergency braking. The driver issued a radio alert signal and notified the infrastructure manager, prompting a complete traffic stoppage on both tracks. Rising waters from "Le Caillou" stream eroded the ballast, creating a breach over 23 meters long across both tracks, with voids up to 1.50 meters beneath the concrete ties. The TGV's leading power car stopped directly over the breach; the driver reported that at least one wheel on the bogie between cars 1 and 2 was no longer in contact with the rail and that the embankment had been washed away.

2) Derailment and initial fire of TER No. 849 902 on May 30, 2025, in Laon (Aisne - 02)



The event occurred on the line from La-Plaine to Hirson-and-Anor (border), a few hundred meters from La Neuville-sous-Laon station, along a straight alignment.

A track-and-ballast renewal operation was scheduled for Track 1. Preparatory work involving rail replacement and trackside path reconstruction between Laon and Soissons was performed during the night of May 29 to 30, requiring obstacle removal (rails, ties). This work was executed under a Track Closure Request (DFV) for Elementary Protection Zone SL110 granted at 9:24 p.m. by the Soissons Signaler (SNCF Réseau), without work train involvement. The DFV was returned at 4:29 a.m. without restrictions.

Train No. 849 902 (SNCF Voyageurs) was the first to run after track clearance. Operating from Laon to Paris-Nord and serving Anizy Pinon, it was carrying 25 passengers. At around 5:45 a.m., traveling toward Anizy Pinon at approximately 90 km/h, the driver noticed a dark area in the ballast ahead. Upon closer approach, the driver identified an obstacle—a track clamp weighing 650 kg—in the middle of the track and applied emergency brakes. The collision occurred around km 137.270. The train came to a stop approximately 370 meters further after heavy shaking in the cab (initial and subsequent impacts, derailment of the leading axle). The driver made a passenger announcement, unlocked the embankment-side doors for evacuation, and shut down the diesel engines. An onboard SNCF employee informed the driver that the first passenger door on the inter-track side had opened due to the impact and was emitting dense smoke. The driver performed an inspection, confirmed the derailment, and alerted the Laon Signaler. Traffic was stopped on both tracks.

3) Non-collision "head-to-head situation" between two SNCF Voyageurs trains in Marseille (Bouches-du-Rhône - 13)



On Saturday, September 6, 2025, starting at 6:00 a.m., a track circuit fault occurred at St-Joseph Le Castellat. Both track intervals on Tracks 1 and 2 (between km 436.850 and 438.311) experienced intermittent non-clearance indications. Signalers (AC) at SNCF Réseau were unable to establish track direction. Signalers at Marseille Signal Boxes 1 and 2 exchanged formal dispatches to prevent opposing traffic routes and evaluated degraded-mode operations per regulatory procedures. Traffic resumed under restricted conditions in both directions.

At 7:44 a.m., following a preceding train's clearance, the Signaler at Box 1 prepared procedures for Train No. 17 402. Route establishment conditions from Sainte-Marthe to Saint-Antoine defined in Annex 2 of the box's "Consigne Rose" were verified.

At 7:53 a.m., Train No. 17 402 stopped at St-Joseph, received authorization to pass the signal, and resumed operation in the even direction on the reversible track toward St-Antoine. The driver passed the stop signal (*carré*) and proceeded under "sight running" (*marche à vue*). At 8:02 a.m.,

the driver was authorized to resume normal running upon passing the signal governing the next block. The driver then encountered a "Slowdown to 60" followed by a "Reminder 60" signal aspect. At 8:03 a.m., Train No. 880 697 was at the platform on Track A at St-Antoine. For its departure toward Sainte-Marthe, the Signaler at Box 2 prepared an order authorizing it to pass stop signal C 8209. The route had not been lined, and establishment conditions under Annex 2 of the "Consigne Rose" were unverified. Upon authorization, the driver of Train No. 880 697 passed the stop signal and proceeded under sight running in the odd direction onto the route leading to the reversible track toward St-Joseph.

While on the viaduct, the driver of Train No. 17 402 spotted an oncoming train on the same track and brought the train to a stop. The driver of Train No. 880 697 also saw the approaching train, applied emergency brakes, and triggered the flashing warning signal. Emergency dispatches were issued. At 8:04 a.m., the situation froze into a near head-on confrontation. On-call staff from SNCF Réseau and SNCF Voyageurs opened an investigation. The two trains came to a stop 30 meters apart.

4) Contact between two SNCF Voyageurs trains at Paris-Est station (75)



Around 7:00 a.m., an empty TGV inOui heading toward platform Track 27 and a passenger-carrying Transilien train heading toward platform Track 22 converged to the point of side-friction contact, damaging their exterior side panels. Such an event is exceptionally rare on the French rail network.

The track layout governing the signal zone involved was modified in 1999. Preliminary findings pointed to an operational incident resulting from a signaling failure—specifically, a parameter configuration error in the installation.

Because platform Track 27 was still occupied, TGV 609 561 stopped before closed signal C98. As this signal was mounted on a gantry, the driver stopped the power car approximately 20 meters short of the signal (10 meters upstream of the track magnet / "crocodile") to maintain visibility of the signal aspect from the seat while ensuring the train did not pass over the track magnet.

Because the distance between signal C98 and the fouling point (*garage franc*) of turnout 2326b was only 4.13 meters, the rear of the TGV failed to clear the fouling point. Nevertheless, its dedicated track circuit unexpectedly registered as clear (track circuit 2332 clear).

Transilien 113 604 coming from Track 2bis was routed toward Track M to reach its terminus at Track 22. Coupled turnouts 2326a and 2326b were set to the diverging route. The Transilien train obeyed signaling and was traveling at 22 km/h when its driver, approaching turnout 2326b facing points, judged that the rear of the stationary TGV on the straight track was too close to the train path. The driver reduced speed to 9 km/h; the front left side of the Transilien struck the rear nose of the TGV before stopping. No passengers were injured. The TGV driver felt no shock.

Signal C98 subsequently opened toward Track 27, and TGV 609 561 moved up to the platform. The Transilien driver inspected the train set, deemed it movable but requiring expert rolling-stock inspection before further service, proceeded at reduced speed to Track 22, and disembarked the passengers.

Guided Transport

1) Collision of two tramway units in Strasbourg (Bas-Rhin - 67)



On Saturday, January 11, 2025, around 3:15 p.m., a tramway unit was stopped between "Gare Centrale" and "Les Halles" stations on a 7% gradient ramp inside the tunnel exit portal. Public demonstrations in downtown Strasbourg impacted tram operations, causing high traffic density in the area—particularly along this shared section for lines A and D.

When attempting to restart, the tram rolled backward (runaway) for unknown reasons. It traveled down the tunnel gradient against the normal direction of travel, gaining speed. After several hundred meters, it collided with another tram stationary at the platform in Gare Centrale station. Numerous passengers were aboard both trams.

The accident involved 131 people, 68 of whom sustained minor injuries. Material damage was extensive, particularly to the structural frames of both trams.

2) Runaway and derailment of a Panoramique des Dômes train unit in Orcines (Puy-de-Dôme - 63)



On Wednesday, September 24, 2025, technicians from rail manufacturer Stadler were conducting checks and adjustments on train unit No. 3 at the maintenance center. Around 3:00 p.m., they requested a driver to take the train out on the line for dynamic testing. With traffic control authorization, the driver advanced to the departure station and proceeded up the line toward the summit.

At the Muletiers passing loop, the train passed the downstream turnout, passed an oncoming train carrying passengers, and advanced to the signal corresponding to the loop's upstream turnout. The driver slowed down; as the train reached a complete stop, it entered an uncontrolled backward drift (runaway) and accelerated to 28 km/h. The train passed through the downstream turnout, which had changed position shortly before (to set the route for the opposing train). Unit No. 3 derailed on the turnout, slid on its left side across a pedestrian path, struck an overhead line pole, and came to a stop on the grass.

Operations managers arrived on scene, alerted emergency services, secured train No. 3, and organized passenger evacuation from the other train back to the departure station since the line was blocked. The damaged train was re-railed that evening and towed to the maintenance center the following morning.

Material damage was minor, limited to sections of the track, the turnout, and train unit No. 3 (one derailed bogie). No injuries were reported. Following advice from STRMTG (the safety oversight agency for guided systems), the Prefect suspended line operations.

Ski lifts / Ropeways

No investigations opened in 2025.

Inland waterways

No investigations opened in 2025.

1.3 Opened Study

No studies opened in 2025.

2 Reports published in 2025

2.1 Road Transport

Published Investigations

Two reports covered road traffic accidents (excluding level crossings and tramway intersections):

Event Date	Accident Nature et Location	Fatalities
20/01/2023	Fire and explosion of a hazmat tanker truck in Fillinges (74)	0
28/07/2023	Collision between a bus and a light vehicle in Mézières-sur-Seine (78)	2

Fillinges: The direct cause was an engine compartment fire that spread to the diesel tank, triggering an overpressure explosion (BLEVE) of the LPG tank. Firefighters faced access delays due to remote station locations, heavy traffic, and snow. The blast wave dismantled the truck and launched debris hundreds of meters. Nearby homes suffered severe damage; miraculously, only one person sustained minor injuries.



Mézières-sur-Seine: A light vehicle veered left out of its lane and collided head-on with an oncoming bus on departmental road D 113 in Yvelines (between Mantes-la-Jolie and Mézières-sur-Seine). Two bus passengers standing near the front dashboard by the door were killed. Other standing passengers suffered life-threatening injuries, whereas seated passengers sustained only minor injuries.



Issued Recommendations

Seven recommendations were issued by the BEA-TT:

	Tanker Truck Fire and Explosion (Fillinges — Published Sept 2025)
R1 : - DGPR	Within the BLEVE working group, initiate discussions to mandate thermal protection on fuel tanks for FL and EX/III category motor vehicles to delay fuel leakage/fire beneath the tanker, ultimately preventing dangerous pressure and temperature rises.
R2 : - FFC	Define technically and economically viable retrofits for in-service FL and EX/III motor vehicles regarding tanker thermal protection, prioritizing cases where fires originate in the driver cab or engine compartment.
R3 : - DGSCGC	Initiate strategic review on response conditions and automated equipment deployment during hazardous material fires to protect emergency personnel—evaluating whether to prioritize population/responder safety even if a vehicle fire leads to a BLEVE with material-only damage.

	Bus vs. Light Vehicle Collision (Mézières-sur-Seine — Published July 2025)
R1 : - DGEC	Regulatively mandate a 70 km/h speed limiter on buses designed to transport standing passengers (by design or retrofit).
R2 : - DGEC - DSR	Require driver seatbelt installation on new buses operating with standing passengers. Seatbelt use may be optional in urban areas but mandatory in interurban zones.
R3 : - DGEC - DSR	Require mandatory signage, deterrent floor markings, or physical barriers preventing passengers from standing forward of the driver seat midpoint in interurban buses.
R4 : - DGITM	Study experimental installation of forward-facing dashboard cameras in buses/coaches, with footage access strictly restricted to authorized regulatory bodies.

Status of Recommendations (End of 2025)

Investigation	Recommendations			
	Number	Accepted	Rejected	Pending
Fillinges	3	1	0	2 (DGPR, DGSCGC)
Mezières-sur-Seine	4	0	1* (DGEC)	3 (DSR)
TOTAL	7	1	1	5

**Note: Red figures indicate responses exceeding the 90-day deadline. DGEC response for Mézières-sur-Seine was received in April 2026.*

2.2 Rail transport

Published Investigations

Seven rail reports were published in 2025 (excluding level crossings). Events marked in red were classified as "serious accidents" requiring mandatory technical investigation under Articles L. 1621-1 and L. 1621-2 of the Transport Code.

Event Date	Accident Nature et Location	Fatalities
14/07/2022	Trackside wildfire following train passage in Graveson (13)	1
09/10/2022	Prolonged TGV stranding in the Fréjus Tunnel (73)	0
25/06/2023	Hazardous emergency handling of a stranded train in Nuits (89)	0
11/02/2024	Freight train rear-end collision and derailment in Metz-Sablon (57)	0
22/07/2024	High-voltage arcing injury during test run in Zillisheim (68)	0
24/07/2024	TER derailment following landslide and bridge collision near Eus (66)	0
24/12/2024	TGV driver fatal fall from moving train in Crisenoy (77)	1

GRAVESON : A freight train was stopped after triggering a hot box detector (DBC) with a brake-danger alarm. Trackside blazes spread rapidly, causing massive damage to railway electrical infrastructure. A volunteer firefighter died on July 25 following a medical emergency suffered during firefighting operations on July 15.



FREJUS : TGV 9251 (Paris to Milan, operated by SVI) stopped inside the Fréjus rail tunnel due to a traction failure triggered by a fire alarm. The driver found no fire. Troubleshooting attempts failed. Rescue operations via a relief locomotive from Modane encountered major delays; the train arrived back in Modane 4.5 hours later. No injuries.



NUITS : An OSLO passenger train broke down. Without air conditioning, cabin temperatures exceeded 40°C, requiring medical aid. Emergency responders entered rail premises without adequate track protection measures. No injuries.



METZ : A Fret SNCF train rear-ended a stationary freight train on a main line. Significant damage to overhead lines and trackage. Both drivers suffered shock but were uninjured.



ZILLISHEIM : During trial runs testing a new Alstom locomotive, an electrical arc inside the cab severely injured a crew member.



EUS : A TER train struck earth debris from a slope landslide, derailing the lead bogies. The train continued forward and struck a road bridge abutment. The bridge was destroyed, overhead line supports were torn down, and 250 m of track required full replacement. The driver was seriously injured; four passengers suffered minor injuries.



CRISENOY : TGV 6689 traveling at 255 km/h underwent automatic emergency braking (VACMA). The train stopped in 2,320 m. Radio contact with the driver failed; an onboard conductor entered the cab and found it empty. Emergency crews located the driver's deceased body 2,000 m upstream..



Issued Recommendations (Summary by Investigation)

A total of **41 recommendations** were formulated across these 7 reports covering:

	GRAVESON
R1 : - SNCF Réseau	In fire-prone areas along non-high-speed lines, identify locations where rapid crossing of the tracks by heavy emergency vehicles is necessary but currently impossible. Where appropriate, assess the feasibility of enabling such vehicles to cross the tracks using quick, temporary solutions that do not damage the track infrastructure. These assessments could be conducted in partnership with the SDIS (Departmental Fire and Rescue Service) and local authorities. For the Montagnette area, evaluate the possibility of installing a railway crossing to facilitate firefighting operations. A solution—such as a track crossing platform installed at the site of a previously removed level crossing, intended for use solely by firefighters or SNCF Infra personnel subject to appropriate safety measures—could be studied in collaboration with the SDIS and local authorities.
R2 : - SNCF Réseau	Replace remaining 3rd-generation DBCs with 4th-generation DBC/DFS units, in accordance with the SNCF Réseau Product Committee decision of October 8, 2024. Assess the feasibility of reducing the spacing between DBC/DFS units in areas at risk of fire that are traversed by freight trains; in these same areas, assess the feasibility of lowering DFS detection thresholds and implementing data linking between DBC/DFS units. Implement the conclusions and recommendations of the JNS final report titled "Consequences of unintended brake applications with LL blocks."
R3 : - DGPE	Ensure, in coordination with the relevant ministries, the proper implementation of the July 2023 law—and specifically the interministerial order of March 29, 2024, issued pursuant to Article L.131-10 of the Forestry Code—so that SNCF Réseau can carry out its mandatory vegetation clearance (*OLD*) operations under optimal conditions, particularly in fire-prone areas.
R4 : - HEXAFRET - EPSF	Enhance driver monitoring of their own train and other traffic. Inform drivers of the potential consequences of a brake seizure involving LL brake blocks. Modify the conditions for applying an overload: - systematically apply the overload prior to brake tests and always wait for it to be released before departing onto the line; - - apply this generally under specific train departure conditions (prolonged stops, extended periods of immobility, significant winter/summer temperature fluctuations) and always wait for the overload to be released. Implement the conclusions and recommendations of the JNS final report titled "Consequences of unintended brake applications with LL blocks".

R5 : - HEXAFRET - EPSF	Assess the merits and feasibility of adjusting the overload pressure to a value above 5.4 bar. Proposals may be shared within working groups led by the EPSF.
R6 : - HEXAFRET - EPSF	Building on the work carried out as part of the JNS "Consequences of unintended brake applications with LL blocks," the aim is to study experiments designed to improve the detection of braking system anomalies: • at departure: for example, a system to assist with and verify the proper execution of brake tests in order to detect anomalies; • in service: taking into account the potential consequences related to the thermal properties of LL brake blocks (e.g., temperature and pressure sensors, etc.). Proposals may be shared within working groups led by the EPSF.

Destinataires	FREJUS TUNNEL
R1 : - SVI	SVI must apply the rule stating that, in the event of a breakdown or accident inside the tunnel, the driver must request train assistance from the Bardonecchia DCO within a maximum of 15 minutes (if the incident has not been resolved within that timeframe).
R2 : - SNCF Réseau - RFI	RFI and SNCF Réseau must treat any stoppage in the tunnel as a safety incident that could escalate into a serious crisis. The PIS must be activated. Emergency services must be notified (via pre-alert or alert, depending on the nature of the incident) by RFI and SNCF Réseau..
R3 : - RFI	RFI must initiate arrangements for the recovery (towing) of the trainset within a maximum of 15 minutes. RFI must regularly verify the availability of recovery locomotives and the adequacy of the dedicated personnel. RFI must formalize this process. Ensure that RFI evaluates the feasibility of making available a dedicated recovery vehicle—equipped with a recovery coupling—that can be rapidly deployed with qualified personnel.
R4 : - SVI	SVI must provide theoretical and practical training, as well as periodically verify (both theoretically and practically) the skills acquired by personnel, in accordance with the following requirements: • For drivers: French language training to a level enabling them to understand and carry out instructions given in French regarding rolling stock. • For drivers: knowledge of train functionality and the equipment affected by a fire alarm; knowledge and mastery of procedures related to fire alarms and train rescue operations (requesting rescue, cancelling rescue, installing/removing emergency coupling, recovering the disabled train, etc.). • For on-call managers: knowledge and mastery of procedures triggered by the PIS (Passenger Information System) that fall under the railway undertaking's responsibility; knowledge of rolling stock operating procedures for degraded situations.
R5 : - SNCF Réseau - SVI RFI	Ensure that RFI, SVI, and SNCF Réseau periodically verify that personnel have mastered the procedures set out in the PIS.
R6 : - EPSF - ANAFISA	Carry out a joint monitoring action regarding the railway undertaking SVI.
R7 : -SNCF Voyageurs	In accordance with the rolling stock modification process, ensure that SNCF Voyageurs TGV modifies the PLT trainsets to monitor the C FI FS contactor, so that any malfunction is accounted for in the SIAC system. More generally, for future modifications, SNCF Voyageurs TGV must ensure they are carried out according to best practices, analyze failures and their consequences for the train's running capability—particularly in the event of an onboard fire—and perform the associated maintenance checks. Depending on the associated safety implications and the impact on operations, ensure that SNCF Voyageurs TGV incorporates these failures into the SIAC software.
R8 : -SNCF Voyageurs	Ensure that SNCF Voyageurs TGV verifies during maintenance that emergency couplers are in working order and ready for use by railway undertakings.
R9 : -SNCF Réseau - RFI	Ensure that RFI and SNCF Réseau adapt their alert and information-exchange processes to guarantee the efficiency of the alert chain and the continuous sharing of information between the two infrastructure managers. Access to a shared tool for French and Italian stakeholders would enable the objective of real-time information sharing to be met.
R 10 : - Commission intergouvernementale de sécurité du tunnel de Fréjus - Préfet de Turin	Ensure that the Intergovernmental Commission, the Prefect of Savoy, and the Prefect of Turin—in collaboration with the Safety Committee, RFI, and SNCF Réseau—update and validate the PSB—and subsequently the PIS, taking into account developments based on lessons learned from the incident. Ensure that the operational documents of the various operators are updated.
R 11 : - Commission intergouvernementale	In collaboration with the Safety Committee, ensure that the Intergovernmental Commission, the Prefect of Savoy, and the Prefect of Turin periodically organize safety exercises in the tunnel

mentale de sécurité du tunnel de Fréjus - Préfet de Turin	involving all Franco-Italian stakeholders (RFI, SNCF Réseau, railway undertakings, emergency services, etc.). Ensure that these exercises include train towing operations.
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Destinataires	NUTS
R1 : - OSLO	Align operational procedures with those of SNCF R. Finalize partially documented procedures and update those requiring it. Promote adherence to procedures, define a strategy for handling emergency situations, and regularly test its effectiveness.
R2 : -SNCF Voyageurs	Precisely define the scope of intervention, competencies, and geographical limits for SNCF V's on-call operations. Ensure that its subsidiaries organize themselves accordingly and in alignment with this framework.
R3 : -SNCF Réseau	Implement a quality and safety control system capable of detecting instances of interference with, or disregard for, the prerogatives of staff responsible for traffic safety during interventions by regional and national crisis managers. Integrate a systematic review process into the control system for any situation handled in a manner that deviated from established rules.
R4 : -SNCF Réseau	Ensure the application of document DC 4380 to guarantee that information exchanged between crisis managers and on-site personnel is systematically routed through the traffic controller for incidents on the open line, or through the Station Manager (AC) for events within station boundaries. To manage a passenger train in distress that has requested assistance—while accounting for the situation's instability—create an entry in document DC 01503 mandating "cautious movement" (restricted speed) for any train passing or overtaking the distressed train. Incorporate rules regarding police or gendarmerie intervention into document DC 2611, or create a dedicated document covering these procedures.
R5 : -SNCF	Conduct a post-event review to explain and promote this rule to all staff members across the group, regardless of rank.
R6 : - DGSCGC	Conduct a post-incident review to reiterate the rules that must be strictly observed during any intervention in a railway environment. This process will necessarily involve the Directorate General of the National Police, the Directorate General of the National Gendarmerie, the command structures of the Paris Fire Brigade and the Marseille Naval Fire Battalion, and the Association of Mayors of France (representing municipal police officers).

Destinataires	METZ SABLON
R1 : -SNCF Réseau	Identify situations that do not comply with DES 207 Rectif No. 3 (dated October 2000) regarding the distance between the violet signal (Cv) and the first block signal. Where appropriate, examine how to mitigate the risk of the driver failing to correctly apply "proceed at sight" (Marche à Vue) rules by implementing the following progressive measures: • at a minimum, mandate via operating regulations that the clearing of violet signals (Cv) providing access to main lines (VP) be conditional upon the clearing of main-line track circuits upstream of the first block signal; • based on a risk analysis that takes local conditions into account—specifically signal visibility and the installation distance from the switch point—implement a technical interlock requiring that the clearing of violet signals (Cv) providing access to main lines (VP) be conditional upon the clearing of main-line track circuits upstream of the first block signal; • in the event of signaling modernization—specifically the renewal of interlocking systems—equip the light signals providing access to main lines (VP) with block indications (BAL, ETCS, etc.) and their associated support systems (cab signaling/signal repetition, KVB, ETCS, etc.).
R2 : -SNCF Réseau	Improve traffic management procedures handled by centralized network control (CCR) centers to foster better collaboration with field personnel: • immediately lift a train hold as soon as the situation changes / dispatch trains as quickly as possible (communication from the Duty Manager (CS) to traffic controllers (AC)); • implement systematic verbal communication between traffic controllers in adjacent sectors (see §11.1 of DC 1510) to verify the advisability of dispatching a train from one traffic sector to the other; • improve mutual familiarity among traffic controllers, the CCR traffic manager, and staff at remote signal boxes to better share information on local specifics and coordinate actions; • evaluate the installation of a GSM-R unit at Signal Box D to reduce communication delays and enable the stopping of a train in an emergency (e.g., forgotten wheel chock, sparks, etc.).
R3 : - HEXAFRET	Review the driver scheduling process in a broad sense: • in the event of a train cancellation or a change to a work shift, the scheduler must assign the driver to a duty that complies with applicable labor regulations, specifically regarding rest periods; • during ongoing training, revisit practices regarding drivers' self-assessment of their alertness levels and the requirement to immediately notify the scheduler if they do not feel fit for duty;

	• explore the possibility of enabling the scheduler to assess drivers' fitness to perform their duties at the start of their shift.
R4 : - HEXAFRET	Strengthen the process for maintaining the competence of freight train drivers regarding adherence to restrictive operating modes, including "running on sight" when accessing main lines: • step up the presence of traction supervisors and increase periodic "in situ" checks (conducted on the line by traction/operations supervisors) to verify staff competence in handling these operating modes; • reinforce retrospective monitoring by having traction supervisors verify on-board data recordings; • share lessons learned from situations where adherence to a restrictive operating mode enabled the train to stop before reaching a hazard (e.g., a stopped train, wagons immobilized on a siding, or an obstacle).
R5 : - HEXAFRET	Increase the presence of traction supervisors and conduct periodic, on-the-spot "in situ" checks to verify a high level of competence regarding signal observation and immediate, unquestioning compliance with signals.

Destinataires	ZILLISHEIM
R1 : -SNCF Réseau	Define and implement a procedure to ensure that the stabling locations for test runs are of a quality commensurate with the nature of the operation—for example, by conducting a joint preliminary inspection to formally agree on the necessary accompanying measures.
R2 : - EPSF - DB System Technik	As part of the upcoming update to the guide for applicants seeking trial authorizations, analyze the lessons learned from this accident and incorporate the corresponding expectations for applicants into the revised guide.

Destinataires	EUS
R1 : -SNCF Réseau - Mairie EUS	Take advantage of the work on the embankment and the road restoration to rebuild the irrigation water collection channel, in coordination with local residents.
R2 : -Canal Eus et Marquixanes	Ensure adequate maintenance of hydraulic drainage structures (particularly crest ditches) across the entire network during routine monitoring of earthworks. Strengthen the requirements set out in the maintenance standards regarding this matter.
R3 : -Canal Eus et Marquixanes	The ASA should provide training and information to neighboring landowners to ensure proper control and monitoring of water flow during open-field irrigation, particularly when reintroducing water after a period of several years. Implement systems to limit water flow rates when opening irrigation sluices and to ensure better control over the flow. Raise awareness among landowners adjacent to the railway line regarding the risks this open-field irrigation method poses to the railway and their own liability. Raise awareness among stakeholders regarding the maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure.
R4 : -SNCF Réseau -Canal Eus et Marquixanes	Restore effective communication and jointly establish an organizational structure and effective means to detect anomalies and intervene rapidly.
R5 : -SNCF Réseau	• Improve knowledge of the asset base by populating the relevant database with data on civil engineering structures—for instance, during detailed inspections. • Subsequently, determine and quantify criteria relating to the railway track, earthworks, and civil engineering structures. Initiate the necessary analyses based on the distance between the structure's support and the track. These analyses will help the infrastructure manager determine the advisability of implementing measures to: • reduce the risk of a train striking a civil engineering structure following a derailment, • and/or mitigate the consequences of such an impact—for example, by installing guide rails or guide walls.

Destinataires	CRISENOY
R0 : -SNCF Voyageurs	Recommendation pending investigation: • Immediately verify, for all train drivers, compliance with the schedule for safety-critical fitness assessments and occupational health check-ups. • Strengthen monitoring and reporting systems, and remind management of the measures to be taken regarding any discrepancies identified.

	• If you wish to explore—for instance—the possibility of train managers (ASCTs) intervening with support from the TGV Driving Support Unit (or other PACs) to handle future VACMA alarm incidents (while considering whether formal authorization from a competent manager is required), this does not absolve you of the immediate need to: ▪ remind any staff member not certified to drive trains that they are prohibited from operating the controls of a train's traction unit, ▪ remind the various Driving Support Units that they are prohibited from issuing instructions regarding traction unit controls to any personnel not certified for that task. • Promptly issue a memo to on-board staff—without waiting for the revision of standard VO00250—that: ◦ enables precise, error-free identification of the qualified staff members with authority over them for managing any situation involving railway operational safety or personal safety, ◦ addresses safety incidents on high-speed lines (LGV). • Revise standard VO00250. • More generally, remind all staff—regardless of rank—of the absolute obligation to adhere to "life-saving rules" and the chain of command. When doing so, carefully assess how the message is received and clarify any ambiguities. • Ensure that on-board staff work phones provide access to the CCSE (Central Safety/Security Control) just as easily as to the COS (Operational Control Centre). Remind the COS that they must, above all, ensure that security services are fully involved in event management from the very beginning.
R1 : SNCF	Establish an organizational structure that ensures the VMT framework is clearly defined and operates effectively within the SNCF Group. Provide advice and support to the Group's subsidiary entities to ensure a proper understanding of the issues associated with each type of medical examination.
R2 : -SNCF Voyageurs	Mandate that the driver—particularly following a rest period away from their home base—establish contact with a resource manager, a local representative of the railway undertaking, or the train attendant, either upon reporting for duty or before taking their place on board the train.
R3 : -SNCF Voyageurs	Using a representative panel of support agents, assess the level of knowledge of the agents to deal with the security events incumbent on them. Implement continuing training activities for CBORDs to ensure mastery of the skills necessary to manage any security event.
R4 : -SNCF Voyageurs	Improve and ensure the consistency, usability, and up-to-date status of the documents and tools available to CBORDs.
R5 : -SNCF Réseau -SNCF Voyageurs	Establish and assert, for EF SNCF-V representatives at the CNOF, the priority of managing an ongoing safety incident over the potential need for resources for a projected scenario. Share all available information within the CNOF to prevent any decision from negatively interfering with the strategies defined at the incident site by the responding personnel.
R6 : -SNCF Réseau -SNCF Voyageurs	Promote and ensure the conduct of investigations—in accordance with document RFN IG TR4 D3 No. 1—for any safety-related incident or accident occurring on the national railway network. Strengthen joint training for "Operations" and "Infrastructure" managers regarding the role of investigation leads.

The table below shows the actions taken by the recipients by the end of 2025.

Investigation	Recommendations			
	Number	Accepted	Rejected	Pending
Graveson	9	7	2	
Fréjus	11	8		3*
Nuits	6	4	2	
Metz-Sablon	5	1	1	3 (HEXAFRET)
Zillisheim	3	3		
Eus	6			6
Crisenoy	10			10
TOTAL	50	23	5	22

**Note: Fréjus responses from SNCF, EPSF, and CS were submitted in January 2026.*

2.3 Level crossings

Published Investigation

Event Date	Accident Nature et Location	Fatalities
24/01/2023	TER train vs. school coach collision at LC No. 42 in Cevins (73)	0

CEVINS : A TER train carrying ~50 passengers struck an empty school coach stranded on Level Crossing No. 42. The coach split in two; its driver was critically injured, and three train passengers sustained injuries from debris impact.



Issued Recommendations

Issued Recommendations (5 Issued / All 5 Accepted)

	Recommendations
R1 : - DSR - DGITM	Remind departmental prefects that school transport organizing authorities and professional road coach transport organizations must be invited to meetings of the departmental level-crossing safety commissions.
R2 : - Transdev Savoie	When recruiting a non-French-speaking driver, ensure they strengthen their knowledge of driving specifics in France—particularly safety rules regarding level crossings, tunnels, stopping on the roadway, etc. Ensure that drivers performing school transport duties are able to communicate in French, specifically to carry out emergency vehicle evacuations or to reiterate safety instructions on board the coach.
R3 : - Conseil régional Auvergne- Rhône-Alpes	Strengthen oversight of transport companies contracted to provide school transport services to verify that drivers have been trained on the specific risks associated with crossing level crossings and are capable of conveying information and evacuation instructions in French.
R4 : - Transdev Savoie	Drawing lessons from this accident—and taking into account the lingering uncertainties regarding its causes—drivers must be made aware of the absolute necessity of formally reporting any perceived malfunctions to their supervisors and to those responsible for equipment maintenance, particularly when such potential malfunctions involve safety-critical systems (propulsion, braking, evacuation, etc.) on the vehicles they operate.
R5 : - SNCF Réseau	• Include in the technical standards the case of railway tunnels located near a level crossing as a situation where safety rails may be installed to mitigate the consequences of a derailment; • Extend the scope of application to other types of very massive natural or artificial obstacles that may be located near a level crossing.

The table below shows the follow-up actions taken by the recipients.

Investigation	Recommendations			
	Number	Accepted	Rejected	Pending
Cevins	5	5	0	0
TOTAL	5	5	0	0

2.4 Inland Waterways

Published Investigations

Two investigations concerning inland waterway transport were published in 2025; the nature, dates, and locations of these accidents are specified in the table below.

Event Date	Accident Nature et Location	Fatalities
17/01/2023	Freight barge CELERITAS bridge collision in Berneuil-sur-Aisne (60)	0
02/09/2023	Collision between two passenger dinner-cruise ships in Paris (15th)	0

BERNEUIL-SUR-AISNE :

The *CELERITAS*—a Dutch-flagged, self-propelled Freycinet barge carrying 293 tonnes of fertilizer—was traveling upstream on the canalized Aisne River on the afternoon of Tuesday, January 17, 2023, en route from Ghent, Belgium, to Vailly-sur-Aisne. At the Berneuil-sur-Aisne bridge, the skipper chose the channel reserved for downstream traffic, deeming the other channel too dangerous given the prevailing hydraulic conditions. As the vessel was completing its passage under the bridge, its port-side stern struck the submerged reinforcement of the structure's central pier. The accident appears to have been directly caused by a loss of control over the vessel as it exited the bridge channel and/or an improperly adjusted trajectory during the final section of the curve associated with the passage.



PARIS: On Saturday, September 2, 2023, at approximately 10:50 p.m., the *Grand Pavois* and *L'Ivoire*—two vessels operating dinner cruises on the Seine in Paris, carrying 136 and 91 passengers respectively—collided at the downstream tip of the Île aux Cygnes. Following the impact, the vessels proceeded to moor at the Port de Grenelle. Sixteen people, including passengers and crew members, sustained minor injuries. The direct cause of the accident was the imprudent initiation of a turning maneuver, combined with the delayed nature of the corrective actions taken.



Published Recommendations

For these investigations, the BEA-TT issued six recommendations:

	BERNEUIL-SUR-AISNE
R1 : - VNF	Modify the crossing arrangements for the Berneuil-sur-Aisne bridge to allow the left-bank channel to be used for navigation in both directions—rather than solely by downstream-bound vessels—mark this channel with A10 signs, and, without waiting for a revision of the RPP, mark the edges of the submerged reinforcement at the bridge pier using signage.
	PARIS
R1 : - Société Bleu Seine	In preparation for the upcoming renewal of *L'IVOIRE*'s navigation certificate, have the modifications made to the steering system validated by the inspection body and ensure that the surveyor includes a description of this matter in their inspection report.
R2 : - Préfecture de la région Île-de-France - VNF - DRIEAT	Regulate all maneuvers downstream of the Île aux Cygnes that do not constitute a standard U-turn—specifically, a 180-degree turn to port when approaching from upstream—ensuring they are performed sufficiently far from the tip of the island and that the vessels involved yield the right-of-way to others before resuming their course; or, alternatively, simply prohibit such maneuvers entirely if the competent authority deems this preferable.
R3 : - Préfecture de la région Île-de-France - VNF - DRIEAT	In line with the recommendations set out in the 2016 CGEDD/IGA report and in conjunction with the rollout of the accident monitoring observatory, plans should be made to—on the one hand—extend the mandatory AIS equipment requirement to all vessels navigating through Paris and—on the other—to mandate (with the exception of small vessels) the installation of an electronic navigational chart display system, such as ECDIS in information mode, to facilitate and thereby enhance the ability of operators to view AIS-derived data. An initial step could involve the RPP recommending the system in question.
R4 : - CCP	Develop a code of best practices for VHF communications and announcements on the Seine as it flows through Paris, in order to harmonize and improve the practices followed by passenger boat operators.
R5 : - Préfecture de la région Île-de-France - VNF - DRIEAT	Implement—subject to a cost assessment—a centralized recording system for VHF communications made by boat operators while navigating through Paris, in order to facilitate an understanding of the mechanisms behind accidents and encourage improved practices, unless analysis shows that on-board recording constitutes a realistic and effective alternative.

The table below shows the follow-up actions taken by the recipients Le tableau ci-dessous indique les suites données par les destinataires.

Investigation	Recommendations			
	Number	Accepted	Rejected	Pending
Berneuil-sur-Aisne	1	1	0	0
Paris (15è)	5	5	0	0
TOTAL	6	6	0	0

2.5 Guided Transport

No survey on guided transport systems was published in 2025.

2.6 Sky Lifts

An incident involving ski lifts was published in 2025. The nature, date, and location of this accident are specified in the table below:

Event Date	Accident Nature et Location	Fatalities
19/11/2024	Collision between the two Cime Caron cable car cabins at their respective stations in Val Thorens (Savoie).	0

VAL THORENS: The first morning run of the Cime Caron cable car carried 16 tradespeople to the summit that day. While the lift was operating in manual mode—bypassing safety systems—at a speed of 8 m/s, the operator stepped away from the control console. Without slowing down, both cabins crashed into their respective stations. Six people were injured, two of them seriously.



Published Recommendations

Five recommendations were issued in this report:

	VAL THORENS
R1 : - SETAM	Continue and complete the internal process of reflection and formalization regarding the distribution of tasks within the company, workload planning, and risk-taking.
R2 : - STRMTG	In conjunction with the upcoming revision of the RM1 and RM5 technical guides, and in coordination with the industry, clarify the concepts of operation (operational runs and non-operational runs) as well as the distinctions between passengers, users, and customers.
R3 : - SETAM	Undertake in-depth, long-term work on the company's safety culture, involving all lift personnel and management. Concurrently, enhance the Safety Management System (SMS) provisions by addressing, at a minimum, the following areas: the conduct of risk assessments; the position and role of the safety manager within the organization, including their independence from operations and maintenance; the value of regularly introducing a fresh perspective on activities; the traceability of manual operation and system overrides; and the monitoring and analysis of these practices. Review the handling of non-operational running modes within the operating regulations for the resort's three reversible aerial tramways.
R4 : - DSF	Foster the promotion of a safety culture among operators and implement cross-checks of practices—including exceptional ones—in partnership with the industry and, where appropriate, with the assistance of subject-matter experts.
R5 : - STRMTG	In partnership with the industry, and for operating modes involving passenger transport (automatic operation, manual operation, and fire-safety operation—specifically second-level), conduct a national review of the "dead-man" system, focusing in particular on whether or not it should be mandatory in the future, its safety level, and its functional characteristics.

The table below shows the actions taken by the recipients by the end of 2025.

Investigation	Recommendations			
	Number	Accepted	Rejected	Pending
Val Thorens	5	5		0
TOTAL	5	5		0

3 Study Published in 2025

Study on road accidents involving vehicle submersion in a watercourse or body of water – Part 2: Accident circumstances



The BEA-TT conducted a study on road accidents involving a vehicle plunging into a watercourse or body of water, aiming to improve understanding of the associated issues and circumstances and to formulate recommendations to reduce their frequency or severity. A report on the issues involved was published in 2022.

The second part, which focuses on the circumstances of these accidents, continues the analysis by describing in detail what happens to a vehicle that has entered the water and the conditions under which occupants can escape; this is based on a review of international literature followed by an analysis of 65 accident reports from incidents in France.

The BEA-TT issued 9 recommendations:

	STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS
R1 : - Cerema	As part of the revision of the "Treatment of roadside obstacles..." guide, the risk index calculation method should be supplemented to account for watercourses and bodies of water that pose a drowning risk to the occupants of a passenger vehicle. The method should characterize not only sites where the water depth would lead to the vehicle becoming fully submerged, but also those where the area between the roadway and the water features elements (such as obstacles or a significant drop-off) likely to cause the vehicle to roll over and end up upside down in water of intermediate depth.
R2 : - ADF - AMF	Issue the following recommendation to their members: when designing a new structure or carrying out a major refurbishment of an existing structure crossing a watercourse or body of water, systematically provide for the installation of a road restraint system on the structure and its approaches.
R3 : - ACEA	Issue the following recommendation to members: future passenger vehicle models should be equipped with a control allowing the trunk lid or tailgate to be opened from the driver's seat, thereby providing occupants with an additional means of escaping the vehicle's interior should it plunge into water.
R4 : - ACEA	Circulate the following recommendation to members: systematically equip the driver's area of future passenger vehicle models with a window-breaking tool.
R5 : - DGEC	Promote the development of technical specifications (subsequently to be incorporated into a standard or technical regulation at the national or international level) for verifying the reliability of glass-breaking tools intended for use in new or existing passenger vehicles.
R6 : - DSR	Incorporate a module into the theoretical driver training covering the appropriate actions to take in the event of vehicle submersion.
R7 : - DSR	Launch a public awareness campaign regarding the appropriate actions to take if a vehicle becomes submerged, and the benefits of keeping a window-breaking and seatbelt-cutting tool inside the vehicle.
R8 : - FFA	Circulate the following recommendation to members: raise awareness among auto insurance policyholders regarding the appropriate course of action in the event of vehicle submersion, and the benefits of keeping a window-breaking and seatbelt-cutting tool inside the vehicle.
R9 : - ACEA	Circulate the following recommendation to members: include information in passenger vehicle owner's manuals regarding the appropriate course of action in the event of vehicle submersion, as well as a warning that side windows cannot be broken if they are made of laminated glass.

The table below shows the follow-up actions taken by the recipients as of the end of 2025.

**DGEC response transmitted in April 2026*

Study	Recommendations			
	Number	Accepted	Rejected	Pending
	9	1	0	8 (DGEC*, DSR, DF, AMF, ACEA)

4 Progress notes

For serious railway accidents, when the time required to complete the investigation exceeds one year, the BEA-TT is required to publish an interim report to inform stakeholders and the public of the investigation's progress and to announce initial preventive recommendations to the relevant entities. The BEA-TT has decided to extend this practice to all modes of land transport.

In 2025, nine progress reports were published, concerning:

Ambulance running off the road in Pamproux (79)

Fire involving an electric tourist train in Riquewihr (68)

Electric vehicle running off the road followed by a fire in Celles-sur-Belle (79)

Bus running off the road in Lévens (06)

Freight train derailment in Oulchy-Breny (02)

Train derailment in Jorquenay (52)

Passenger falling onto the tracks on RER line B in Bourg-la-Reine (92)

Freight train derailment in Carcassonne (11)

Person struck by a train at the Bel-Air station on Paris Metro line 6 (75)

These notes remain on the BEA-TT website, under the "ongoing investigations" section, until the final reports are published.



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MONITORING OF ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED
BY THE STAKEHOLDERS IN THE RAIL SYSTEM
FOLLOWING THE RECOMMENDATIONS
FORMULATED BY THE BEA-TT

Balance sheet as of 31/12/2025

This document presents the follow-up to 31/12/2025 of the actions implemented following the recommendations issued by the BEA-TT to the stakeholders in the railway sector.

Reports published in 2006

Key code: Closed Tracking = C; Open Tracking = O

Date of report	Title of the investigation	No.	Wording of the BEA-TT recommendation	Entity	Status of actions pursued by the EPSF at the end of 2025	Code
12/2006	Collision of a TER and a heavy goods vehicle on a passage to level at Saint-Laurent-Blangy (62) the 09/06/2005	R1	Continue to study the solutions (on-site elevation change or new route) to eliminate this level crossing, in order to reach a decision and implementation as soon as possible.	SNCF Network General Council 62	The technical solution for installing obstacle detection is a working avenue. Several steps are involved. courses concerning, in particular, the taking of an exam reliability of the obstacle detection function taking into account the particular situation of this PN and the study of the equipment in electric torches. The monitoring of actions implemented by SNCF Réseau anticipates the commissioning of the obstacle detection solution no later than June 2026. Despite requests from the General Council 62 by the DGITM in February 2023 and in March 2024, no information No further information on the progress of the implementation of this action could be obtained. Open Tracking	O

Reports published in 2010

Legend code: Closed tracking = **C**; Open tracking = **O**.

Date of report	Title of the investigation	No.	Wording of the BEA-TT recommendation	Entity	Status of actions pursued by the EPSF at the end of 2025	Code
09/2010	Collision between a coach and a TER at level crossing no. 4 Nevers (58) the 03/02/2009	R1	Evaluate and study the traffic light control system at level crossing no. 4 (and level crossing no. 5) to identify simple optimization measures (traffic light cycle duration, potential coordination of upstream and downstream lights, upstream light activation delay after detection, detection loop effectiveness, etc.) in order to reduce the risk of a vehicle stopped at the rear of the queue downstream of the crossing encroaching on the railway track. level.	Municipality of Nevers	Despite requests from the Municipality of Nevers by the DGITM in February 2023 and in March 2024, no information updates on the progress of the implementation of this action could not be obtained. No information was received by the EPSF in 2025. in accordance with the 2024 monitoring document, the action is The alleged investigation was carried out and the follow-up is now closed. Follow-up Closed	C

Reports published in 2015

Legend code: Closed tracking = **C**; Open tracking = **O**.

Date of report	Title of the investigation	No.	Wording of the BEA-TT recommendation	Entity	Status of actions pursued by the EPSF at the end of 2025	Code
05/2015	Collision at the following a drift in Modane (73) the 24/01/2013	R1	Tighten and clarify the maintenance rule aimed at searching for and eliminate, on the fleet of wagons for which you are the entity in charge of the maintenance, the coupling tensioners not bearing the markings of conformity to European standards or recognized national standards.	ERMEWA	ERMEWA responded with a commitment to take action on the checks of the coupling tensioners on its fleet. At the end of 2021, 46% of the wagon fleet was affected by this The recommendation had been addressed. Since June 2021, there has been no information on the progress of the actions implemented have not been transmitted to the EPSF, a The final relaunch will take place in 2026 before the closing of the followed up as needed. Open Tracking	O
		R3	As soon as the modification referred to in recommendation R2 is implemented to the point, to have it applied during the revisions of the distributors concerned wagons for which you are the entity in charge of maintenance.	SNCF Voyageurs Directorate of material	Faiveley planned to supply SNCF with [unclear] in September 2020 prototypes of membranes described as "-50°C". One type is currently being used in revisions. The other The type of membranes planned, after receipt and inspection, will be applied from June 2021. Since June 2021, there has been no information on the progress of the actions implemented have not been transmitted to the EPSF, a The final relaunch will take place in 2026 before the closing of the followed up as needed. Open Tracking	O

Reports published in 2016

Legend code: Closed tracking = **C**; Open tracking = **O**.

Date of report	Title of the investigation	No.	Wording of the BEA-TT recommendation	Entity	Status of actions pursued by the EPSF at the end of 2025	Code
11/2016	Drift of a TER after a shock with bovines Serqueux (76) the 20/10/2015	R2	Positioning of the obstacle avoider and protection of sensitive organs under the cash register By involving the rail sector and after determining the form best suited to the European context: ÿ Explain how to calculate and use the rolling stock construction template in order to optimize the positioning of the obstacle avoider with respect to the risk of overlapping an obstacle located on the way ; ÿ formulate the necessary instructions for the identification of sensitive components under the chassis, their protection and their positioning at a height relative to the obstacle deflector.	EPSF	The standard concerning passive safety (EN 15227) was published in 2020 with a new formulation responding to the recommendation from the BEA-TT. Regarding rolling stock dimensions, the Loc&Pas TSI guide could be usefully amended. In this regard, in May 2023, the EPSF proposed a comment in the relevant application guide. This proposal was not accepted by the European Railway Agency and will require a more detailed amendment request. No further information in 2025. Open Tracking	O

Reports published in 2019

Legend code: Closed tracking = C; Open tracking = O.

Date of report	Title of the investigation	No.	Wording of the BEA-TT recommendation	Entity	Status of actions pursued by the EPSF at the end of 2025	Code
04/2019	Pedestrian hit by train on a passage floored on the 22nd February 2018 Écommoy station (72)	R1	To study the technical conditions under which the traffic lights at public level crossings can be equipped with means of recording proof of their operation. To define a modernization plan enabling them to be equipped with this recording system within a specified timeframe.	SNCF Network	SNCF Réseau is committed to studying the technical conditions under which the traffic lights on the TVP (Transports à Passeurs à Particuliers - Passenger Transport Networks) can be equipped with means of recording proof of their operation. The target date is set for the end of September 2021. The deployment plan for a technical solution remains without a target date and depends on the completion of the previous action. The technical studies were completed in 2022. To meet the need for a "local TVP recorder," a technical solution was selected. In 2023, SNCF Réseau deployed this technical solution at eight planned construction sites, without, however, defining a deployment plan for all sites equipped with TVP and pictograms. As of 2025, the trial is still ongoing, and the deployment plan remains pending. Open tracking.	O
05/2019	Collision between a TER and a coach of school transport in Millas (66) the 14/12/2017	R1	Establish, in coordination with SNCF Réseau and the safety delegation road (DSR), a technical standard setting performance and a conformity assessment procedure for equipment at crossings level, as provided for by the road regulations relating to the qualification of road equipment, as well as rules for implementation service and location depending on their characteristics and the environmental constraints.	General Management Infrastructure, Transport and of the Sea - DGITM	The DGITM has committed to setting up a working group involving in particular SNCF Réseau and the delegation to the road safety (DSR), which aims to take stock of the three families of equipment (flashing red lights, barriers and (ringing). Numerous bilateral exchanges between the DGITM and the relevant departments followed up on the first meeting of this working group. The work began in 2021 and has the objective is to identify existing reference frameworks, define the benchmarks to be implemented, define performance thresholds desired, etc. The work will then allow for the development of a decree including performance thresholds and certifications compliance for these three equipment categories,	O

					in accordance with Articles R. 119-4 and R. 119-7 of the code road infrastructure. A precise overview of current practices and regulations implementations were carried out on these three families equipment, including at the European level for the barriers. Details on the number of lights and their location has been incorporated into the regulations. Each of these equipment categories is still the subject of of future actions in relation to the stakeholders involved regarding the possibility of defining new reference frameworks. Open tracking.	
12/2019	Study Accidents mortals by intrusion on the domain railway Analysis of accidents 2015 and 2016 and prevention policies	R2	Deploy a tool for understanding the network's fence infrastructure, describing the location and condition of the devices, for the purpose of monitoring the risk of collisions on the line by local managers.	SNCF Network	SNCF Réseau continues the deployment and quality improvement of the GAIA tool, designed to ensure the inventory of all its heritage and, eventually, to store data relating to fences. In 2025, SNCF Réseau informed the EPSF about the progress actions decided upon following the audit conducted on the theme of securing the premises. These actions involved the drafting and dissemination of a methodology for identifying risk zones as well as the implementation of a performance evaluation of these same zones. In 2026, the improvement of data entry in GAIA of The fencing installed during investment operations must lead to the evolution of the reference framework and its deployment, while the treatment of risk areas according to the defined methodology is expected by the end of 2030. Open tracking.	O

12/2019	Study Accidents mortals by intrusion on the domain railway Analysis of accidents 2015 and 2016 and policies prevention	R3	To study the feasibility of establishing a mandatory regulatory requirement to the construction of a physical barrier between the railway rights-of-way and the adjacent land, in and near areas designated as urban in the sense of the Town Planning Code.	General Management Infrastructure, Transport and of the Sea - DGITM	As part of the feedback meetings organized specifically for infrastructure managers, a an ad hoc working group will identify the alternatives or the complementary devices to fences designed to prevent intrusions. The work of this group will be recorded in a report that will also include an evaluation component of their effectiveness from a safety perspective with regard to investments to be undertaken. Following this work, the DGITM will study the possibility of setting an order requirement regulatory. The target date, initially set for 31/12/2021, could not be The working group will be engaged in the fourth quarter of 2024. Its objectives will be to establish an inventory of railway land. equipped with fences, but also, if possible, to assess their effectiveness. In parallel, a benchmark and a cost analysis will allow us to continue the search for alternatives or complementary fencing devices, compatible with objectives of the double compensation rule. No further information available in 2025 Open Tracking	O
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Reports published in 2021

Legend code: Closed tracking = C; Open tracking = O.

Date of report	Title of the investigation	No.	Wording of the BEA-TT recommendation	Entity	Status of actions pursued by the EPSF at the end of 2025	Code
05/2021	Stopping a axle on train freight between Romilly-sur-Seine and Troyes (10)	R4	Re-examine the procedures for the type approval tests of "LL" soles by leveraging lessons learned from deterioration caused by excavation of the wheel bearing table, during brake seizure incidents, on the wagons equipped with these soles.	European Union Agency for railways (ERA)	The Agency responded with a two-step approach. First, the UIC should reconsider the brake application tests. defined in its UIC sheet, taking into account the conclusions of the technical investigation report. When the UIC sheet is updated, then it could be considered by the appropriate working group in charge of revising the TSIs in order to amend the technical document to which Regulation 321/2013 (TSI Wagon) refers. In 2024 the normal JNS procedure "Consequences of unintended brake applications with LL blocks" will be concluded with the dissemination of recommendations. Follow-up closed in 2024	C
				Office of standardization railway (BNF)	No response to this recommendation has been provided by the BNF to BEA-TT at this stage. In April 2023, the EPSF reminded the BNF of the existence of this recommendation. Currently, the standard NF EN 16452 (Railway Applications – Braking – Brake Pads) is in the design stage with no specific publication date. No further information is available in 2025. Open tracking.	O

				Union international railways (UIC)	The UIC responded to the recommendation by committing to a working approach with its members in order to build a funding for a project to review the terms and conditions type approval tests for "LL" soles. No further information in 2025. Open tracking.	O
07/2021	Exceeding speed limit by a TGV on the BPL line to La Miesse (72) the 22/12/2019 Exceeding speed limit by a TGV on the BPL line to La Miesse (72) the 22/12/2019	R1	Revisit the "ETCS signalling" production processes to ensure that a verification error is not propagated further into the production process.	HITACHI RAIL STS	The parameter verification and validation process has been re-analyzed taking into account the precursors of each activity and revised to prevent any error from being propagated further in the process. The "Parameterization Verification Plan" documentation has been updated on the BPL and SEA projects and is being carried out on the LGVEE project as part of the N1/N2 transitions, where a transmission of documents from the client was expected for December 2021. The target date for this final action will allow us to close the... The follow-up is scheduled for the first quarter of 2022. No progress information has been available since October 2021. The actions implemented have not been transmitted to the EPSF. a final relaunch will be carried out in 2026 before the closing of the Follow-up as needed. Open follow-up.	O

		R2	To study the implementation of formal method algorithms in the framework for proving the operational safety of systems signage.	HITACHI RAIL STS	This recommendation will be studied within the framework of the upcoming HITACHI RAIL STS projects. The ARGOS projects already include the implementation of activities formal proof and studies will be conducted in this context. This action remains open pending evidence on studies on the implementation of formal methods. No progress information has been available since October 2021. The actions implemented have not been transmitted to the EPSF. a final relaunch will be carried out in 2026 before the closing of the Follow-up as needed. Open follow-up.	O
07/2021	Exceeding speed limit by a TGV on the BPL line to La Miesse (72)	R3	Formalize a process for exploiting precursors during verification and validation operations in order to identify and address root causes.	HITACHI RAIL STS	HITACHI RAIL STS's response is identical to that provided for recommendation R1. The target date is set for the first quarter of 2022. No progress information has been available since October 2021. The actions implemented have not been transmitted to the EPSF. a final relaunch will be carried out in 2026 before the closing of the Follow-up as needed. Open follow-up.	O
		R4	Revisiting the evaluation methodology regarding the "validation of the system" according to CENELEC 50126 and subsequent standards in order to guarantee the validity of the assessment.	CERTIFY	CERTIFER has drafted an internal document called RFU, applicable (unless otherwise justified) and relating to "the assessment of the parameterization process." Its objective is to specify and clarify regulatory or normative requirements. This document will be referenced by the RF0015 repository "For Product security integrity level certification or systems according to CENELEC standards EN50126, EN50128, EN50129. The application of this RF0015 standard is controlled by the COFRAC during these periodic CERTIFER audits.	O

					No progress information has been available since October 2021. The actions implemented have not been transmitted to the EPSF. a final relaunch will be carried out in 2026 before the closing of the Follow-up as needed. Open follow-up.	
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Reports published in 2022

Legend code: Closed tracking = **C**; Open tracking = **O**.

01/2022	Derailment of a TGV on the line at large Speed East European on the 5th March 2020 Ingenheim (Bas-Rhine)	R1	Strengthen the requirements of the technical reference document for the implementation of LGV concerning the framework for the consistency of tests leading the choice of geomechanical parameters for verifying the stability of large embankments of excavation.	SNCF NETWORK	SNCF Réseau is committed to making the necessary changes, providing further details. necessary for the existing parties concerned, the technical reference document requirements dealing with consistency tests to be carried out to define the choice of parameters geomechanical methods for verifying the stability of large slopes of excavation for the construction of High Speed Rail Lines. In 2025, the high-speed rail design framework will be adopted. IN3278, initially scheduled for 31/12/2023, has been postponed to 31/12/2025. Open tracking.	O
07/2022	Clash of officers maintenance infrastructure by a TER train to Schiltigheim (67) March 18, 2020	R1	Develop specific training programs and exercises on safety communications between maintenance personnel and signal boxes. Develop monitoring of the quality of these exchanges using appropriate means (e.g., recordings where available).	SNCF NETWORK	SNCF Réseau has committed to 4 actions: - incorporate a safety communication component into the "new S9" training programmed during 2023 for all maintenance agents and signal box agents. - to be created during the year 2024, within the framework of the Continuing education, specific exercises on inter-professional safety communication will be provided for maintenance technicians and signal box operators. Starting in January 2025, joint exercises on safety - communications will be included in the initial training of maintenance and signal box operators. The methodology for monitoring... will be studied and described. - communications in 2023. In 2023, evidence of the incorporation of a communications component safety measures in the "new S9" training had been	C

					transmitted to the EPSF. In 2024 the monitoring methodology was defined. The other actions have been implemented and the elements of evidence transmitted. Follow-up Closed	
07/2022	Clash of officers maintenance infrastructure by a TER train to Schiltigheim (67) March 18, 2020	R2	Implementing security monitoring to verify adequacy between the on-site foot inspections carried out and the construction site insurance actually taken where prescribed, to anticipate any difficulty that could compromise safety	SNCF NETWORK	SNCF Réseau is committed to studying the provision information relating to the actual execution of operations work within the framework of the development of digital tools related to work with the Maintenance and Works entities. The study undertaken was inconclusive. Meanwhile, SNCF The network has included the follow-up to this recommendation in the NOT with the implementation by sampling of measurements of Recommended protection. Additional information regarding this monitoring was carried out. Follow-up closed.	C
		R3	Ensure the implementation of a modern system less susceptible to human error regarding the safety of personnel working on the tracks during the regeneration of traffic management systems. To inventory the areas of heavy traffic covered by the modern devices already implemented in order to quantify this modernization	SNCF NETWORK	SNCF Réseau has committed to three actions: defining • the concept of a "dense zone" for the area staff safety. • work, in parallel, on the characterization criteria of a modern system concerning the safety of personnel working on the tracks in order to make the inventory. • to link modern systems and areas meeting the definition of a "dense area" in order to inventory those already covered by said modern systems but also those planned in regeneration. The topic has been integrated into the mission Our Lives, Our Priority including the component "Reducing the risk of train collisions at the source" which includes two specific actions on the one hand	O

					the digitalization of exchanges between AC and Manager of work plan and, on the other hand, on the deployment of the MGPT work protection management module and assurance of its use for requests at J-1. Open tracking.	
11/2022	Derailment of a freight train, August 26, 2021 in Saint-Hilaire-at the temple (51)	R3	Finalize the reinforcement of analyses and monitoring methods for the actual condition of rails within the reference frameworks to address risks related to the age of older rails, particularly vertical cracking defects. Include provisions in the overall maintenance organization to ensure that these new measures are reliably and auditably implemented.	SNCF NETWORK	SNCF Réseau is committed to developing a rail rating tool to allow for an assessment of their criticality. The regulations concerning rail monitoring will evolve : • The rail visual inspection cycle has been strengthened, reduced from every 3 years to every 1 year on lines 7 to 9 AV at speeds below 140 km/h. All main lines of the network are now subject to visual inspections. annual. • The speed of rail inspection by heavy ultrasonic rail inspection equipment (ELUS) has already been adapted to the actual condition of the rail infrastructure. • The US inspection cycles for lines 7 to 9AV will be adapted to the state of disrepair of the rail. The publication of the MT02070 document, initially expected at the end of 2025, has been postponed to the end of 2026. Open tracking.	O
11/2022	Derailment of a freight train, August 26, 2021 in Saint-Hilaire-at the temple (51)	R6	Evaluate the relevance of further studying the scenario of a collision on a clear obstacle that a structure can present, within the framework of the program of activities of the experts associated with the revision of this sheet UIC. Depending on the result of this evaluation, integrate into the revision work in progress or at a later revision, the objective is to improve sheet 777-2	UIC	The UIC has committed to consulting its members in order to decide and finance the implementation of the evaluation recommended by the BEA-TT. No information or target date is available at this stage. Open tracking.	O

Reports published in 2023

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02/2023	Derailment of a freight train September 17, 2020 Corbonod (01)	R1	Establish a state-of-the-art review of axle cap assembly operations in the workshop, with a view to improving the operating procedure, control and the traceability, and to guarantee a durable preload on the cap screws	AFWP UIP	As of 31/12/2025, the responses of the IPU and AFWP to the recommendations made by the BEA-TT were not Still available. Open tracking.	O
02/2023	Derailment of a freight train September 17, 2020 Corbonod (01)	R3	Surveying AFWP members on their feedback on SNCF-type brake plates. If risks are confirmed and after examination of the information provided by SNCF Voyageurs, to decide on a Request for a correction to the VPI reference document concerning this brake plate	AFWP	As of 31/12/2025, the AFWP's response to the recommendation the formula proposed by the BEA-TT had not yet been formulated. However, as part of the follow-up to the recommendation R2, the information received by the EPSF showed that a AFWP's solicitation of its members has location. Monitoring remains ongoing pending further information. precision and should be closed at the next meeting. Follow-up. Open follow-up.	O
03/2023	Collision between a TER and a light vehicle, January 15, 2021, on PN n° 44 at Péronnas (01)	R1	Regulate and indicate in warning and position the priority rules between road users crossing level crossing no. 44. Study, in association with SNCF Réseau: 1) the increase in the width of the road at level crossing no. 44; 2) the increase in the radii of the last road curves approaching this level crossing, in order to decrease the angle of crossing the road to improve visibility on the railway line.	City of Péronnas	The city of Péronnas is committed to studying safety improvements with relevant services and partners: SNCF Réseau, the DDT (Departmental Directorate of Territories), and the Ain Departmental Council. Implementation of all measures is planned for no later than September 30, 2023. Despite the request from the Ain Departmental Council by the DGITM in March 2024, no precise information on the completion of the works has not been achieved. Through monitoring the implementation of actions in response to recommendation R3, the EPSF received information on the adjustments which consisted of changing the speed of speed reduction from 80 to 30 km/h. No further information in 2025. Monitoring open in Awaiting confirmation. Tracking open.	O

03/2023	Collision between a TER and a light vehicle, the January 15, 2021 on PN n° 44 at Péronnas (01)	R4	Raising awareness among train drivers of the priority that must be given, when conditions permit, to initiating the ground-to-train radio and more generally to carrying out the actions that require them to leave the track and the catenary of the eyes, outside of geographical areas exhibiting level crossings, or any other known risk factor. During the design or refurbishment of equipment, take into account the objective of reducing the duration of actions during which the driver is no longer able to observe the track and the catenary.	All EF to date publication of report, or 51 EF SNCF Network	As of 31/12/2024, SNCF Réseau and 14 railway companies have responded to the BEA-TT by specifying awareness-raising actions intended for driving agents. The EPSF added a specific point on the actions currently being taken on the EF side to the framework of the annual safety report. Open tracking.	O
08/2023	Collision between a train of goods and a set truck driver, June 16 2021 on the PN No. 17 in Rumigny (08)	R3	Make available data on the longitudinal profiles of road infrastructure near and at level crossings, so that road transport operators of passengers and goods can more easily assess the level crossing capabilities of their vehicles. In each department, provide this data annually to the departmental level crossing safety commission, in addition to the list of level crossings with difficult crossings. updated.	All GI/GIC to date of publication of the report, i.e. 15 GI/GIC	As of 31/12/2024, three infrastructure managers responded at the BEA-TT. The EPSF added a specific point on the actions currently being taken on the EF side to the framework of the annual safety report. Open tracking.	O
08/2023	Collision between a train of goods and a set truck driver, June 16 2021 on the PN No. 17 in Rumigny (08)	R4	It is crucial to promote internationally the importance of a shared definition of minimum performance requirements for securing certain portable equipment, such as short-circuiting bars and fire extinguishers, found inside trains and, in some cases, inside driver's cabs. Pending harmonized international regulations, a national exchange should be organized between railway equipment manufacturers and railway companies to foster best practices and short-term technological solutions.	EPSF	The EPSF informed railway equipment manufacturers and railway undertakings of the contents of the investigation report and the resulting recommendations at a feedback meeting in 2024. The EPSF (French National Health Insurance Fund) brings this issue to the forefront of attention at every opportunity. favorable within the framework of the consultation work on the standards that may be relevant to this subject. In 2025, this was the case for the EN 14033-1 standard concerning machinery works. Open tracking.	O

12/2023	Fall of a dump truck on the tracks railways since a road bridge, the June 2, 2022 Saint-Chamond (42)	R1	Equip the structure on Boulevard de Fonsala in Saint-Chamond with a modifications aimed at reducing the risk of a vehicle falling onto the routes: for example, a restraint system on either side of the structure, over 50m if possible.	Saint-Étienne Metropolis	In a letter responding to the BEA-TT report of December 2025, the Saint-Étienne metropolitan area confirmed the implementation of the physical protection requested by the recommendation. Follow-up Closed	C
12/2023	Fall of a dump truck on the tracks railways since a road bridge, the June 2, 2022 Saint-Chamond (42)	R2	Entrusting Cerema with the task of working, with road and rail management partners, on a method for calculating ID (danger index) specific to existing road bridges (all project owners), as a continuation of the initial guidelines proposed by the BEA-TT in this report.	DGITM	In its response of March 2024, the DGITM informs the BEATT that the hazard index of the 2021 CEREMA guide has been calibrated for road infrastructure of the national road network on in which the speed is greater than or equal to 70 km/h. One evolution of the method should be able to be carried out by the CEREMA within three years, under an agreement with the DGITM. Open Tracking	O
12/2023	Fall of a dump truck on the tracks railways since a road bridge, the June 2, 2022 Saint-Chamond (42)	R3	For the purpose of protecting the national rail network, and using the method which will be proposed by Cerema, to obtain for each department a list of works ranked according to the risk of vehicle falling onto railway lines. On the most at-risk structures (on the order of one (an average of two weeks per department), to act in favor of the achievement from a safety perspective, involving road and rail stakeholders to define measures aimed at limiting the risk.	DGITM	In its response of March 2024, the DGITM informs the BEATT that : For the non-concessionary national road network, the upgrade restraint systems for crossing structures railway lines have been the subject of specific studies by several DIRs: this approach will be complemented on a larger scale national. Upgrading the most critical systems	O

12/2023	Fall of a dump truck on the tracks railways since a road bridge, the June 2, 2022 Saint-Chamond (42)	R4	In this approach, and in line with what some directions interdepartmental road authorities (DIR) have already undertaken, are continuing and to generalize to the entire non-concessionary national road network the implementation of progressive level of the retention systems of the structures crossing the tracks of the national rail network.	DGITM	to be carried out gradually depending on the budget financial resources available. For the national concessionary road network, this upgrade is integrated during contractual operations investment (new) facilities, expansions...) or heavy maintenance on a specific crossing in compliance with the guide of CEREMA of 2021. For the non-concessionary national road network, the DGITM has not authority over the project owners of local authorities for prescribe the securing of their structures. If this falls within However, in its action strategy, CEREMA could establish a prioritized list of works based on the risk of vehicles falling onto the railway tracks at level departmental to guide the actions of local authorities. Open Tracking	O
12/2023	Fall of a dump truck on the tracks railways since a road bridge, the June 2, 2022 Saint-Chamond (42)	R5	To promote the existence, at the departmental level, of a partnership-based mechanism for managing the recommended actions. Without prejudice to organizational responsibilities, the BEA-TT suggests that this could involve expanding the powers of the departmental level crossing commissions.	DGITM	In its response of March 2024, the DGITM informs the BEATT that the departmental commissions do not appear as the most suitable device. On the other hand, the DGITM will encourage SNCF Réseau to have enhanced exchanges with the managers of overpasses. Open Tracking	O

Reports published in 2024

Legend code: Closed tracking = C; Open tracking = O.

Date of report	Title of the investigation	BEA-TT Recommendation No.	BEA-TT Recommendation Title	Entity	Status of actions pursued by the EPSF at the end of 2024	Code
02/2024	the derailment of a freight train, August 19, 2020 between Villeneuve-on the Yonne and Saint-Julien-du-Sault (89).	R1	Taking action with the European Committee for Standardization and the VPI association in order to initiate the modification of the EN 15 313 standards and guide to VPI (document VPI 01 Appendix 21) designed to generalize the implementation, during workshop maintenance operations on axles, examination indices of wheel circularity defects defined in Annex 10 of the Uniform Contract for the Use of Wagons. To work with the ERA to raise awareness among "certification bodies" ECEs (European Centres for Economic and Social Development) regarding this type of feared event. The aim is to make them take awareness at the ECE that this type of defect must be taken into account in their "domain of possible defects" to be covered by the plans maintenance, even for new wheels.	EPSF	In its response of December 2024, the EPSF commits to share with the Railway Standardization Bureau (BNF), at the occasion of the next meeting, the conclusions of this investigation report, and in particular the request relating to the EN 15313 standard formulated by recommendation R1. For In memory, this Bureau ensures, by delegation from AFNOR, the participation of French stakeholders in the work of European and international standardization. In fact, it is with from the BNF that potential work subjects must be carried. The investigation report on this accident will also be released. within 2 months, to the VPI association, sectoral association of private railway wagon owners goods and workshops in Germany. The EPSF will finally propose to the ERA that awareness of this type a feared event should be placed on the agenda of a next meeting of the ECE certifiers group which anime. No further information in 2025. Open Tracking	O
02/2024	the derailment of a freight train, August 19, 2020 between Villeneuve-on the Yonne and Saint-Julien-du-Sault (89).	R3	Explore the possibility of collecting temperature data and alarms generated by the national rail network's DBCs (Digital Control Points) to ensure real-time centralized management. The infrastructure manager's supervision center should thus enable: – the resolution of uncertainties and facilitate the application of regulations by field agents, ACs (Agents de Conduite et de Contrôle - Control and Control Agents) and drivers, as well as the infrastructure manager's maintenance operations; – to increase the operational availability of DBCs.	SNCF Network	In its response of June 2024, SNCF Réseau informs the BEA-TT that the first part of the recommendation finds an answer in the PC STEM program initiated and whose progressive deployment is ensured from 2026. Regarding the infrastructure manager's supervision center mentioned in the second part of the recommendation, SNCF Réseau specifies that, to date, the 4 supervision centers distributed across its territory (1 per zone of	C

					production) are not intended to supervise the state of the circulations but rather that of the network. No action is planned as a result Follow-up closed.	
03/2024	the fire of work train May 28, 2021, at Saint-Hilaire-Bonneval (87).	R1	Revisiting the design processes of factory work trains in order to take the necessary precautions related to the fire risk that may be caused by overheating at the wheel/sole contact point and/or the particle projections, with a notion of an acceptable duration limit and temperature to be defined, and to produce the safety demonstration in the Authorization files.	Plasser & Theurer	In its May 2024 response, Plasser & Theurer commits to including the additional risk related to the occurrence of "brakes" tight", independent of the design of the construction equipment, in its future risk analyses during the design phase. A A prototype should be available within 12 months. months, followed by validation testing. A final solution is feasible within 24 months. No further information available in 2025 Open tracking.	O
03/2024	the fire of work train May 28, 2021, at Saint-Hilaire-Bonneval (87).	R3	Revisiting the regulatory framework governing the conditions for authorization of bringing factory work trains to market in order to better control the risk of fire from the bogies during transport operations.	EPSF	In its response of December 2024, the EPSF proposed to extend this recommendation to special vehicles as part of an amendment to the STI Wagon through a CR 669 amendment request issued on October 25, 2024. As the organization and schedule of this work are managed by the ERA and the European Commission, the EPSF cannot commit to a deadline or the expected outcome. Furthermore, the EPSF has proposed to the BEA-TT that it may to speak at the feedback meeting on the 12th December 2024. The BEA-TT was able to present the event during a System feedback meeting in December 2024. Follow-up Closed	C

03/2024	the fire of work train May 28, 2021, at Saint-Hilaire- Bonneval (87).	R5	Organize a working group with railway operators and the manufacturers of static recorders to study the extension of the field information recorded on the control parameters of braking, but not limited to it.	EPSF	In its response of December 2024, the EPSF informs the BEA- TT of the commitment to work on the recording of driving events to meet the demand of the European Commission regarding the reason for this rule national. A list of parameters to be recorded is indeed harmonized at the European level, but the member states retain the possibility of supplementing this list in application from an open point of the STI OPE. The EPSF is therefore inviting the BEA-TT to participate in this work so that it can share its experience and address the needs in subject of event analysis. The publication of the EPSF recommendation "Recording of events related to the security of "Flooding Arrangements on Board Mobile Vehicles" took place at October 2025. Follow-up Closed	C
03/2024	the fire of work train May 28, 2021, at Saint-Hilaire- Bonneval (87).	R6	Revisiting the conditions for maintaining the operational readiness of hot box detectors and brake pad wear detectors in order to Guarantee a fault diagnosis and an estimated repair time within 24 hours (in cases where repair cannot be completed within 24 hours), without ever allowing two consecutive DBCs to be unavailable. Raise awareness among maintenance departments about the importance of these devices, which contribute to the safety of RFN traffic.	SNCF Network	In its June 2024 response, and in order to limit the occurrence of two consecutive DBC's being unavailable, SNCF Réseau commits to revising and clarifying the maintenance guidelines relating to the DBC to include an estimate of the projected restoration time in cases where restoration cannot be carried out within 24 hours. To raise awareness among maintenance staff about the importance of these devices, support for the new versions of the Maintenance guidelines will be implemented at the establishments by the experts from the Production Zones within the framework of existing technical coordination meetings, held every 6 month. Open Tracking	O

08/2024	the collision between a TER and a heavy goods vehicle, the 24th February 2022, at PN n°22 to Hochfelden (67).	R2	Study the technical and economic feasibility of the installation on level crossings at SAL 4 of closing sensors on the exit barriers which would allow the detection of a vehicle stopped at the barriers, and the transmission of this information to train drivers by the Existing railway signaling.	SNCF Network	In its response of November 2024, SNCF Réseau renews his reservations regarding the proposed solution and informs of the approval of the obstacle detection device at level crossing. A deployment policy over 15 The first level crossings, including level crossing 22 at Hochfelden, are already planned. The recommendation is not accepted by SNCF Réseau while specifying the actions taken. Follow-up Closed	C
08/2024	the collision between a TER and a heavy goods vehicle, the 24th February 2022, at PN n°22 to Hochfelden (67).	R3	Considering the available space and the direction of rail traffic, study the lateral spacing of the catenary support masts closest to the track bed of a level crossing, in order to prevent a road vehicle or its load from becoming trapped after a collision between these masts and the train. If this is not possible, study the longitudinal spacing of the catenary masts closest to the track bed.	SNCF Network	In its response of November 2024, SNCF Réseau commits, for any study of new infrastructure, to modify the principle plan applicable to all my catenary collections. For existing installations, a case-by-case relevance analysis is necessary. The preliminary plan incorporating the announced changes was published in 2025. Follow-up Closed	C

08/2024	the collision between a TER and a heavy goods vehicle, the 24th February 2022, at PN n°22 to Hochfelden (67).	R4	Investigate the feasibility of modifying rolling stock requirements to reduce the risk of the automatic coupler passing under the train following a particularly violent impact. In particular, consider adding possible restraint device (chains, cables or other) on the part external to the automatic coupling. Encourage the inclusion of these requirements in type-approval documents at the European level.	EPSF	In its response of January 6, 2025, the EPSF (French Railway Safety Authority) commits to relaying the information to rolling stock manufacturers via the French Railway Industries Federation (FIF). Following the studies that would be conducted and depending on the conclusions, the EPSF commits to implementing the necessary follow-up measures, possible.	O
08/2024	the collision between a TER and a heavy goods vehicle, the 24th February 2022, at PN n°22 to Hochfelden (67).	R5	Together with railway companies and rolling stock manufacturers, define a list of safety and comfort equipment for which power supply must continue even after the automatic coupler is potentially destroyed following a collision with an obstacle. Encourage, at the European level, the inclusion of requirements for maintaining power supply to this equipment in type-approval documents. identified.	EPSF	No further information to be provided in 2025 Open Tracking	O

08/2024	the collision of two pedestrians by a freight train, the November 14 2022, on a TVP at the station Donchery (08).	R1	Securing the management and progress of the prevention action plan pedestrian hit by the SNCF-operated TVP. This action plan includes, in particular, the following actions: • raise awareness among travellers about the risk by conducting campaigns revamped public communication; • ensure the complete implementation of the new signage at ground ; • implement audio and visual prevention announcements on display screens in stations; • deploy the intervention program in middle and high schools; • experiment with sound support on TVP signaling strengthen traveler alerts; • accelerate the TVP removal program; • develop a new generation TVP offering a barrier effective physical activity at the risk of inattention; • experience the delivery of a "cruising train" warning; • equip the traffic lights of the TVP with means recording of their proof of operation.	SNCF Network SNCF Stations & Connections SNCF Voyageurs	In its October 2024 response, SNCF Voyageurs engaged in cooperation with SNCF Réseau and SNCF Gares and Connections to the action plan and will produce a state progress of actions implemented by SNCF Travelers. In its November 2024 response, SNCR Réseau informs the BEA-TT that it will not propose any actions other than those already implemented and monitored within the framework of the aforementioned action plan. Furthermore, SNCF Réseau considers that monitoring within the DSSR and progress reviews conducted twice a year with EPSF helps to guarantee its security. In its response of November 2024, SNCF Gare and Connexions recalls the management and progress of the plan actions entrusted to a project manager Securing TVPs in place since the first quarter of 2023. SNCF Station and Connexions is committed to ensuring that progress points are integrated into the biannual reviews carried out between SNCF Réseau (DSSR) and the EPSF in order to guarantee its security. No further information available in 2025 Open Tracking	O
08/2024	the collision of two pedestrians by a freight train, the November 14 2022, on a TVP at Donchery station (08).	R2	Investigate how to implement audio announcements on trains, delivering a safety message about the dangers of level crossings in stations and the absolute necessity of obeying traffic signals, before each arrival at a station. Then, implement the chosen solution(s).	SNCF Voyageurs	In its letter of October 2024, SNCF Voyageurs informed the BEA-TT of the conclusions of an experiment conducted on December 2023 to April 2024 on series of equipment Compatible with AGC and REGIO2N. This trial did not yield the positive lessons needed to improve the situation. Consequently, SNCF Voyageurs is not committing to deploying the broadcast service. audio announcements on board trains. Other solutions As testing continues, SNCF Voyageurs is committed to communicating progress updates on the discussions and implementing the solutions deemed appropriate. No specific action will be taken in line with the response Follow-up Closed	C

08/2024	the collision of two pedestrians by a freight train, the November 14 2022, on a TVP at the station Donchery (08).	R3	Securing, within the pedestrian collision prevention action plan TVP, the project to develop a new generation TVP offering an effective physical barrier to the risk of pedestrian inattention to the light signaling.	SNCF Network SNCF Stations & Connections	In its response of November 2024, SNCR Réseau specifies in response to the recommendation that the catch-up loop the work on which SNCF Réseau will be able to take the form of a physical barrier only if the results of the study carried out in the different lots of the new TVP project generation, still ongoing with an expected completion date of mid-2026, confirm this possible direction. In its response of November 2024, SNCF Gare and Connexions expresses that the various proposals stemming from the the project will incorporate the collision prevention action plan pedestrian to TVP. In this context, the physical barrier is a Options have been studied, but no conclusion has been reached yet. written. No further information available in 2025 Open Tracking	O
08/2024	the collision of two pedestrians by a freight train, the November 14 2022, on a TVP at Donchery station (08).	R4	Requesting, from SNCF Réseau and SNCF Gares & Connexions, a presentation of the consistency of the next-generation TVP project covered by recommendation R3, as well as a preliminary draft of a "note of determination of the nature of the modification" which assesses the modification generated by this project (this, even if a project presentation file for authorization was not required).	EPSF	In its response of December 2024, the EPSF commits to submit a request to SNCR Réseau presentation of the consistency of the next-generation TVP project as well as a preliminary draft of the "determination note" of the nature of the modification" which assesses the modification generated by this project during the first quarter of 2025. No further information available in 2025 Open Tracking	O
08/2024	the collision of two pedestrians by a freight train, the November 14 2022, on a TVP at the station Donchery (08).	R5	Study the strengthening of resources dedicated to staff presence to TVP at sites and times with the highest passenger traffic and the highest train crossing rates. These reinforcements would be applied on a provisional basis pending improving the safety of TVP installations.	SNCF Stations & Connections	In its response of November 2024, SNCF Gare and Connexions informs the BEA-TT that the elements of this recommendations are taken into account in the evolution of the Station usage and based on local studies. By elsewhere, a measure of the maturity of the behavior of customers during the crossing has been added and is carried out in at the same time as VxT product field evaluations. Open Tracking	O

08/2024	the collision of two pedestrians by a freight train, the November 14 2022, on a TVP at the station Donchery (08).	R7	To study how to implement financial support for SNCF for improving the safety of public crossings on railways by station within the framework of national and regional funding in favor of the railway development.	DGITM	In its response of September 2024, the DGITM informs that a A dedicated budget line for railway safety exists. It is primarily dedicated to improving the security of level crossings and railway tunnels. The opportunity to to mobilize funds from this line to finance experiments contributing to the securing of TVP will However, it has been studied. This is a matter for SNCF. Network and SNCF Gares et Connexions having defined a multi-year program to eliminate crossings pedestrian walkways, ongoing updating of contracts performance of SNCF Réseau and SNCF Gares et Connexions, planned for 2025, will be an opportunity to clarify the conditions of monitoring of the program to improve the security of pedestrian crossings. No further information available in 2025 Open Tracking	O
08/2024	the collision of two pedestrians by a freight train, the November 14 2022, on a TVP at Donchery station (08).	R8	Finalize and implement the grade separation project for the railway crossing at Donchery station.	SNCF Network SNCF Stations & Connections	In its response of November 2024, SNCF Réseau specifies that the project to remove the TVP at Donchery station in favor of an underpass, managed by SNCF Gare and Connections with the participation of SNCF Réseau, has been planned for commissioning at the end of the first half of 2028. No further information available in 2025 Open Tracking	O

12/2024	the collision between a train and a road vehicle December 26 2022, at PN n° 13 in Ayse (74).	R1	Emphasize this during initial and ongoing driver training. by train, and during online escorts, on the absolute priority to focus on railway signalling and the environment immediate external environment. Given the presence of numerous screens and indicator lights/indicators in the driver's seat and the risk of distraction it creates, remember that observing railway signalling and the environment constitutes the main foundation of security rail traffic is entrusted to train drivers.	SNCF Voyageurs	In its response of February 2025, SNCF Voyageurs commits to integrate the precision targeted by the recommendation into the driver reference framework from June 2025. The point will also be integrated into a continuing education program in 2026 and will be evaluated by managers. Regarding training Initially, this point will also be taken into account in 2026. The integration of the different points was carried out in 2025. Follow-up Closed	C
12/2024	the collision between a train and a road vehicle December 26 2022, at PN n° 13 in Ayse (74).	R2	Complete the conduct guidelines to clarify emergency evacuation rules	SNCF Voyageurs	In its response of February 2025, SNCF Voyageurs commits to clarifying this point in the conduct reference framework from June 2025. Clarification of the reference framework to be carried out in 2025. Follow-up Closed	C
12/2024	the collision between a train and a road vehicle December 26 2022, at PN n° 13 in Ayse (74).	R3	To provide passenger train drivers and train service agents with a training sequence on the practical handling of the equipment necessary for the emergency opening of passenger area doors, systematically for all locomotives they operate. led to use. Consider the possibility of adding instructions (label, diagram, text, etc.) for the emergency door opening device.	SNCF Voyageurs	In its response of February 2025, SNCF Voyageurs makes the following commitments: - for train drivers, this point should be added to the educational file for initial training and to supplementary training in 2026; - for Régiolis self-propelled trains, to make available to trainers and drivers an educational film to review knowledge; - For support staff, a letter should be sent to the activities for consideration in each business unit during job adaptation training. The addition to the educational file and the provision of an educational film were carried out in 2025. Open Tracking	O

12/2024	the collision between a train and a road vehicle December 26 2022, at PN n° 13 in Ayse (74).	R4	Remind train drivers of the rules and precautions intervention in the event of a fire. To learn from this accident and reiterate the decision-making process that must be followed regarding requests from the security forces rescue.	SNCF Voyageurs	In its response of February 2025, SNCF Voyageurs commits to integrating the two points of the recommendation into a continuing education in 2026. Both details were added in 2025 in a continuing education Follow-up Closed	C
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12/2024	the derailment of the TEVO train substitute of the road, the 17th January 2024, on the base technique of Saint-Florentin-Vergigny (89).	R1	To ensure the proper condition and maintenance of rear bases and railway production sites to the cleanliness of the trails, to the installation of signs compliant with regulations and the implementation of constituent elements the living quarters and parking areas in order to control the Risk of collision with rail traffic. Incorporate into the criteria choice of rear base positioning, in relation to the area of construction site, the desire to limit the distance to be travelled to control the risks to the safety of railway operations and personnel.	SNCF Network	In its April 2025 response, SNCF Réseau highlighted the implementation of a transformation strategy for its rear bases aiming at their industrialization. This approach will involve defining a standard and a master plan will also allow a anticipating needs, better monitoring and better site maintenance thus ensuring their sustainability. The evidence regarding the basic standard The back and the master plan were submitted in 2025 Follow-up Closed	C
12/2024	the derailment of the TEVO train substitute of the road, the 17th January 2024, on the base technique of Saint-Florentin-Vergigny (89).	R2	Designing production processes and support for all routine shunting operations, particularly for heavy trains on the rear bases before they are put into service.	ETF Services	In its April 2025 response, ETF services confirmed that it had implemented several measures to ensure the safety and security of its clients. compliance of maneuvers, particularly those concerning the heavy trains operating on rear bases. These actions focus on the design of production processes for routine maneuvers, documentation support, and operator training and awareness. Follow-up Closed	C
12/2024	the derailment of the TEVO train substitute of the road, the 17th January 2024, on the base technique of Saint-Florentin-Vergigny (89).	R3	Incorporate into the briefings conducted at rear bases the importance of anticipating foreseeable degraded situations such as treatment problems caused by the train delay need to be addressed and the taking into account taking into account the state of operator fatigue. Emphasize the absolute necessity to implement production processes in compliance with safety rules.	SNCF Network ETF Services	In its response of April 2025, SNCF Réseau points out that the SNCF Réseau's standard briefings already plan to redo One point for any organizational change or unforeseen event. The requirements from these briefings were also taken up in destination of external service providers via Sécubox as part of the "Our Lives, Our Priority" program. In its April 2025 response, ETF services confirmed that it had took several measures to ensure that the anticipation of deteriorating situations, stress or fatigue management operators are taken into account in the briefings in the framework of operations on rear bases. The details on "the requirements of the briefing at the foot of the operation" were transmitted in 2025 Follow-up Closed	C

12/2024	the derailment of the TEVO train substitute of the road, the 17th January 2024, on the base technique of Saint-Florentin-Vergigny (89),	R4	Consolidate operational management at rear bases to guarantee the implementation of production processes in strict compliance rules.	ETF Services	In its April 2025 response, ETF services confirmed that it had put in place several actions aimed at strengthening supervision and to guarantee strict adherence to production processes as part of operations on rear bases across including the strengthening of local management, the continuing education and awareness-raising for management Work completed. Follow-up .	C
12/2024	the derailment of the TEVO train substitute of the road, the 17th January 2024, on the base technique of Saint-Florentin-Vergigny (89).	R5	Redefine effective and rigorous security control methods for each operator and common and regular control methods on rear bases to improve their level of security by ensuring in particular the minimum conditions in terms of the skills of the personnel in charge of security controls.	SNCF Network ETF Services	In its April 2025 response, SNCF Réseau commits to a three-year management program aimed at improving the safety performance of GI trains. Several themes included in a "GI Train" label are designed to address the challenges of this recommendation. The rollout of the "GI Convoy" label will involve all SNCF Réseau business lines as well as its partners in external companies or the SNCF group. In its response of April 2025, ETF services confirmed that it had put in place several measures to ensure rigorous and regular control, as well as minimum competency requirements for staff in charge of security checks. Open Tracking	C
12/2024	the derailment of the TEVO train substitute of the road, the 17th January 2024, on the base technique of Saint-Florentin-Vergigny (89).	R6	Verify that the texts structuring the safety of railway operations applicable to rear bases are taken into account for the establishment contracts written by SNCF R and that the management actors of the security has them under control.	SNCF Network ETF Services	In its response of April 2025, SNCF Réseau commits to remind market managers and stakeholders of security management at rear bases to ensure of the proper alignment between markets and texts governing the safety of railway operations in bases back. In its April 2025 response, ETF services confirmed undertakes a systematic review of its contracts. This The review aims to ensure that the legislative texts and regulations relating to railway safety, in particular those applicable to the rear bases are integrated and clearly defined in the contractual clauses.	C

					Follow-up Closed	
12/2024	the derailment of the TEVO train substitute of the road, the 17th January 2024, on the base technique of Saint-Florentin- Vergigny (89).	R	Immediate recommendation in three points: - Without delay, ensure that the agents responsible for carrying out the maneuvers on the St-Florentin-Vergigny site use compliant radio equipment. - Ensure that contractual clauses are consistent with the rules security - Check the situation on all similar sites and proceed with necessary adjustments	SNCF Network	In its response of June 2024, SNCF confirms that: - The radios used today at the St Florentin base are SNCF Réseau approved radios that comply with regulations. - The works contracts specify the obligation to use a qualified service provider. Technical guide IG97914 deal with the service provider and client obligation to use equipment approved by SNCF Réseau. Furthermore, a news flash was issued at the end The event highlights the conditions for using radios during guided maneuvers. - A survey of the situation was carried out on all the rear bases of the construction sites regeneration (analogous sites) Follow-up Closed	C

12/2024	the collision between a train of travelers and a heavyweight carrying a part of a mast wind turbine, the 19th June 2023, at the PN No. 51 in Clerjus (88).	R5	To study and implement, on the X73500 series vehicles in service, the reinforcement of the fixings of the short-circuit bar installed in the cabin steering system to help it stay in place in the event of a collision. Study the need for similar reinforcement for other components. portable equipment located in the cabin (fire extinguishers, safety equipment, etc.).	SNCF Voyageurs	In a response dated March 2025, SNCF Voyageurs stated committed to studying the feasibility of strengthening the portable equipment installed in the driver's cab X73500 before the end of June 2026. A decision will be made following the study. will be taken into account for possible implementation. Regarding this Regarding the tablet, SNCF Voyageurs expressed its opinion. unfavorable to imposing a single position in the cabin of conduct taking into account the disparity in its use practical. No further information available in 2025 Open Tracking	O
12/2024	the collision between a train of travelers and a heavy goods vehicle transporting part of a mast wind turbine, the 19th June 2023, at PN n° 51 in Clerjus (88).	R6	For all types of motor vehicles, study and install on the driver's cab consoles a mounting device for the driver's professional phone, on equipment operating on lines equipped with the GSM-GFU link, as well as for the tablet.	SNCF Voyageurs	In a response from March 2025, SNCF Voyageurs committed to studying the feasibility of a phone mounting device on equipment operating on lines equipped with the GSMGFU link before the end of June 2026 without calling into question the studies underway in response to the R2 recommendation of the Boulzicourt (08) accident. No further information available in 2025 Open Tracking	O
12/2024	the collision between a train of travelers and a heavyweight carrying a part of a mast wind turbine, the 19th June 2023, at the PN No. 51 in Clerjus (88).	R7	Remind drivers and traffic officers that insurance for the driver of the effective implementation of the protection The obstacle can only result from an explicit confirmation by the AC; that this confirmation is therefore imperative; and that a simple acknowledgment of receipt of a request for obstacle protection does not in any way imply its implementation.	SNCF Voyageurs SNCF Network	SNCF Réseau responded in April 2024 by committing to complete two texts (DC1503 and DC3791) to specify that The obstacle protection must be formally confirmed at applicant, once its implementation has been completed. In its response of March 2025, SNCF Voyageurs commits to to carry out an action during the 2026 training sessions to specify the points addressed by the recommendation. No further information available in 2025 Open Tracking	O

12/2024	the collision between a train of travelers and a heavyweight carrying a part of a mast wind turbine, the 19th June 2023, at the PN No. 51 in Clerjus (88).	R8	Identify the most relevant frequency for training agents guidance on emergency procedures and the information to be provided when an obstacle on the way and to the assessment of situations requiring putting implement the obstacle coverage procedure, and introduce this frequency in the programming of their continuing education. During online support sessions with local management, to regularly train drivers in emergency procedures and to the notices to be issued when an obstacle is present on the track, and to evaluate situations requiring the implementation of the coverage procedure obstacle.	SNCF Voyageurs	In its response in March 2025, SNCF Voyageurs stated committed to a training scenario addressing the obstacle protection is to be addressed in 2026 as part of the certification (three-year cycle) of drivers. No further information available in 2025 Open Tracking	O
12/2024	the collision between a train of passengers and a heavy goods vehicle carrying a part of a mast wind turbine, the 19th June 2023, at PN n° 51 in Clerjus (88).	R9	Implement a monitoring system for all train driver management to ensure that any local variations of established rules do not compromise the level of safety guaranteed by regulations. Identify any local initiatives modifying a prescribed rule as a hazard in the company's hazard register, and determine and implement risk mitigation measures to ensure that the level of safety is not compromised. security.	SNCF Voyageurs	In its response in March 2025, SNCF Voyageurs analyzed the situation and committed to sending a formal letter from the Security Director reiterating that a local rule cannot override applicable regulations and must not, under any circumstances, compromise the level of safety. This letter will be sent to the Business Unit Directors before the end of June 2025. Letter sent in 2025 Follow-up Closed	C
12/2024	the collision between a train of travelers and a heavyweight carrying a part of a mast wind turbine, the 19th June 2023, at the PN No. 51 in Clerjus (88).	R10	Given the security challenges, reviewing the organization of part of the establishment of the "J+1" meeting preparation document, on the other hand part of the validation of the causal analysis report, to ensure that a an external perspective not locally involved in the context of the event may help to identify areas for improvement. For events involving an obstacle to traffic trains, systematically evaluated, within the framework of the "J+1" meetings and the RACs, the measures taken by stakeholders since the perception from the presence of the obstacle until assurance is obtained that The obstacle is protected.	SNCF Network	SNCF Réseau responded in April 2025 by recalling the principles for triggering "J+1" meetings, specifying in particular the principle of the external perspective brought by the Invited participants. No further information available in 2025 Open Tracking	O

12/2024	the collision between a train of travelers and a heavyweight carrying a part of a mast wind turbine, the 19th June 2023, at the PN No. 51 in Clerjus (88).	R11	Amend the "DPX Portal" application to ensure that a refusal possible first version of the feedback document by A security expert should be explicitly referred to the decision-maker in this matter. application to accompany the second version offered to its approval, and reported in parallel to the security expert's hierarchy. When the event in question presents a high potential for severity or learning, or is of a nature to interest management, put in work involves sharing feedback with all of the management of the entity led by the decision-maker.	SNCF Voyageurs	In its response of March 2025, SNCF Voyageurs commits to modify the tool to send an automatic notification to decision-maker in the event of expert commentary on the analysis security. This upgrade is scheduled to be put into production before the end of 2025. Regarding the sharing of the return Based on experience with supervision, information will be provided. to territorial experts before the end of 2025. Sharing completed in 2025 Follow-up Closed	C
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Reports published in 2025

Legend code: Closed tracking = **C**; Open tracking = **O**.

Date of report	Title of the investigation	BEA-TT Recommendation No.	BEA-TT Recommendation Title	Entity	Status of actions pursued by the EPSF at the end of 2025	Code
01/2025	the fire at roadsides following the passage by train on the 14th July 2022 Graveson (13)	R1	Identify in fire-risk areas, on lines other than high-speed rail, the places where a rapid passage of heavy emergency vehicles from one side and Another approach would be necessary but is not possible. If so, to study the possibility of crossing the tracks with these vehicles Rapid, temporary solutions without damaging the tracks. These studies could be carried out with the SDIS and local authorities. In the Montagnette area, study the possibility of installing a Crossing railway lines to facilitate firefighting. A solution, such as a railing platform in place of an old level crossing removed, and which would be used by firefighters only or SNCF Infra1 services subject to safety measures appropriate solutions could be studied in collaboration with the SDIS and the local territorial authorities	SNCF Network	In its reply letter to the BEA-TT, SNCF Réseau stated committed to conducting a study of removable means of crossing of the vehicles. The deadline is set for 31/12/2026 Open Tracking	O
01/2025	the fire at roadsides following the passage of a train on the 14th July 2022 Graveson (13)	R2	Replace the remaining 3rd generation DBCs with 4th generation DBCs/DFSs generation, in accordance with the decision of the product commission SNCF Réseau, October 8, 2024. Study the possibility of reducing the distance between fire alarms/fire detection systems in areas sensitive to fire risks and crossed by freight convoys. Study the possibility, in these same areas, of lowering the detection thresholds of the fire detection systems and ensuring information chaining between them. DBC/DFS. Implement the conclusions and recommendations of the JNS final report "Consequences of unintended brake applications with LL blocks".	SNCF Network	In its reply to the BEA-TT, SNCF Réseau confirmed the replacement of the remaining 3rd generation DBCs with 4th generation DBC/DFSs by the deadline 2030. Furthermore, no other specific action is planned to be undertaken. Open Tracking	O

01/2025	the fire at roadsides following the passage of a train on the 14th July 2022 Graveson (13)	R4	Strengthen the monitoring by drivers of their train and other circulations. Inform drivers about the potential consequences of a blockage brake with LL soles. Modify the conditions for applying an overload: • systematically perform the overload before the tests brakes and always wait for its elimination before leaving in line ; • to be generalized under certain train departure conditions (stop prolonged, significant immobilization, temperature variations important winter/summer) and always wait for its elimination. Implement the conclusions and recommendations of the JNS final report "Consequences of unintended brake applications with LL blocks".	HEXAFRET EPSF	As of 31/12/2025, no response from HEXAFRET was received. available. In its letter of reply to the BEA-TT, the EPSF committed to transmit the investigation report to the companies concerned, as well as planning a presentation in feedback meeting. Open Tracking	/
01/2025	the fire at roadsides following the passage of a train on the 14th July 2022 Graveson (13)	R5	Investigate the interest and possibility of modifying the overload to a value greater than 5.4 bar. The proposals can be shared within Working Groups managed by the EPSF.	HEXAFRET EPSF		/
01/2025	the fire at roadsides following the passage of a train on the 14th July 2022 Graveson (13)	R6	Beyond the work carried out within the framework of the JNS "Consequences of unintended brake applications with LL blocks", study experiments aimed at improving the detection of system anomalies braking: • initially: for example, a system to assist and control the proper execution of brake tests in order to detect anomalies; • online taking into account the potential consequences related to the thermal capacities of the LL soles (for example temperature and pressure sensors...). The proposals can be shared within Working Groups managed by the EPSF.	HEXAFRET EPSF		/

Date of report	Title of the investigation	BEA-TT Recommendation No. BEA-TT Recommendation Title	Entity	Status of actions pursued by the EPSF at the end of 2025	Code
03/2025	the implementation danger of people during distress from a train travelers on the 25th June 2023 in Nuits (89)	R1 Align operational procedures with those of SNCF Network. Finalize the partially described procedures and update what needs to be updated. the being. Take action to promote compliance with procedures, define a strategy for handling emergency situations and testing their effectiveness regularly.	OSLO	In its reply letter to the BEA-TT, the company OSLO has confirmed having adapted its organization to the requirements Security intervention plans. Procedures related to transshipments/evacuations will be tested during a real-life exercise. A return Experimentation will be carried out and procedures will be adapted if necessary Regarding the updating of the procedures in question, the adaptations were made and an internal audit was conducted on the The documentary and information process has been mandated. for October 2025. Finally, several actions to integrate situations emergency, of day before on THE shares evacuation/transshipment and animation of On-call duties have been scheduled for 2025. Open Tracking	O
03/2025	the implementation danger to people during distress from a train travellers on June 25, 2023 in Nuits (89))	R2 Clearly define the scope of intervention, skills, and geographical limits of SNCF V's on-call duty commitments. Ensure that its subsidiaries organize themselves accordingly and in a consistent manner with this frame.	SNCF V	In a letter replying to the BEA-TT, SNCF V confirmed that it had put in place on-call services whose skills and limits of intervention are clearly defined by the prescribed documentation. Open Tracking	O

03/2025	the implementation danger of people during distress from a train travelers on the 25th June 2023 in Nuits (89)	R3	Implement a quality and safety control system capable of detect situations of interference or disregard for prerogatives agents responsible for traffic safety during interventions territorial and national crisis managers. Combine the control process with systematic feedback for any situation where the handling differed from the established rules.	SNCF R	In its reply letter to the BEA-TT, SNCF Réseau has renewed the observations made during the consultation.	O
03/2025	the implementation danger of people during distress from a train travelers on the 25th June 2023 in Nuits (89)	R4	Ensure compliance with document DC 4380 to guarantee that the information circulating between crisis managers and responders those present on site systematically go through the regulator for a situation occurring live online or via the AC for an event located within the territorial limits of the station. To manage the distress of a passenger train that had requested assistance Taking into account the instability of the situation, create a record in the document DC 01503 mandating the implementation of a cautious approach for any traffic passing or crossing the train in distress. Integrate into document DC 2611 or create a document dealing with the rules of intervention for police or gendarmerie forces. .	SNCF R	Furthermore, in response to the various topics raised In these two recommendations, SNCF Réseau has included in its 2025/2026 roadmap a set of actions covering different aspects (Procedures, Interfaces with EF and emergency services, Organizations). Open Tracking	O
03/2025	the implementation danger of people during distress from a train travelers on the 25th June 2023 in Nuits (89)	R5	Conduct a debriefing on the event to explain and promote this rule for all agents of the group, regardless of or their rank...	SNCF Group	In a letter to the BEA-TT, SNCF Voyageurs confirmed that within its scope, the Security policy, signed by all members of the SNCF Voyageurs executive committee were distributed to all employees. Open Tracking	O

03/2025	the implementation danger of people during distress from a train travelers on the 25th June 2023 in Nuits (89)	R6	Conduct a debriefing on the event to reiterate the rules to be strictly observed for any intervention in a railway environment. This process will necessarily involve the General Directorate of the National Police, the General Directorate of the Gendarmerie, the Commands of the Paris Fire Brigade Battalions and of Marseille Fire Brigade, and the Association of Mayors of France for Municipal Police Officers.	SNCF R General Management Security Civil and of the Crisis Management	In its reply letter to the BEA-TT, SNCF Réseau has confirmed that within the framework of the animations carried out with various external bodies (BSPP, DGSI, Gendarmerie, Police...) will focus on this an event to illustrate the risk of railway accidents and to remind the conditions and safety measures to be observed during of interventions in the railway environment. The integration of this focus within a regular animation system will guarantee continuity in the transmission of the message Open Tracking	O
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Date of report	Title of the investigation	BEA-TT Recommendation No. BEA-TT Recommendation Title	Entity	Status of actions pursued by the EPSF at the end of 2025	Code
04/2025	the derailment of a freight train following make-up session on the 11th February 2024 Metz-Sablon (57)	R1 Identify situations that do not comply with DES 207 Amendment No. 3 of 10/2000 regarding the distance between the purple square (Cv) and the first panel of block. If necessary, study how to cover the risk of a incorrect application of Visual Driving by the driver by applying the following progressive measures: • at a minimum, make it conditional through operating regulations the opening of the CVs giving access to the main roads (VP) upon liberation track circuits of the main line upstream of the first sign block; • based on a risk analysis taking into account the local context including signal visibility, implementation distance from the switching point, technically conditioning the opening of the Cv giving access to VPs upon release of the main track circuits in upstream of the first block panel; • in the case of a modernization of the signage, in particular the signal box upgrade, equipping the illuminated panels giving access to the VP of block indications (BAL, ETCS...), their support systems (repetition, KVB, ETCS...).	SNCF Network	In its reply letter to the BEA-TT, SNCF Réseau has specified that a criticality study on the routes similar to the situation in Metz-Sablon, which aims to define the possible modifications to be made to the installations concerned and their prioritization in a concern Cost-effectiveness. The results of this study are expected. by the end of June 2026. Regarding point 3 of this recommendation, IG3035 will be rewritten and brought into line with the reference IG93267. Open Tracking	O
04/2025	the derailment of a freight train following make-up session on the 11th February 2024 Metz-Sablon (57)	R2 Improving traffic management methods through centralized network control (CCR), for better collaboration with the actors on the ground: • lift the detention of a train without delay as soon as a situation changes / start trains as quickly as possible (head of service (CS) to traffic agents (AC)); • Establish systematic oral communication between the ACs of two adjacent sectors (see §11.1 of DC 1510) to ensure the viability of dispatching a train from one sector to another. the other; • improve mutual understanding between the ACs, the head of traffic management CCR and actors from remote posts in order to better share local specificities, information and coordinate their actions;	SNCF Network	In its letter of reply to the BEA-TT, SNCF Réseau maintained its response regarding the draft version and will not follow this recommendation, some measures of which contradict the very philosophy of implementing centralized network control. Follow-up Closed	C

			study the installation of a GSM-R station at station D in order to shorten the exchange times and allow it to stop a train in case of danger (forgetting of wedge, spark, etc).			
04/2025	the derailment of a freight train following make-up session on the 11th February 2024 Metz-Sablon (57)	R3	Revisiting the overall driver ordering process: - in the event of a train cancellation or a change to a workday, the resource manager must direct the driver on a delivery that complies with current labor regulations, and more specifically the duration of rest periods; - return during continuing education, on the practices of self-assessment of their level of alertness by drivers and on the fact to immediately inform the resource manager if they do not feel not suitable; - to study the possibility of giving the manager a means of evaluation the drivers' ability to fulfill their duties upon starting their shift.	Hexafret	As of 31/12/2025, no response from HEXAFRET was received. available.	/
04/2025	the derailment of a freight train following make-up session on the 11th February 2024 Metz-Sablon (57)	R4	Consolidate the process of maintaining the competence of drivers freight trains to observe restricted procedures, including sighting procedures providing access to the main roads: - intensify the presence of traction managers and periodic on-the-spot "in situ" checks (online by transport traction managers (CTT)) to ensure the competence of agents to manage these marches; - consolidate ex-post control by verifying records edge by the traction frames; - to provide feedback on situations where compliance with a restrictive procedure allowed stopping before a danger (stopped train, wagons immobilized on service track (VS), obstacle...).	Hexafret		/
04/2025	the derailment of a freight train following make-up session on the 11th February 2024 Metz-Sablon (57)	R5	Intensify the presence of traction officers, and periodic on-the-spot checks "in situ", in order to validate a high level of competence for searching and passive and immediate obedience to signals.	Hexafret		/

Date of report	Title of the investigation	BEA-TT Recommendation No.	BEA-TT Recommendation Title	Entity	Status of actions pursued by the EPSF at the end of 2025	Code
06/2025	the accident high voltage during a traffic trial on the 22nd July 2024 to Zillisheim (68)	R1	Define and implement an operating procedure to ensure that the test circulation garage sites have a quality proportionate to the nature of the traffic, by carrying out for example a preliminary bilateral visit to formalize the accompanying measures to take.	DB SystemTechnik SNCF Network	In its reply letter to the BEA-TT, the company DB Systemtechnik reported that during a request from a site of the garage, it is the partner Railway Company which expresses its need to the PSEF (Platform of Services to Railway Companies) for obtaining service roads and that the maintenance of the latter is DB Systemtechnik is not responsible. None planned action In its reply letter to the BEA-TT, SNCF Réseau has reiterated its opinion that such a process should be planned in the "testing" regulations and/or in the processes of issuing the resulting authorizations. By elsewhere, SNCF Réseau is not necessarily aware the full range of the applicants' activities, and it appears from the outset it is then more appropriate to place the responsibility on such checks for test applicants. SNCF Réseau will obviously be able to be involved in the process and will put in places cooperation particularly for the management of Unforeseen circumstances. No action planned. Follow-up Closed	C

06/2025	the accident high voltage during a traffic trial on the 22nd July 2024 to Zillisheim (68)	R2	As part of the upcoming update of the guide for applicants for trial authorizations, analyze the lessons learned. of this accident and to incorporate into the revision of the guide the expectations corresponding to the applicants.	EPSF	In its letter of reply to the BEA-TT, the EPSF commits to publish, on its website, a revision of guide 022 – Guide for applicants for temporary authorizations for testing purposes and testing categories on the railway system network during the first half of 2026 Open Tracking	O
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Date of report	Title of the investigation	BEA-TT Recommendation No.	BEA-TT Recommendation Title	Entity	Status of actions pursued by the EPSF at the end of 2025	Code
08/2025	the collision between a TER and a coach on the PN No. 42 on the 24th January 2024 to Cevins (73)	R1	Remind the departmental prefects that the organizing authorities of school transport and professional transport organizations Passengers traveling by coach should be invited to committee meetings departmental level crossing safety authorities.	DGITM	In a letter to the BEA-TT, the DGITM committed to send a joint letter with the delegation to the road safety (DSR) addressed to the prefects of department in order to remind them that the authorities organizers of school transport and the professional road transport organizations must be invited to each meeting of the commission departmental level crossings. Open Tracking	O
08/2025	the collision between a TER and a coach on the PN No. 42 on the 24th January 2024 to Cevins (73)	R5	• Add to the technical reference the case of railway tunnels located near a level crossing as a situation in which safety rails can be installed to limit the consequences of a derailment; • Extend the use cases to other types of very massive natural or artificial obstacles that may be found near a level crossing.	SNCF Network	In a letter to the BEA-TT, SNCF Réseau committed to taking this recommendation into account by initiating the rewriting of the reference document "IG90201: Safety Rails" designed to limit the consequences of a derailment." The next version of this text, scheduled for the end of 2026, will include the possibility of equipping certain sections of track near structures (including tunnels) located close to these level crossings with safety rails. Open Tracking	O

Date of report	Title of the investigation	BEA-TT Recommendation No.	BEA-TT Recommendation Title	Entity	Status of actions pursued by the EPSF at the end of 2025	Code
10/2025	Immobilization prolonged of a train TGV in the tunnel of the Fréjus (survey) joint France-Italy)	R1	SVI must apply the rule: in the event of a breakdown or accident in the tunnel, the driver must submit a request to the DCO in Bardonecchia request for train assistance within a maximum of 15 minutes (when the incident is not resolved within this timeframe).	SVI	In a letter to the BEA-TT, SVI reminded that within the framework initial and continuing training for staff conduct, the necessity is clearly explained and reiterated to initiate the emergency request procedure by consultation with the traffic management department of the competent infrastructure manager (IM) in the area of the incident in accordance with the applicable rules (reference framework) SVI driver, in accordance with GI rules). No action planned Follow-up Closed	C
10/2025	Immobilization prolonged of a train TGV in the tunnel of the Fréjus (survey) joint France-Italy)	R2	RFI and SNCF Réseau must consider any stop in the tunnel as a security incident that could escalate into a serious crisis. The PIS must be activated. Emergency services must be notified (pre-alert or alert depending on the nature of the event) by RFI and by SNCF Network.	RFI (outside scope) EPSF) SNCF Network	As of 31/12/2025, SNCF Réseau's response to this The recommendation was not yet available.	/
10/2025	Immobilization prolonged of a train TGV in the tunnel of the Fréjus (joint investigation) France-Italy)	R4	SVI must provide theoretical and practical training, as well as periodically verify (in theory and in practice) the skills acquired by the personnel according to the following conditions: • For drivers: learning French at a level that allows them to understand and execute French requests in the rolling stock sector. • For drivers: knowledge of train operation and of Equipment affected in the event of a fire alarm; knowledge and mastery of procedures associated with fire alarms and rescue operations.	SVI	In a letter to the BEA-TT, SVI explained that with regard to the drivers, in the event of equipment failure requiring a Communication between driving staff and the driving support unit is conducted in French, as the drivers are interoperable (holding a B1 level qualification). Regarding the knowledge of the train, its operation and its various equipment, initial training sessions and continuous include a section relating to rolling stock. Regarding on-call managers, considering that the	C

			train (request for assistance, cancellation of assistance, assembly/disassembly) emergency coupling and repatriation of the rescued train...). • For on-call managers: knowledge and mastery of procedures called by the PIS under the railway company; knowledge of rolling stock operating procedures in case of degraded situation.		drivers have a sufficient level of French (B1), executives are no longer involved in the procedures of troubleshooting. No action planned Follow-up Closed	
10/2025	Immobilization prolonged of a train TGV in the tunnel of the Fréjus (survey) joint France-Italy)	R5	Ensure that RFI, SVI and SNCF network periodically verify that the staff are proficient in the procedures outlined in the PIS.	RFI (outside scope) EPSF) SVI SNCF Network	As of 31/12/2025, SNCF Réseau's response to this The recommendation was not yet available. In a letter to the BEA-TT, SVI reminded everyone that exercises indoors or on the field are organized once or twice per year in order to train and improve the training of mobile and on-call personnel for situations degraded and urgent. A full-scale tunnel evacuation drill nature took place in March 2025. During the year 2026 a exercise on the theme of rescuing a train will programmed. These exercises are carried out either internally and either independently or as part of broader exercises under the authority of the prefectural authorities. SVI can to communicate at the request of the prefectural authorities, emergency services and GIs any useful information relating to the organization and execution of these exercises. Open tracking	O

10/2025	Immobilization prolonged of a train TGV in the tunnel of the Fréjus (survey) joint France-Italy)	R6	To carry out a joint monitoring action of the railway company SVI.	EPSF ANSFISA	As of 31/12/2025, the response to this recommendation was not Not yet available.	/
10/2025	Immobilization prolonged of a train TGV in the tunnel of the Fréjus (survey) joint France-Italy)	R7	In accordance with the process for rolling stock modifications, ensure that SNCF Voyageurs TGV modifies the PLT trainsets for check the C-FI-FS contactor so that its malfunction is taken into account taken into account in the SIAC. In general, during the upcoming changes, SNCF TGV Voyageurs ensures that these services are carried out according to best practices. analyzes failures and their consequences on rolling suitability of the train, particularly in the event of a fire on board, and carries out checks on maintenance associates. Depending on the associated security issue and the impact on operations, ensure that SNCF Voyageurs TGV takes breakdowns into account in the SIAC software.	SNCF Voyageurs TGV	As of 31/12/2025, the response to this recommendation was not Not yet available.	/
10/2025	Immobilization prolonged of a train TGV in the tunnel of the Fréjus (survey) joint France-Italy)	R8	Ensure that SNCF Voyageurs TGV carries out maintenance that the Emergency couplings are in working order and ready for use for railway companies.	SNCF Voyageurs TGV	As of 31/12/2025, the response to this recommendation was not Not yet available.	/

10/2025	Immobilization prolonged of a train TGV in the tunnel of the Fréjus (survey) joint France-Italy)	R9	Ensure that RFI and SNCF Réseau adapt their alert and information exchange procedures to guarantee the efficiency of the alert chain and the continuous sharing of information between the two operators. Access to a common tool for French and Italian stakeholders would help achieve the objective of real-time information sharing.	RFI SNCF Network	As of 31/12/2025, the response to this recommendation was not Not yet available.	/
10/2025	Immobilization prolonged of a train TGV in the tunnel of the Fréjus (joint investigation) France-Italy)	R10	Ensure that the Intergovernmental Commission, the Prefect of Savoy and the Prefect of Turin, in collaboration with the Security Committee, RFI and SNCF Réseau update and validate the PSB and then the PIS, taking into account the changes related to the feedback from the incident. Ensure that the operational documents of the various operators are kept up to date.	Inter-Commission Government Prefect of Savoie Prefect of Turin	As of 31/12/2025, the response to this recommendation was not Not yet available.	/
10/2025	Immobilization prolonged of a train TGV in the tunnel of the Fréjus (joint investigation) France-Italy)	R11	In collaboration with the Security Committee, ensure that the Intergovernmental Commission, the Prefect of Savoie and the Prefect of Turin periodically organizes safety drills in the tunnel, involving all Franco-Italian stakeholders (RFI, SNCF Réseau, railway companies, emergency services, etc.). It is important to ensure that these drills include train towing exercises.	Inter-Commission Government Prefect of Savoie Prefect of Turin)	As of 31/12/2025, the response to this recommendation was not yet available.	/

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12/2025	the derailment of a TER on the 24th July 2024 near Eus (66)	R1	Take advantage of the work on the embankment and the restoration of the road to redo the irrigation water recovery canal in connection with the local residents.	Eus Town Hall SNCF R	As of 31/12/2025, responses to the recommendations were not yet available.	/
12/2025	the derailment of a TER on the 24th July 2024 near Eus (66)	R2	To ensure, across the entire Network, sufficient maintenance of Hydraulic drainage structures (ridge ditches in particular) should be inspected during regular monitoring of earthworks. The maintenance guidelines on this subject should be strengthened	SNCF R		/
12/2025	the derailment of a TER on the 24th July 2024 near Eus (66)	R4	Re-establish effective communication and jointly establish an effective organization and resources to detect anomalies and intervene quickly.	SNCF R		/

12/2025	the derailment of a TER on the 24th July 2024 near d'Eus (66)	R5	• Improve knowledge of heritage by providing information for the works of art the data in the heritage database, for example at the opportunity for detailed inspections. • Consequently, determine and quantify the criteria related to the railway, the Earthworks and engineering structures. Trigger the analyses necessary depending on the distance between the support and the track. These analyses will provide the infrastructure manager with valuable information on the opportunity to implement measures: • Reducing the risk of a collision with an engineering structure due to a track departure from a train, • and/or mitigating its consequences, for example, the implementation in place of a guide rail or guide wall.	SNCF R	As of 31/12/2025, the response to this recommendation was not Not yet available.	O
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Date of report	Title of the investigation	BEA-TT Recommendation No.	BEA-TT Recommendation Title	Entity	Status of actions pursued by the EPSF at the end of 2025	Code
12/2025	the fall on the the way of driver of a TGV in motion December 24th 2024 in Crisenoy (77)	R	Check without delay that all driving personnel are complying with the frequency of Fitness for Safety visits and medical visits work. Strengthen the monitoring and reporting system, and remind management of the action to be taken based on the discrepancies observed. If you wish to investigate, for example, the possibility of intervention by ASCT with the support of the TGV Driving Support Center (or other PACs) to manage, in particular, future VACMA alarm cases, by studying the The need for the formal agreement of a competent manager does not exempt not, in the immediate future, to recall: ÿ to any agent not authorized to drive trains the prohibition of to operate the control mechanisms of a train engine, ÿ to the various Driving Support Hubs the prohibition on giving instructions relating to the control components of motor vehicles at all personnel not authorized to perform this task. Quickly distribute a memo to the ship's service agents without waiting for the revision of VO00250: • allowing for the precise and error-free identification of competent agents having authority over them to manage any situation related to the security of railway operations and personnel, - ÿ to handle security events on high-speed rail. • Review VO00250. • More generally, remind all agents, regardless of their rank the absolute obligation to respect the rules that save lives and the guidelines hierarchical. On this occasion, carefully analyze how the message is received and ambiguities are cleared up. • Ensure that the service phone of the onboard service agents gives them access to the CCSE as easily as to the COS. Remind the COS that he must first ensure that the security services are being well involved from the outset in the management of an event.	SNCF V	In its reply letter to the BEA-TT, SNCF Voyageurs stated committed to : • Strengthen in 2025 the actions undertaken in common between the establishments Voyageurs and medical services. These actions are broken down following the main identified areas: - o Continue to increase the delegation of visits to health nurses at Work within the framework of protocols established with occupational physicians and in compliance with regulations rigor; - o Supporting the teams in charge in Voyageurs establishments optimize visit scheduling occupational health medical services; - o Addressing employee "no-shows" convened, in consultation with the school administrations." • To distribute an information note in order to remind you of the priority use of contact details telephones in case of accidental stoppage, obstacle or danger; • Review the business document VO00250 from the REx of the event • Remind everyone in an information note of the Crew application functionality, equipping the professional phones of captains, allowing access to CCSE As of 31/12/2025, these actions have been implemented.	

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12/2025	the fall on the the way of driver of a TGV in motion December 24th 2024 in Crisenoy (77)	R1	Recommendation R1 for the SNCF group: To establish an organization that guarantees a clarification of the VMT framework and its proper functioning within the SNCF Group. To provide advice and support to the Group's public limited companies' establishments for to ensure a clear understanding of the issues involved in each type of visit medical.	SNCF V	As of 31/12/2025, responses to the recommendations were not yet available.	/
12/2025	the fall on the the way of driver of a TGV in motion December 24th 2024 in Crisenoy (77)	R2	Recommendation R2 to SNCF-V: Establish a mandatory contact for the driver, particularly following a rest period away from home, with a resource manager or local representative of the EF or the train escort agent at each start of service or before taking a seat on board the train.	SNCF V		/
12/2025	the fall on the the way of driver of a TGV in motion December 24th 2024 in Crisenoy (77)	R3	Recommendation R3 to SNCF-V: Evaluate, using a representative panel of support agents, the agents' level of knowledge in handling events of safety is their responsibility. Implement ongoing training actions for CBORDs to ensure mastery of the skills necessary to manage any security event.	SNCF V		/

12/2025	the fall on the the way of driver of a TGV in motion December 24th 2024 in Crisenoy (77)	R4	Recommendation R4 to SNCF-V: Improve and ensure the consistency, ergonomics and updating of documents and tools available to CBORDs.	SNCF V		/
12/2025	the fall on the the way of driver of a TGV in motion December 24th 2024 in Crisenoy (77)	R5	Recommendation R5 for EF SNCF-V and GI SNCF-R: Define and affirm for the representatives of EF SNCF-V at CNOF the predominance of the treatment of an ongoing security event over the possibility of a need for resources for a envisaged situation. Share within the CNOF all information held in order to prevent a decision from negatively interfering with the strategies defined on the event site by the participants.	SNCF V	As of 31/12/2025, responses to the recommendations were not yet available.	/
12/2025	the fall on the the way of driver of a TGV in motion December 24th 2024 in Crisenoy (77)	R6	Recommendation R6 for EF SNCF-V and GI SNCF-R: Promote and ensure the completion of investigations in accordance with document RFN IG TR4 D3 No. 1 for any event or accident of safety incident on the national rail network. Strengthen joint training for "Operations" managers and managers "Infrastructure" to the role of investigation leaders	SNCF V		/