



Czech Republic



The Rail Safety
Inspection Office

NIB ANNUAL REPORT 2025

according to Article 24(3) of Directive (EU) 2016/798

The Rail Safety Inspection Office

Czech Republic

September 2026



PREFACE TO THE REPORT

A National Investigation Body operates in the Czech Republic – The Rail Safety Inspection Office – conducting independent investigation of the causes and circumstances of railway accidents and incidents according to Directive (EU) 2016/798, the principles and requirements of which have been implemented into the national legislation. The objective of the investigation of the causes and circumstances of railway accidents and incidents is to increase the safety of railways.

This Annual Report is an annual report issued by the National Investigation Body of the Czech Republic, The Rail Safety Inspection Office, for 2025, pursuant to Art. 24(3) of Directive (EU) 2016/798. It comprises information regarding:

- the National Investigation Body
- the system of investigation of railway accidents and incidents
- the investigations of accidents and incidents completed in 2025
- the safety recommendations issued.

CONTENTS

PREFACE TO THE REPORT.....	2
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE INVESTIGATION BODY.....	4
1.1 Legal framework.....	4
1.2 Role and Mission.....	4
1.3 Organisation.....	5
1.4 Organisational flow.....	6
2. INVESTIGATION PROCESSES.....	8
2.1 Cases to be investigated.....	8
2.2 Institutions involved in investigations.....	8
2.3 Investigation process or approach of the NIB.....	8
3. INVESTIGATIONS.....	10
3.1 Overview of investigations completed in 2025 identifying key trends.....	10
3.2 Investigations completed and commenced in 2025.....	10
3.3 Research studies (or Safety Studies) commissioned and completed in 2025.....	13
3.4 Summaries of investigations completed in 2025.....	13
3.5 Comment and introduction or background to the investigations.....	13
3.6 Accidents and incidents investigated during last five years (in 2021–2025).....	14
4. RECOMMENDATIONS.....	15
4.1 Short review and presentation of recommendations.....	15
4.2 Recommendations issued in 2025.....	23

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE INVESTIGATION BODY

1.1 Legal framework

Directive (EU) 2016/798 was implemented into the national legislation of the Czech Republic by Act 266/1994 Coll., on Railways, as amended, and the subsequent issue of implementing Decree 376/2006 Coll., on the System of Safe Railway Operation and Railway Transport Operation and Procedures Following Railway Accidents and Incidents, as amended.

Accidents and incidents are further divided into the following categories, reflecting their nature and consequences:

- serious accidents
- accidents
- incidents

The national legislation of the Czech Republic orders infrastructure managers (IM) and railway undertakings (RU) to investigate the causes and circumstances of railway accidents and incidents.

The accident and incident investigation performed by The Rail Safety Inspection Office is independent of any other party and independent of the investigation conducted by other bodies, especially police investigation and the investigation of the causes and circumstances of accidents and incidents conducted by infrastructure managers or railway undertakings.

1.2 Role and Mission

The National Investigation Body (NIB) was established in the Czech Republic on 1st January 2003. The mission is to guarantee independent investigation of the causes and circumstances of railway accidents and incidents. The national legislation of the Czech Republic also authorizes the National Investigation Body to investigate accidents and incidents within trams, trolleybuses and cable-ways, because all these kinds of transport are included in the same legislation regime as the railways.

The main goal of the Office's work is to prevent the occurrence of accidents and incidents. Therefore, the Rail Safety Inspection Office:

- investigates the causes and circumstances of rail accidents and incidents,
- issues safety recommendations to the National Safety Authority (NSA) and where needed by reason of the character of the recommendation, to the European Union

Agency for Railways, other administration bodies and authorities or other relevant bodies of different member states.

1.3 Organisation

On 1st January 2003, the National Investigation Body – The Rail Safety Inspection Office – was established in the Czech Republic pursuant to the provisions of Act 77/2002 Coll. The Rail Safety Inspection Office is a national body investigating the causes of railway accidents and incidents independently of any other party. As an investigation body it is independent of any infrastructure manager, railway undertaking and regulatory body. The competences of The Rail Safety Inspection Office include:


- railways (main lines, regional lines, sidings, underground)
- tram lines
- trolleybus lines
- cable-ways

The Rail Safety Inspection Office has a total of **38 employees** in five cities of the Czech Republic (Ostrava, Brno, Praha, Plzen, Ceske Budejovice). It comprises of the Central Inspectorate and four Regional Inspectorates covering the area of the entire country. The Central Inspectorate consists of the Economic Department and the Department of the Methodology.

The Economic Department plays supportive role for the Inspector General and the whole structure of The Rail Safety Inspection Office. It provides human-resource management, economic, IT and legal services and public relations.

The Department of Methodology creates and improves methodology for investigations, maintains accident investigation including the co-ordination of the regional inspectorates' activities, manages staff training, mediates communication with EU bodies and provides 24/7 reporting office for notification of accidents and incidents.

Regional Inspectorates investigate the causes of rail accidents and incidents with the aim of enabling lessons to be learned for improving the safety of railways.



1.4 Organisational flow


The structure of railway sector in the Czech Republic and relationships among the parties involved are defined in Act 266/1994 Coll., on Railways, as amended, and its implementing regulations. The legislation applies to the following transport systems:

- railways (main lines, regional lines, sidings, underground)
- tram lines
- trolleybus lines
- cable-ways

The most important bodies in the railway sector include the Czech Ministry for Transportation, The Railway Office and The Rail Safety Inspection Office. The Czech Ministry for Transportation is in charge of the national railway legislation, including implementation of the EU railway legislation. The Railway Office is the National Safety Authority carrying out certification, authorization and regulation of railway and railway transport operation and performing state supervision of railways, according to the national legislation. The Rail Safety Inspection Office is the National Investigation Body independent of any party in the railway sector.

All these authorities are involved in the system of maintaining and improving safety of railways and railway transport:

- **The Czech Ministry for Transportation** sets the framework by developing railway legislation.
- **The Rail Safety Inspection Office (NIB)** investigates railway accidents and incidents and issues safety recommendations to The Railway Office.
- **The Rail Authority (NSA)** sets and adjusts safety rules for infrastructure managers and railway undertakings.



2. INVESTIGATION PROCESSES

2.1 Cases to be investigated

The national legislation of the Czech Republic orders the National Investigation Body, The Rail Safety Inspection Office, in accordance with European principles, to investigate the causes and circumstances of serious accidents on main and regional lines, border railways and sidings. In addition, The Rail Safety Inspection Office can investigate, in cases defined by the respective law, other occurrences in the following cases:

- serious accidents regarding underground, trams, trolleybuses and cable-ways
- accidents and incidents on all types of guided transport

When making decision whether to investigate or not, The Rail Safety Inspection Office takes into account the set legal requirements (seriousness, repeating, impact on railway safety, requests from infrastructure managers, railway undertakings, the national safety authority or the Member States) as well as possibility to learn safety relevant lessons from the accident or incident.

2.2 Institutions involved in investigations

Following the occurrence of railway accident or incident, various parties may launch several independent investigations, depending on the occurrence's nature and consequences:

- **Infrastructure manager or railway undertaking** identifies the causes and circumstances of accident or incident, focusing on the drafting of preventative measures and the proposal of responsibility for the occurrence.
- **The Rail Safety Inspection Office** investigates the causes and circumstances of accident or incident with a focus on the determination of the causes and contribution factors and issue of preventative safety recommendation. The investigation shall in no case be concerned with apportioning blame or liability.
- **Czech Police** investigate accident or incident with the aim of defining responsibility for the committing of offenses or criminal acts.

2.3 Investigation process or approach of the NIB

The objective of the investigation of the causes of railway accidents and incidents is to gain knowledge for the prevention of accidents and incidents, minimize the consequences and increase the safety of railways.

Investigation performed by the National Investigation Body of the Czech Republic, The Rail Safety Inspection Office, focuses on the following aspects of each occurrence:

- independent investigation of the causes and circumstances of accident or incident (serious accidents and selected accidents and incidents only)
- meeting legal requirements for procedures following railway accident or incident by infrastructure manager and railway undertaking (for example notification without any delay, securing of accident site, etc.)

When notified about the occurrence of accident or incident by an infrastructure manager or railway undertaking, The Rail Safety Inspection Office will decide whether it will immediately go to the accident-site or not. The investigation of accident or incident may be launched immediately after the occurrence and/or later, in reaction to specific circumstances. If The Rail Safety Inspection Office launches an investigation, it will notify the European Union Agency for Railways within seven days.

The Rail Safety Inspection Office will publish the conclusions of its investigation in Investigation Report, the structure of which is based on the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2020/572. If the accident or incident occurred without any violation of legislation or internal regulations of infrastructure manager and/or railway undertaking, The Rail Safety Inspection Office issues safety recommendation with the aim of preventing reoccurrence of the accident or incident. Safety recommendation is issued also if there are other findings relevant for the safety.

3. INVESTIGATIONS

3.1 Overview of investigations completed in 2025 identifying key trends

Trends of completed investigations (last column of the table) are calculated as difference to previous year (2024).

Type of accidents investigated	Number of accidents	Number of victims		Damages in € (approx.)	Trends in relation to previous year
		Deaths	Injury *		
Collisions	8	0	42	4.985.103,-	+14 %
Derailments	2	0	1	189.947,-	-33 %
LC-accident	4	4	22	211.427,-	+33 %
Fire in RS	0	0	0	0	0 %
Acc. to person	1	1	0	1.110,-	-75 %
Other	5	0	0	8.914,-	0 %

* In the national legislation of the Czech Republic in Act 266/1994 Coll., on Railways, as amended, is already mentioned only term harm to health (there is no definition of serious injury or any other classification of injuries).

3.2 Investigations completed and commenced in 2025

Investigations completed in 2025

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis	Completed (date)
7. 10. 2022	Level-crossing accident: km 312,048 between Libice nad Cidlinou – Podebrady stations	i	27. 3. 2025
20. 10. 2022	Level-crossing accident: km 9,925 between Brandys nad Labem – Neratovice stations	i	24. 11. 2025
5. 12. 2022	Other: Collision of shunting operation with oncoming shunting operation in Kolin station	i	23. 9. 2025
21. 6. 2023	Level-crossing accident: km 164,187 between Liberec – Mnisek u Liberce stations	i	15. 5. 2025
22. 12. 2023	Other: Unauthorised movement of rolling stock other than SPAD in Praha Malesice station	i	22. 4. 2025
16. 2. 2024	Other: SPAD in Havlickuv Brod station	i	20. 1. 2025
5. 3. 2024	Accident to person caused by RS in motion: between Roznov pod Radhostem – Stritez nad Becvou stations	i	25. 2. 2025

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis	Completed (date)
21. 5. 2024	Level-crossing accident: km 12,330 between Cermna nad Orlici - Borohradek stations	i	20. 1. 2025
24. 5. 2024	Trains collision: in Praha hlavní nadraží station	i	25. 3. 2025
9. 6. 2024	Trains collision with an obstacle with consequent derailment: in Milovice station	i	21. 7. 2025
10. 6. 2024	Other: SPAD in Chrudim station	i	13. 2. 2025
15. 6. 2024	Train derailment: in Rychnov u Jablonce nad Nisou station	i	28. 3. 2025
27. 6. 2024	Trains collision: between Holubice – Rousinov stations	i	27. 10. 2025
14. 7. 2024	Train derailment: between Lednice stop – Bori les station	i	24. 6. 2025
6. 8. 2024	Other: SPAD in Chodov station	i	7. 4. 2025
22. 8. 2024	Trains collision with an obstacle: between Praha Radotín - Dobruška stations	i	30. 9. 2025
18. 9. 2024	Trains collision: in Odbočka Balabánka station	i	16. 9. 2025
1. 11. 2024	Trains collision: in Praha Malesice station	i	28. 7. 2025
3. 12. 2024	Other: Unauthorised train movement other than SPAD in Hostivice station	i	23. 9. 2025
22. 1. 2025	Trains collision with an obstacle: between Olbramovice - Sumna stations	i	23. 9. 2025

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

Investigations commenced in 2025

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis
13. 1. 2025	Other: SPAD in Jihlava station	i
22. 1. 2025	Trains collision with an obstacle: between Olbramovice - Sumna stations	i
22. 1. 2025	Trains collision with an obstacle: in Ceska Trebova station	i
4. 2. 2025	Train derailment: in Ostrava Bartovice station	i
28. 2. 2025	Train derailment: in Hustopeče nad Bečvou station	i
12. 3. 2025	Train derailment: in Znojmo station	i
2. 4. 2025	Train derailment: in Ostrava hlavní nadraží station	i

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis
2. 4. 2025	Train derailment: between Olomouc Nova Ulice – Olomouc hlavní nadraží stations	i
18. 5. 2025	Train derailment: in Zdar nad Sazavou station	i
2. 6. 2025	Other: Unauthorised train movement other than SPAD in Nemočice station	i
5. 6. 2025	Other: SPAD in Drahotuse station	i
5. 6. 2025	Other: SPAD in Letovice station	i
9. 9. 2025	Trains collision with an obstacle: between Dolní Lipka - Hanušovice stations	i
17. 9. 2025	Train derailment: between Odbočka Zadulka – Opatov stations	i
18. 9. 2025	Other: SPAD in Vsetatý station	i
14. 10. 2025	Other: Unauthorised movement of rolling stock other than SPAD in Mariánské Lázně station	i
15. 10. 2025	Train derailment: in Kolin station	i
20. 10. 2025	Other: SPAD in Studenka station	i
26. 10. 2025	Other: SPAD of shunting operation with consequent derailment in Prerov station	i
27. 10. 2025	Level-crossing accident: km 7,009 between Breznice - Belčice stations	i
2. 11. 2025	Train derailment: in Neratovice station	i
20. 11. 2025	Other: Accident to person caused by RS in motion: in The City of Praha – metro line A in Muzeum station	ii
20. 11. 2025	Trains collision: in Zlín station	i
25. 11. 2025	Trains collision with an obstacle: in Roudnice nad Labem station	i
23. 12. 2025	Level-crossing accident: km 61,796 between Lenora - Volary stations	i

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive)

3.3 Research studies (or Safety Studies) commissioned and completed in 2025

Safety Studies completed in 2025

Date of commission	Title of the Study (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis	Completed (date)
	none		

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

Safety Studies commenced in 2025

Date of commission	Title of the Study (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis
	none	

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

3.4 Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

See annex of this report.

3.5 Comment and introduction or background to the investigations

Date of commission	Title of the Study (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis
	none	

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

Investigations commenced in 2025 and not followed

Date of commission	Title of the Study (Occurrence type, location)	Legal basis
	none	

Basis for investigation: i = According to the Safety Directive, ii = On national legal basis (covering possible areas excluded in Article 2, §2 of the Safety Directive), iii = Voluntary – other criteria (National rules/regulations not referred to the Safety Directive).

3.6 Accidents and incidents investigated during last five years (in 2021–2025)

Rail investigations completed in 2021–2025

The table groups investigations by year of their completion.

Accidents investigated		2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	TOT
Serious accidents (Art 20.1)	Train collision	3	1	1	0	2	7
	Train collision with an obstacle	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Train derailment	0	0	1	0	0	1
	Level-crossing accident	2	1	3	1	1	8
	Accident to person caused by RS in motion	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Fire in rolling stock	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Involving dangerous goods	0	0	0	0	0	0
Accidents (Art 20.2)	Train collision	6	4	3	2	3	18
	Train collision with an obstacle	3	3	1	3	3	13
	Train derailment	7	12	6	3	2	30
	Level-crossing accident	9	4	6	2	3	24
	Accident to person caused by RS in motion	1	1	0	3	1	6
	Fire in rolling stock	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Involving dangerous goods	0	0	0	0	0	0
Incidents		3	4	2	1	3	13
TOTAL		34	30	23	15	18	120

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Short review and presentation of recommendations

A safety recommendation can be issued only on a basis of an independent investigation performed by The Rail Safety Inspection Office (NIB). Safety recommendation is usually issued when an accident occurred without any violation of legislation or internal regulations of infrastructure manager and/or railway undertaking, or if there are other findings relevant for the safety.

According to national legislation, safety recommendations are not legally binding. When a recommendation is issued, all relevant parties (for example National Safety Authority, another administration body, etc.) are obliged to adopt their own preventative safety measures based on the safety recommendation issued.

Implementation of recommendations during 2021 – 2025

Recommendations issued		Recommendation implementation status					
		Implemented		In progress		Not to be implemented	
Year	[No.]	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]
2021	21	9	43	11	52	1	5
2022	16	5	31	10	63	1	6
2023	16	3	19	13	81	0	0
2024	13	5	38	7	54	1	8
2025	10	3	30	5	50	2	20
TOTAL	76	25	33	46	60	5	7

Accidents with safety recommendations issued in 2021 – 2025

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location)	Status of implem.	Completed (date)
22. 1. 2019	Level-crossing accident: km 5,446 between Vesec u Liberce – Jablonec nad Nisou stations	partially implemented	12. 2. 2021
1. 4. 2019	Other: Collision of the trolleybus with the tram in The City of Brno – in the area of the road crossing Masna, Krenova and Kozeluzska streets	implemented	10. 3. 2021

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location)	Status of implem.	Completed (date)
3. 11. 2019	Train derailment: in Praha Malesice station	implemented	17. 2. 2021
5. 11. 2019	Other: Unauthorised train movement other than SPAD between Cachnov – Skutec stations	not implemented	6. 1. 2021
9. 12. 2019	Trains collision with an obstacle: in Zamrsk station	implemented	16. 4. 2021
21. 2. 2020	Level-crossing accident: km 3,119 between Dobris – Mala Hradice stations	partially implemented	14. 1. 2021
20. 3. 2020	Other: Collision of rolling stocks during shunting operation in Kolin station	implemented	15. 3. 2021
7. 5. 2020	Unauthorised movement of shunting operation other than SPAD with consequent collision with other rolling stock and derailment between Decin Prostredni Zleb - Decin vychod stations	in progress	28. 5. 2021
12. 6. 2020	Train derailment: between Jindris – Blazejov stations	implemented	1. 2. 2021
29. 6. 2020	Other: Unauthorised train movement other than SPAD in Svetla nad Sazavou station	partially implemented	22. 2. 2021
7. 7. 2020	Trains collision: between Pernink – Nove Hamry stations	implemented	18. 1. 2021
10. 7. 2020	Trains collision: in Praha Bechovice station	partially implemented	16. 12. 2021
14. 7. 2020	Trains collision: between Uvaly – Cesky Brod stations	partially implemented	25. 11. 2021
15. 7. 2020	Level-crossing accident: km 12,688 between Velke Opatovice - Sebetov stations	in progress	26. 3. 2021
21. 7. 2020	Level-crossing accident: km 14,025 between Cermna nad Orlici - Borohradek stations	partially implemented	30. 6. 2021

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location)	Status of implem.	Completed (date)
22. 7. 2020	Train derailment: in Lazne Kynzvalt station	implemented	14. 7. 2021
9. 9. 2020	Trains collision: in Kdyne station	partially implemented	29. 11. 2021
18. 9. 2020	Level-crossing accident: km 100,674 in Kunovice station	partially implemented	1. 7. 2021
19. 12. 2020	Train derailment: in Hluboka nad Vltavou Zamosti station	partially implemented	18. 10. 2021
15. 1. 2021	Other: Tram trains collision in The City of Ostrava - between Elektra – Karolina stops	implemented	24. 6. 2021
4. 3. 2021	Level-crossing accident: km 71,113 between Slatinany – Chrast u Chrudimi stations	implemented	14. 10. 2021
6. 11. 2020	Derailment during shunting operation in Kolin station	in progress	21. 1. 2022
3. 3. 2021	Train derailment: in Namest nad Oslavou station	implemented	14. 4. 2022
5. 5. 2021	Trains collision with an obstacle: between Trebovice v Cechach – Ceska Trebova stations	partially implemented	24. 5. 2022
6. 5. 2021	Other: SPAD in Roztoky u Prahy station	partially implemented	1. 4. 2022
10. 5. 2021	Other: SPAD in Praha Masarykovo nadrazi station	partially implemented	10. 1. 2022
5. 6. 2021	Trains collision with an obstacle: in Trinec station	in progress	12. 7. 2022
18. 6. 2021	Trains collision: Collision of shunting operation with standing passenger train in Cercany station	in progress	16. 9. 2022
15. 7. 2021	Train derailment: between Chvalkov – Vcelnicka stations	implemented	22. 4. 2022

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location)	Status of implem.	Completed (date)
31. 7. 2021	Trains collision: in Nemcice nad Hanou station	implemented	21. 4. 2022
4. 8. 2021	Train derailment: in Kralupy nad Vltavou station	partially implemented	15. 12. 2022
22. 9. 2021	Accident to person caused by RS in motion: in Bori les station	implemented	15. 8. 2022
28. 10. 2021	Level-crossing accident: km 18,495 between Sedlejšov - Telc	partially implemented	14. 7. 2022
31. 10. 2021	Trains collision: Collision of shunting operation with standing freight train between Cesky Tesin – Albrechtice u Ceskeho Tesina stations	partially implemented	7. 6. 2022
29. 12. 2021	Level-crossing accident: km 69,846 between Rozna – Bystrice nad Pernštejnem stations	not implemented	13. 9. 2022
1. 4. 2022	Train derailment: in Bavorov station	implemented	31. 10. 2022
4. 7. 2022	Level-crossing accident: km 44,499 between Klatovy – Janovice nad Uhlavou stations	partially implemented	23. 12. 2022
14. 8. 2020	Other: Uncontrolled movement of rolling stocks from Keraclay Nehvizdy siding with consequent derailment and collisions with an obstacle in Mstetice station	implemented	8. 8. 2023
14. 7. 2021	Other: SPAD in Poricany station	in progress	10. 1. 2023
13. 1. 2022	Trains collision: in Prosenice station	partially implemented	9. 1. 2023
29. 1. 2022	Train derailment: in Teplice v Cechach station	in progress	16. 2. 2023

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location)	Status of implem.	Completed (date)
18. 3. 2022	Other: Derailment of rolling stock during shunting operation with consequent Accident to person caused by RS in motion, collision with standing rolling stock, collision with an obstacle and other derailment in Obrnice station	implemented	12. 4. 2023
19. 5. 2022	Other: Injury of the employee of IM by electric current during repair of damaged contact line in Kolin station	in progress	29. 5. 2023
7. 6. 2022	Other: Damage of contact line during ride of the train in Otrokovice station	in progress	19. 6. 2023
27. 6. 2022	Trains collision: in Bohumin station	in progress	16. 6. 2023
24. 7. 2022	Level-crossing accident: km 6,557 between Zlin Malenovice – Zlin stred stations	in progress	1. 8. 2023
15. 9. 2022	Other: Unauthorised train movement other than SPAD in Hostejn station	partially implemented	29. 8. 2023
11. 10. 2022	Level-crossing accident: km 3,779 between Stritez nad Becvou – Valasske Mezirici stations	implemented	7. 6. 2023
26. 10. 2022	Level-crossing accident: km 11,019 between Malsice – Sudomerice u Bechyne stations	partially implemented	12. 5. 2023
9. 11. 2022	Trains collision: Collision of shunting operation with freight train in Melnik station	in progress	6. 11. 2023
8. 12. 2022	Train derailment: in Brno Malomerice station	partially implemented	15. 11. 2023
28. 5. 2023	Level-crossing accident: km 89,133 between Krasna Lipa - Rumburk stations	partially implemented	24. 11. 2023
5. 6. 2023	Level-crossing accident: km 26,819 between Bystrice pod Hostynem - Holesov stations	in progress	19. 12. 2023

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location)	Status of implem.	Completed (date)
10. 2. 2022	Other: Unauthorised train movement other than SPAD in Decin Prostřední Zleb station	partially implemented	5. 9. 2024
17. 2. 2022	Trains collision with an obstacle with consequent derailment: between Zdarec u Skutce - Hlinsko v Čechách stations	in progress	10. 7. 2024
10. 3. 2022	Trains collision: in Odbočka Skály station	partially implemented	11. 4. 2024
10. 10. 2022	Trains collision with an obstacle with consequent derailment: in Poricany station	implemented	25. 1. 2024
13. 2. 2023	Trains collision with an obstacle: between Cervenka - Štěpánov stations	not implemented	9. 9. 2024
16. 2. 2023	Other: Accident to person caused by RS in motion: in "LASSELSBERGER Chlumčany u Dobrušky" siding	implemented	27. 2. 2024
10. 7. 2023	Level-crossing accident: km 7,491 in Božice u Znojma station	implemented	12. 6. 2024
4. 8. 2023	Other: SPAD in Dluhonice station	implemented	30. 7. 2024
3. 10. 2023	Accident to person caused by RS in motion: between Belčice - Blatná stations	partially implemented	4. 6. 2024
17. 10. 2023	Level-crossing accident: km 0,580 in Olomouc hlavní nádraží station	in progress	12. 9. 2024
9. 11. 2023	Level-crossing accident: km 18,441 in Pelhřimov station	implemented	7. 10. 2024
13. 12. 2023	Train derailment: in Brumov station	partially implemented	11. 12. 2024
16. 1. 2024	Other: SPAD in Rynoltice station	in progress	7. 6. 2024
7. 10. 2022	Level-crossing accident: km 312,048 between Libice nad Cidlinou – Písečnice stations	in progress	27. 3. 2025

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation (Occurrence type, location)	Status of implem.	Completed (date)
20. 10. 2022	Level-crossing accident: km 9,925 between Brandys nad Labem – Neratovice stations	partially implemented	24. 11. 2025
5. 12. 2022	Other: Collision of shunting operation with oncoming shunting operation in Kolin station	partially implemented	23. 9. 2025
21. 6. 2023	Level-crossing accident: km 164,187 between Liberec – Mnisek u Liberce stations	in progress	15. 5. 2025
5. 3. 2024	Accident to person caused by RS in motion: between Roznov pod Radhostem – Stritez nad Becvou stations	implemented	25. 2. 2025
21. 5. 2024	Level-crossing accident: km 12,330 between Cermna nad Orlici - Borohradek stations	not implemented	20. 1. 2025
24. 5. 2024	Trains collision: in Praha hlavní nadrazi station	partially implemented	25. 3. 2025
6. 8. 2024	Other: SPAD in Chodov station	implemented	7. 4. 2025
22. 8. 2024	Trains collision with an obstacle: between Praha Radotin - Dobruška stations	implemented	30. 9. 2025
18. 9. 2024	Trains collision: in Odbočka Balabenka station	not implemented	16. 9. 2025

4.2 Recommendations issued in 2025

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation, Safety recommendation
7. 10. 2022	Level-crossing accident: km 312,048 between Libice nad Cidlinou – Podebrady stations
Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): to ensure that infrastructure managers of the railway, with the exception of special railway, to take its own measure forcing at increasing safety at multi-track level crossings with level crossing safety installation that is partially (for one of the tracks) not in operation, either by placing traffic signs informing about the possible movement of rolling stocks even when the level crossing is open or traffic signs reminding priority for rolling stocks over road traffic or obligation to guard the level crossing when movement on a track where the level crossing safety installation is not in operation;	

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation, Safety recommendation
	to ensure that traffic signs, according to previous point of the safety recommendation at the IMs, in cooperation with road administrative authorities, will be used uniformly in the Czech Republic (type, inscription, location).
20. 10. 2022	Level-crossing accident: km 9,925 between Brandys nad Labem – Neratovice stations
Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): - to take measure to ensure addition of the level crossing No. P2752 which is secure by warning crosses to flashing light level crossing warning system with barriers which with regard to point of view of optical and manual barrier will reduce probability of the driver's entrance at the level crossing when he does not respond to light signalization in the warning state; - to take measure to ensure that IMs and RUs in their technological procedures for resolving the situation after an occurrence, establish the obligation to prioritize saving human lives and health, i.e. actively detect whether at an occurrence has caused harm to health and to transmit information about the number of injured as a priority to the relevant medical rescue service and fire rescue service and if information about harm to health is not known to assume that it has occurred.	
5. 12. 2022	Other: Collision of shunting operation with oncoming shunting operation in Kolin station
Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): - to ensure that the infrastructure manager SŽ reviews and clearly defines which tracks must be listed during the notification of shunting technology in an internal regulation; - to ensure that the infrastructure manager SŽ assess and alternatively establishes the duty to notify the shunting control employee of the end point of the part of shunting route all the time, when the part of shunting route ends at a fixed signal device valid for shunting operation in front of which there is not a sufficiently long diverging section of track in an internal regulation; - to ensure that the infrastructure manager SŽ establishes the duty to notify the shunting control employee of the end point of the part of shunting route all the time, when the part of shunting route ends at a fixed signal device valid for shunting operation, that forms (at the time of creation or passing of a part of a shunting route) indirect lateral protection of another route created at the same time	

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation, Safety recommendation
	in an internal regulation; to analyze the possibility of implementing a technical measures which would regulate the risks associated with unauthorized movement behind a signal device by shunting set of cars.
21. 6. 2023	Level-crossing accident: km 164,187 between Liberec – Mnisek u Liberce stations
Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): to take own measure to ensure addition of the level crossing No. P2819 which is secure by flashing light level crossing warning system to a level crossing system equipped with barriers which with regard to point of view of optical and manual barrier will reduce probability of the driver's entrance at the level crossing when he does not respond to light signalization in the warning state.	
5. 3. 2024	Accident to person caused by RS in motion: between Roznov pod Radhostem – Stritez nad Becvou stations
Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): as part of its activities as a national safety authority to accept a measure which ensures that for train drivers at railways (with exception of metro) will be determine obligation to give the warning signal „Attention“ not only in situation when he notices a person in the structure gauge of track where he is driving or will drive but also in situation when he notices a person in immediate nearness of track where he is driving or will drive [it does not relate a person who is situated in distance more than 2.5 meters from track centre-line on platform (in safe area which is marked by yellow line)].	
21. 5. 2024	Level-crossing accident: km 12,330 between Cermna nad Orlici - Borohradek stations
Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): to take own measure to ensure addition of the level crossing No. P4874 which is secure by flashing light level crossing warning system to a level crossing system equipped with barriers which with regard to point of view of optical and manual barrier will reduce probability of the driver's entrance at the level crossing when he does not respond to light signalization in the warning state.	
24. 5. 2024	Trains collision: in Praha hlavní nadraží station

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation, Safety recommendation
Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): to ensure at RU České dráhy, a. s. and other under consideration RUs to adopt own measure which ensure that the minimum technological times for turn trains [at change of driver's cab of a train driver or at change of driver's cab of a train driver associated with relief of train drivers on the axis after the train has finished running and for the consequent starting (turning) train departing from the turning point in the opposite direction] consisting from electric or diesel multiple-unit train, locomotives with set of rolling stocks arranged between locomotives or a locomotive with set of rolling stocks and with driving trailer, so that train drivers can perform all the tasks (activities) assigned to them by legal regulations and uniform technological procedures of RU when operating and driving the rolling stock even before the departure of the train from the point of departure on the track (e.g. railway station), will be determine by internal regulations. Minimum technological times would be have create total average real times necessary to perform all set operations and activities of train drivers at real operation and corresponding time reserves to next activities given by character of railway transport.	
6. 8. 2024	Other: SPAD in Chodov station
Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): as part of its activities as National Safety Authority to adopt own measure to ensure at IMs of railway tracks national and regional continue to realize and deepen a system of practical training for train dispatchers, when it is create crisis situations requiring an appropriate reaction to immediate threat of safe operation of railway transport in order to avert an occurrence or reduce their consequences without unnecessary delay.	
22. 8. 2024	Trains collision with an obstacle: between Praha Radotín - Dobruška stations
Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA): as part of its activities as a national safety authority to accept a measure which ensures at infrastructure manager Správa železnic, státní organizace that will be in practice realize adjustment of a technological procedures contained in preparing new edition of internal regulation SŽ D1 Transport and signal regulation which will be valid from 14.12.2025, specifically that signalman/woman record real times of pass of trains pass the main (section) signal device of signal box to relevant transport documentation, and that as soon as possible before this internal	

Date of occurrence	Title of the investigation, Safety recommendation
	regulation will come into effect yet.
18. 9. 2024	Trains collision: in Odbočka Balabenka station
Addressed to the Czech Ministry of Transport (alternatively with other ministries): to adopt a measure which ensure adjustment of a legal regulations so that NSA will be inform about fact that it was assign a punishment for criminal offence of danger under the influence of addictive narcotic for holder of licence of train driver.	

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time: 7th October 2022, 8:57 (6:57 GMT).
Occurrence type: level crossing accident.
Description: collision of the shunting between operating control points with the car at the level crossing No. P3585.
Type of train: the shunting between operating control points.
Location: open line between Libice nad Cidlinou and Poděbrady stations, the level crossing No. P3585, km 245,044.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
Elektrizace železnic Praha, a. s. (RU of the shunting between operating control points);
driver of the car (level crossing user).
Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 250 000,-

Causal factors:

- unauthorized entry of the car driver onto the level crossing No. P3585 with the level crossing safety installation switched off for the affected (excluded) track line at the time when the barrier beams were raised and the warning signal ended after the train passed along the non-excluded track, and at the same time when a shunting between operating control points was approaching the level crossing along the excluded track, and the car driver did not convince if can ride safe over the level crossing;
- exceed the maximum permitted speed prescribed by the instruction to drive with increased caution to and over the level crossing No. P3585 more than twice by the driver of the the shunting between operating control points resulting in a reduction in the ability of the car driver to react to the situation and to fulfill the obligation not to enter onto level crossing if an approaching rolling stock is already visible.

Contributing factor:

- none.

Systemic factor:

- none.



Recommendation:

Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

- to ensure that infrastructure managers of the railway, with the exception of special railway, to take its own measure forcing at increasing safety at multi-track level crossings with level crossing safety installation that is partially (for one of the tracks) not in operation, either by placing traffic signs informing about the possible movement of rolling stocks even when the level crossing is open or traffic signs reminding priority for rolling stocks over road traffic or obligation to guard the level crossing when movement on a track where the level crossing safety installation is not in operation;

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

- to ensure that traffic signs, according to previous point of the safety recommendation at the IMs, in cooperation with road administrative authorities, will be used uniformly in the Czech Republic (type, inscription, location).



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time: 20th October 2022, 8:14 (6:14 GMT).
Occurrence type: level crossing accident.
Description: collision of the regional passenger train No. 19406 with the lorry at the level crossing No. P2752.
Type of train: the regional passenger train No. 19406.
Location: open line between Brandýs nad Labem and Neratovice stations, the level crossing No. P2752, km 9,925.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 19406);
driver of the lorry (level crossing user).
Consequences: 2 fatalities, 1 injury;
total damage CZK 310 447,-

Causal factor:

- an unauthorized entrance of the lorry at the level crossing No. P2752 at the time when the train No. 19406 was arriving, caused by behavior of the driver of the lorry, who did not make sure whether he could safely pass the level crossing.

Contributing factor:

- meteorological effect – heavy to very heavy fog, which reduced visibility in an observation fields at the level crossing No. P2752 according to ČSN 73 6380.

Systemic factor:

- none.

Recommendation:

Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

- to take measure to ensure addition of the level crossing No. P2752 which is secure by warning crosses to flashing light level crossing warning system with barriers which with regard to point of view of optical and manual barrier will reduce probability of the driver's entrance at the level crossing when he does not respond to light signalization in the warning state;
- to take measure to ensure that IMs and RUs in their technological procedures for resolving the situation after an occurrence, establish the obligation to prioritize saving human lives and health, i.e. actively detect whether at an occurrence has caused harm to health and to transmit information about the number of injured as a priority to the relevant medical rescue service and fire rescue service and if information about harm to health is not known to assume that it has occurred.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time: 5th December 2022, 20:23 (19:23 GMT).

Occurrence type: trains collision.

Description: unauthorized movement (SPAD) of the pulling shunting set of cars behind the shunting signal device Se49 with consequent collision with the pushing shunting set of cars and derailment of 1 rolling stock of the pushing shunting set of cars.

Type of train: 2 shunting sets of cars.

Location: Kolín station, the shunting signal device Se49, km 346,783. Place of the collision was between the switches No. 310 and 69, km 346,887.

Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the pulling shunting set of cars);
ČD Cargo, a. s. (RU of the pushing shunting set of cars).

Consequences: 1 injury;
total damage CZK 6 577 414,-

Causal factor:

- failure to respect the signal „Shunting forbidden“ of the shunting signal device Se49 at Kolín station by the train driver of the pulling shunting set of cars.

Contributing factor: none.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendations:

Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

- to ensure that the infrastructure manager SŽ reviews and clearly defines which tracks must be listed during the notification of shunting technology in an internal regulation;
- to ensure that the infrastructure manager SŽ assess and alternatively establishes the duty to notify the shunting control employee of the end point of the part of shunting route all the time, when the part of shunting route ends at a fixed signal device valid for shunting operation in front of which there is not a sufficiently long diverging section of track in an internal regulation;
- to ensure that the infrastructure manager SŽ establishes the duty to notify the shunting control employee of the end point of the part of shunting route all the time, when the part of shunting route ends at a fixed signal device valid for shunting operation, that forms (at the time of creation or passing of a part of a shunting route) indirect lateral protection of another route created at the same time in an internal regulation;
- to analyze the possibility of implementing a technical measures which would regulate the risks associated with unauthorized movement behind a signal device by shunting set of cars.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time: 21st June 2023, 13:53 (11:53 GMT).
Occurrence type: level crossing accident.

Description: collision of the regional passenger train No. 6385 with the trailer of the lorry which transported building machine (wheel excavator).

Type of train: the regional passenger train No. 6385.

Location: open line between Mníšek u Liberce and Liberec stations, the level crossing No. P2819, km 164,187.

Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 6385);
driver of the lorry (level crossing user).

Consequences: 0 fatality, 21 injuries;
total damage CZK 4 240 736,-

Causal factor:

- an unauthorized entrance of the lorry with loaded trailer at the level crossing No. P2819 at the time when the regional passenger train No. 6385 was arriving, caused by behavior of the lorry driver, who did not respect the light and acoustic warning of the level crossing safety equipment and did not make sure whether he could safely pass the level crossing.

Contributing factor: none.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation:

Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

- to take own measure to ensure addition of the level crossing No. P2819 which is secure by flashing light level crossing warning system to a level crossing system equipped with barriers which with regard to point of view of optical and manual barrier will reduce probability of the driver's entrance at the level crossing when he does not respond to light signalization in the warning state.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time:	21 st December 2023, 23:57 (22:57 GMT).
Occurrence type:	unauthorized movement other than SPAD.
Description:	unsecured movement of the detached rolling stock to the operated track.
Type of train:	detached rolling stock.
Location:	Praha-Malešice station, station track No. 6, km 4,240; place of stop the rolling stock was at Praha-Vysočany station, station track No. 5, km 6,583.
Parties:	Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM); RegioJet a. s. (RU of the detached rolling stock).
Consequences:	0 fatality, 0 injury; total damage CZK 0,-
Causal factor:	insufficient securing of the detached rolling stock A-RJ 61 81 28-90 032-0 against uncontrolled movement by the train driver of the shunting operation, who beyond the scope of his work duties separate the rolling stock from the rest of the train set on station track No. 6 of Praha-Malešice station, and failure to secure the rolling stock against uncontrolled movement by dispatcher/shunter, who fulfilled the duties of the shunting leader.
Contributing factor:	none.
Systemic factor:	none.
Recommendation:	not issued.



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time: 16th February 2024, 15:03 (14:03 GMT).

Occurrence type: unauthorized movement (SPAD).

Description: unauthorized movement of the shunting operation behind the signal device Se12 and consequent ride into the train route for the regional passenger train No. 8747.

Type of train: the shunting operation;
the regional passenger train No. 8747.

Location: Havlíčkův Brod station, the station track No. 2a, the signal device Se12, km 223,292.

Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the shunting operation and the regional passenger train No. 8747).

Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 204 100,-

Causal factor:

- failure to respect the signal „Shunting forbidden“ of the shunting signal device Se12 at Havlíčkův Brod station by the train driver of the shunting operation.

Contributing factor:

- the station dispatcher of Havlíčkův Brod station did not tell required information during permission for shunting to the train driver of the shunting operation, did not give an order to release the train route and did not stop of interfering shunting.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation: not issued.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time: 5th March 2024, 8:46 (7:46 GMT).
Occurrence type: an accident to a person caused by a rolling stock in motion.
Description: collision of the regional passenger train No. 13206 with the worker (employee of the infrastructure manager).
Type of train: the regional passenger train No. 13206.
Location: open line between Rožnov pod Radhoštěm and Střítež nad Bečvou operating control points, km 9,112.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 13206).
Consequences: 1 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 27 754,-

Causal factor:

- failure to ensure own safety by the track foreman at entrance and stay in structure gauge of the track line at the time while the the regional passenger train No. 13206 was moving.

Contributing factor:

- the train driver of the regional passenger train No. 13206 did not warn by warning signal „Attention“ the track foreman who was situated in structure gauge of the track line or in walking and handling clearance or nearness and who entered to the structure gauge before the occurrence, because the train driver did not see the track foreman although the track foreman was located in place where he was detectable from cab of the train driver.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendations:

Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

- as part of its activities as a national safety authority to accept a measure which ensures that for train drivers at railways (with exception of metro) will be determine obligation to give the warning signal „Attention“ not only in situation when he notices a person in the structure gauge of track where he is driving or will drive but also in situation when he notices a person in immediate nearness of track where he is driving or will drive [it does not relate a person who is situated in distance more than 2.5 metres from track centre-line on platform (in safe area which is marked by yellow line)].

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time:	21 st May 2024, 17:12 (15:12 GMT).
Occurrence type:	level crossing accident.
Description:	collision of the regional passenger train No. 1895 with a car at the level crossing No. P4874.
Type of train:	the regional passenger train No. 1895.
Location:	open line between Borohrádek and Čermná nad Orlicí stations, the level crossing No. P4874, km 12,330.
Parties:	Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM); České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 1895); driver of the car (level crossing user).
Consequences:	2 fatalities, 0 injury; total damage CZK 484 482,-
Causal factor:	• an unauthorized entrance of the car at the level crossing No. P4874 at the time when the regional passenger train No. 1895 was arriving, caused by behavior of the car driver, who did not respect the light and acoustic warning of the level crossing safety equipment and did not make sure whether he could safely pass the level crossing.
Contributing factor:	• none.
Systemic factor:	• none.
Recommendation:	
Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):	• to take own measure to ensure addition of the level crossing No. P4874 which is secure by flashing light level crossing warning system to a level crossing system equipped with barriers which with regard to point of view of optical and manual barrier will reduce probability of the driver's entrance at the level crossing when he does not respond to light signalization in the warning state.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time: 24th May 2024, 10:31 (8:31 GMT).
Occurrence type: trains collision.
Description: unauthorized movement (SPAD) of the regional passenger train No. 9123 behind the main (departure) signal device S26 of Praha hl. n. station and consequent collision of the regional passenger train No. 9123 with the shunting operation.
Type of train: the regional passenger train No. 9123;
the shunting operation.
Location: Praha hl. n. station, station head in direction to Praha-Vršovice and Praha-Vyšehrad, track between the shunting signal Se16 and the switch No. 7, km 185,469. Place of the unauthorized movement was the the main (departure) signal device S26, km 185,614.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 9123 and the shunting operation).
Consequences: 0 fatality, 2 injuries;
total damage CZK 68 153 259,-
*) The amount of damage was not final at the date of the report publishing.

Causal factor:

- failure to respect the signal „Stop” of the main (departure) signal device S26 at Praha hl. n. station by the train driver of the regional passenger train No. 9123 due to unconscious mistake of the train driver which manifested in the unauthorized movement of this train without dispatching from Praha hl. n. station and consequent unobservation of signal (unconviction about signal code) during ride of the train to relevant main (departure) signal device.

Contributing factor:

- non-acceptance of appropriate measure on the base previously safety recommendation which NIB recommended, that until to installation operation trains under sight European Train Control System (ETCS), to ensure to addition missing safety safeguard by technical equipment or other way, e.g. extend obligation of head of train attending crew with train with passenger transport or first person of train attending crew from front forefront of train give to train driver signal „Consent with departure” after conviction that movement of train is allow by relevant main signal device or other way.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation:


Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

- to ensure at RU České dráhy, a. s. and other under consideration RUs to adopt own measure which ensure that the minimum technological times for turn trains [at change of driver's cab of a train driver or at change of driver's cab of a train driver associated with relief of train drivers on the axis after the train has finished running and for the consequent starting (turning) train departing from the turning point in the

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

opposite direction] consisting from electric or diesel multiple-unit train, locomotives with set of rolling stocks arranged between locomotives or a locomotive with set of rolling stocks and with driving trailer, so that train drivers can perform all the tasks (activities) assigned to them by legal regulations and uniform technological procedures of RU when operating and driving the rolling stock even before the departure of the train from the point of departure on the track (e.g. railway station), will be determine by internal regulations. Minimum technological times would be have create total average real times necessary to perform all set operations and activities of train drivers at real operation and corresponding time reserves to next activities given by character of railway transport.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time: 9th June 2024, 16:40 (14:40 GMT).

Occurrence type: train collision with a railway technical device.

Description: unauthorized movement of the regional passenger train No. 25635 behind the main (route) signal device Sc2 with consequent collision with the rail buffer stop and derailment.

Type of train: the regional passenger train No. 25635.

Location: Milovice station, station track No. 2, rail buffer stop, km 5,553.
Place of the unauthorized movement was the main (route) signal device Sc2, km 5,550.

Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 25635).

Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 3 438 527,-

Causal factor:

- failure to stop of the regional passenger train No. 25635 in front of the main (route) signal device Sc2 with signal „Stop” at Milovice station, caused by incorrect driving style of the train driver, specifically:
 - not to start braking so, that the train safely stopped in front of the main (route) signal device Sc2 due to not to watch an operation and diagnostic monitor and a position of controller mode of ride on the control panel at a driver's footplate pointing out to deactivation of function (mode) target braking and necessity operate of brake controller.

Contributing factor: none.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation: not issued.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time: 10th June 2024, 6:21 (4:21 GMT).

Occurrence type: an unauthorized movement (SPAD).

Description: unauthorized movement of the regional passenger train No. 15186 behind the main (departure) signal device L1a with signal „Stop”.

Type of train: the regional passenger train No. 15186.

Location: Chrudim station, the main (departure) signal device L1a, km 81,058.

Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 15186).

Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 0,-.

Causal factor:



- failure to respect the signal „Stop” of the main (departure) signal device L1a at Chrudim station by the train driver of the regional passenger train No. 15186 caused by train driver’s unconscious mistake, he did not notice the signal „Stop” while driving to the signal device L1a.

Contributing factor: none.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation: not issued.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time: 15th June 2024, 15:11 (13:11 GMT).

Occurrence type: train derailment.

Description: derailment of the regional passenger train No. 5414.

Type of train: the regional passenger train No. 5414.

Location: Rychnov u Jablonce nad Nisou station, the switch No. 2, km 143,294.

Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
ARRIVA vlaky, s. r. o. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 5414).

Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 1 038 055,-

Causal factor:


- change of gauge of the third wheelset of rolling stock of regional passenger train No. 5414 caused by releasing the connection between the right wheel tyre and the wheel rim in direction of ride.

Contributing factor: none.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation: not issued.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time:	27 th June 2024, 8:43 (6:43 GMT).
Occurrence type:	trains collision.
Description:	unauthorized movement (SPAD) of the service train No. 52199 behind the main (departure) signal device S1 at Holubice station with consequent collision with the freight train No. 54035 between Holubice and Rousínov stations.
Type of train:	the service train No. 52199; the freight train No. 54035.
Location:	Holubice station, the station track No. 1, the main (departure) signal device S1, km 28,898. Place of trains collision was in km 30,705 between Holubice and Rousínov stations.
Parties:	Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM and RU of the service train No. 52199); TOMI-REMONT a.s. (RU of the freight train No. 54035).
Consequences:	0 fatality, 1 injury; total damage CZK 5 283 520,-
Causal factor:	failure to respect the signal „Stop” of the main (departure) signal device S1 at Holubice station by the train driver of the service train No. 52199 caused by train driver's unconscious mistake, he did not notice the signal „Stop” while driving to the signal device S1.
Contributing factor of trains collision:	muting and failure to perform a functional test of the on-board radio station located on the service train No. 52199.
Systemic factor:	none.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025


ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time: 14th July 2024, 12:28 (10:28 GMT).
Occurrence type: train derailment.
Description: derailment of 2 rolling stocks of the regional passenger train No. 4583.
Type of train: the regional passenger train No. 4583.
Location: open line between Lednice railway stop and Boří les station, km 5,113.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 4583).
Consequences: 1 injury;
total damage CZK 3 710 619,-
Causal factor:

- exceeding of the safety limit of track gauge and change of gauge as a result of insufficient holding of fastenings on the rotten wooden sleepers due to failure to adopt adequate measures to ensure safe guideway operating and guided transport operating.

Contributing factor: none.
Systemic factor: none.
Recommendation: not issued.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time: 6th August 2024, 16:38 (14:38 GMT).
Occurrence type: unauthorized movement (SPAD).
Description: unauthorized movement (SPAD) of the regional passenger train No. 1671 behind the main (departure) signal device L2 and entry to the train route for the regional passenger train No. 7007.
Type of train: the regional passenger train No. 1671;
the regional passenger train No. 7007.
Location: Chodov station, the station track No. 2, the main (departure) signal device L2, km 21,096.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger trains No. 1671 and No. 7007).
Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 18 757,-

Causal factor:

- unauthorized set the regional passenger train No. 1671 in motion and failure to respect the signal „Stop” of the main (departure) signal device L2 at Chodov station by the train driver without would:
 - it was dispatched the regional passenger train No. 1671 from Chodov station;
 - the train driver visually convinced whether the main (departure) signal device L2 at Chodov station allows movement of the train.

Contributing factor: none.



Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation:

Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

- as part of its activities as National Safety Authority to adopt own measure to ensure at IMs of railway tracks national and regional continue to realize and deepen a system of practical training for train dispatchers, when it is create crisis situations requiring an appropriate reaction to immediate threat of safe operation of railway transport in order to avert an occurrence or reduce their consequences without unnecessary delay.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time:	22 nd August 2024, 13:33 (11:33 GMT).
Occurrence type:	unsecured movement.
Description:	unsecured movement of the regional passenger train No. 9940 behind the main (section) signal device of Kazín operating point with block apparatus (hereinafter signal box) into the block section which was occupied by the regional passenger train No. 8838 and consequent collision with the damage contact line.
Type of train:	the regional passenger trains No. 9940 and No. 8838.
Location:	open line between Praha-Radotín and Dobřichovice stations, Kazín signal box, the main (section) signal device Lo, the line track No. 2, km 15,152. A place of collision with the damage contact line was between Kazín and Horní Mokropsy signal boxes, the line track No. 2, between the contact line supports No. 172 (km 15,410) and No. 174 (km 15,470).
Parties:	Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM); České dráhy, a.s. (RU of the regional passenger trains No. 9940 and No. 8838).
Consequences:	0 fatality, 0 injury; total damage CZK 266 023,-
Causal factor:	• permission of ride of the regional passenger train No. 9940 by hand calling-on signal behind the main (section) signal device Lo of Kazín signal box into the block section which was occupied by the previous regional passenger train No. 8838 which caused by series of failures at performance of transport service, that: ◦ the signalwoman at Kazín signal box did not continuously observe a condition of an elements of a level crossings safety installations and a line safety and signalling plant at Kazín signal box, from which were evident occupying of the block section of the line track No. 2 between Kazín and Horní Mokropsy signal boxes before the occurrence; ◦ the signalwoman at Kazín signal box did not find out (did not come to realize) that the previous regional passenger train No. 8838 already passed at signal box and on base of this mistake gave for other employees who controlled railway transport between Praha-Radotín and Dobřichovice stations (i.e. both station dispatchers and signalmán/woman at Kosoř and Horní Mokropsy signal boxes) wrong information about a position of this train at line, when she said that the train stands in front of the main (section) signal device Lo of Kazín signal box and this employees proceeded from this wrong information at their work activity; ◦ the signalwoman at Kosoř signal box did not notify other employees who controlled railway transport between Praha-Radotín and Dobřichovice stations about possible danger, when she got wrong information about the position of the previous regional passenger train No. 8838 at line from the signalwoman at Kazín signal box and she did not immediately intervene although it was located

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

the regional passenger trains No. 8838 and 9940 at the same time on the line track No. 2 between Kazín and Horní Mokropsy signal boxes.

Contributing factor:

- absence of an obligation that signaller/woman at signal boxes keep an evidence of times of individual trains at relevant operating points – signal boxes, e.g. so time data write time data down in transport documentation so, that this employees have relevant information about real pass of trains by signal boxes and they do not have to use only their memory.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation:

Addressed to the Czech National Safety Authority (NSA):

- as part of its activities as a national safety authority to accept a measure which ensures at infrastructure manager Správa železnic, státní organizace that will be in practice realize adjustment of a technological procedures contained in preparing new edition of internal regulation SŽ D1 Transport and signal regulation which will be valid from 14.12.2025, specifically that signaller/woman record real times of pass of trains pass the main (section) signal device of signal box to relevant transport documentation, and that as soon as possible before this internal regulation will come into effect yet.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time:	18 th September 2024, 7:38 (5:38 GMT).
Occurrence type:	trains collision.
Description:	unauthorized movement (SPAD) of the regional passenger train No. 7763 behind the signal device 301VS with consequent collision with end of the standing regional passenger train No. 9408.
Type of train:	the regional passenger train No. 7763; the regional passenger train No. 9408.
Location:	Balabenka junction point, the main (entry) signal device 301VS, km 5,200. Place of the collision was at the track No. 301K, km 5,147.
Parties:	Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM); KŽC Doprava, s. r .o. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 7763); České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 9408).
Consequences:	0 fatality, 37 injuries; total damage CZK 31 614 162,-
Causal factor:	the instructor-train driver of the regional passenger train No. 7763 did not ensure corresponding speed (which was given by a signal „Speed 80 km/h and Warning“ of the main (departure) signal device L2 at Praha-Vysočany station) of this train at a ride to the main (entry) signal device 301VS at Balabenka junction point so that the train will stop in time in front of this signal device.
Contributing factor:	none.
Systemic factor:	none.
Recommendation:	
Addressed to the Czech Ministry of Transport (alternatively with other ministries):	to adopt a measure which ensure adjustment of a legal regulations so that NSA will be inform about fact that it was assign a punishment for criminal offence of danger under the influence of addictive narcotic for holder of licence of train driver.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time: 1st November 2024, 10:24 (9:24 GMT).

Occurrence type: trains collision.

Description: unauthorized movement (SPAD) of the freight train No. 53051 behind the main (departure) signal device S1, entry to the train route and collision with the freight train No. 61020 and consequent derailment of the both trains.

Type of train: the freight train No. 53051;
the freight train No. 61020.

Location: Praha-Malešice station, the main (departure) signal device S1, km 4,038. The place of the collision was at the switch No. 9ab, km 3,946.

Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
GJW Praha spol. s r. o. (RU of the freight train No. 53051);
ČD Cargo, a. s. (RU of the freight train No. 61020).

Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 8 776 026,-

Causal factor:

- failure to respect the signal „Stop” of the main (departure) signal device S1 at Praha-Malešice station due to:
 - the train driver of the freight train No. 53051 followed signal „Continue” of the main (departure) signal device S2 at Praha-Malešice station which was not intended for this train;
 - the head guard of the freight train No. 53051 did not observe the track and signals and he did not alert the train driver of the need to stop the train.

Contributing factor: none.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation: not issued.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time: 3rd December 2024, 8:36 (7:36 GMT).

Occurrence type: unsecured movement.

Description: unsecured movement of the long distance passenger train No. 1233 to the station track No. 4 occupied by the detached rolling stocks.

Type of train: the long distance passenger train No. 1233.

Location: Hostivice station, the main (entry) signal device S, km 15,456.

Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
ARRIVA vlaky s.r.o. (RU of the long distance passenger train No. 1233).

Consequences: 0 fatality, 0 injury;
total damage CZK 0,-

Causal factor:

- permission of movement of the long distance passenger train No. 1233 on a calling-on signal from the main (entry) signal device S to the station track No. 4 occupied by the detached rolling stocks at Hostivice station.

Contributing factor:

- limited functionality of the station interlocking plant after trailing of the switch No. 24 which made it impossible to fully secure movement of the long distance passenger train No. 1233.

Systemic factor: none.

Recommendation: not issued.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025



Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

ACCIDENT Summary

Date and time: 22nd January 2025, 16:57 (15:57 GMT).
Occurrence type: trains collision with an obstacle.
Description: collision of the regional passenger train No. 24836 with the obstacle (broken off part of the treetop) which fell on a track.
Type of train: the regional passenger train No. 24836.
Location: open line between Olbramkostel and Šumná stations, km 116,610.
Parties: Správa železnic, státní organizace (IM);
České dráhy, a. s. (RU of the regional passenger train No. 24836).
Consequences: 0 fatality, 1 injury;
total damage CZK 518 642,-
*) The amount of damage was not final at the date of the report publishing.
Causal factor:

- disruption of a structure gauge of the line track between Olbramkostel and Šumná stations by the obstacle – broken off part of the treetop which grew in a railway protective area in an impact distance from the structure gauge as a result of its limited vitality and a defective growth of a skeletal branch when it was not selected to removing within checking activity to ensuring of operability of the line track and it was not removed.

Contributing factor:

- failure of stability of a weakened valley of a tree crown skeletal branch (oak) caused by the load of a thick layer of rime.

Systemic factor: none.
Recommendation: not issued.

Annex – Summaries of investigations completed in 2025

