

NSA Annual Safety Report

Reporting year: 2015



Contents

A.	Scope of the report.....	3
B.	Introductory Section	3
C.	Organisation	5
D.	The development of railway safety	7
E.	Important changes in legislation and regulation	14
F.	The development of safety certification and authorisation.....	15
G.	Supervision of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers	18
H.	Reporting on the application of the CSM on risk evaluation and assessment	20
I.	NSA Conclusions on the reporting year – Priorities.....	20
J.	Alternative measures through derogations regarding ECM certification scheme.....	21
K.	Sources of information	21
L.	Annexes	21

A. Scope of the report

According to Article 18 of the Railway Safety Directive (RSD as follows) the National Safety Authorities (NSA as follows) have to prepare annually a report which covers the trend of the Common Safety Indicators (CSI as follows), the changes in the national legislation, the development of the safety certification and safety authorization system and the experiences of the related supervision activities.

With this report the Hungarian NSA intends to provide insight on the safety related processes of the Hungarian railway market and to communicate its activity in publicity and for the European Railway Agency.

This Annual Report covers the country's railway safety performance in the light of the year 2015 with the application of the common structure that the European Railway Agency proposed in its guidelines.

B. Introductory Section

1. Introduction to the report

This report presents an overview of the processes concerning the safety of railway transport, the condition of the safety of the Hungarian railway sector, the changes of the rules, and the activities of the Hungarian NSA. Also shows the CSI statistics of 2015 and gives an analysis of the trends on the safety performance of the country.

2. A brief introduction into the national legislation in the light of the EU legislation

The Hungarian railway transportation's basic principles are laid down in the Act no. CLXXXIII of 2005 on Railway Transportation (Railway Act as follows). This is in harmony – among others – with the RSD, the Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and Council, Directive 2007/59/EC of the European Parliament and Council, Commission Regulation No. 445/2011/EU, Commission Decision No. 2011/765/EU.

There are Government and Ministry Decrees which specify the details of the Railway Act's regulation. This includes the GKM Decree no. 40/2006 of the Ministry of Economy and Transport which corresponds with the RSD, the Commission Regulations no. 653/2007/EC, 1158/2010/EU and 1169/2010/EU; the NFM Decree no. 19/2011 (V.10.) of the Ministry of National Development which is identical to the RSD, the Directive 2007/59/EC of the European Parliament and Council; the Government Decree no. 203/2009 (IX.18.) which describes professionally and in details all the health requirements and the way of the examination procedure of people working in railway safety related jobs.

The latest part of the EU legislation related to the railway sector is applied in an 'as is' form. E.g. most of the TSIs don't have peculiar national rules.

3. The railway network

Based on the Railway Act, the elements of the railway infrastructure in Hungary are classified in five regional categories. These serve different purposes and various conditions must be fulfilled in order to operate and use them.

Open access railway infrastructure: The length of the Hungarian rail network is 7690 km. Annex A contains the map of the Hungarian railway network showing the major lines. There are two Infrastructure Managers in Hungary, the MÁV Hungarian State Railways Co. (MÁV Co.) and the GySEV Co. The major part (7251 km) of the network is managed by MÁV Co. There are no high-speed lines in Hungary. The national infrastructure includes 2830 kilometres of lines operating as part of the Trans-European freight corridors, as well as all other major nation-wide railway lines.

The Regional infrastructure is appointed for regional commercial railway activity; it expands over no more than three counties or up to the limit of 400 km. Nowadays, only narrow-gauge railway lines belong to this group. It includes altogether 480 km of railway lines, which primarily serves passenger transport for touristic purposes.

The Municipal railway network serves for public transport between a city and its suburbs. The length of this network is 210 km and consists of public rail network and other different transport means.

Local/City railway networks include tracks within the city borders and its surrounding areas, as well as rail service between a city and surrounding suburbs. The local network of Budapest, Debrecen, Miskolc and Szeged belongs to this group. In these cities their respective transportation companies are operating the railway, underground, tramway and trolley infrastructure and are also providing scheduled passenger service. That's why from the viewpoint of the railway regulatory environment the local railway network operating companies are 'integrated railway companies'. That means they are acting as RU and IM in the same time. It is a great challenge because they have to fulfil both the requirements of RUs and IMs.

Private railway networks are operated by the owner of the industrial sidings. These can be found at harbours, logistical complexes, mines (usually gravel), power-stations and large factories (i.e. car- or steel factory, oil refinery, chemical plant, paper factory).

The list of the Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers operating in Hungary can be found in Annex A.

3. Summary – General Trend Analysis

The table below summarizes the key indicators of the railway safety performance since the beginning of the reporting regime.

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total number of all accidents	155	180	142	147	152	186	190	156
Number of serious injuries	60	84	70	76	88	87	73	38
Number of fatalities	115	92	82	84	72	102	108	109
Number of precursors	740	18	754	391	602	352	518	783
Total precursors of accidents with signals passed at danger	8	7	10	18	21	18	18	11
Number of level crossing accidents	44	39	42	38	37	35	28	33
Number of valid Part B Safety Certificates	14	20	32	35	36	43	42	42
Number of ECM Certificates*	-	-	-	5	8	15	20	21
Number of Maintenance Functions Certificates**	-	-	-	0	0	4	6	15

*= Numbers show only the ECM Certificates issued by the Hungarian NSA as certification body

**= Numbers show only the Maintenance Functions Certificates issued by the Hungarian NSA as certification body

In 2015, the number of significant accidents decreased significantly by 21 % compared to the previous year. This is considered as a very good result of the Hungarian railway sector, as the 5-years-long trend of increasing numbers has stopped and this indicator returned to its medium value from the earlier top levels. The main reason is that the number of serious injuries is on its lowest level since the 2008's beginning of data collection. The number of fatalities increased by one according to last year, maintaining on a high level, actually it is the 2nd highest value since 2008. This shows that railway still

collects its death-toll, proving that the safety of railway operation and equipment is just one side of the coin. From the other side, it is important to behave properly on railway premises. This is true for car-drivers, passengers and cyclists too. Regarding the safety of level-crossings, after last year's decrease, the trend turned again into climb. This underlines the importance of conducting an active campaign for popularising the rule-obeying and attentive behaviour at these dangerous places.

The number of precursors continued its eclectic trend, resulting for the reporting year its top value. The cause behind of this is the still high number of broken rails and a top level in the number of track buckles and other track misalignments. Along with this, a broken axle case happened and the number of SPADs is still relatively high but it is less than any time in the past 4 years.

Further analysis will follow in the 2nd paragraph of Chapter D. in this report.

Detailed statistical data can be found in Annex C.1.

C. Organisation

1. Introduction to the organisation

The National Transport Authority established by the government, started its operation on 1st of January 2007 under the supervision of the Ministry. As the legal successor to the General Inspectorate of Transport, the Central Inspectorate of Transport, the Local Transport Inspectorates in the counties and the Civil Aviation Authority. Its duty is carrying out authorization tasks in all fields of the different transport modes. The Military Aviation Authority was integrated into the National Transport Authority on the 1st of July 2007. From 1st of July 2008 the Hungarian Rail Office has also been functioning within the National Transport Authority as an independent body. From 2010 the different tasks of road transport has been divided between the National Transport Authority and the county and capital government offices.

The National Transport Authority is an independent organization with a central budgeting.

In the field of rail transport, the National Transport Authority acts with national jurisdiction.

During its work, the National Transport Authority makes decisions in mind of improving the safety performance of the transport system.

The Railway Department of the National Transport Authority acts as the Hungarian NSA.

2. Organisational structure; relationship with other national bodies

The diagrams can be found in Annex B.

Railway Department (current staff: 54 people)

- Represents the NSA at RISC, ILGGRI and ERA events
- Gives opinion on railway legislation, technical directives and regulations, makes suggestions to amend them
- Provides assistance to the ministry for the preparation of draft proposals for legislations, concerning the railway sector
- Deals with various tasks within the conventional, urban, narrow gauge and industrial rail networks nationally in the following fields:
 - Railway Safety and Supervision Unit
 - Performs its task nationally within the conventional, private rail and urban transport network.

- Issues safety certificates and authorizations, ECM certificates.
- Assures the fulfilment of the interoperability in case of every subsystem.
- Supervises the operational and maintenance activity, and checks the compliance with legal framework.
- Supervises RUs, IMs, ECMs.
- Informs the leaders of the relevant fields on the experiences of supervisions and prepares an annual report for the president of the NSA by 28th of February of each year, concerning the previous year.
- Carries out legal action in the cases of offensive behaviour or when railway safety is put to risk.
- Prepares the Annual report.
- Deals with the tasks given by the ERA.
- Represents the NSA at the Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary in case of accidents.
- Railway Mechanical Unit
 - Issues type licences and places conventional, urban, narrow gauge, etc. railway vehicles in service,
 - Carries out on-track tests of vehicles,
 - Authorises the construction, modification, demolition and placing in service of mechanical equipment (eg. scales, turntables, cranes, etc.) and operational facilities (eg. elevators, escalators), and further supervises the operational status of these items.
 - Deals with cases concerning special railway systems (eg. checking condition of vehicles for operational safety, type and modification authorisations etc.) and the placing in service of railway vehicles.
- Railway Infrastructure Unit
 - Authorises the establishment, placing in service, modification and the tearing of railway tracks and other infrastructure elements (eg. signalling, bridges, tunnels, etc.) nationally.
 - Authorises the establishment, placing in service, modification and the tearing of railway interlocking and train control systems.
 - Acts as specialized authority.
 - Contributes to regional development concepts, programs and town planning in terms of rail transport.
 - Manages the register of rail infrastructure.
- Examination and Training Supervision Unit
 - Supervises and controls the training and examinations of engine drivers and other employees related to railway safety.
 - Approves the corporate instructions of the railway undertakings related to railway staff training and development or activities affecting the safety of the railway operation.
 - Defines the strategy, directives and requirements of the examination and other materials of courses concerning railway professional staff training and development.
 - Registers professional tutors and examiners.
 - Issues driving licences and complementary certificates for engine drivers.
 - Appoints examiners.
 - Transposes foreign rail qualifications.

D. The development of railway safety

1. Initiatives to maintain/improve safety performances

Hungary fully implemented all essential requirements of the Railway Safety Directive 2004/49/EC in its national law.

In Hungary the Transportation Safety Bureau (independent from the NSA and other organizations in the railway sector) is responsible for the investigation of transport accidents. According to the act No. CLXXXIV of 2005 its main duty is the independent technical investigation of aviation, railway and shipping accidents and incidents. To increase the safety level of the transport system the NIB issues recommendations if necessary. The purpose of the independent investigation is to find the cause of the accident or incident to prevent similar future events, but not its duty to determine the liability.

The recommendations which were issued and addressed to the NSA can be found in table D.1.1.

Please note that in the following table:

- Investigation Committee means the NIB's group of experts investigating the given accident,
- NSA refers to NSA HU (National Transport Authority),
- For the explanation of other abbreviations please refer to Annex C.3.

Table D.1.1 - Safety measures triggered by accidents/precursors

Accidents/precursors which triggered the measure			Safety measure decided
Date	Place	Description of the trigger	
16 th December, 2014	Rákosrendező station	Train No. 21125 (empty passenger stock run) passed No. 'K3' exit signal at danger at Rákosrendező station. The train split open switch No. 16 and stopped appr. 250 m after the exit signal. There was no traffic on the track at the time of occurrence.	<p>The main reason of the accident was that the locomotive driver misunderstood the exit signal's aspect: due the curvy tracks, he mixed the adjacent tracks 'yellow' signal aspect with the forbidding aspect exit signal on the track he was travelling. Additional important circumstances were that the train was running behind of its schedule, endangering the on time departure of the service that will be the passenger stock's next run. This was caused because of the lack of necessary regulation regime of the movements of the maintenance facility where the train was serviced before its run.</p> <p>BA2014-1357-5-01: The IC determined that the movements between 'Rákosrendező' and 'Istvánteleki Főműhely' Maintenance Facility are not correctly regulated by the infrastructure managers and operator railway undertakings which is potentially dangerous. That's why in this safety recommendation the Transportation Safety Bureau proposed the National Transportation Authority and the involved RUs to revise the current processes in order to ensure the safe running of trains between the above mentioned two stations.</p>
6 th January, 2015	Tímár street station on Budapest Suburban Railway line H5	The 5 th wagon of train No. 4093 derailed with 2 axles due bad track conditions.	<p>The IC established that the evaluation of the track's plane distortion was performed during the track surveillance measurements along the Budapest Suburban Railway network, but they apply the base lengths of the national networks, which is not appropriate for the wheel base of the bogies of the rolling stock used on the line.</p> <p>BA2015-0023-5-01: The Transportation Safety Bureau recommends the National Transport Authority to initiate the overview of the track supervision rules defined as part of the safety management system and to modificate it if necessary, for the use of the appropriate base length. In the case of accepting and implementing the recommendation the conclusions drawn from the evaluation of plane distortion values would be in accordance with the actual risks of derailment originating from such distortions.</p>
7 th April, 2015	Jánoshegy, narrow gauge	On the 'Children's railway' narrow	The IC determined that the maintenance of narrow gauge networks are based on the outdated, deficient but at some parts too strict Instruction No. D56 for the allowed dimension limits of railway tracks.

	railway station	gauge line, the locomotive No. Mk45-2002 of train No. 30233 derailed and turned on. No one was injured.	BA2015-0315-5-01: The Transportation Safety Bureau recommends National Transport Authority to initiate the IM's revision of Instruction D.56 – including reasonably less strict dimension limits which are proportionate to the safety risks.
23 rd July, 2015	Csorna station	Passenger train No. 9912 collided with a car at No. SR1 level crossing at Csorna station. In the accident, all four people sitting in the car died on the scene.	The IC determined during the on-scene investigation that the road signs warning the drivers for the oncoming railway crossing are missing, deficient, damaged and hard to see. BA2015-0729-5-01A: TSB recommends the Inspectorate of Transport of Győr-Moson-Sopron County Government Office to review the design and the environment of the level crossing and to take actions as necessary to have the road signs repaired and to provide uninterrupted visibility of the level crossing's warning lights.

2. Detailed data trend analysis

The number of all accidents: From the year 2009, after a bigger fall back in 2010, shows a slowly increasing tendency with a bigger jump in 2013 but in 2014 this trend has slowed down significantly: this number only grew with 6 cases. This favourable trend improved significantly, as in 2015 this indicator decreased to a medium level, braking the 5-years-long trend of increasing numbers.

The above result is because of a big drop in the number of serious injuries which decreased by 52 %. Most serious injuries were caused by accidents to persons by rolling-stock in motion. Simultaneously level-crossing accidents maintained their significant, 1/3 share in this category. Unfortunately, due passenger-train collision accident, it is the first time since 2011, that passengers were injured seriously while sitting on the train. 3 passengers were injured this way.

From a 'user' aspect, unauthorized persons (15 from the total 38 cases) and level-crossing users (11) dominate in the statistics followed by passengers (9) and a still significant number (3) of employees.

In 2015, the number of fatalities increased by 1 according to the previous year. The share among 'users' reflects the same structure as the serious injuries but the number of unauthorized persons died in railway accidents is still gives the biggest part of the number of fatalities.

79 unauthorized persons lost his life this way, which is less than in 2014 (85) but still higher than between 2011 – 2013. The best year was 2012 with 41 persons. 25 level-crossing users died in railway accidents in 2015. Sadly, the number increased by 38 % according to 2014 after a drop of 22 % related to 2013.

An interesting fact is that regarding level-crossing users, the number of serious injuries decreased significantly, by around 74 % while the death toll maintained on its same high level. The reason behind this could be searched in the road-vehicle industry. It seems that modern vehicles provide better protection against small-medium accidents and simultaneously, the average age of the cars owned in Hungary might have improved.

Unfortunately, also 2 employees (highest value since 2011) and 3 passengers (same as in 2014, 2012 and 2011) died in railway accidents.

The reason for the latter is the improper behaviour of passengers. It often happens that despite of the warnings they tend to get off or board the train while it is moving or in other cases they get off on the wrong side of the train, not where the platform is.

Most fatal accidents were accidents to persons caused by movement of trains and the level-crossing accidents.

In 2015, the number of significant accidents decreased significantly by 21 % compared to the previous year. This is considered as a very good result of the Hungarian railway sector, as the 5-years-long trend of increasing numbers has stopped and this indicator returned to its medium value from the earlier top levels. The main reason is that the number of serious injuries is on its lowest level since the 2008's beginning of data collection. The number of fatalities increased by one according to last year, maintaining on a high level, actually it is the 2nd highest value since 2008. This shows that railway still collects its death-toll, proving that the safety of railway operation and equipment is just one side of the coin. From the other side, it is important to behave properly on railway premises. This is true for car-drivers, passengers and cyclists too. Regarding the safety of level-crossings, after last year's decrease, the trend turned again into climb. This underlines the importance of conducting an active campaign for popularising the rule-obeying and attentive behaviour at these dangerous places.

The number of precursors continued its eclectic trend, resulting for the reporting year its top value. The cause behind of this is the still high number of broken rails and a top level in the number of track buckles and other track misalignments. Along with this, a broken axle case happened and the number of SPADs is still relatively high but it is less than any time in the past 4 years.

There were 6 fires in rolling stock and 6 derailments.

Regarding the precursors, the number broken-rail situations continued its hectic trend, producing its lowest value since 2011. The level of SPADs decreased slightly but is still unsatisfying and need attention. There were 10 track-buckles in 2015 without consequences. This value is high, so the NSA plans to focus on this topic as well during the IM's audits. In 2015, there were no wrong-side signalling failures and broken wheels. The number of broken axles decreased to 1 case.

Transport of dangerous goods: The safety level of the transportation of dangerous goods was favourable in 2014 as well, since still no accidents occurred.

There were significant accidents which caused major traffic disruption, significant costs or attracted public's attention:

- On 20th April, 2015 shortly after midnight, one car of freight train No. 65822-1 derailed at Pécel station at a speed of 25 km/h because of a broken axle and damaged the track 300 m long.




*The derailed freight wagon of train No. 65822-1 at Pécel station on 20th April, 2015
(Photo's courtesy of the Hungarian NIB)*

- on 1st June, 2016 passenger train No. 2329 could not stop at the designated place and collided with the bumper, at the end of its arrival track in Budapest-Nyugati railway station at a speed of 14 km/h resulting the minor injury of 1 passenger.
- on 17th July, 2015 at Rajka station, during the shunting with the locomotive and wagons of the recently arrived train No. 44288-1, the shunted wagons collided with the consist standing on the same track. The battery of the locomotive driver's radio had been discharged but the driver did not realize this fact. Also, they failed to switch to communicate by hand-signals and inducing emergency braking when the foreman of the shunting movement got no response to his orders.



*The derailed empty tank wagons at Rajka station after the collision on 17th July, 2015
(Photo's courtesy of GYSEV Co.)*

- on 16th August, 2015 local passenger train No. 33512 left Acsa-Erdőkurt station despite of the previously given written order to stay stopped at the station and meet with the opposing passenger train. The passenger train collided with train No. 33517. At the moment of the collision, the velocities of the trains were 23 km/h and 28 km/h. The two train drivers realized the dangerous situation and immediately applied the emergency brake, but they could not manage to avoid the collision. In the accident, 3 passengers and one driver were injured seriously and 14 passengers and 2 other staff members suffered light injuries.



*The two collided train's cab (upper image) and the trains seen from distance (lower picture) after collision on 16th August, 2015
(Photo's courtesy of the Hungarian NIB)*

In summary, the picture of the CSIs is very colourful and shows many aspects. The decrease of the total number of accidents is a very favourable result. However, there are areas where the indicators are not developing in the desired way (e.g. level-crossing accidents, number of passengers & employees involved in accidents) but the overall safety level of the Hungarian railway network was preserved.

3. Results of the Safety Recommendations

Accidents (Details in Table D.1.1)	Result of the Safety Recommendations
16 th December, 2014	BA2014-1357-5-01: The National Transit Authority took up the leading manager role in resolving this issue. In 2016, during our supervision activities, we started to enforce the involved RU and IM to take actions in three fields. Firstly, the exact demarcation of the territories should be solved: as this is partly an open access infrastructure – it has to be defined where the endpoint of the line is, where the maintenance facility's infrastructure begins, where trains depart and terminates. The network statement and other data shall be modified according to the result Secondly, a tailored, lightweight and practical regulation shall be established between the involved parties that rules the train and shunt movements. Thirdly, the necessary staff has to be provided.
6 th January, 2015	BA2015-0023-5-01: The railway undertaking that maintains the infrastructure took the Safety Recommendation and as a part of its own safety management system, they revised instruction system and the updating is currently in progress.
7 th April, 2015	BA2015-0315-5-01: The Infrastructure Manager started the revision of the instruction system related to track surveillance and a systematic update is planned.
23 rd July, 2015	<p>BA2015-0729-5-01A: TSB recommends the Inspectorate of Transport of Győr-Moson-Sopron County Government Office to review the design and the environment of the level crossing and to take actions as necessary to have the road signs repaired and to provide uninterrupted visibility of the level crossing's warning lights.</p> <p>the Inspectorate of Transport of Győr-Moson-Sopron County Government Office performs the review of the level-crossing within its annual level-crossing supervision program.</p>

E. 1. Important changes in legislation and regulation

In 2015, the Railway Act changed five times during the year. These changes included the following:

- the scope of the act had been specified in a more detailed way,
- terminology got corrected or became more specific and updated,
- new section has been introduced regarding the railway network development strategy
- new section has introduced the opportunity for local governments to take up roles and tasks voluntarily in connection with railway network development and management,
- the regulation changed for industrial, narrow gauge and museum railways, these type of activities have to be reported for the NSA without any charge.

Also, the NFM Decree 19/2011 of the Ministry of National Development will have changed. That means that the rules for the training and examination of railway safety related jobs will have been improved.

The next modifications of No. F.1. Code of Signalling Rules and No. F.2. Code of Operational Rules came into force on 30th October, 2015.

2. Upcoming changes in the legislation and regulation

The legal environment regarding maintenance activities and Entities in Charge of Maintenance for other vehicles than freight wagons changes significantly. A new Decree was issued in 2016, which contains the detailed requirements for maintenance workshops having in the scope among others the insurance, the knowledge of staff, the equipment and the management systems. The NFM Decree 31/2010. (NFM) Decree got an extension which from one hand emphasizes that freight wagons shall have an ECM certified according to the Regulation No. 445/2011/EU. From the other hand it sets out the requirements for ECMs for other vehicles than freight wagons in a similar way as it is in Annex III. of the aforementioned EU regulation.

F. The development of safety certification and authorisation

Safety Certification:

There was a rapidly growing trend in the field of the safety certifications during the reporting year. The interest of the stakeholders for safety certification widened significantly, as it can be seen in the following details.

In 2015, 4 new safety certificates (Part A & Part B) were issued for 'Vasútépítők Kft.', 'DS VASÚT Vasúti Szolgáltató és Fuvarozó Kft.', 'Continental Railway Solution Kft.' and 'KÖZGÉP Építő- és Fémszerkezetgyártó Zártkörűen Működő Részvénnytársaság'.

Interestingly, 'Continental Railway Solution Kft.' deals mainly with passenger transport as the companies profile is to operate excursion trains besides providing traction and freight forwarding.

A new Part B safety certificate was issued for Express Group a.s. based in Slovak Republic.

3 new ECM certificates were issued by the Hungarian NSA for 'KÖZGÉP Építő- és Fémszerkezetgyártó Zártkörűen Működő Részvénnytársaság', 'MTMG Logisztikai Zártkörűen Működő Részvénnytársaság' and 'DS VASÚT Szolgáltató és Fuvarozó Korlátolt Felelősséggű Társaság'.

Regarding the renewals of the safety certificates, 5 Part A & their accompanying Part B safety certificates were renewed in 2015 and there was one amendment of safety certificate due the significant change of the scope of the RU's activity.

Among the RUs located in other MSs, there were 2 renewals of Part B safety certificates. Also, 2 ECM certificates were renewed by the Hungarian NSA.

Safety Authorization:

The year 2015, played an important role in the biggest IM's life as it's safety authorization was to be renewed. The MÁV Hungarian Railway Co. had gotten its safety authorization in 2010 at the very early days of the current safety authorization scheme, as it was issued a half year before the appearance of Commission Regulation No 1169/2010/EU. In the past years, the MÁV Co. was enforced during the NSA's supervision activities to develop its safety management system. Despite of this, it was an important task that resulted in a big workload both for the applicant and the authority to assess and fulfil the requirements of the EU regulation and adjust the procedures to the practice and to the real actions.

Finally, for MÁV Co. the renewed safety authorization was issued on 29th June, 2015 with No. HU 21 2015 0001 and is valid until 30th June, 2020. MÁV Co. is holding also an ECM certificate

regarding its own wagons used for the maintenance of the infrastructure. This ECM certificate was renewed in the same process and has the same validity, with EIN HU/31/0015/0005.

1. National legislation – starting dates – availability

Legal materials are available for the applicants on CD. Also, on the homepage of the NSA, there is a section dedicated for the legislation which relates to the railway sector. A new, redesigned and improved web-page of the NSA was launched in 2015. This contains even more information in connection with the certification processes and other important topics. The Authorities gates are always open, so RUs, IMs or private persons who have issues can consult freely with the NSA. After that for the applicants the formal requirements, the application form for Safety Certificates, ECM Certificates are provided. This practice is popular and effective, in most safety certification processes there is a close pre-engagement between the parties with great success, however it is voluntary.

In addition, the Hungarian NSA successfully reworked the information materials for the applicants. A new set of documents are available with a cleaner structure and logic resulting the decrease of administrative burden for the applicants as they need to handle less documents during the process.

2. Numerical data

See Annex E.

3. Procedural aspects

3.1. Safety Certificates Part A

Reasons for updating/amending Part A Safety Certificates

In 2015, the Safety Certificate of GYSEV Cargo Zrt. was amended because the significant change of the scope of the RU's activity. Along freight forwarding, the traction services gathered an important

Overview of the requests from other National Safety Authorities to verify/access information relating the Part A Certificate of a Railway Undertaking that applies for a Part B certificate in the other Member State

In 2015, there were no such requests from other NSAs.

NSA Charging fee for issuing a Part A Certificate

The amount of fees charged by the NSA is described in the Decree No. 72/2006. (IX. 29.) GKM of the Ministry of Economy and Transport. The fees were slightly reduced in October, 2012. In 2014 and also in 2015 there were *no changes in the fees*.

The fee depends on the number of vehicles and the type of service. The fee can vary from 3 279 € to 19 352 €.

Summary of the common problems/difficulties for the NSA in application procedures for Part A Certificates

No major problems were reported with application procedures for Part A certificates. However, it still turns out in some cases that the applicants forgot to submit the proper application form according to Commission Regulation No 653/2007/EC. A new, interesting occurrence is that there are more companies which occupies a special place in the supply chain and it is not easy for them to identify what are they railway activities.

Summary of the problems mentioned by Railway Undertakings when applying for a Part A Certificate

Usually, the formation of the Safety Management System according to Commission Regulation No 1158/2010/EU is a great challenge for the Railway Undertakings. It needs several turns to provide a material which is in compliance with the regulation. The NSA helps with consultations and with providing a check-list in which the compliance of the submitted Safety Management System documentation can be checked in details, according to the regulation.

Feedback procedure (e.g. questionnaire) that allows Railway Undertakings to express their opinion on issuing procedures/practices or to file complaints

RUs can contact the NSA in person, via written letter or in urgent cases by phone and email as well.

3.2. Safety Certificates Part B

NSA Charging fee for issuing a Part B Certificate

The amount of fees charged by the NSA is described in the Decree No. 72/2006. (IX. 29.) GKM of the Ministry of Economy and Transport. The fees were slightly reduced in October, 2012. The fee depends on the number of vehicles and the type of service. The fee can vary from 3 279 € to 19 352 €. Since 2012, there were *no changes in the application fee* of SC.

Summary of the common problems/difficulties for the NSA in application procedures for Part B Certificates

The Hungarian NSA experienced only small problems with application procedures for Part B Certificates. Most companies operate on the whole Hungarian national railway network which results in using the infrastructure of the two largest IMs. There are regulations which are different at the two IMs and in 2014, there were two applicants who had problems with identifying the different regulations and requirements. In these cases, on the applicant's request the Hungarian NSA hold personal consultation and gave the needed information for these two RUs.

Summary of the problems mentioned by Railway Undertakings when applying for a Part B Certificate

There was no problem mentioned by Railway Undertakings when applying for a Part B Certificate. Only two RUs experienced the difficulty described in the previous paragraph.

Feedback procedure (e.g. questionnaire) that allows Railway Undertakings to express their opinion on issuing procedures/practices or to file complaints

Railway Undertakings can contact the NSA in person, via written letter or in urgent cases via phone and by email.

3.3. Safety Authorisations

Feedback procedure (e.g. questionnaire) that allows Infrastructure Managers to express their opinion on issuing procedures/practices or to file complaints

Infrastructure Managers can contact the NSA in person, via written letter or in urgent cases by email.

NSA Charging fee for issuing a Safety Authorisation

The amount of fees charged by the NSA is also described in the Decree No. 72/2006. (IX. 29.) GKM. The fee can vary from 6.406 € to 11.625 €. The fees were slightly reduced in October, 2012. Since then, *there were no changes in the fees*.

G. Supervision of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers

1. The Hungarian NSA supervises the operational- and traffic-safe state of the railway tracks, the technical conditions of the operational equipment, the rolling stock and the railway workers and whether the occasional examinations and necessary repairs are completed. The RUs and IMs are obligated to ensure all conditions of free supervision, especially access to the relevant documents and equipment under supervision. If the NSA during its supervision determines an omission, it obligates the operator to conduct the necessary examination or repair, and may impose a fine on the operator, or suspend its operations.

The Hungarian NSA in its decision made within its deliberation based on Act no. CLXXXIII of 2005 takes into consideration:

- the seriousness of the infringement, its effect on the safety of the railway transport,
- the time frame during which the unlawful situation has been maintained,
- whether the breaching behaviour is chargeable,
- the previous breaching behaviour, and
- the actions to assist the measures taken to discontinue the unlawful situation, as well as the activities conducted independently to end the unlawful situation prior to the NSA's procedure.

The new regulation that appeared at the end of 2014 provides the opportunity for the NSA as well to impose a fine on the lawbreaker RUs, IMs or railway workers. The decision is based upon the same deliberation of the above listed points.

The NSA also has to deal with the public and the trade union complaints concerning railway safety.

1.1. Audits/Inspections/Checklists

The content of the annual audit programme (supervision of the conditions of the issued safety certificates):

- supervision of processes according to documents
- supervision of the Safety Management System of the RU
- reviewing the effectiveness of the measures taken after the findings of previous supervision
- checking that the lessons learned from accidents and incidents of the given RU are taken into account
- on site supervision
- supervision of running trains.

Audits/inspections are carried out by the NSA. Only 7 people are available for audits, which is about 10% of NSA's staff. These people also deal with issuing the Safety Certificates, Safety Authorizations, issue ECM Certifications, Maintenance Function Certificates, deal with public complaints and also with the accreditation of NoBos and DeBos. Experts of other units are also involved if necessary and are available.

Economic aspects: The cost of audits is included in the NSA's budget.

1.2. Vigilance aspects/Sensitive points to follow-up by the NSA

There can be mentioned two sensitive points:

- calling upon RUs or IMs to eliminate insufficiencies identified during the audit;
- examining the measures taken since the last audit/inspection.

In 2015, the NSA performed 40 audits. The audits did reveal serious discrepancies in some cases. These were the improper implementation of the SMS, failing to include the newly appeared EU and Hungarian regulations, breaching the allowed driving time and rest period rules set by national law. Also, several administrative shortcomings were identified. e.g.: incomplete preparation of route logs, the training report not complying with the rules. After the NSA issued the obligations, imposed fines and took other enforcement actions, the companies performed the necessary corrective measures.

INSPECTIONS		Issued Safety Certificates Part A	Issued Safety Certificates Part B	Issued Safety Authorisations	Other Activities (Issued ECM or Maintenance function certificates)
Number of audits of RUs/IMs for 2015	planned	*	34	1	6
	unplanned	*	6	1	3
	carried out	*	40	1	6

*= Audits for Part A Safety Certificates are included in the audits of the safety certificate Part B in the case of Hungarian RUs. Audits of RUs located in other MSs (and possessing a Part B Safety Certificate for the Hungarian railway network) are included in the number of audits of issued Safety Certificate Part B.

AUDITS		Issued Safety Certificates Part A	Issued Safety Certificates Part B	Issued Safety Authorisations	Other Activities (Issued ECM or Maintenance function certificates)
Number of inspections of RUs/IMs for 2015	planned	*	21	4	3
	unplanned	*	26	11	4
	carried out	*	47	15	7

*= Inspections for Part A Safety Certificates are included in the inspections of the Safety Certificate Part B in the case of Hungarian RUs. Inspections of RUs located in other MSs (and possessing a Part B Safety Certificate for the Hungarian railway network) are included in the number of audits of issued Safety Certificate Part B. This is because systematically the content and also the conditions of Part A and Part B Safety Certificates are interconnected.

2. Summary of the relevant corrective measures in 2015:

- registering the knowledge of routes of the engine drivers;
- enforcing the regulations authorised by the NSA;
- enforcing the operational rules of RUs;
- enforcing the loading rules of freight transport;

- enforcing RUs and maintenance workshops to properly identify and improve the technical requirements for repairing rail vehicles;
- promoting the importance of safety culture and the improvement of the RUs SMS into a more applicable way – if needed.

The observations of the audits are recorded in writing. Based on these records, the NSA decides about the further tasks.

The RUs and IMs have to make an action plan to eliminate the deficiencies and inform the NSA about the stage of implementation of their plan. The NSA could check the implementation of the plan during the next inspection or immediately and continuously depending on the nature of the case. The NSA's activity is based on the risk analysis of the processes.

3. There were no complaints from IM('s) concerning RU('s) related to conditions in their Part A/Part B Certificate.
4. There were no complaints from RU('s) concerning IM('s) related to conditions in their authorisation.

H. Reporting on the application of the CSM on risk evaluation and assessment

With the appearance of Regulation No. 402/2013/EU, the NSA started to draw the RU's and IM's attention on the changes and new requirements of the regulation. Also, these companies were informed to revise the risk-management procedures in their SMS.

NSA HU also reported to the competent Ministry in connection with the changes of the CSM.

There were several cases when NSA HU proposed an RU to carry out its risk-management procedure and send in the documentation of the decision. One example for such case was when one of the passenger transporting RU was instructed to apply its risk-management procedures to evaluate the effect of the regulation and technical specification on the operation of passenger carriage doors.

During SC and ECM certificate audits NSA HU regularly checks the register of the risks identified by the companies.

NSA Conclusions on the reporting year – Priorities

The main objective of the NSA is to improve railway safety, in accordance with the EU and national objectives.

The tasks of the NSA were carried out nearly as planned in 2015. Significant amount of resources had to be reorganized to carry out the ECM certification which is developing very well. The voluntary certification of Maintenance Workshops is getting more popular.

As a new and important task, the accreditation of NoBos and DeBos is delegated to NSA HU as well. This needs significant resources. In 2015, regarding these accreditation activities, the necessary audits also have to be carried out after the certification.

Some other tasks needed to be postponed to 2016 because of the lack of staff. With the number of tasks increasing year-by-year, more professional staff is required.

Taking a bigger part in international activities, dealing with SPAD and rolling stock fire cases are some of the important priorities of the NSA for the following time. Our NSA considers it very important to deal with the introduction of the 4th Railway Package and participate in most ERA workshops and working groups, provide the necessary information and improve the already good partnership with ERA and the other NSAs. This also results in a notable increase of workload.

I. Alternative measures through derogations regarding ECM certification scheme

According to article 14a (8) of Directive 2008/110/EC alternative measures are no longer allowed to be implemented, so Hungary does not apply such measures. Earlier issued ('MoU') certificates have already lost their validity and the involved companies have their certification according to Regulation No. 445/2011/EU.

J. Sources of information

The source of the data in the report:

- Accident, incident reports and the annual reports submitted by the railway undertakings and infrastructure managers
- IM's daily accident reports
- IM's investigation reports on accidents
- Final reports and the included safety recommendations of the investigations carried out by the Transportation Safety Bureau (NIB of Hungary), and the organisation's website (www.kbsz.hu)
- The NSA's internal background data about the RU's Safety Certificates and IM's Safety Authorizations, inspections, audits, procedures
- Complex Law Library
- ERADIS
- ERAIL database of accidents and Common Safety Indicators

K. Annexes

ANNEX A: Railway Structure Information

ANNEX B: Organisation chart(s) of the National Safety Authority


ANNEX C: CSIs data – Definitions applied

ANNEX D: Important changes in legislation and regulation

ANNEX E: The development of safety certification and authorisation – Numerical Data

ANNEX A: Railway Structure Information

A.1. Network map



A.2. List of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers

A.2.1. Infrastructure Manager(s)

Name	Address	Website/Network Statement Link	Safety Authorisation (Number/Date)	Start date commercial activity	Total Track Length/Gauge	Total Track Length HSL	Number of LC
GySEV Zrt.	9400 Sopron, Mátyás király u. 19.	www.gysev.hu	HU 01 2011 0001 2011.12.15.	2008.10.02.	439 km	-	298
MÁV Zrt.	1087 Budapest Könyves Kálmán krt. 54-60.	www.mav.hu	HU 21 2015 0001 2015.06.29.	2010.07.01.	7251 km	-	5743

A.2.2. Railway Undertaking(s) in 2014

Company Name	Address	Homapage	EIN* of Safety Certificate	Service is to begin	Activity
AWT Rail HU Zrt.	1134 Budapest, Róbert Károly krt. 64-66.	www.awt.eu	HU 11 2015 0012	16.11.2010	traction freight forwarding
BoBo Kft.	3528 Miskolc, Csele utca 10.	www.bobokft.hu	HU 11 2011 0003	02.04.2008	traction freight forwarding
boxXpress.de GmbH	21129 Hamburg, Köhlfleetdamm 5.	www.boxxpress.de	HU 12 2014 0005	16.04.2009	traction freight forwarding
BSS 2000 Kft.	2700 Cegléd, Alkotmány út 59.	www.bss2000.hu	HU 11 2011 0009	30.11.2011	traction freight forwarding

Central Railways, s.r.o.	040 01 Szlovákia, Košice, Kriva 21.	www.crw.sk	HU 12 2012 0001	01.02.2012	traction freight forwarding
CER Zrt.	1097 Budapest Könyves Kálmán krt. 16.	www.cer.hu	HU 11 2011 0004	28.11.2011	traction freight forwarding
Continental Railway Solution Kft.	1143 Budapest, Hungária krt. 80/a II/3.	http://www.continentaltrain.com	HU 11 2015 0006	15.05.2015	traction, passenger transport, freight forwarding
DB Schenker Rail Hungária Kft.	9027 Győr, Hűtőház út 23.	logistics.dbschenker.hu	HU 11 2012 0002	15.12.2011	traction
DRT Danubius Rail Transport Kft.	1064 Budapest, Podmaniczky utca 57.	www.danubiusrailtransport.hu	HU 11 2013 0001	10.04.2013	traction
DS VASÚT Kft.	4400 Nyíregyháza, Derkovits utca 74.	http://dsvasut.uniweb.hu	HU 11 2015 0003	10.05.2015	traction and freight forwarding
DUNAGÉP Szolgáltató Zrt.	2316 Tököl, Csépi út 221.	www.dunagep.hu	HU 11 2013 0005	16.06.2013	traction
Floyd Zrt.	1138 Budapest, Madarász u.47-49.	www.floyd.hu	HU 11 2014 0008	01.09.2008	traction freight forwarding
FOX Rail Zrt.	1042 Budapest, Árpád út 56, II. em. 4.	http://www.foxrail.hu	HU 11 2013 0009	10.10.2013	traction freight forwarding
G & G Kft.	6726 Szeged Torockói u. 3/b	www.gesgkft.hu	HU 11 2014 0008	16.12.2008	freight forwarding
GySEV Cargo Zrt.	9400 Sopron, Mátyás király u. 19.	www.gysevcargo.hu	HU 11 2015 0007	01.06.2010	traction freight forwarding
GySEV Zrt.	9400 Sopron Mátyás Király u. 19.	www.gysev.hu	HU 11 2011 0007	28.06.2007	passenger transport traction
Kárpát Vasút Kft.	2737 Ceglédbercel, Virág utca 9.	available on well known social networks	HU 11 2015 0004	01.05.2010	traction


KÖZGÉP Zrt.	1239 Budapest, Harasztí út 44.	www.kozgep.hu	HU 11 2015 0005	08.05.2015	traction freight forwarding
LTE Hungária Vasúti Árufuvarozó és Logisztikai Kft.	1117 Budapest, Október Huszonharmadika utca 8-10.	www.lte-group.eu	HU 11 2015 0013	24.02.2015	traction freight forwarding
LTE Logistik- und Transport GmbH	Karlauer Gürtel 1 A-8020 Graz Austria	www.lte-group.eu	HU 12 2015 0016	12.02.2010	traction freight forwarding
Magyar Vasúti Áruszállító Kft.	4028 Debrecen, Jósika utca 9.	www.mvakft.hu	HU 11 2011 0002	15.08.2011	freight forwarding
MÁV FKG Kft.	5137 Jászkisér Jászladányi u. 10.	www.fkg.hu	HU 11 2013 0010	16.11.2008	traction freight forwarding
MÁV NOSZTALGIA KFT.	1142 Budapest, Tatai út 95.	www.mavnosztalgia.hu	HU 11 2014 0011	01.06.2009	passenger transport traction freight forwarding
MÁV-START Zrt	1087 Budapest Könyves Kálmán krt. 54-60.	www.mav-start.hu	HU 11 2014 0003	01.07.2010	passenger transport traction, maintenance services
METRANS /Danubia/ a.s.	92901 Szlovákia, Dunajska Streda, Povodska cesta 18.	www.metrans.cz	HU 12 2012 0003	01.07.2012	traction freight forwarding
MMV Zrt.	1035 Budapest, Kerék u. 80.	www.mmv.hu	HU 11 2012 0004	01.10.2007	traction freight forwarding
MOL Nyrt.	1117. Budapest, Október huszonharmadika u. 18.	www.mol.hu	HU 11 2012 0001	01.04.2012	freight forwarding

MTMG Zrt.	1012 Budapest, Logodi u. 34/A	mtmgzrt.com	HU 11 2014 0009	16.11.2009	traction freight forwarding
PETROLSPED s.r.o.	98401 Lučenec, L. Svobodu 2839/1 Szlovákia	www.petrolsped.sk	HU 12 2012 0002	16.05.2012	traction freight forwarding
PKP Cargo Spółka Akcyjna	ul. Grójecka 17., PL- 02-021 Warszawa	www.pkp-cargo.pl	HU 12 2014 0009	10.05.2013	traction freight forwarding
Prvá Slovenská Železničá, a.s.	934 01 Levice, Ku Bratke 5. Szlovákia	www.psz.sk	HU 12 2014 0004	16.05.2008	traction freight forwarding
Rail Cargo Hungaria Zrt.	1033 Budapest, Váci u. 92.	www.railcargo.hu	HU 11 2013 0004	01.03.2011	traction freight forwarding
Rail Cargo Carrier Zrt.	1033 Budapest, Váci u. 92.	www.rcc.hu	HU 11 2014 0010	01.04.2013.	traction freight forwarding
RTS Rail Transport GmbH	A-8055 Graz, Puchstraße 184	www.rts-rail.com	HU 12 2011 0003	13.10.2011	traction freight forwarding
SŽDS a.s.	960 01 Zvolen, Na Štepnici 1379/1., Szlovákia	www.szds.sk	HU 12 2013 0011	16.10.2008	traction freight forwarding
Swietelsky Vasúttechnika Kft.	9500 Celldömölk, Nagy Sándor tér 14.	www.vasuttechnika.hu	HU 11 2013 0007	16.08.2013	traction freight forwarding
Szentesi Vasútépítő Kft.	6000 Szentes, Baross G. u. 2.	-	HU 11 2014 0002	16.05.2008	traction freight forwarding
Train Hungary Kft.	4028 Debrecen, Szoboszlói u. 50.	www.trainhungary.hu	HU 11 2014 0004	01.09.2007	traction freight forwarding
Vasútépítők Kft.	9031 Győr, Csaba utca 9.	www.vasutepitok.hu	HU 11 2015 0014	22.12.2015	traction freight forwarding
Vasútvillamosító Kft.	1106 Budapest, Jászberényi út 90.	www.vasutvill.hu	HU 11 2011 0005	15.11.2011	traction freight forwarding

Wiener Lokalbahnen Cargo	1230 Wien, Triesterstraße 118.	www.wlb.at	HU 12 2012 0007	16.11.2010	traction freight forwarding
Záhony-Port Zrt.	4625 Záhony, Európa tér 12.	www.zahony-port.hu	HU 11 2013 0008	16.09.2008	traction freight forwarding
ŽSSK CARGO a.s.	Bratislava, Drieňová u. 24. 820 09 Slovakia	www.zscargo.sk	HU 12 2010 0012	16.10.2010	traction freight forwarding

ANNEX B: Organisation chart(s) of the National Safety Authority

B.1. Chart: Internal organization – continued on the following page



Railway Department


Railway Tracks and Bridges Unit

Railway Engineering Unit

Railway Safety and Supervising Unit

Railway Training and Exam Supervising
Unit



B.2. Chart: Relationship with other National Bodies






ANNEX C: CSIs data – Definitions applied

C.1. CSIs data


Outcomes











Exposure data













Risk indicators












**All person fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km
(CST 6)**




Precursor to accidents




Infrastructure





Please note: For reporting years 2014 and 2015 no input data were available.



C.2. Definitions used in the annual report

C.2.1. Definitions in Regulation 91/03 to be applied:

deaths (killed person)

means any person killed immediately or dying within 30 days as a result of an injury accident, excluding suicides

injuries (seriously injured person)

means any person injured who was hospitalized for more than 24 hours as a result of an accident, excluding attempted suicides

passenger-km

means the unit of measure representing the transport of one passenger by rail over a distance of one kilometer. Only the distance on the national territory of the reporting country shall be taken into account

passenger

means any person, excluding members of the train crew, who makes a trip by rail. For accident statistics, passengers trying to embark/disembark onto/from a moving train are included

suicide

means an act to deliberately injure oneself resulting in death, as recorded and classified by the competent national authority

significant accident

means any accident involving at least one rail vehicle in motion, resulting in at least one killed or seriously injured person, or in significant damage to stock, track, other installations or environment, or extensive disruptions to traffic. Accidents in workshops, warehouses and depots are excluded

train

means one or more railway vehicles hauled by one or more locomotives or railcars, or one railcar traveling alone, running under a given number or specific designation from an initial fixed point to a terminal fixed point. A light engine, i.e. a locomotive traveling on its own, is not considered to be a train

train*Km

means the unit of measure representing the movement of a train over one kilometer. The distance used is the distance actually run, if available, otherwise the standard network distance between the origin and destination shall be used. Only the distance on the national territory of the reporting country shall be taken into account

C.2.2. National definitions

Directive 2004/49/EC lays down in Annex 1, point 6:

“Definitions

The reporting authorities may use nationally applied definitions of the indicators and methods for calculation of costs when data according to this Annex are submitted. All definitions and calculation methods in use shall be explained in an Annex to the annual report described in Article 18.”

National definitions and methods to calculate costs concerning the items listed in the Annex 1 to Directive 2004/49/EC are to be reported in this paragraph, whether not defined in this legal act and in the Reg.91/03.

C.3. Abbreviations

CSI	Common Safety Indicator
CSM	Common Safety Method
SPAD	Signal Passed At Danger
CST	Common Safety Target
Reg.	Regulation
ATP	Automatic Train Protection
EIN	European Identification Number
ERA	European Agency for Railways
NIB	National Investigation Body
RSD	Railway Safety Directive
LC	Level Crossing
MLN	10^6
BLN	10^9
NSA	National Safety Authority
RS	Rolling Stock
RU/IM	Railway Undertaking and Infrastructure Manager

ANNEX D: Important changes in legislation and regulation

Please refer to section 'E' for the report on the current and upcoming changes in the national legal environment.

ANNEX E: The development of safety certification and authorization – Numerical Data

E.1 Safety Certificates according to Directive 2004/49/EC

	Number of certificates 'Part A' – 2015			
	Number of part A New	Number of part A Amended	Number of part A Renewed	Number of part A Revoked
Total	4	1	5	0

	Number of certificates 'Part B' – 2015			
	Number of part B New	Number of part B Amended	Number of part B Renewed	Number of part B Revoked
Total	5	1	7	0

E.1.3. List of Railway Undertakings with only part B certificate

Name of RU	Member-State where Safety Certificate 'Part A' was issued
boxXpress.de GmbH	Federal Republic of Germany
Central Railways a.s.	Slovak Republic
Express Group a.s.	Slovak Republic
LTE Logistik- und Transport GmbH	Republic of Austria
METRANS /Danubia/ a.s.	Slovak Republic
PETROLSPED s.r.o.	Slovak Republic
PKP Cargo Spółka Akcyjna	Republic of Poland
Prvá Slovenská Železnica, a.s.	Slovak Republic
RTS Rail Transport Service GmbH	Republic of Austria
Slovenská Železničná Dopravná Spoločnosť a. s.	Slovak Republic
Wiener Lokalbahnen Cargo GmbH	Republic of Austria
Železničná spoločnosť Cargo Slovakia a. s	Slovak Republic

E 1.5. Number of certificates Part A revoked in the reporting year	2
--	---

E 1.6. Number of certificates Part B revoked in the reporting year	0
--	---

E.2. Safety Authorisations according to Directive 2004/49/EC

	Total number of safety authorisations
E.2.1. Number of valid Safety Authorisations issued to Infrastructure Managers in the reporting year and in previous years and remain valid at the end of the year 2015	2

	A	R	P
E.2.2. Number of applications for Safety Authorisations submitted by Infrastructure Managers in year 2015	New authorisations	-	-
	Updated/amended authorisations	-	-
	Renewed authorisations	1	-

A = Accepted application, authorisation is already issued

R = Rejected applications, no authorisation was issued

P = Case is still pending, no authorisation was issued so far

E.3. Procedural aspects – Safety Certificates part A

		New	Updated /amended	Renewed
The average time after receiving of the application with the required information and the final delivery of a Safety Certificate Part A in year 2015 for Railway Undertakings [days]	Where the part A has been issued in the Member-State	90	90	30
	Where the part B has been issued in another Member-State	90	90	30

E.4. Procedural aspects – Safety Certificates part B

		New	Updated /amended	Renewed
The average time after receiving the application with the required information and the final delivery of a Safety Certificate Part B in year 2015 for RUs [days]	Where the part A has been issued in the Member-State	90	90	30
	Where the part B has been issued in another Member-State	90	90	30