NKH NATIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY

Roads, Railways and Shipping Authority

NSA Annual Safety Report

2014

Contents

A. Scope of the report

According to Article 18 of the Railway Safety Directive (RSD as follows) the National Safety Authorities (NSA as follows) have to prepare annually a report which covers the trend of the Common Safety Indicators (CSI as follows), the changes in the national legislation, the development of the safety certification and safety authorization system and the experiences of the related supervision activities.

With this report the Hungarian NSA intends to provide insight on the safety related processes of the Hungarian railway market and to communicate its activity in publicity and for the European Railway Agency.

This Annual Report covers the country's railway safety performance in the light of the year 2014 with the application of the common structure that the European Railway Agency proposed in its guidelines.

B. Introductory Section

1. Introduction to the report

This report presents an overview of the processes concerning the safety of railway transport, the condition of the safety of the Hungarian railway sector, the changes of the rules, and the activities of the Hungarian NSA. Also shows the CSI statistics of 2014 and gives an analysis of the trends on the safety performance of the country.

2. A brief introduction into the national legislation in the light of the EU legislation

The Hungarian railway transportation's basic principles are laid down in the Act no. CLXXXIII of 2005 on Railway Transportation (Railway Act as follows). This is in harmony – among others – with the RSD, the Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and Council, Directive 2007/59/EC of the European Parliament and Council, Commission Regulation no. 445/2011/EU, Commission Decision no. 2011/765/EU.

There are Government and Ministry decrees which specify the details of the Railway Act's regulation. This includes the GKM decree no. 40/2006 of the Ministry of Economy and Transport which corresponds with the RSD, the Commission Regulations no. 653/2007/EC, 1158/2010/EU and 1169/2010/EU; the NFM decree no. 19/2011 (V.10.) of the Ministry of National Development which is identical to the RSD, the Directive 2007/59/EC of the European Parliament and Council; the Government decree no. 203/2009 (IX.18.) which describes professionally and in details all the health requirements and the way of the examination procedure of people working in railway safety related jobs.

The latest part of the EU legislation related to the railway sector is applied in an 'as is' form. E.g. the TSIs don't have peculiar national rules.

3. The railway network

Based on the Railway Act, the elements of the railway infrastructure in Hungary are classified in five regional categories. These serve different purposes and various conditions must be fulfilled in order to operate and use them.

Open access railway infrastructure: The length of the Hungarian rail network is 7690 km. Annex A contains the map of the Hungarian railway network showing the major lines. There are two Infrastructure Managers in Hungary, the MÁV Hungarian State Railways Co. (MÁV Co.) and the GySEV Co. The major part (7251 km) of the network is managed by MÁV Co. There are no high-speed lines in Hungary. The national infrastructure includes 2830 kilometres of lines operating as part of the Trans-European freight corridors, as well as all other major nation-wide railway lines.

The Regional infrastructure is appointed for regional commercial railway activity; it expands over no more than three counties or up to the limit of 400 km. Nowadays, only narrow-gauge railway lines belong to this group. It includes altogether 480 km of railway lines, which primarily serves passenger transport for touristic purposes.

The Municipal railway network serves for public transport between a city and its suburbs. The length of this network is 210 km and consists of public rail network and other different transport means.

Local/City railway network includes tracks within the city borders and its surrounding areas, as well as rail service between a city and surrounding suburbs. The local network of Budapest, Debrecen, Miskolc and Szeged belongs to this group. In these cities their respective transportation companies are operating the railway, underground, tramway and trolley infrastructure and are also providing scheduled passenger service. That's why from the viewpoint of the railway regulatory environment the local railway network operating companies are 'integrated railway companies'. That means they are acting as RU and IM in the same time. It is a great challenge because they have to fulfil both the requirements of RUs and IMs.

Private railway networks are operated by the owner of the industrial sidings. These can be found at harbours, logistical complexes, mines (usually gravel), power-stations and large factories (i.e. car- or steel factory, oil refinery, chemical plant, paper factory).

The list of the Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers operating in Hungary can be found in Annex A.

3. Summary – General Trend Analysis

The table below summarizes the key indicators of the railway safety performance in the last five years.

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total number of all accidents	155	180	142	147	152	186	190
Number of serious injuries	60	84	70	76	88	87	73
Number of fatalities	115	92	82	84	72	102	108
Number of precursors	740	18	754	391	602	352	518
Total precursors of accidents with signals passed at danger	8	7	10	18	21	18	18
Number of level crossing accidents	44	39	42	38	37	35	28
Number of valid Part B Safety Certificates	14	20	32	35	36	43	42
Number of ECM Certificates*	-	-	-	5	8	15	20
Number of Maintenance Functions Certificates**	-	-	-	0	0	4	6

*= Numbers show only the ECM Certificates issued by the Hungarian NSA as certification body

**= Numbers show only the Maintenance Functions Certificates issued by the Hungarian NSA as certification body

In the reporting year the number of accidents has increased slightly by 2.15 % compared to the previous year. This is because of the raising number of fatalities of unauthorized persons caused by movement of trains which increased again from 75 to 85 cases. The activities of unauthorized persons are difficult to handle and are mainly out of the control of the RUs and IMs.

The number of precursors has increased significantly by 47.1 % because the number of broken rail cases increased again as it happened in 2012, however it is still below the level of that year (by 14.7 %) and the highest numbers as well.

From the viewpoint of most indicators the improvement continued as in the previous years. The number of level-crossing accidents dropped again which is the favourable trend of the past 5 years. The number of SPADs remained on the same level as in 2013. It is still considered to be high, so the NSA keeps it among the hot topics of its supervision activities.

Further analysis will follow in the 2nd paragraph of Chapter D. in this report.

Detailed statistical data can be found in Annex C.1.

C. Organisation

1. Introduction to the organisation

The National Transport Authority established by the government, started its operation on 1st of January 2007 under the supervision of the Ministry. As the legal successor to the General Inspectorate of Transport, the Central Inspectorate of Transport, the Local Transport Inspectorates in the counties and the Civil Aviation Authority. Its duty is carrying out authorizational tasks in all fields of the different transport modes. The Military Aviation Authority was integrated into the National Transport Authority on the 1st of July 2007. From 1st of July 2008 the Hungarian Rail Office has also been functioning within the National Transport Authority. From 2010 the different tasks of road transport has been divided between the National Transport Authority and the county and capital government offices.

The National Transport Authority is an independent organization financed by the central budget.

In the field of rail transport the National Transport Authority acts with national jurisdiction.

During its work, the National Transport Authority makes decisions in mind of improving the safety performance of the transport system.

The Railway Department of the National Transport Authority acts as the Hungarian NSA.

2. Organisational structure; relationship with other national bodies

The diagrams can be found in Annex B.

<u>Railway Department (Staff: 63 people)</u>

- Represents the NSA at RISC, ILGGRI and ERA events
- Gives opinion on railway legislation, technical directives and regulations, makes suggestions to amend them
- Provides assistance to the ministry for the preparation of draft proposals for legislations, concerning the railway sector
- Deals with various tasks within the conventional, urban, narrow gauge and industrial rail networks nationally in the following fields:

  - Railway Safety and Supervision Unit

    - Performs its task nationally within the conventional, private rail and urban transport network.
    - Issues ECM certificates, railway safety certificates and authorizations.
    - Assures the fulfilment of the interoperability in case of every subsystem.

- Supervises the operational and maintenance activity, and checks the compliance with legal framework.
- Supervises RUs, IMs, ECMs.
- Informs the leaders of the relevant fields on the experiences of supervisions and prepares an annual report for the president of the NSA by 28th of February of each year, concerning the previous year.
- Carries out legal action in the cases of offensive behaviour or when railway safety is put to risk.
- Deals with the tasks given by the ERA.
- Represents the NSA at the Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary in case of accidents.

▪ Railway Mechanical Unit

- Issues type licence and places conventional, urban, narrow gauge, etc. railway vehicles in service,
- Carries out on-track tests of vehicles,
- Authorises the construction, modification, demolition and placing in service of mechanical equipment (eg. scales, turntables, cranes, etc.) and operational facilities (eg. elevators, escalators), and further supervises the operational status of these items.
- Deals with cases concerning special railway systems (eg. checking condition of vehicles for operational safety, type and modification authorisations etc.) and the placing in service of railway vehicles.

▪ Railway Infrastructure Unit

- Authorises the establishment, placing in service, modification and the tearing of railway tracks and other infrastructure elements (eg. signalling, bridges, tunnels, etc.) nationally.
- Authorises the establishment, placing in service, modification and the tearing of railway interlocking and train control systems.
- Acts as specialized authority.
- Contributes to regional development concepts, programs and town planning in terms of rail transport.
- Manages the register of rail infrastructure.

▪ Examination and Training Supervision Unit

- Supervises and controls the training and examinations of engine drivers and other employees related to railway safety.
- Approves the corporate instructions of the railway undertakings related to railway staff training and development or activities affecting the safety of the railway operation.
- Defines the strategy, directives and requirements of the examination and other materials of courses concerning railway professional staff training and development.
- Registers professional tutors and examiners.
- Issues driving licences and complementary certificates for engine drivers.
- Appoints examiners.
- Transposes foreign rail qualifications.

D. The development of railway safety

1. Initiatives to maintain/improve safety performances

Hungary fully implemented all essential requirements of the Railway Safety Directive 2004/49/EC in its national law.

In Hungary the Transportation Safety Bureau (independent from the NSA and other organizations in the railway sector) is responsible for the investigation of transport accidents. According to the act No. CLXXXIV of 2005 its main duty is the independent technical investigation of aviation, railway and shipping accidents and incidents. To increase the safety level of the transport system the NIB issues recommendations if necessary. The purpose of the independent investigation is to find the cause of the accident or incident to prevent similar future events, but not its duty to determine the liability.

The recommendations which were issued and addressed to the NSA can be found in table D.1.1.

Please note that in the following table:

- Investigation Committee means the NIB's group of experts investigating the given accident,
- NSA refers to NSA HU (National Transport Authority),
- For the explanation of other abbreviations please refer to Annex C.3.

Table D.1.1 - Safety measures triggered by accidents/precursors

Accidents/precursors which triggered the measure			Safety measure decided
Date	**Place**	**Description of the trigger**	
20th July, 2012	Tárnok	Train No. 4560 passed the home signal No. 'F' of Tárnok station at danger and then forced open switch No. I/14.	The accident happened because the locomotive driver ignored the 'Stop' signal of No. 'F' home signal. The conductor in charge was serving on board of the locomotive as well but misconducted the situation and realised his mistake late. **BA2012-483-5-01A:** The IC determined that the temporary interlocking system of Tárnok station is not properly designed. Therefore the TSB recommends the following: The National Transportation Authority should obligate the infrastructure manager to cease this lack of side protection in the interlocking system immediately. Until fixing the signalbox, MÁV Co. should ensure by the managing of railway traffic that such cases can be prevented during station block traffic. According to the opinion of the TSB, with accepting and executing this recommendation, the occurrence chance of such accidents can be reduced significantly.
19th October, 2012	Aszód station	Freight train number 55902-1 entering Aszód station's 7th track derailed with two cars and damaged the track in a length of around 300 meters.	The accident happened due slow-order had not been in effect because of the bad track conditions at the time of the accident because of slow decision making process of the Infrastructure Manager. That's why the involved train was entering the tracks with a higher speed than permitted. **BA2012-705-5-01**: During the investigation, the Investigation Committee found that the system of the rail network operator includes no regulation to determine the degree of limitation (or exclusion) to be introduced in function of the deviation of the dimensions of turnouts from the standard dimensions. Transportation Safety Bureau therefore recommends the National Transport Authority to approve the next modification to the track supervision instructions and maintenance rules only if the definitions of procedures and limitations necessary in function of the deviation of the dimensions of turnouts are included in them.
15th August, 2013	Bakonygyirót stop	At the unprotected level-crossing next to the stop's platform a car was	The No. 39510 train was approaching Bakonygyirót stop where it was not scheduled stop and at the level-crossing located at the beginning of the platform hit a car. The driver of the car entered the unprotected level-crossing without stopping and making sure of there is no train approaching and the safe driving through is possible. That's why the train hit the car and the driver flew out from the car because her

		hit by train No. 39510. The driver of the car died in the accident.	seatbelt was not fastened. However the accident *happened because of the car driver's improper behaviour*, the NIB's Investigation Committee determined that *the vegetation partly limited the visibility from the level crossing which resulted that the approaching train could not be seen from the distance prescribed in the relevant regulation.* **BA2013-666-5-02:** The Investigation Committee proposes the NSA to examine through the SMS of the relevant IM the processes for providing the necessary resources to keep clean the 'limited visibility triangle' or for posting speed limits for trains. The Investigation Committee expects from the realization of this recommendation that the prescribed visibility will be provided or trains will approach slower the poorly-visible level crossings which will reduce the risk of accidents occurring in unprotected level crossings. **BA2013-666-5-03:** The Investigation Committee proposes the 'county government offices' to locally control the 'limited visibility triangles' and take the necessary steps for cleaning them or to take alternative safety measures. The Investigation Committee expects from the realization of this recommendation that it will help the realization of the IM's safety processes described in its SMS.
15th August, 2013	Rátka stop	Train No. 35234 dragged a passenger as her arm had been trapped by the closing door on departure.	At Rátka stop a lady was getting off from local train No. 35234 and she intended to reach back to her baggage while the locomotive driver closed the doors and departed. The lady's arm was trapped by the closing door than as the train started to move it dragged the lady who fell over and suffered light injuries. <u>Causes:</u> 1. *Due the geometry of the stop (located on the outer side of a 300 m radius curve) the train crew could not see that the lady reached back to her baggage.* 2. *Because of the old construction of the door- state reporting equipment, it did not signal properly for the locomotive driver that one of the doors was not fully closed.* **BA2013-667-5-01:** The NIB proposes the NSA to examine the construction of the door-position sensors and if necessary prescribe modifications.

14th September 2013	Rákosrendező station	Train No. 20216 derailed on switch No. 507 with 4 axles.	During the setting of switch No. 507 the point wire tore. Because of this failure the switch rails/point blades did not reach their final position and led the wheels of train No. 20216 (an empty EMU service run) off the rails. **BA2013-764-5-1:** The NIB proposes the NSA to oblige the IM to supervise Rákosrendező station's interlocking system and to carry out risk assessment regarding the operation of the interlocking system. **BA2013-764-5-2:** The NIB proposes the NSA to oblige the IM to carry out a risk assessment regarding the applicable rules and the infrastructure of the station and to take necessary measures based on this (e.g. the changing the role of the signal involved in the accident or to introduce indirect way for authorizing the trains to depart).
14th September 2013	Kelenföld station	No. 4542 and no. 819 trains were running against each other on the same track they stopped around 130 m apart.	The no. 4542 and no. IC819 trains were running against each other on the same track between Kelenföld and Háros stations on the capitol area network. The engine driver of train No. 4542 passed Kelenföld station's second exit signal at danger and also had not obeyed the speed limits before. Additionally, during track reconstruction works a cable had been cut which caused the failure of the signalling equipment in Kelenföld station before the accident. **BA2013-766-5-02:** The NIB proposed the NSA to take into account during the upcoming modification of No. F.2. Operation Instructions those routes that contains more exit signals a 'Stop!' aspect the second exit signal cannot be pre-indicated if with the first exit signal no proceeding signal can be given. **BA2013-766-5-03:** The NIB proposed the NSA to take into account during the upcoming modification of No. F.2. Operation Instructions the risk of conducting movements that are endangering each other. **BA2013-766-5-04:** The NIB proposed the NSA to check the how the relevant procedures prevail regarding the question of planning movements' routes that can endanger each other. **BA2013-766-5-05:** The NIB proposed the NSA to check the fulfilment of the relevant regulation (regarding the method of authorizing the trains to depart) on Kelenföld station and oblige the IM to take the necessary measures.

4th November 2013	Hatvan marshalling yard	On switch No. 412, 8 freight cars of train No. 65822-1 were derailed	On the indicated place and time, No. 65822-1 freight train was departing and during leaving the station on No. 412 switch, 8 cars of the train derailed but the following No. 411 facing point switch guided the wheels of the derailed cars back on the track, so the locomotive driver did not realise the accident and the train continued until Ferencváros station where it was inspected. Causes: 1. *Because of the poor condition of the tracks they were stretched by the dynamic forces that made the right-side wheels falling off the rails.* 2. *In the case of two cars the qR value of the wheel flanges did not reach the necessary 6.5 mm.* **BA2013-938-5-01A:** The NIB proposes the NSA to oblige the extraordinary inspection of the involved RU's subseries 390, 391, 393 freight wagons.
23rd December, 2013	Between Győr and Öttevény stations	Between these two stations at level crossing AS1458 the No. 165 train hit a car. Due the collision a fire broke out that resulted the heavy damage of the locomotive.	At level crossing AS1458 a car accidentally left the road and stuck on the railway tracks, possibly due a technical failure (flat tire). The driver of the car tried to remove the vehicle with the help of another car's driver but they did not succeed. The driver called the police and reported the case. Due a misunderstanding of the car's location and other communication deficiencies the next approaching train (RJ165) hit the car nearly with the full allowed speed of 160 km/h. No one was injured in the accident. The collision ended up in such a big fire that it could not been extinguished by the locomotive driver and also endangered the whole passenger train so the passenger cars were removed from the scene with the following freight trains locomotive. The firefighters arrived the scene in time but because of the long procedure of shutting down the overhead wires and establishing the necessary local grounding they could start extinguishing the fire after 73 minutes of their arrival. **BA2013-1118-5-02:** The NIB proposes the NSA to examine through the SMS of the relevant IM the processes for emergency situations the possibility of speeding up the grounding of the overhead wires.

.

2. Detailed data trend analysis

The number of all accidents: From the year 2009, after a bigger fall back in 2010, shows a slowly increasing tendency with a bigger jump in 2013 but in 2014 this trend has slowed down significantly: this number only grew with 6 cases.

The cause of the trend change in 2013 was the raising number of fatalities of unauthorized persons caused by movement of trains which as of 2013 increased from 41 to 75 and from 75 to 85 in 2014. This is the highest value since the 2006's beginning of data collection.

Regarding the persons involved in the accidents, as it was mentioned above, unauthorized persons suffered far the most fatalities. As someone studies the graphics in Annex C it can be deducted that this composition is partly true for the serious injuries However, the ratio of unauthorised persons and level crossing users exchanged in 2013, 2014. This is because one of the IMs used the definitions regarding the involved persons even more accurately this year and it turned out that many accidents that involved to unauthorized persons happened in level crossings. These cases was earlier counted differently because being in a level crossing while it is closed by an oncoming train is illegal that results the persons became counted as unauthorized there.

Since 2011, less-and-less level crossing users are involved in lethal accidents. Also, there are less accidents happening in level-crossings.

In 2013, the total number of passengers seriously injured in accidents to persons caused by rolling stock in motion decreased significantly by 60%. In 2014, with a bit climb there were 24 cases, which is still the 55% of the 2009's value. In the last six years, no passengers were injured in fires, derailments and collisions. Only the number of passengers injured in other accidents and accidents caused by rolling stock in motion has risen. The reason for the latter is the improper behaviour of passengers. It often happens that despite of the warnings they tend to get off or board the train while it is moving or in other cases they get off on the wrong side of the train, not where the platform is.

In 2014, there were 9 cases when fire broke out in rolling stock which is again a significant raise as it happened in 2013. These cases were fires in locomotives. No passengers were involved and no injuries happened in these cases.

In 2014, no collision of trains happened but there were 5 derailments (there had been 4 in 2013). The NSA HU started to investigate together with the NIB, IMs, RUs, ECMs and Maintenance Workshops these cases and turned out that the cause of these derailments is in connection with the maintenance of freight wagon's axle boxes. Upon the intermediate results of the investigations, NSA HU implemented preventive measures.

Regarding the precursors, more broken-rail situation occurred but none of them led to accident or incident. The level of SPADs maintained and no track-buckles or misalignments happened.

Transport of dangerous goods: The safety level of the transportation of dangerous goods was favourable in 2014 as well, since still no accidents occurred.

There were significant accidents which caused major traffic disruption or significant costs:

- on 10th June, 2014 the 8th car of train No. 53015 was derailed between Mezőkövesd and Füzesabony stations. The derailed car – which was loaded with lignite – was lifted by the next level crossing's 'Bodan' panel which led to the turnover of 3 freight cars. The track was seriously damaged 40 m long and one overhead wire pole was also destroyed causing major traffic disruption and damage costs

The derailed freight wagons of train No. 53015 between Mezőkövesd and Füzesabony stations on 10th June, 2014
(Photo's courtesy of the Hungarian NIB)

– on 19th June, 2014 the train No. 2135 passed the 'D' home signal of Dunakeszi station at danger forced switch No. 7 open and went on the same track against train No. 2364 which was standing at the station and exchanging passengers

Trains No. 2364, 2135 standing in front of each other at Dunakeszi station on 19th June, 2014
(Photo's courtesy of the Hungarian NIB)

– on 21st October, 2014 at Ostffyasszonyfa station the first 4 carriages of train No. 9021 were derailed on switch No. 1. There were around 60 passengers on board, only one person was taken to the hospital because of high blood-pressure

The derailed carriages of train No. 9021 at Ostffyasszonyfa station (Photo's courtesy of the Hungarian NIB)

In significant accidents the damage cost of the rolling stock and infrastructure was about 3 814 241 € which is a significant raise according to 2013 (616 628 €) and is closer to the 2012 level when the damage cost was 3 254 023 €.

In summary, the picture of the CSIs is very colourful and shows many aspects. However, the number of accidents increased a little, there are areas (e.g. level-crossing accidents, injuries to passengers) were the situation is continuously improving and the overall safety level of the Hungarian railway network was preserved.

3. Results of the Safety Recommendations

Accidents *(Details in Table D.1.1)*	**Result of the Safety Recommendations**
20th July, 2012	**BA2012-483-5-01A:** In order to abolish the deficiency revealed by the IC, MÁV Co. solved the problem with railway traffic management. Since the case the signalbox structure had been rebuilt into its final, permanent state.

19th October, 2012 – Aszód station	**BA2012-705-5-01:** The Hungarian NSA agrees with the Safety Recommendation and applies it during the next modification's approval of the relevant instructions and rules.
15th August, 2013 – Bakonygyirót stop	**BA2013-666-5-02:** The NSA is examining the relevant processes of MÁV Co. during the oncoming annual audit according to points G.5, I., K.2., K.5., Q.2. points of Annex II of 1169/2010/EU regulation.
15th August, 2013 – Rátka stop	**BA2013-667-5-01:** MÁV-START Co. – as the operator of these motor-cars – started to implement new inductive door-protection sensors, the equipment and authorization of the modified vehicles are on its way.
14th September, 2013 – Rákosrendező station	**BA2013-764-5-1 & BA2013-764-5-2:** During the annual audit of the IM, in 2014 the NSA checked the maintenance of the switches on Rákosrendező station and prescribed further measures for their safe operation.
14th September, 2013 – Kelenföld station	**BA2013-766-5-02 & BA2013-766-5-03:** The NSA does not agree with these safety recommendations because the No. F.2. Operation Instruction contains the rules for both questions. **BA2013-766-5-04 & BA2013-766-5-05:** The relevant procedures where checked in the NSA's separate procedure that investigated the circumstances of the accident and the IM was obliged to take the necessary measures.
4th November, 2013 – Hatvan marshalling yard	**BA2013-938-5-01A:** The NSA ordered the involved RU to inspect after unloading all of their type Rs, Res, Rgs freight cars. The inspection of every car was performed according to a pre-defined schedule.
23rd December, 2013 – Between Győr and Öttevény stations	**BA2013-1118-5-02:** The NSA is examining the relevant processes of MÁV Co. during the oncoming annual audit according to points R.2., R.4., R.9. points and Chapter U. of Annex II of 1169/2010/EU regulation.

E. 1. Important changes in legislation and regulation

In 2014, one of the most important acts changed: Railway Act changed four times during the year. These changes included the following:

- added extra terminology,
- modified sections in connection with asset-management,
- introducing the role of the National Infrastructure Developer,
- modifications to comply with the amended Civil Code,
- modifications regarding the allocation of the railway network's capacity,
- added extra sentence that the NSA can ask for technical assistance.

The last two points are to fit EU legislation and were made according the notification of the relevant EU bodies.

A new regulation was issued on 14th November, 2014: The No. 277/2014. (XI. 14.) Government Decree. This decree defines the rules for charging and paying the fines imposed by the NSA in case of some railway actor will break the law.

The GKM Decree No. 40/2006 of the Ministry of Economy and Transport changed on the very last day of 2014. The changes were made in order to comply with the modifications of the RSD introduced by the Directive 2014/88/EU and relevant modified TSIs.

2. Upcoming changes in the legislation and regulation

By this time in 2015 another major change in the Railway Act will have taken place.
Also, the NFM Decree 19/2011 of the Ministry of National Development will have changed. That means that the rules for the training and examination of railway safety related jobs will have been improved.

The next modifications of No. F.1. Code of Signalling Rules and No. F.2. Code of Operational Rules will come into force on 30th October, 2015.

F. The development of safety certification and authorisation

In 2014 one new Safety Certificate (Part A & Part B) was issued for FEHÉRVILL-ÁM Kft. accompanied with adequate ECM certificate. Interestingly, during the 3rd and 4th quarter of the year 4 new applications arrived to the NSA which granted the Safety Certificates at the beginning of 2015.

8 Part A and Part B Safety Certificates were renewed (Floyd Zrt., Train Hungary Magánvasút Zrt., MÁV NOSZTALGIA Kft. – renewed two times, G&G Kft., MTMG Zrt., Rail Cargo Carrier Kft. and Szentesi Vasútépítő Kft.)

3 Part B Safety Certificates were renewed for RUs located in other MSs (Prvá Slovenská železničná, a.s., boxXpress.de GmbH, PKP Cargo S.A.).

No safety authorizations were issued in 2014.

1. National legislation – starting dates – availability

Legal materials are available for the applicants on CD. Also, on the homepage of the NSA, there is a section dedicated for the legislation which relates to the railway sector. A new, redesigned and improved web-page of the NSA is also under final works. This will contain even more information in connection with the certification processes and other important topics. The Authorities gates are always open, so RUs, IMs or private persons who have issues can consult freely with the NSA. After that for the applicants the formal requirements, the application form for Safety Certificates, ECM Certificates are provided.

In addition, the Hungarian NSA started to rework its information materials for the applicants in 2014.

2. Numerical data

See Annex E.

3. Procedural aspects

3.1. Safety Certificates Part A

Reasons for updating/amending Part A Safety Certificates

The railway undertakings 'MÁV-GÉPÉSZET Zrt.' and 'MÁV-TRAKCIÓ Zrt.' and their activities were merged into 'MÁV-START Vasúti Személyszállító Zrt.' Thatswhy the two companies' respective Safety Certificates, ECM Certificates and Maintenance Functions Certificates were rewoked and for 'MÁV-START Vasúti Személyszállító Zrt.' an amended Safety Certificate (Part A and Part B) and ECM Certificate and Maintenance Functions Certificate were issued by the Hungarian NSA.

Overview of the requests from other National Safety Authorities to verify/access information relating the Part A Certificate of a Railway Undertaking that applies for a Part B certificate in the other Member State

In 2014, there were no such requests from other NSAs.

NSA Charging fee for issuing a Part A Certificate

The amount of fees charged by the NSA is described in the decree No. 72/2006. (IX. 29.) GKM of the Ministry of Economy and Transport. The fees were slightly reduced in October, 2012. In 2014 there were *no changes in the fees*.

The fee depends on the number of vehicles and the type of service. The fee can vary from 3 279 € to 19 352 €.

Summary of the common problems/difficulties for the NSA in application procedures for Part A Certificates

No major problems were reported with application procedures for Part A certificates. However, it still turns out in some cases that the applicants forgot to submit the proper application form according to Commission Regulation No 653/2007/EC.

Summary of the problems mentioned by Railway Undertakings when applying for a Part A Certificate

Usually, the formation of the Safety Management System according to Commission Regulation No 1158/2010/EU is a great challenge for the Railway Undertakings. It needs several turns to provide a material which is in compliance with the regulation. The NSA helps with consultations and with providing a check-list in which the compliance of the submitted Safety Management System documentation can be checked in details, according to the regulation.

Feedback procedure (e.g. questionnaire) that allows Railway Undertakings to express their opinion on issuing procedures/practices or to file complaints

RUs can contact the NSA in person, via written letter or in urgent cases by phone and email as well.

3.2. Safety Certificates Part B

NSA Charging fee for issuing a Part B Certificate

The amount of fees charged by the NSA is described in the decree No. 72/2006. (IX. 29.) GKM of the Ministry of Economy and Transport. The fees were slightly reduced in October, 2012. The fee depends on the number of vehicles and the type of service. The fee can vary from 3 279 € to 19 352 €. Since 2012, there were *no changes int he application fee* of SC.

Summary of the common problems/difficulties for the NSA in application procedures for Part B Certificates

The Hungarian NSA experienced only small problems with application procedures for Part B Certificates. Most companies operate on the whole Hungarian national railway network which results in using the infrastructure of the two largest IMs. There are regulations which are different at the two IMs and in 2014, there were two applicants who had problems with identifying the different regulations and requirements. In these cases, on the applicant's request the Hungarian NSA hold personal consultation and gave the needed information for these two RUs.

Summary of the problems mentioned by Railway Undertakings when applying for a Part B Certificate

There was no problem mentioned by Railway Undertakings when applying for a Part B Certificate. Only two RUs experienced the difficulty described in the previous paragraph.

Feedback procedure (e.g. questionnaire) that allows Railway Undertakings to express their opinion on issuing procedures/practices or to file complaints

Railway Undertakings can contact the NSA in person, via written letter or in urgent cases via phone and by email.

3.3. Safety Authorisations

Feedback procedure (e.g. questionnaire) that allows Infrastructure Managers to express their opinion on issuing procedures/practices or to file complaints

Infrastructure Managers can contact the NSA in person, via written letter or in urgent cases by email.

NSA Charging fee for issuing a Safety Authorisation

The amount of fees charged by the NSA is also described in the decree No. 72/2006. (IX. 29.) GKM. The fee can vary from 6.406 € to 11.625 €. The fees were slightly reduced in October, 2012. Since then, *there were no changes in the fees.*

G. Supervision of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers

1. The NSA supervises the operational- and traffic-safe state of the railway tracks, the technical conditions of the operational equipment, the rolling stock and the railway workers and whether the occasional examinations and necessary repairs are completed. The RUs and IMs are obligated to ensure all conditions of free supervision, especially access to the relevant documents and equipment under supervision. If the NSA during its supervision determines an omission, it obligates the operator to conduct the necessary examination or repair, and may impose a fine on the operator, or suspend its operations.

The NSA in its decision made within its deliberation based on Act no. CLXXXIII of 2005 takes into consideration:

- the seriousness of the infringement, its effect on the safety of the railway transport,
- the time frame during which the unlawful situation has been maintained,
- whether the breaching behaviour is chargeable,
- the previous breaching behaviour, and
- the actions to assist the measures taken to discontinue the unlawful situation, as well as the activities conducted independently to end the unlawful situation prior to the NSA's procedure.

The new regulation that appeared at the end of 2014 provides the opportunity for the NSA as well to impose a fine on the lawbreaker RUs, IMs or railway workers. The decision is based upon the deliberation of the above listed points. Please refer to point E.1. of this report as well.

The NSA also has to deal with the public and the trade union complaints concerning railway safety.

1.1. Audits/Inspections/Checklists

The content of the annual audit programme (supervision of the conditions of the issued safety certificates):

- supervision of processes according to documents;

- supervision of the Safety Management System of the RU;
- on site supervision;
- supervision of running trains.

Audits/inspections are carried out by the NSA. Only 7 people are available for audits, which is about 10% of NSA's staff. These people also deal with issuing the Safety Certificates, Safety Authorizations, issue ECM Certifications, Maintenance Function Certificates, deal with public complaints and also with the accreditation of NoBos and DeBos. Experts of other units are also involved if necessary and are available.

Economic aspects: The cost of audits is included in the NSA's budget.

1.2. Vigilance aspects/Sensitive points to follow-up by the NSA

There can be mentioned two sensitive points:

- calling upon RUs or IMs to eliminate insufficiencies identified during the audit,
- examining the measures taken since the last audit/inspection.

In 2014, the NSA performed 50 audits. The audits did reveal serious discrepancies in some cases. These were the improper implementation of the SMS, failing to include the newly appeared EU and Hungarian regulations, breaching the allowed driving time and rest period rules set by national law. Also, severeal administrational shortcomings were identified. e.g.: incomplete preparation of route logs, the training report not complying with the rules. After the NSA issued the obligations, to the companies performed the necessary corrective measures.

INSPECTIONS		Issued Safety Certificates Part A	Issued Safety Certificates Part B	Issued Safety Authorisations	Other Activities (Issued ECM or Maintenance function certificates)
Number of inspections of RUs/IMs for 2014	planned	7	20	25	6
	unplanned	8	26	34	3
	carried out	15	46	59	9

AUDITS		Issued Safety Certificates Part A	Issued Safety Certificates Part B	Issued Safety Authorisations	Other Activities (Issued ECM or Maintenance function certificates
Number of audits of RUs/IMs for 2014	planned	22	22	4	7
	unplanned	8	8	3	0
	carried out	20	21	2	7

2. Summary of the relevant corrective measures in 2014:

   - registering the knowledge of routes of the engine drivers;
   - enforcing the regulations authorised by the NSA;
   - enforcing the operational rules of RUs;
   - enforcing the loading rules of freight transport;
   - enforcing RUs and maintenance workshops to properly identify and improve the technical requirements for repairing rail vehicles;
   - promoting the importance of safety culture and the improvement of the RUs SMS into a more applicable way – if needed.

   The observations of the audits are recorded. Based on these records, the NSA decides about the further tasks.

   The RUs and IMs have to make an action plan to eliminate the deficiencies and inform the NSA about the stage of implementation of their plan. The NSA could check the implementation of the plan during the next inspection or immediately and continuously depending on the nature of the case. The NSA's activity is based on the risk analysis of the processes.

3. There were no complaints from IM('s) concerning RU('s) related to conditions in their Part A/Part B Certificate.

4. There were no complaints from RU('s) concerning IM('s) related to conditions in their authorisation.

H. Reporting on the application of the CSM on risk evaluation and assessment

With the appearance of Regulation No. 402/2013/EU, the NSA started to draw the RU's and IM's attention on the changes and new requirements of the regulation. Also, these companies were informed to revise the risk-management procedures in their SMS.

NSA HU also reported to the competent Ministry in connection with the changes of the CSM.

There were several cases when NSA HU proposed an RU to carry out its risk-management procedure and send in the documentation of the decision. One example for such case was when one of the passenger transporting RU was instructed to apply its risk-management procedures to evaluate the effect of the regulation and technical specification on the operation of passenger carriage doors.

During SC and ECM certificate audits NSA HU regularly checks the register of the risks identified by the companies.

NSA Conclusions on the reporting year – Priorities

The main objective of NSA is to improve railway safety, in accordance with the EU objectives.

The tasks of the NSA were carried out nearly as planned in 2014. Significant amount of resources had to be reorganized to carry out the ECM certification which is developing very well. The voluntary certification of Maintenance Workshops is getting more popular.

As a new and important task the accreditation of NoBos and DeBos is delegated to NSA HU as well. This needs significant resources.

Some other tasks needed to be postponed to 2015 because of the lack of staff. With the number of tasks increasing year-by-year, more professional staff is required.

Taking a bigger part in international activities, dealing with SPAD and rolling stock fire cases are some of the important priorities of the NSA for the following time.

I. Alternative measures through derogations regarding ECM certification scheme

According to article 14a (8) of Directive 2008/110/EC alternative measures are no longer allowed to be implemented, so Hungary does not apply such measures. Earlier issued certification have already been lost their validity and the involved companies have their certification according to Regulation No. 445/2011/EU.

J. Sources of information

The source of the data in the report:

- Accident and event reports, the annual reports submitted by the railway undertakings and infrastructure managers.
- IM's daily accident reports
- IM's investigation reports on accidents
- Final reports and the included safety recommendations of the investigations prepared by the Transportation Safety Bureau (NIB of Hungary), and the organisation's website (www.kbsz.hu)
- The NSA's internal background data about the RU's Safety Certificates and IM's Safety Authorizations, inspections, audits
- Complex Intranet law library
- ERADIS
- ERAIL database of accidents and Common Safety Indicators

K. Annexes

ANNEX A: Railway Structure Information

ANNEX B: Organisation chart(s) of the National Safety Authority

ANNEX C: CSIs data – Definitions applied

ANNEX D: Important changes in legislation and regulation

ANNEX E: The development of safety certification and authorisation – Numerical Data

ANNEX A: Railway Structure Information

A.1. Network map

A.2. List of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers

A.2.1. Infrastructure Manager(s)

Name	**Address**	**Website/ Network Statement Link**	***Safety Authorisation (Number/Date)***	***Start date commercial activity***	***Total Track Length/Gauge***	***Total Track Length HSL***	***Number of LC***
GySEV Zrt.	*9400 Sopron, Mátyás király u. 19.*	*www.gysev.hu*	*HU 01 2011 0001 2008.09.15.*	*2008.10.02.*	*439 km*	-	298
MÁV Zrt.	*1087 Budapest Könyves Kálmán krt. 54-60.*	*www.mav.hu*	*HU 01 2010 0001 2010.06.30.*	*2010.07.01.*	*7251 km*	-	5743

A.2.2. Railway Undertaking(s) in 2014

Company Name	**Address**	**Homapage**	**EIN* of Safety Certificate**	**Service is to begin**	**Activity**
AWT Rail HU Zrt.	1134 Budapest, Róbert Károly krt. 64-66.	www.awt.eu	HU 11 2010 0012	16.11.2010	traction freight forwarding
BoBo Kft.	3528 Miskolc, Csele utca 10.	www.bobokft.hu	HU 11 2011 0003	02.04.2008	traction freight forwarding
boxXpress.de GmbH	21129 Hamburg, Köhlfleetdamm 5.	www.boxxpress.de	HU 12 2009 0001	16.04.2009	traction freight forwarding
BSS 2000 Kft.	2700 Cegléd, Alkotmány út 59.	www.bss2000.hu	HU 11 2011 0009	30.11.2011	traction freight forwarding

Central Railways, s.r.o.	040 01 Szlovákia, Košice, Kriva 21.	www.crw.sk	HU 12 2012 0001	01.02.2012	traction freight forwarding
CER Zrt.	1097 Budapest Könyves Kálmán krt. 16.	www.cer.hu	HU 11 2011 0004	28.11.2011	traction freight forwarding
DB Schenker Rail Hungária Kft.	9027 Győr, Hűtőház út 23.	logistics.dbschenker.hu	HU 11 2012 0002	15.12.2011	traction
DRT Danubius Rail Transport Kft.	1064 Budapest, Podmaniczky utca 57.	www.danubiusrailtransport.hu	HU 11 2013 0001	10.04.2013	traction
DUNAGÉP Szolgáltató Zrt.	2316 Tököl, Csépi út 221.	www.dunagep.hu	HU 11 2013 0005	16.06.2013	traction
Floyd Zrt.	1138 Budapest, Madarász u.47-49.	www.floyd.hu	HU 11 2014 0008	01.09.2008	traction freight forwarding
FOX Rail Zrt.	1042 Budapest, Árpád út 56, II. em. 4.	http://www.foxrail.hu	HU 11 2013 0009	10.10.2013	traction freight forwarding
G & G Kft.	6726 Szeged Torockói u. 3/b	www.gesgkft.hu	HU 11 2014 0008	16.12.2008	freight forwarding
GySEV Cargo Zrt.	9400 Sopron, Mátyás király u. 19.	www.gysevcargo.hu	HU 11 2010 0009	01.06.2010	freight forwarding
GySEV Zrt.	9400 Sopron Mátyás Király u. 19.	www.gysev.hu	HU 11 2011 0007	28.06.2007	passenger transport traction
Kárpát Vasút Kft.	2737 Ceglédbercel, Virág utca 9.	–	HU 11 2010 0007	01.05.2010	traction
LTE Logistik- und Transport GmbH	Karlauer Gürtel 1 A-8020 Graz Austria	www.lte.at	HU 12 2010 0002	12.02.2010	traction freight forwarding
Magyar Vasúti Áruszállító Kft.	4028 Debrecen, Jósika utca 9.	www.mvakft.hu	HU 11 2011 0002	15.08.2011	freight forwarding

Mátrai Erőmű Zrt.	3271 Visonta Erőmű u. 11.	www.mert.hu	HU 11 2009 0001	16.06.2009	freight forwarding
MÁV FKG Kft.	5137 Jászkisér Jászladányi u. 10.	www.fkg.hu	HU 11 2013 0010	16.11.2008	traction freight forwarding
MÁV NOSZTALGIA KFT.	1142 Budapest, Tatai út 95.	www.mavnosztalgia.hu	HU 11 2014 0011	01.06.2009	passenger transport traction freight forwarding
MÁV-START Zrt	1087 Budapest Könyves Kálmán krt. 54-60.	www.mav-start.hu	HU 11 2014 0003	01.07.2010	passenger transport traction, maintenance services
METRANS /Danubia/ a.s.	92901 Szlovákia, Dunajska Streda, Povodska cesta 18.	www.metrans.cz	HU 12 2012 0003	01.07.2012	traction freight forwarding
MMV Zrt.	1035 Budapest, Kerék u. 80.	www.mmv.hu	HU 11 2012 0004	01.10.2007	traction freight forwarding
MOL Nyrt.	1117. Budapest, Október huszonharmadika u. 18.	www.mol.hu	HU 11 2012 0001	01.04.2012	freight forwarding
MTMG Zrt.	1012 Budapest, Logodi u. 34/A	mtmgzrt.com	HU 11 2014 0009	16.11.2009	traction freight forwarding
PETROLSPED a.s.	98401 Lučenec, L. Svobodu 2839/1 Szlovákia	www.petrolsped.sk	HU 12 2012 0002	16.05.2012	traction freight forwarding
PKP Cargo Spółka Akcyjna	ul. Grójecka 17., PL-02-021 Warszawa	www.pkp-cargo.pl	HU 12 2014 0009	10.05.2013	traction freight forwarding
Prvá Slovenská Železničá, a.s.	934 01 Levice, Ku Bratke 5. Szlovákia	www.psz.sk	HU 12 2014 0004	16.05.2008	traction freight forwarding

Rail Cargo Hungaria Zrt.	1033 Budapest, Váci u. 92.	www.railcargo.hu	HU 11 2013 0004	01.03.2011	traction freight forwarding
Rail Cargo Carrier Zrt.	1033 Budapest, Váci u. 92.	www.rcc.hu	HU 11 2014 0010	01.04.2013.	traction freight forwarding
RTS Rail Transport GmbH	A-8055 Graz, Puchstraße 184	www.rts-rail.com	HU 12 2011 0003	13.10.2011	traction freight forwarding
SŽDS a.s.	960 01 Zvolen, Na Štepnici 1379/1., Szlovákia	www.szds.sk	HU 12 2013 0011	16.10.2008	traction freight forwarding
Swietelsky Vasúttechnika Kft.	9500 Celldömölk, Nagy Sándor tér 14.	www.vasuttechnika.hu	HU 11 2013 0007	16.08.2013	traction freight forwarding
Szentesi Vasútépítő Kft.	6000 Szentes, Baross G. u. 2.	-	HU 11 2014 0002	16.05.2008	traction freight forwarding
Train Hungary Kft.	4028 Debrecen, Szoboszlói u. 50.	www.trainhungary.hu	HU 11 2014 0004	01.09.2007	traction freight forwarding
Vasútvillamosító Kft.	1106 Budapest, Jászberényi út 90.	www.vasutvill.hu	HU 11 2011 0005	15.11.2011	traction freight forwarding
Wiener Lokalbahnen Cargo	1230 Wien, Triesterstaße 118.	www.wlb.at	HU 12 2012 0007	16.11.2010	traction freight forwarding
Záhony-Port Zrt.	4625 Záhony, Európa tér 12.	www.zahony-port.hu	HU 11 2013 0008	16.09.2008	traction freight forwarding
ZSSK CARGO	Bratislava, Drieňová u. 24. 820 09 Slovakia	www.zscargo.sk	HU 12 2010 0012	16.10.2010	traction freight forwarding

*= EIN: European Identification Number

ANNEX B: Organisation chart(s) of the National Safety Authority

B.1. Chart: Internal organization


National Transport Authority
President
Presidential Secretariat
General Vice President
Economic Vice President
Strategical Vice President
Secretariat
Legal Department
Department of Second Instance Authority
Railway Administration Department
Central Supervisory Unit
Economic Department
Technical and Supply Unit
Human Relations Department
Department of Internal Control
Communication and PR Unit
Safety Manager
IT security rapporteur
Strategical and International Affairs
IT Department
Road, Rail and Shipping Office
Road and Bridge Department
Railway Department
Shipping Department
Road Vehicles Office
Aviation Office


Railway Department
Railway Tracks and Bridges Unit
Railway Engineering Unit
Railway Safety and Supervising Unit
Railway Training and Exam Supervising Unit

B.2. Chart: Relationship with other National Bodies



ANNEX C: CSIs data – Definitions applied

C.1. CSIs data

Outcomes






Serious injuries per accident type
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
70
76
88
87
90
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Collisions
Derailments
Level crossing accidents
Accidents to persons caused by RS in motion
Fires in RS
Others


Serious injuries per user
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
70
76
88
87
90
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Passengers
Employees
Level crossing users
Unauthorised persons
Others



Exposure data




Number of passenger kilometers (millions)
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
7666
7795
8070
7830
7379
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Passenger km


Number of line kilometres
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
8657
7690
7691
7590
7706
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Line km


Passenger fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion passenger train-km (CST 1.1)
90,00
80,00
70,00
60,00
50,00
40,00
30,00
20,00
10,00
0,00
69,208
73,983
80,326
69,534
65,145
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
FWSI per billion passenger train-km


Passenger fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion passenger-km (CST 1.2)
1,00
0,90
0,80
0,70
0,60
0,50
0,40
0,30
0,20
0,10
0,00
0,770
0,795
0,880
0,766
0,732
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
FWSI per billion passenger-km


Employee fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km (CST 2)
25,00
20,00
15,00
10,00
5,00
0,00
20,488
9,981
9,507
4,351
16,816
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
FWSI per billion train-km


Level crossing user fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km (CST 3.1)
350,00
300,00
250,00
200,00
150,00
100,00
50,00
0,00
314,146
264,032
253,237
208,854
220,580
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
FWSI per billion train-km


Level crossing user fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km / Track-km per No of level crossings (CST 3.2)
200,00
180,00
160,00
140,00
120,00
100,00
80,00
60,00
40,00
20,00
0,00
177,136
150,850
144,635
119,286
150,007
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
FWSI per exposure


Other user fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km (CST 4)
14,00
12,00
10,00
8,00
6,00
4,00
2,00
0,00
0,000
0,000
0,000
13,053
9,891
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
FWSI per billion train-km


Unauthorized person fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km (CST 5)
900,00
800,00
700,00
600,00
500,00
400,00
300,00
200,00
100,00
0,00
476,098
500,844
374,237
684,867
856,603
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
FWSI per billion train-km


All person fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km (CST 6)
1400,00
1200,00
1000,00
800,00
600,00
400,00
200,00
0,00
868,293
831,110
698,346
963,339
1157,304
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
FWSI per billion train-km

Precursor to accidents



Infrastructure





Please note: For reporting years 2010 and 2014 no input data were available



C.2. Definitions used in the annual report

C.2.1. Definitions in Regulation 91/03 to be applied:

deaths (killed person)
means any person killed immediately or dying within 30 days as a result of an injury accident, excluding suicides

injuries (seriously injured person)
means any person injured who was hospitalized for more than 24 hours as a result of an accident, excluding attempted suicides

passenger-km
means the unit of measure representing the transport of one passenger by rail over a distance of one kilometer. Only the distance on the national territory of the reporting country shall be taken into account

passenger
means any person, excluding members of the train crew, who makes a trip by rail. For accident statistics, passengers trying to embark/disembark onto/from a moving train are included

suicide
means an act to deliberately injure oneself resulting in death, as recorded and classified by the competent national authority

significant accident
means any accident involving at least one rail vehicle in motion, resulting in at least one killed or seriously injured person, or in significant damage to stock, track, other installations or environment, or extensive disruptions to traffic. Accidents in workshops, warehouses and depots are excluded

train
means one or more railway vehicles hauled by one or more locomotives or railcars, or one railcar traveling alone, running under a given number or specific designation from an initial fixed point to a terminal fixed point. A light engine, i.e. a locomotive traveling on its own, is not considered to be a train

train*Km
means the unit of measure representing the movement of a train over one kilometer. The distance used is the distance actually run, if available, otherwise the standard network distance between the origin and destination shall be used. Only the distance on the national territory of the reporting country shall be taken into account

C.2.2. National definitions

Directive 2004/49/EC lays down in Annex 1, point 6:

"Definitions

The reporting authorities may use nationally applied definitions of the indicators and methods for calculation of costs when data according to this Annex are submitted. All definitions and calculation methods in use shall be explained in an Annex to the annual report described in Article 18."

National definitions and methods to calculate costs concerning the items listed in the Annex 1 to Directive 2004/49/EC are to be reported in this paragraph, whether not defined in this legal act and in the Reg.91/03.

C.3. Abbreviations

CSI	Common Safety Indicator
CSM	Common Safety Method
SPAD	Signal Passed At Danger
CST	Common Safety Target
Reg.	Regulation
ATP	Automatic Train Protection
ERA	European Railway Agency
NIB	National Investigation Body
RSD	Railway Safety Directive
LC	Level Crossing
MLN	10^6
BLN	10^9
NSA	National Safety Authority
RS	Rolling Stock
RU/IM	Railway Undertaking and Infrastructure Manager

ANNEX D: Important changes in legislation and regulation

Page intentionally left blank.

ANNEX E: The development of safety certification and authorization – Numerical Data

E.1 Safety Certificates according to Directive 2004/49/EC

	Number of certificates Part A 2014			
	Number of part A New	Number of part A Amended	Number of part A Renewed	Number of part A Revoked
Total	1	1	5	2

	Number of certificates Part B 2014			
	Number of part B New	Number of part B Amended	Number of part B Renewed	Number of part B Revoked
Total	1	0	5	0

E.1.3. List of Railway Undertakings with only part B certificate

Name of RU	Member-State where Safety Certificate Part A was issued
boxXpress.de GmbH	Germany
Central Railways a.s.	Slovakia
LTE Logistik- und Transport GmbH	Austria
METRANS /Danubia/ a.s.	Slovakia
PETROLSPED s.r.o.	Slovakia
PKP Cargo Spółka Akcyjna	Poland
Prvá Slovenská Železničá, a.s.	Slovakia
RTS Rail Transport Service GmbH	Austria
Slovenská Železničná Dopravná Spoločnosť a. s.	Slovakia
Wiener Lokalbahnen Cargo GmbH	Austria
Železničná spoločnosť Cargo Slovakia a. s	Slovakia

E 1.5. Number of certificates Part A revoked in the reporting year	2

E 1.6. Number of certificates Part B revoked in the reporting year	0

E.2. Safety Authorisations according to Directive 2004/49/EC

	Total number of safety authorisations
E.2.1. Number of valid Safety Authorisations issued to Infrastructure Managers in the reporting year and in previous years and remain valid at the end of the year 2014	2

		A	R	P
E.2.2. Number of applications for Safety Authorisations submitted by Infrastructure Managers in year 2014	New authorisations	-	-	-
	Updated/amended authorisations	-	-	-
	Renewed authorisations	-	-	1

A = Accepted application, authorisation is already issued
R = Rejected applications, no authorisation was issued
P = Case is still pending, no authorisation was issued so far

E.3. Procedural aspects – Safety Certificates part A

		New	Updated /amended	Renewed
The average time after receiving of the application with the required information and the final delivery of a Safety Certificate **Part A** in year 2013 for Railway Undertakings	Where the part A has been issued in your Member-State	90	90	30
	Where the part B has been issued in another Member-State	90	90	30

E.4. Procedural aspects – Safety Certificates part B

		New	Updated /amended	Renewed
The average time after receiving the application with the required information and the final delivery of a Safety Certificate **Part B** in year 2013 for RUs	Where the part A has been issued in your Member-State	90	90	30
	Where the part B has been issued in another Member-State	90	90	30