NKH NATIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY

Roads, Railways and Shipping Authority

NSA Annual Safety Report

2012

A. Scope of the report

This annual report was prepared by the National Transport Authority functioning as the Hungarian National Safety Authority in order to fulfil its obligation defined in Article 18 of the Railway Safety Directive. This report is in accordance with the ERA questionnaire covers the activities of the National Transport Authority in Hungary, from 1 January to 31 December 2012. The scope of this report covers the railway system of Hungary.

B. Introductory Section

1. Introduction to the report

The report presents an overview of the activities of the Hungarian Safety Authority (NSA HU), the processes concerning the safety of railway transport, the condition of the safety of the Hungarian railway sector, the changes of the rules, and the statistical figures of 2012.

2. The railway network

Based on Act no. CLXXXIII of 2005, the elements of the railway infrastructures in Hungary are classified in five regional categories. These serve different purposes and various conditions must be fulfilled in order to operate and use them.

Open access railway infrastructure: The length of the Hungarian rail network is 7690 km. Annex A contains the map of the Hungarian railway network showing the major lines. There are two Infrastructure Managers in Hungary, the MÁV Hungarian State Railways Co. (MÁV Co.) and the GySEV Co. The major part (7251 km) of the network is managed by MÁV Co. There are no high-speed lines in Hungary. The national infrastructure includes 2830 kilometres of lines operating as part of the Trans-European freight corridors, as well as all other major nation-wide railway lines.

The Regional infrastructure is appointed for regional commercial railway activity; it expands over no more then three counties or up to the limit of 400 km. Nowdays only narrow-gauge railway lines belong to this group. It includes altogether 480 km of railway lines, which primarily serves passenger transport.

The Municipal railway network serves for public transport between a city and its suburbs. The length of this network is 210 km and consists of public rail network and other different transport means (cog-wheel rail, funicular, and ski-lifts, etc.).

Local/City railway network includes tracks within the city borders and its surrounding areas, as well as rail service between a city and surrounding suburbs. The local network of Budapest, Debrecen, Miskolc and Szeged belongs to this group.

Private railway networks are operated by the owner of the industrial sidings.

The list of the Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers operating in Hungary can be found in Annex A.

3. Summary

The table below summarizes the key indicators of the railway safety performance in the last five years. Detailed information can be found in Annex C.

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total number of all accidents	155	180	142	147	152
Number of serious injuries	60	84	70	76	88
Number of fatalities	115	92	82	84	72
Number of precursors	740	18	754	391	602

In 2012 the number of accidents has increased by 3% compared to the previous year. The number of serious injuries has changed from 76 to 88, which is a significant change. The Number of fatalities decreased from 84 to 72, which is a 15% change. The number of precursors has significantly increased. The reason for the change is the number of broken rails increased by 207 compared to the previous year. The number of signals passed at danger shows a growing tendency, more attention should be paid on this matter during the inspections of 2013.

C. Organisation

1. Introduction to the organisation

The National Transport Authority established by the government, started its operation on 1st of January 2007 under the supervision of the Ministry. as the legal successor to the General Inspectorate of Transport, the Central Inspectorate of Transport, the Local Transport Inspectorates in the counties and the Civil Aviation Authority. Its duty is carrying out authorizational tasks in all fields of the different transport modes. The Military Aviation Authority was integrated into the National Transport Authority on the 1st of July 2007. From 1st of July 2008 the Hungarian Rail Office has also been functioning within the National Transport Authority. From 2010 the different tasks of road transport has been divided between the National Transport Authority and the county and capital government offices.

The National Transport Authority is an independent organization financed by the central budget.

In the field of rail transport the National Transport Authority acts with national jurisdiction.

During its work, the National Transport Authority makes decisions in mind of improving the safety performance of the transport system.

The Railway Department of the National Transport Authority acts as the Hungarian NSA.

2. Organisational structure; relationship with other national bodies

The diagrams can be found in Annex B.

Railway Department (Staff: 56 people)

- Represents the NSA at RISC and ERA events.
- Gives opinion on railway legislation, technical directives and regulations, makes suggestions to amend them.
- Provides assistance to the ministry for the preparation of draft proposals for legislations, concerning the railway sector.
- Deals with various tasks within the conventional, urban, narrow gauge and industrial rail networks nationally in the following fields:

▪ Railway Safety and Supervision Unit

- Performs its task nationally within the conventional, private rail and urban transport network.
- Issues ECM certificates, railway safety certificates and authorizations.
- Assures the fulfilment of the interoperability in case of every subsystem.
- Supervises the operational and maintenance activity, and checks the compliance with legal framework.
- Supervises RUs, IMs, ECMs.
- Informs the leaders of the relevant fields on the experiences of supervisions and prepares an annual report for the president of the NSA by 28th of February of each year, concerning the previous year.
- Carries out legal action in the cases of offensive behaviour or when railway safety is put to risk.
- Deals with the tasks given by the ERA.
- Represents the NSA at the Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary in case of accidents.

▪ Railway Mechanical Unit

- Issues type licence and places conventional, urban, narrow gauge, etc. railway vehicles in service.
- Authorises the construction, modification, tearing and placing in service of mechanical equipment (eg. scales, turntables, cranes, etc.) and operational facilities (eg. elevators, escalators), and further supervises the operational status of these items.
- Deals with cases concerning special railway systems (eg. checking condition of vehicles for operational safety, type and modification authorisations etc.) and the placing in service of railway vehicles.

▪ Railway Infrastructure Unit

- Authorises the establishment, placing in service, modification and the tearing of railway tracks and other infrastructure elements (eg. signalling, bridges, tunnels, etc.) nationally.
- Authorises the establishment, placing in service, modification and the tearing of railway interlocking and train control systems.
- Acts as specialized authority.
- Contributes to regional development concepts, programs and town planning in terms of rail transport.

- Manages the register of rail infrastructure.

- Examination and Training Supervision Unit

  - Supervises and controls the training and examinations of engine drivers and other employees related to railway safety.
  - Approves the corporate instructions of the railway undertakings related to railway staff training and development or activities affecting the safety of the railway operation.
  - Defines the strategy, directives and requirements of the examination and other materials of courses concerning railway professional staff training and development.
  - Registers professional tutors and examiners.
  - Issues driving licences and complementary certificates for engine drivers.
  - Appoints examiners.
  - Transposes foreign rail qualifications.

D. The development of railway safety

1. Initiatives to maintain/improve safety performances

Hungary fully implemented all essential requirements of the Railway Safety Directive 2004/49/EC in its national law.

In Hungary the Transportation Safety Bureau (independent from the NSA and other organizations in the railway sector) is responsible for the investigation of transport accidents. According to the act No. CLXXXIV of 2005 its main duty is the independent technical investigation of aviation, railway and shipping accidents and incidents. To increase the safety level of the transport system the NIB issues recommendations if necessary. The purpose of the independent investigation is to find the cause of the accident or incident to prevent similar future events, but not its duty to determine the liability.

The recommendations which were issued in 2012 and addressed to the NSA can be found in table D.1.1.

Table D.1.1 - Safety measures triggered by accidents/precursors to these

Accidents/precursors which triggered the measure			**Safety measure decided**	**Safety measure by the NSA**
Date	**Place**	**Description of the event**		
07.10.2011	Budapest-Ferencváros	Train No. 71350 passed the Nr. 'K9m' exit signal at danger at Budapest-Ferencváros railway station. After that the train forced open the No. 32 point.	**BA-2010-459-01:** The IC determined during the examination of the case that the definition of 'railway junction and industrial trackage serving train' (1.2.13th section, No.F.2. Instructions for Railway Traffic) is not exact in the list of the exceptions of 'travelling without cab signalling system (Train Protection System, TPS)' in the 12.3.11th section, No.F.2. Instructions (for Railway Traffic). This is not directly relevant to the case. Namely, this definition uses the conception of 'train between joint stations from the aspect of	**BA-2010-459-5-01**: After consultation with MÁV Co, no changes have been made in the F.2. Instruction. During its supervision activities the NSA will increase attention to the concerned areas.

			service' and the definition of this wasn't found by the IC in the above mentioned Instruction. Due the absence of this definition the exceptions of the obligatory TPS application (12.3.11th section, No.F.2.Instructions) can be used optionally in wide spectrum which gives the opportunity of bypassing this important rule. The TSB recommends the National Transportation Authority to review the regulations regarding to the running of 'railway junction and industrial/own purpose trackage serving trains' with the involved RUs and make an effective action in order to be defined 'the joint stations of freight shunting junctions from the aspect of service' precisely. Thus, only in real special cases allow the usage of the railway infrastructure without proper TPS. With the implementation of this safety	

			recommendation it can be achieved that the rules of using the infrastructure without TPS will be exact and could be applied in legitimate cases.	
06.03.2011	Passing Point/, Station Ötvös	Train No. 42001-2/48081-2 passed the Nr. 'V1' exit signal at danger. After that the train went through the No. 1 switch, which hadn't been set for it's route.	**BA2011-106-05-01:** The IC determined that the signalman of Zalaszentiván station as the traffic controller in this case made train-meetings at Passing Point/Station Ötvös. For carrying out this activity, the relevant section of the No.F.2.Instructions makes a condition among others: 'If visibility is not limited'. However in the examined case the visibility wasn't limited the traffic controller hadn't got the opportunity to make sure of this. For this reason the IC makes the following safety recommendation: The TSB recommends the National Transportation Authority to get reviewed by the handler of the No.F.2. Instructions the	**BA-2011-106-5-01:** The amended F.2. Instruction will entry into force on 26/08/2013. It includes the changes about the limited visibility. The driver has reporting duty of the stop and if the visibility is limited.

			regulations for the case of limited visibility on such CTC lines where there is no attendant at the stations, in order that the traffic controllers have the necessary information of occurring external influences – from which rail traffic can be significantly affected in certain cases. The IC expects from this safety recommendation that the relevant rules can be still observed and be effective during the technical and technological changes happened meanwhile on the Hungarian railway network. With the evolving of unattended posts, stations where there was not left such railway worker who fulfils the obligation of train observation prescribed in the 15.1.12th section of No.F.2. Instructions. For the determining and reporting of limited visibility by running trains on the mainline only	

			the engine driver is available, but there are no rules prescribing them that.	
18.09.2011	Sopron	trains running against each other	**BA2011-465-05-01:** The IC determined that TPS of the engine leading the No. 47116 train had been set into INDUSI mode at Sopron Marshalling Yard because the train has its first scheduled station stop on the territory of Austria. Sopron station is equipped with EVM type of TPS. So, due the different systems, train protection was not realised and after passing a signal at danger, penalty braking application did not happen. Because of the above mentioned case the IC proposes the issuing of the following safety recommendation: The TSB proposes the National Transportation Authority to review the Action Plan made by GYSEV Co. and in case of its	**BA2011-465-05-01; -02:** The construction of the two stations Sopron and Sopron Marshalling Yard has built in compliance with the existing legislation. To improve rail safety GYSEV Co has started the construction of the INDUSI system on the concerned line. The construction is fall within NKH's authorization scope.

			compliance participate in the realisation of this Plan as soon as possible. (According to the Action Plan, GYSEV Co. should equip the necessary amount of tracks used by departing trains with INDUSI trackside equipment and magnets for the uninterrupted railway traffic in order to realise the train protection in all circumstances, so the consequences of an incidental case of a SPaD could be reduced. The IC expects from this safety recommendation that the related rules of the Instructions for Railway Traffic can be observed; and on TPS equipped lines, line sections, regular hauling of trains can be done by engines equipped with the adequate train protection in terms of the trackside system. **BA2011-465-05-02:** The IC determined that on the route of train No. 47116 different train protection systems are installed. At Sopron	

			Marshalling Yard a different TPS had been chosen (INDUSI) which resulted the absence of penalty brake application after passing a signal at danger at the next station, Sopron – which is equipped with different TPS (EVM). The IC also determined that the switching points of the different systems are not ruled. The IC proposes the National Transportation Authority to obligate GYSEV Co. to rule where the changing between the train protection systems should happen on the different relations of the lines equipped with different TPS with regard to the locomotives on-board systems. The IC expects from this safety recommendation that the changing between the different train protection systems would happen in a regulated way. So, it can be	

			obeyed that regular hauling of trains can only happen on TPS equipped lines, line sections by locomotives installed with the adequate train protection equipment.	
29.08.2011	Debrecen	The first two cars behind the engine of the No. 45481-2 train derailed at Debrecen station.	**BA2011-425-5-01:** According to the earlier experience and the determinations made during the examination of the case the IC deducted that the marking and visibility of tools used for securing the vehicles against breaking away is not proper. Because of the design and the worn, contaminated paintwork, these tools were left under the departing vehicles and cause derailment. The TSB recommends the National Transportation Authority to review the rule-system for protection of vehicles against	**BA2011-425-5-01**: The NSA discussed the issue with MÁV Co and Train Hungary Co. The case is pending.

			break aways together with the involved RUs and make a proposal for introducing such tools or markers which makes it clearly noticeable, even from distance. According to the opinion of the IC, the improving of perceptibility this way can significantly reduce the occurrence chance of these accidents – for which there is several examples in the international practice.	

25.02.2012	Rácalmás	The No. 66823-2 train derailed at Rácalmás station.	**BA2012-135-5-01A:** In connection with the examination of the derailment which happened on 25th February, 2012 at Rácalmás station the IC determined that the breakage of the axle nut retainer plate contributed to the occurrence of the accident. The used retainer plate was built in at the end of 2006 and according to the traces that can be seen on the surface. The IC deducted that this part had already been used before it was built in. The IC found deformed, broken and cracked retainer plates or which were forced into the axle roller bearings by other examined axles of the vehicle. After the accident the IC made examination by another car of the Rail Cargo Hungaria Co. which car was not involved in the accident and was fitted with axle end roller bearing as well, and after looking through the report and the photos,	**BA2012-135-5-01A:** The NSA started an investigation about the accident. After the accident the keeper (Rail Cargo Hungaria Co.) made various examinations on the concerned type of wagons and made the necessary corrective measure. The NSA has issued a safety alert on 29/05/2013 because thematic inspections were held in mind with the risks, and during these inspections the NSA found other wagons with similar maintenance issues.

			determined that in one of the bearings there is also a broken retainer plate. Therefore the TSB recommends the National Transportation Authority to obligate the RUs that are running vehicles equipped with such bearings or the companies which deal with the maintenance of these kind of vehicles to check the retainer plates with the needed care and attention and for the changing of the retainer plates as soon as possible which are broken, deformed or which are having size errors. The IC expects from this recommendation that in short terms, the opportunity of a part which is intended to prevent operational dangers causing accident can be ruled out on the Hungarian network.	

05.07.2012	Budapest-Déli railway station	The No. 4320 train departing from the 3rd platform collided with the shunting locomotive standing on the 1st platform outside the stabling limit signal.	**BA2012-443-5-01A:** The IC determined that the built environment disturbs the free sight between the 1st and 3rd platforms on the home-end of Budapest-Déli railway station. Therefore, the obligatory eye-checking of the routes – prescribed in the 2.7.4th section of No.F.2. Instructions for Railway Traffic – can only be circumstantially carried out during setting the switches for entering and exiting trains this area. Because of the above mentioned, the TSB recommends the National Transportation Authority to audit the fulfilment of the obligatory eye-checking of routes – which is prescribed in the 2.7.4th section of the No. F.2. Instruction and in the Enforcement Instruction for the Station – and in necessary case take measures in order to create the necessary	**BA2012-443-5-01A:** The NSA examined the recommendation. The Safety Organization of MÁV Co. in its investigation made the following statements: the accident happened due to non-compliance with technological rules and human factors. The internal rules are suitable, the safe operation is assured with these rules. With the implementation of this safety recommendation the number of human faults will be reduced.

			conditions. That can be realised even with technical improvement (e.g. setting up a camera) or with work-management. By accepting and realising this recommendation, according to the TSB's opinion, the risk of accidents originating from the limited checking opportunity of the route can be reduced.	

20.07.2012	Tárnok	Train No. 4560 passed the No. ’F’ entrance signal at danger of the station without permission. The No. 4560 train got into the route set for the No. 17712 train.	**BA2012-483-5-01A:** The IC determined that the temporary interlocking system of Tárnok station is not properly designed. Therefore the TSB recommends the following: The National Transportation Authority should obligate the infrastructure manager to cease this lack of side protection in the interlocking system immediately. Until fixing the signalbox, MÁV Co. should ensure by the managing of railway traffic that such cases can be prevented during station block traffic. According to the opinion of the TSB with accepting and executing this recommendation, the occurrence chance of such accidents can be reduced significantly.	**BA2012-483-5-01A:** In order to abolish the deficiency revealed by the IC, MÁV Co. solved the problem with railway traffic management. Since the case the signalbox structure had changed.

Abbreviations:
IC - Investigation Committee
LC - Level crossing
TSB - Transport Safety Bureau (NIB)
NTA - National Transport Authority (NSA)
CTC - Centralised Traffic Control
TPS - Train Protection System
SPaD - Signal Passed at Danger

2. Detailed data trend analysis

Number of accidents: Altogether the number accidents have slightly increased in the last three years, compared to last year it has raised by 3%.

Number of fatalities (suicides not included): The number of fatalities decreased by 15% compared to the previous year.

Number of injures: The number of injures increased by 15% compared to the previous year.

Number of precursors to accidents: The number of precursors has significantly increased in 2012.

Transport of dangerous goods: The safety level of the transportation of dangerous goods was favourable in 2012, no accidents occurred. There were 35 incidents, which is a 40% decrease compared to the previous year. During these incidents flammable gases, gases and corrodent materials were released. According to the investigation the cause of the incidents were consisted at the despatch.

Cost of serious accidents: The cost of the serious accidents was about ~ 4.032.851 €.

In summary, the numbers of accidents and the other significant indicators were higher compared to the previous year, the level of safety of the rail systems and rail transport are high. There were two accidents which caused major traffic disruption and significant costs (there were no personal injury):

- On the 25th of February 2012 the No. 66823-2 freight-train has derailed at Rácalmás station. After the investigation has finished a safety alert has been issued to ERA on 29th of May 2012.
- On the 12th of May 2012 the No. 90552 freight-train has derailed between Gödöllő and Aszód stations.

The reasons of the accidents caused by technical issues have changed. There were different technical problems with the vehicles and infrastructure which weren't common earlier. The technical problem of the track caused accidents on the main line, which calls attention to the mechanical condition of the track. The number of broken rails has increased significantly from 369 to 576. The technical conditions of the track results slower speeds on particular sections. As the content of the track bulletins (written provisions) grows, it can be confusing and the engine drivers have to share their attention more often which can cause higher risk.

E. Important changes in legislation and regulation

The Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC) was fully transposed and implemented in the legislation and railway administration in Hungary. Important changes of the legislations or regulations can be found in the table in Annex D.

F. The development of safety certification and authorisation

The Railway Department of the National Transport Authority has issued one new (MOL Co.), one amended (DB SchenkerLtd.) and two renewed (MMV Co., Train Hungary Ltd.) safety certificates, furthermore 3 new (CRW a.s., Petrolsped Slovakia s.r.o., Metrans a.s), and one amended (WLB Cargo GmbH) only part B safety certificate.

1. National legislation – starting dates – availability

   Starting date for issuing Safety Certificates / Authorizations according to Article 10 of Directive 2004/49/EC is 01.01.2007.

   Legal materials are available for Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers on CD, in printed form or on the internet. The requirements of the content and form of the Safety certificates are provided by the NSA for the RU.

2. Numerical data

   See Annex E.

3. Procedural aspects

   3.1. Safety Certificates Part A

   3.1.1. Reasons for updating/amending Part A Certificates

   Part A Certificates were amended one time in 2012. The reasons for this amendment: the name of the RU has changed.

   3.1.2. Main reasons if the mean issuing time for Part A Certificates (restricted to these mentioned in Annex E and after having received all necessary information), was more than the 4 months foreseen in Article 12(1) of the Safety Directive

   The mean issuing time for Part A Certificates did not exceed 4 months.

   3.1.3. Overview of the requests from other National Safety Authorities to verify/access information relating the Part A Certificate of a Railway Undertaking that has been certified in your country, but applies for a Part B certificate in the other Member State

   There was no request from any NSA in 2012.

   3.1.4. Summary of problems with the mutual acceptance of the Community wide valid Part A Certificate

   There was no problem with mutual acceptance of the Community wide valid Part A Certificate.

   3.1.5. NSA Charging fee for issuing a Part A Certificate (Yes/No – Cost)

   The amount of fees charged by the NSA is described in the decree No. 72/2006. (IX. 29.) GKM. The charging fee depends on the number of vehicles and the type of service. The fee can vary from 3.450 € to 20.300 €.

   3.1.6. Summary of the problems with using the harmonised formats for Part A Certificates, specifically in relation to the categories for type and extent of service

There was no problem with the harmonised formats for Part A Certificates.

3.1.7. Summary of the common problems/difficulties for the NSA in application procedures for Part A Certificates.

No problems were mentioned with application procedures for Part A certificates.

3.1.8. Summary of the problems mentioned by Railway Undertakings when applying for a Part A Certificate

There was no problem mentioned by Railway Undertakings when applying for a Part A Certificate.

3.1.9. Feedback procedure (e.g. questionnaire) that allows Railway Undertakings to express their opinion on issuing procedures/practices or to file complaints

Railway Undertakings can contact the NSA in person, via written letter or in urgent cases by email.

3.2. Safety Certificates Part B

3.2.1. Reasons for updating/amending Part B Certificates (e.g. variation in type of service, extent of traffic, lines to be operated, type of rolling stock, category of staff, etc.)

Part B Certificates were amended once in 2012. The reason for the amendment is that the RU extended the operational territory.

3.2.2. Main reasons if the mean issuing time for Part B Certificates (restricted to these mentioned in Annex E and after having received all necessary information), was more than the 4 months foreseen in Article 12(1) of the Safety Directive

The mean issuing time for Part A Certificates did not exceed 4 months.

3.2.3. NSA Charging fee for issuing a Part B Certificate (Yes/No – Cost)

The amount of fees charged by the NSA is described in the decree No. 72/2006. (IX. 29.) GKM. The charging fee depends on the number of vehicles and the type of service. The fee can vary from 3.450 € to 20.300 €.

3.2.4. Summary of the problems with using the harmonised formats for Part B Certificates, specifically in relation to the categories for type and extent of service

There was no problem with the harmonised formats for Part B Certificates.

3.2.5. Summary of the common problems/difficulties for the NSA in application procedures for Part B Certificates.

There was no problem with application procedures for Part B Certificates.

3.2.6. Summary of the problems mentioned by Railway Undertakings when applying for a Part B Certificate

There was no problem mentioned by Railway Undertakings when applying for a Part B Certificate.

3.2.7 Feedback procedure (e.g. questionnaire) that allows Railway Undertakings to express their opinion on issuing procedures/practices or to file complaints

Railway Undertakings can contact the NSA in person, via written letter or in urgent cases by email.

3.3. Safety Authorisations

3.3.1. Reasons for updating/amending Safety Authorisations

There was no amendment in 2012.

3.3.2. Main reasons if the mean issuing time for Safety Authorisations (restricted to these mentioned in Annex E and after having received all necessary information), was more than the 4 months foreseen in Article 12(1) of the Safety Directive

There was no authorization issued in 2012.

3.3.3. Summary of the regularly problems/difficulties in application procedures for Safety Authorisations

There was no authorization issued in 2012.

3.3.4. Summary of the problems mentioned by Infrastructure Managers when applying for a Safety Authorisation

There was no authorization issued in 2012.

3.3.5. Feedback procedure (e.g. questionnaire) that allows Infrastructure Managers to express their opinion on issuing procedures/practices or to file complaints

Infrastructure Managers can contact the NSA in person, via written letter or in urgent cases by email.

3.3.6. NSA Charging fee for issuing a Safety Authorisation (Yes/No – Cost)

The amount of fees charged by the NSA is described in the decree No. 72/2006. (IX. 29.) GKM. The fee can vary from 6.700 € to 12.200 €.

G. Supervision of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers

The NSA supervises the operational- and traffic-safe state of the railway tracks, the operational equipment and the rolling stock, and whether the occasional examinations and necessary repairs are completed. The RUs and IMs are obligated to ensure all conditions of free supervision, especially unlimited access to the relevant documents, equipment. If the NSA during its supervision determines an omission, it obligates the operator to conduct the examination or repair, and may impose a fine on the operator, or suspend its operations.

The NSA in its decision made within its deliberation based on Act no. CLXXXIII of 2005 takes into consideration:

- the seriousness of the infringement, its effect on the safety of the railway transport,
- the time frame during which the unlawful situation has been maintained,
- whether the breaching behaviour is chargeable,
- the previous breaching behaviour, and
- the actions to assist the measures taken to discontinue the unlawful situation, as well as the activities conducted independently to end the unlawful situation prior to the NSA's procedure.

The NSA has to deal with the public and the trade union complaints concerning railway safety.

1.1. Audits/Inspections/Checklists

The content of the annual audit programme (supervision of the conditions of the issued safety certificates):

- supervision of processes according to documents;
- supervision of the Safety Management System of the RU;
- on site supervision;
- supervision of running trains.

Audits/inspections are carried out by the NSA. 6 people are available for audits, which is about 10% of NSA's staff.

Economical aspects: The cost of audits is included in the NSA's budget.

1.2. Vigilance aspects/Sensitive points to follow-up by the NSA

Calling upon RUs or IMs to eliminate insufficiencies identified during the audit. Examining the measures taken since the last audit/inspection.

In 2012, the NSA performed 35 audits. The audits did not reveal any serious discrepancies except for several administrative shortcomings, e.g.: incomplete preparation of route logs, the training report not complying with the rules. After the NSA issued the obligations, to the companies performed the necessary corrective measures.

INSPECTIONS		Issued Safety Certificates Part A	Issued Safety Certificates Part B	Issued Safety Authorisations	Other Activities (To specify)
2. Number of inspections of RUs/IMs for 2012	planned	39	538	31	-
	unplanned	9	32	0	-
	carried out	31	543	79	-

AUDITS		Issued Safety Certificates Part A	Issued Safety Certificates Part B	Issued Safety Authorisations	Other Activities (To specify)
3. Number of audits of RUs/IMs for 2012	planned	28	35	2	-
	carried out	22	29	2	-

4. Summary of the relevant corrective measures in 2012:

   - registering the knowledge of routes of the engine drivers;

   - enforcing the regulations authorised by the NSA;

   - enforcing the operational rules of RUs;

   - enforcing the loading rules of freight transport.

   The observations of the audits are recorded, and based on these the NSA decides about the further tasks.

   The RUs and IMs have to make an action plan to eliminate the deficiencies and inform the NSA about the stage of implementation of their plan. The NSA could check the implementation of the plan during the next inspection or immediately and continuously depending on the nature of the case. The NSA's activity is based on the risk analysis of the processes.

5. There were no complaints from IM('s) concerning RU('s) related to conditions in their Part A/Part B Certificate.

6. There were no complaints from RU('s) concerning IM('s) related to conditions in their authorisation.

H. Reporting on the application of the CSM on risk evaluation and assessment

In 2012, the actual inspections are carried out based on the risk analysis of the processes. Quantified methodology has not been applied in this risk analysis.

I. NSA Conclusions on the reporting year – Priorities

The main objective of NSA is to improve railway safety, in accordance with the EU objectives.

The tasks of the NSA were carried out as planned in 2012. Significant amount of resources had to be reorganized to carry out the ECM certification. Many other tasks have to be postponed to 2013 because of the lack of staff. With the number of tasks increasing year-by-year, more professional staff is required. To deal with this situation, the NSA has made the necessary steps.

According to the objectives of the ERA, all NSAs has to catch up to the same high level of standards. To achieve this goal, all NSAs has to be audited by an international audit team under the same condition and using the same method. ERA created a mutual audit (Cross-Audit) process. Six member states – including Hungary – have participated in the pilot phase. During the audit, the audit team examined the legal bases of the organisation, and the actual operation of the NSA. The conclusion of the audit team was that the EU legislation procedures that were implemented into the Hungarian law are elaborated, managed and controlled. But application of a few EU regulations needs to be developed. The NSA has created an action plan to eliminate the deficiencies, the implementation of the corrective measures are in progress.

J. Alternative measures through derogations regarding ECM certification scheme

According to article 14a (8) of Directive 2008/110/EC no alternative measures has been implanted in Hungary.

K. Sources of information

The source of the data in the report:

- Accident and event report submitted by the railway undertakings and infrastructure managers.
- IM's daily accident reports
- IM's investigation reports on accidents
- Final reports on the investigations prepared by the Transportation Safety Bureau, and the organisation's website (www.kbsz.hu)
- The NSA's internal database about the RU's and IM's
- Complex Intranet law library
- ERADIS, ERAIL database

L. Annexes

ANNEX A: Railway Structure Information

ANNEX B: Organisation chart(s) of the National Safety Authority

ANNEX C: CSIs data – Definitions applied

ANNEX D: Important changes in legislation and regulation

ANNEX E: The development of safety certification and authorisation – Numerical Data

ANNEX A: Railway Structure Information

A.1. Network map

A.2. List of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers

A.2.1. Infrastructure Manager(s)

Name	Address	Website/Network Statement Link	*Safety Authorisation (Number/Date)*	*Start date commercial activity*	*Total Track Length/Gauge*	*Total Track Length HSL*	*Number of LC*
GySEV Zrt.	*9400 Sopron, Mátyás király u. 19.*	*www.gysev.hu*	*HU 01 2011 0001 2008.09.15.*	*2008.10.02.*	*439 km*	-	298
MÁV Zrt.	*1087 Budapest Könyves Kálmán krt. 54-60.*	*www.mav.hu*	*HU 01 2010 0001 2010.06.30.*	*2010.07.01.*	*7251 km*	-	5743

A.2.2. Railway Undertaking(s)

Name	Address	Website	*Safety Certificate A-B 2004/49/EC (Number/Date)*	*Start date commercial activity*	*Traffic Type (Freight,…)*	*Number of Locomotives*	*Number of Railcars/Multiple Unit-sets*	*Number of Coaches/Wagons*	*Number of train drivers/safety crew*	*Volume of passenger transport*	Volume of freight transport
AWT Rail HU Zrt.	1134 Budapest, Róbert Károly krt. 64-66.	www.awt.eu	HU 11 2010 0012	16.11.2010	traction freight transport	21 pcs	-	24 pcs	16 / 14	-	405 M
BoBo Kft.	3528 Miskolc, Csele utca 10.	www.bobokft.hu	HU 11 2011 0003	02.04.2008	traction freight transport	6 pcs	-	1 pcs	3 / 7	-	2,832 M
boxXpress.de GmbH	21129 Hamburg, Köhlfleetdamm 5.	www.boxxpress.de	HU 12 2009 0001	16.04.2009	traction freight transport	8 pcs	-	694 pcs	Contract	-	-

BSS 2000 Kft.	2700 Cegléd, Alkotmány út 59.	www.bss2000.hu	HU 11 2011 0009	30.11.2011	traction freight transport	4 pcs	-	4 pcs	7 / 16	-	0,087 M
Central Railways a.s.	040 01 Szlovákia, Košice, Kriva 21.	www.crw.sk	HU 12 2012 0001	01.02.2012	traction freight transport	1 pcs	-	50 pcs	1 / 1	-	4,59 M
CER ZRt.	1097 Budapest Könyves Kálmán krt. 16.	www.cer.hu	HU 11 2011 0004	28.11.2011	traction freight transport	8 pcs	-	198 pcs	9 / 23	-	492,9 M
DB Schenker Hungária Kft.	9027 Győr, Hűtőház út 23.	logistics.dbschenker.hu	HU 11 2012 0002	15.12.2011	traction	10 pcs	-	5 pcs	23 / 28	-	108,4 M
Floyd ZRt.	1138 Budapest, Madarász u.47-49.	www.floyd.hu	HU 11 2008 0009	01.09.2008	traction freight transport	30 pcs	-	1 pcs	33 / 13	-	293 M
G & G	6726 Szeged Torockói u. 3/b	www.gesgkft.hu	HU 11 2008 0014	16.12.2008	freight transport	-	-	14 pcs	12 / 11	-	-
GySEV Cargo	9400 Sopron, Mátyás király u. 19.	www.gysevcargo.hu	HU 11 2010 0009	01.06.2010	freight transport	-	-	569 pcs	Contract / 40	-	536,85 M
GySEV ZRt.	9400 SopronMátyás Király u. 19.	www.gysev.hu	HU 11 2011 0007	28.06.2007	passanger transport traction	79 pcs	114 pcs	227 pcs	234 / 382	220 M	585,5 M
Kárpát Vasút Kft.	2737 Ceglédbercel, Virág utca		HU 11 2010 0007	01.05.2010	traction	3 pcs	-	-	13 / 2	-	-

	9.										
LTE	Karlauer Gürtel 1 A-8020 Graz Austria	www.lte.at	HU 12 2010 0002	12.02.2010	traction freight transport	6 pcs	-	40 pcs	6 / 1	-	211,6 M
Magyar Vasúti Áruszállító Kft.	4028 Debrecen, Jósika utca 9.	www.mvakft.hu	HU 11 2011 0002	15.08.2011	freight transport	3 pcs	-	1 pcs	3 / 7	-	-
Mátrai Erőmű Zrt.	3271 Visonta Erőmű u. 11.	www.mert.hu	HU 11 2009 0001	16.06.2009	freight transport	-	-	27 pcs	Contract	-	n.a.
MÁV FKG Kft.	5137 Jászkisér Jászladányi u. 10.	www.fkg.hu	HU 11 2008 0012	16.11.2008	traction freight transport	5 pcs	-	94 pcs	97 / 2	-	27,2 M
MÁV NOSZTALGIA KFT.	1142 Budapest, Tatai út 95.	www.mavnosztalgia.hu	HU 11 2009 0002	01.06.2009	passanger transport traction freight transport	16 pcs	56 pcs	5 pcs	7 / 10	6,1 M	2 M
MÁVÉPCELL	9500 Celldömölk, Sándor tér 14.	www.mavepcell.hu	HU 11 2008 0011	01.11.2008	traction freight transport	1 pcs	-	114 pcs	25 / 6	-	-
MÁVGÉP Kft.	1103 Budapest, Kőér utca 2/d.	www.mavgep.hu	HU 11 2010 0008	16.05.2010	traction freight transport	29 pcs	-	197 pcs	32 / 175	-	-

MÁV-GÉPÉSZET Zrt.	1087 Budapest, Könyves Kálmán krt. út 54-60.	www.mav-gepeszet.hu	HU 11 2010 0006	16.04.2010	traction freight transport	28 pcs	-	37 pcs	143 / 416	-	0,797 M
MÁV-START ZRt	1087 Budapest Könyves Kálmán krt. 54-60.	www.mav-start.hu	HU 11 2010 0010	01.07.2010	passanger transport	419 pcs	2397 pcs	-	3 / 3869	7580 M	-
MÁV-TRAKCIÓ	1087 Budapest, Könyves Kálmán krt 54-60.	www.mav-trakcio.hu	HU 11 2008 0006	16.07.2008	traction	588 pcs	-	-	3095 / 319	-	-
METRANS	92901 Szlovákia, Dunajska Streda, Povodska cesta 18.	www.metrans.cz	HU 12 2012 0003	01.07.2012	traction freight transport	3 pcs	-	49 pcs	Contract	-	162,6 M
MMV ZRt.	1035 Budapest, Kerék u. 80.	www.mmv.hu	HU 11 2012 0004	01.10.2007	traction freight transport	11 pcs	-	130 pcs	39 / 21	-	372,6 M
MOL	1117. Budapest, Október huszonharmadika u. 18.	www.mol.hu	HU 11 2012 0001	01.04.2012	freight transport	22 pcs	-	2014 pcs	26 / 69	-	-
MTMG	1012 Budapest, Logodi u. 34/A	mtmgzrt.com	HU 11 2009 0005	16.11.2009	traction freight transport	3 pcs	-	10 pcs	0 / 4	-	-

PETROLSPED	98401 Lučenec, L. Svobodu 2839/1 Szlovákia	www.petrolsped.sk	HU 12 2012 0002	16.05.2012	traction freight transport	-	-	10 pcs	Contract / 2	-	-
Prvá Slovenská Zeleznica	934 01 Levice, Ku Bratke 5. Szlovákia		HU 12 2008 0003	16.05.2008	traction freight transport	21 pcs	-	275 pcs	16 / 11	-	252,12 M
Rail Cargo Hungaria Zrt.	1033 Budapest, Váci u. 92.	www.railcargo.hu	HU 11 2011 0001	01.03.2011	traction freight transport	20 pcs	-	10628 pcs	128 / 1513	-	6682,2 M
Rail Service Hungaria	1065 Budapest, Bajcsy Zsilinszky út 25.	www.railservice.hu	HU 11 2010 0013	16.12.2009	traction	4 pcs	-	-	8 / 13	-	21,7 M
RTS	A-8055 Graz, Puchstraße 184	www.rts-rail.com	HU 12 2011 0003	13.10.2011	traction freight transport	3 pcs	-	77 pcs	3 / 1	-	16,1 M
SZDS a.s.	960 01 Zvolen, Na Štepnici 1379/1., Szlovákia	www.szds.sk	HU 12 2008 0014	16.10.2008	traction freight transport	2 pcs	-	2 pcs	Contract / 3	-	25,37 M
Szentesi Vasútépítő Kft.	6000 Szentes, Baross G. u. 2.	-	HU 11 2008 0004	16.05.2008	traction freight transport	18 pcs	-	8 pcs	9 / 8	-	-
TRAIN Hungary Kft.	4028 Debrecen, Szoboszlói u.	www.trainhungary.hu	HU 11 2012 0003	01.09.2007	traction freight transport	10 pcs	-	365 pcs	28 / 14	-	175 M

	50.										
Vasútvillamosító Kft.	1106 Budapest, Jászberényi út 90.	www.vasutvill.hu	HU 11 2011 0005	15.11.2011	traction freight transport	-	-	32 pcs	5 / 35	-	0,02 M
WLB	1230 Wien, Triesterstaße 118.	www.wlb.at	HU 12 2012 0007	16.11.2010	traction freight transport	9 pcs	-	1129 pcs	Contract	-	10 M
Záhony-Port ZRt	4625 Záhony, Európa tér 12.	www.zahony-port.hu	HU 11 2008 0007	16.09.2008	traction freight transport	4 pcs	-	20 pcs	- / 31	-	0,06 M
ZSSK CARGO Slovákia	Bratislava, Drieňová u. 24. 820 09 Slovakia	www.zscargo.sk	HU 12 2010 0012	16.10.2010	traction freight transport	4 pcs	-	6336 pcs	Contract / 1	-	2,82 M

Abbreviations: HSL = High Speed Line (Definition acc. Directive 96/48/EC)
ATP = Automatic Train Protection
LC = Level Crossing

ANNEX B: Organisation chart(s) of the National Safety Authority

B.1. Chart: Internal organization


National Transport Authority
President
Presidential Secretariat
General Vice President
Secretariat
Legal Department
Department of Second Instance Authority
Railway Administration Department
Central Supervisory Unit
Economic Vice President
Economic Department
Technical and Supply Unit
Human Relations Department
Department of Internal Control
Communication and PR Unit
Safety Manager
IT security rapporteur
Strategical Vice President
Strategical and International Affairs
IT Department
Road, Rail and Shipping Office
Road and Bridge Department
Railway Department
Shipping Department
Road Vehicles Office
Aviation Office


Railway Department
Railway Tracks and Bridges Unit
Railway Engineering Unit
Railway Safety and Supervising Unit
Railway Training and Exam Supervising Unit

B.2. Chart: Relationship with other National Bodies



ANNEX C: CSIs data – Definitions applied

C.1. CSIs data

Outcomes






Serious injuries per accident type
100
80
60
40
20
0
60
84
70
76
88
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Collisions
Derailments
Level crossing accidents
Accidents to persons caused by RS in motion
Fires in RS
Others


Serious injuries per user
100
80
60
40
20
0
60
84
70
76
88
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Passengers
Employees
Level crossing users
Unauthorised persons
Others



Exposure data




Number of passenger kilometers (millions)
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
8288
7945
7666
7795
8070
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Passenger km


Number of line kilometres
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
8657
7690
7691
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Line km



Risk indicators




Passenger fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion passenger-km (CST 1.2)
0 002
0 002
0 002
0 001
0 001
0 001
0 001
0 001
0 000
0 000
0 000
0 002
0 001
0 001
0 001
0 001
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
FWSI per passenger km (billions)


Employee fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km (CST 2)
0 025
0 020
0 015
0 010
0 005
0 000
0 010
0 009
0 020
0 010
0 010
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
FWSI per train-km (billions)


Level crossing user fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km (CST 3.1)
0 450
0 400
0 350
0 300
0 250
0 200
0 150
0 100
0 050
0 000
0 400
0 274
0 314
0 264
0 253
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
FWSI per train-km (millions)


Level crossing user fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km / Track-km per No of level crossings (CST 3.2)
0 250
0 200
0 150
0 100
0 050
0 000
0 224
0 153
0 177
0 151
0 145
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
FWSI per exposure


Unauthorized person fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km (CST 5)
0 700
0 600
0 500
0 400
0 300
0 200
0 100
0 000
0 583
0 621
0 476
0 501
0 374
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
FWSI per train-km (millions)


All person fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km (CST 6)
1 200
1 000
0 800
0 600
0 400
0 200
0 000
1 110
0 945
0 868
0 831
0 698
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
FWSI per train-km (millions)

Precursor to accidents



Infrastructure




Percentage of train kms on tracks with ATP
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
61%
56%
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total km with ATP


Number of level crossings by type
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
5964
6043
6041
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Active
Passive

C.2. Definitions used in the annual report

C.2.1. Definitions in Regulation 91/03 to be applied:

deaths (killed person)
means any person killed immediately or dying within 30 days as a result of an injury accident, excluding suicides

injuries (seriously injured person)
means any person injured who was hospitalized for more than 24 hours as a result of an accident, excluding attempted suicides

passenger-km
means the unit of measure representing the transport of one passenger by rail over a distance of one kilometer. Only the distance on the national territory of the reporting country shall be taken into account

rail passenger
means any person, excluding members of the train crew, who makes a trip by rail. For accident statistics, passengers trying to embark/disembark onto/from a moving train are included

suicide
means an act to deliberately injure oneself resulting in death, as recorded and classified by the competent national authority

significant accident
means any accident involving at least one rail vehicle in motion, resulting in at least one killed or seriously injured person, or in significant damage to stock, track, other installations or environment, or extensive disruptions to traffic. Accidents in workshops, warehouses and depots are excluded

train
means one or more railway vehicles hauled by one or more locomotives or railcars, or one railcar traveling alone, running under a given number or specific designation from an initial fixed point to a terminal fixed point. A light engine, i.e. a locomotive traveling on its own, is not considered to be a train

train*Km
means the unit of measure representing the movement of a train over one kilometer. The distance used is the distance actually run, if available, otherwise the standard network distance between the origin and destination shall be used. Only the distance on the national territory of the reporting country shall be taken into account

C.2.2. National definitions

Directive 2004/49/EC lays down in Annex 1, point 6:

"Definitions

The reporting authorities may use nationally applied definitions of the indicators and methods for calculation of costs when data according to this Annex are submitted. All definitions and calculation methods in use shall be explained in an Annex to the annual report described in Article 18."

National definitions and methods to calculate costs concerning the items listed in the Annex 1 to Directive 2004/49/EC are to be reported in this paragraph, whether not defined in this legal act and in the Reg.91/03.

C.3. Abbreviations

CSI	Common Safety Indicator
ERA	European Railway Agency
LC	Level Crossing
MLN	10^6
BLN	10^9
NSA	National Safety Authority
RS	Rolling Stock
RU/IM	Railway Undertaking and Infrastructure Manager

ANNEX D: Important changes in legislation and regulation

	Legal reference	Date legislation comes into force	Reason for introduction (Additionally specify new law or amendment to existing legislation)	Description
General national railway safety legislation	Act on Railway Transport No. CLXXXIII/2005. a) 35. § (2) b) 35. § (2a)-(2b), (4a) c) 35. § (5) d) 36/I. § e) 85/B. f) 89. §	a) 23.08.2012. b) 23.08.2012. c) 23.08.2012. d) 23.08.2012. e) 23.08.2012. f) 23.08.2012.	amendment	a) When the validity of the safety certificate/authorization is about to expire, the RU/IM has to submit the application for renewal six month before the expiration date. b) Rules for handling the changes in activities. c) Changes to the fee of the inspections. d) Supervision of the ECMs. e) Changes to the place in service of railway infrastructure. f) Compliance with EU legislation (445/2011/EU, 913/2010/EU, 2011/155/EU, 2011/765/EU).
Rules concerning requirements for wagon keepers	a) 31/2010 (XII. 23.) NFM decree 32. § (4) b) 72/2006. (IX. 29.) GKM decree Annex 2, 29.	a) 01.04.2012. b) 11.10.2012.	a) amendment b) new	a) The request for place in service is also managed as a request for registration in the NVR. b) Fee of the ECM certification.
Rules concerning requirements on staff executing safety critical tasks, including selection criteria, medical fitness and vocational training and certification	40/2006. (VI. 26.) GKM 3. § (2), (10) (1a, (1b))	03.10.2012.	amendment	The RUs and IMs SMS has to ensure that the risks are managed in all activities (maintenance, logistics, human resources). The NSA publish a detailed guideline on its website about the safety certification/authorization process.
Rules concerning the investigation of the accident and incidents including recommendation	Act on Railway Transport No. CLXXXIII/2005. 68., 69., 70., 71., 72. §	07.08.2012.	amendment	investigation of the accident and incidents

ANNEX E: The development of safety certification and authorization – Numerical Data

E.1 Safety Certificates according to Directive 2004/49/EC

	Total number of certificates	Number of certificates Part A in ERADIS
E.1.1. Number of safety certificates Part A issued in the reporting and in previous years by your member state and remain valid in the year 2012	29	29

		Total number of certificates	Number of certificates Part B in ERADIS
E.1.2. Number of safety certificates Part B issued in the reporting and in previous years by your member state and remain valid in the year 2012	Number of certificates Part B, for which the Part A has been issued in your Member-State	39	39
	Number of certificates Part B, for which the part A has been issued in another Member-State	10	10

RU names	Number of certificates Part A 2012			
	Number of part A New	Number of part A Amended	Number of part A Revoked	Number of part A Renewed
DBSRH Kft.	0	1	0	0
MMV Zrt.	0	0	0	1
MOL Nyrt.	1	0	0	0
Train Hungary Kft.	0	0	0	1
Total Sum	1	1	0	2

RU names	Number of certificates Part B 2012			
	Number of part B New	Number of part B Amended	Number of part B Revoked	Number of part B Renewed
Central Railways, s.r.o.	1	0	0	0
DBSRH Kft.	0	1	0	0
METRANS /Danubia/	1	0	0	0
MMV Zrt.	0	0	0	1
Petrolsped Slovakia, s.r.o.	1	0	0	0
Train Hungary Kft.	0	0	0	1
Wiener Lokalbahnen Cargo GmbH	0	1	0	0
Total Sum	3	2	0	2

E.1.3. List of Railway Undertakings with only part B certificate

Name of RU	Member-State where Safety Certificate Part A was issued
boxXpress.de GmbH	Germany
Central Railways a.s.	Slovakia
LTE Logistik- und Transport GmbH	Austria
METRANS	Slovakia
PETROLSPED	Slovakia
Prvá Slovenská Železničá, a.s.	Slovakia
RTS Rail Transport Service GmbH	Austria
Slovenská Železničná Dopravná Spoločnosť a. s.	Slovakia
Wiener Lokalbahnen Cargo GmbH	Austria
Železničná spoločnosť Cargo Slovakia a. s	Slovakia

E.2. Safety Authorisations according to Directive 2004/49/EC

	Total number of safety authorisations
E.2.1. Number of valid Safety Authorisations issued to Infrastructure Managers in the reporting year and in previous years and remain valid at the end of the year 2012	2

		A	R	P
E.2.2. Number of applications for Safety Authorisations submitted by Infrastructure Managers in year 2012	New authorisations	-	-	-
	Updated/amended authorisations	-	-	-
	Renewed authorisations	-	-	-

A = Accepted application, authorisation is already issued
R = Rejected applications, no authorisation was issued
P = Case is still pending, no authorisation was issued so far

E.3. Procedural aspects – Safety Certificates part A

		New	Updated /amended	Renewed
The average time after receiving of the application with the required information and the final delivery of a		90	60	-

Safety Certificate **Part A** in year 2012 for Railway Undertakings				

E.4. Procedural aspects – Safety Certificates part B

		New	Updated /amended	Renewed
The average time after receiving the application with the required information and the final delivery of a Safety Certificate **Part B** in year 2012 for RUs	Where the part A has been issued in your Member-State	90	60	-
	Where the part B has been issued in another Member-State	90	60	-

E.5. Procedural aspects – Safety Authorisations

		New	Updated /amended	Renewed
The average time after receiving the application with the required information and the final delivery of a Safety Authorisation in year 2012 for IMs		-	-	-