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NSA Annual Report

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Page 3 of 48

ERA Annual Report 2014

Contents

**1 Purpose of the report—11**

**2 Summary—12**

**3 Introduction—13**

3.1 General—13

3.2 Information on the rail infrastructure and undertakings/companies—14

3.3 General trend in railway safety—14

**4 Organisation—16**

**5 Railway safety trends—17**

5.1 Initiatives to maintain/improve safety performance—17

5.2 Detailed analysis—19

5.3 Safety recommendations as a result of safety investigations—20

**6 Major changes to the laws and regulations—23**

6.1 Laws and regulations—23

6.2 Policy rules—23

**7 Developments in safety certification and authorisation, national legislation, commencement dates and availability—24**

**8 Supervision of railway undertakings and infrastructure managers—29**

8.1 Audits/inspections/checklists—30

8.2 Authorisation and passenger rights—30

8.3 Focal points for railway safety in the Netherlands—31

8.4 Assessment of annual reports of infrastructure managers and railway undertakings—32

8.5 Complaints—32

**9 Report on the application of the common safety methods (CSM) for risk evaluation and assessment—33**

**10 Exceptions in respect of the ECM certification system—34**

**11 Conclusions for reporting year 2014 – priorities —35**

**Annex A1: Mainline railway network**

**Annex A2: Undertakings and infrastructure managers 2014**

**Annex B: Organisational structure of the NSA (ILT and**

**DGB) and OvV**

**Annex C1: Infrastructure manager key figures**

**Annex C2: Safety indicators: the figures Annex C3: CSI data and associated definitions Annex D: Entries in vehicle register**

7

Terms and abbreviations

**Acceptable level of safety**

A safety level is considered acceptable if the MWA is no higher than the NRW plus a tolerance of 20 %.

**Other types of accident**

All accidents not mentioned elsewhere (train collisions, train derailments, accidents at level crossings, accidents caused to persons by rolling stock in motion and rolling stock fires).

**Audit (European definition)**

A systematic, independent and documented process for obtaining audit evidence and evaluating it objectively to determine the extent to which audit criteria are fulfilled.

**Common Safety Method (CSM)**

Methods developed in order to describe how the level of safety, achievement of the safety aims and conformity with other safety rules are assessed.

**Common Safety Target (CST)**

The minimum safety level to be achieved by the various components of the railway system (such as the conventional railway system, the high-speed railway system, long railway tunnels or lines used exclusively for freight transport) and by the system as a whole in the form of criteria for risk acceptance.

**Fatality (European definition)**

Any person killed immediately in an accident, or dying within 30 days as a result of it, excluding suicides.

**Accidents caused to persons by rolling stock in motion**

Accidents caused to one or more persons who are struck by a railway vehicle or by an object attached to it, or that has become detached from it. This includes persons who fall from railway vehicles while travelling on board or otherwise, or who are hit by loose objects.

**Moving Weighted Average (MWA)**

Weighted average of the number of accidents or injuries per risk category, calculated in accordance with Commission Decision 2009/460/EC.

**Line-km**

Line-kilometre means the length, measured in kilometres, of a Member State’s railway network, the scope of which is laid down in Article 2 of Directive 2009/149/EC. For multiple-track railway lines, only the distance between origin and destination is to be counted.

**Track-km**

Track-kilometre means the length, measured in kilometres, of a Member State’s

Railway network, the scope of which is laid down in Article 2 of Directive 2009/149/EC. For multiple-track railway lines, the distance between origin and destination is to be counted and then multiplied by the number of tracks.

Track buckles (also: rail buckling)

Flaws affecting track continuity and geometry. They may lead to closure of the track or to immediate speed restrictions to maintain safety.

**Minor injury**

Any person injured in an accident and admitted to hospital for less than 24 hours, except attempted suicides.

**National Reference Value (NRV)**

The reference value indicating for the Member State concerned the maximum tolerable level for a railway risk category.

**Others (third parties)**

Means all persons not defined as ‘passengers’, ‘employees including the staff of contractors’, ‘level crossing users’ or ‘unauthorised persons on railway premises’.

**Continuous improvement**

Means the continued maintenance of the high level of safety of the rail network (Third Framework Document on Rail Safety).

**Accident to a person**

Accidents caused to persons by rolling stock in motion, who are hit by an object attached to, or which has become detached or has fallen from, a railway vehicle.

**Passenger-km**

The unit of measurement representing the carriage of a passenger by rail over a distance of one kilometre. Only the distance travelled in the territory of the reporting country is counted.

**Risk category**

Means one of the railway risk categories specified in Article 7(4)(a) and (b) of Directive 2004/49/EC.

**Significant accident**

An accident involving at least one moving rail vehicle, resulting in at least one fatality or serious injury or causing total damage amounting to at least EUR 150 000 or serious traffic disruption (at least six consecutive hours of suspension of the train service). This does not include accidents in workshops, warehouses and store rooms.

**Train**

A single railway vehicle or a rake hauled by one or more locomotives or electric railcars, or one railcar alone, running under a given number or specific designation from an initial fixed point to a terminal fixed point.

**Train-km**

The unit of measurement representing one kilometre travelled by a train. Where available, this is the actual distance travelled, so that the standard distance between

origin and destination is not used. Only the distance travelled in the territory of the reporting country is counted.

**Train passenger**

Any person travelling by rail, other than a crew-member, including passengers attempting to board/alight from a moving train.

**Suicide**

An act of deliberate self-harm resulting in death, as recorded and classified by the competent national authority. This report covers only those suicides in which death has resulted from a collision with a train.

**Serious injury**

Anyone injured in an accident who is admitted to hospital for more than 24 hours, except attempted suicides.

ADR European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (Accord européen relatif au transport international des

Marchandises Dangereuses par Route)

ALARP As low as reasonably practicable

Arbo Working Conditions Act (Arbeidsomstandighedenwet)

ATB vv Automatic Train Control, advanced version

BD Out of service

CSI Common Safety Indicator

CSM Common Safety Method

DGB Directorate-General for Accessibility at the Ministry of

Infrastructure and the Environment

EC European Community

ERA European Railway Agency

FWSI Fatalities and Weighted Serious Injuries

IenM Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (Ministerie van

Infrastructuur en Milieu)

ILT Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate (Inspectie

Leefomgeving en Transport) of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment

ISZW Social Affairs and Employment Inspectorate (Inspectie van Sociale

Zaken en Werkgelegenheid)

LOD Enforcement order bn. Billion (109)

MO/PO Medical check-up/psychological check-up m. Million (106)

MWA Moving Weighted Average

NRV National Reference Value

NSA National Safety Authority

NVW Framework of standards on safe working (Normenkader Veilig Werken)

OvV Dutch Safety Board (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid)

RID Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail (Règlement concernant le transport international ferroviaire des marchandises dangereuses)

SPW Railways act

STS Stop signal

VPC Value of preventing a casualty

1 Purpose of the report

The purpose of this NSA annual report is to provide an illustration of the development of railway safety on the Dutch main-line railway1 in 2014 in accordance with Article 18 of the European Rail Safety Directive (2004/49/EC).

The Dutch National Safety Authority (NSA) reports annually in September to the European Railway Agency (ERA) on the status of the safety on the main-line railway. It does so based on the number of significant accidents. Common understandings have been reached with the ERA on the categories of significant accidents and the associated indicators (Commission Decision 2009/460/EC *Common Safety Indicators*).

The structure of the NSA annual report follows template EN 2012 version 15, recommended by the ERA.

The report is published at the following website:

Europa: [www.era.europa.eu/Search/Key-Documents/Pages/Home.aspx](http://www.era.europa.eu/Search/Key-Documents/Pages/Home.aspx)

1 Main-line Railways Designation Decree, of 20 December 2004

2 Summary

In 2014 the size of the main-line railway remained virtually unchanged. The same applies to the number of undertakings and companies. 145 million passenger kilometres and 10 million goods train kilometres were travelled.

The total number of significant accidents decreased compared to 2013. There were 19 significant accidents. In 2014 there were no fatalities or serious injuries among passengers and staff. A focal point, as in previous years, remains the significant number of accidents on level crossings. 13 of the significant accidents occurred at a level crossing. These resulted in 7 fatalities and 4 serious injuries among level crossing users. By way of comparison, there are 3 times as many accidents on unmanned level crossings. People continue to take risks by crossing level crossings when a train is approaching.

The derailment of a train in Hilversum resulted in material damage of € 2 m to the infrastructure and rolling stock. As a point was being passed, it switched. The cause was a defective point. The OvV and the ILT have carried out an investigation into the accident.

In Onnen a goods train collided with a train laden with a dangerous substance

(concentrated natural gas). No dangerous substance escaped and there were no victims.

In total 6 investigations were carried out or reports published by the ILT concerning accidents in which safety risks were involved. In a number of cases maintenance of the infrastructure or rolling stock played a part. The ILT was also active in 2014 in respect of earlier investigations. One of these was the tightened supervision of the planning of trains.

In 2014 ground was made up on the issue/renewal of driver licences, with 1,354 licences being issued. The number of inspections and refresher audits carried out was 2,1682 and 168, respectively. Most findings resulted in just a warning. In 2 cases a sanction was issued or a notice of the intention to do so, with 3 administrative enforcements, 3 administrative penalties, 2 instances of tightened supervision and 6 enforcement orders.

3 Introduction

**3.1 General**

The ERA annual report on rail safety describes the progress made in safety on the Dutch main-line railway.3 In doing so use is made of quantitative indicators of significant events with personal injury, (financial) damage or delay. The indicators and the way in which these are reported have been agreed with the ERA.

A number of sources are consulted for the indicators. The most important of these are: Promise4, the Meldingen Bijzonder Voorval (reporting of specific events - MBV) by railway undertakings to the ILT, the annual safety reports of the railway undertakings with a Part A safety certificate and the inspection information from the ILT.

Information from the various sources is compared for the purposes of verification. In cases where information is not unanimous or is unclear, the ILT is responsible for selecting the information used in this ERA annual report. Information in this report can therefore deviate from earlier information published by undertakings on a subject.

The information from foreign undertakings operating in the Netherlands, is included where it is provided. They are not subject to any reporting obligation in the Netherlands.

The annual report is limited to the main-line railway as designated in the Mainline Railways Designation Decree of 20 December 2004. This also includes yards designated as main-line railway.

Not all accidents are relevant for the ERA annual report, only those which are ‘significant’. For an accident to be significant it must meet the following criteria:

 It involves at least one train in motion (a train being a railway vehicle or vehicles with traction and train number); and

 At least one person is killed or seriously injured; or

 There is damage to stock, track, other installations or environment totalling at least € 150,000; or

 There is extensive disruption to traffic, with train services being suspended for at least six hours.

In order to be able to follow the trend in an indicator, use is made of a ‘reference indicator’. This reference indicator is a weighted average of significant accidents over a period of 6 successive years. The reference is known as the National Reference Value (NRV). The NRV is compared with the moving weighted average (MWA). The MWA is a progressive weighted average and is recalculated at the end of each calendar year for a period of 5 successive years. In other words, the NRW is a static value and the MWA always moves on by a year at a time. The ERA determined the NRW for the period 2004-2009. In 2016 adjustments are to be made to the system and the NRW period.

3 To the extent that this falls within the remit of the ILT as the National Railway Safety Authority and to the extent that Article 19 of the Main-line railway operating licences and safety certificates Decree applies to an undertaking/company.

4 ProRail administrative system for logging of incidents and accidents.

The calculation and application of the NRV and MWA are prescribed by the

ERA (Commission Decision 2009/460/EC and Implementation Guidance for CSIs).

Because some indicators have to count fatalities and serious injuries, the Fatal Weighted Serious Injuries (FWSI) factor is used: number of fatalities + (0.1 x number of serious injuries).

**3.2 Information on the railway infrastructure and undertakings/companies**

As of 31 December 2014 the makeup of the Dutch main-line rail network was as follows:

*Table 1: Scale of the main-line railway network, undertakings/companies 2013 and 2014.*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Heading** | **2013** | **2014** |
|  |  |  |
| Railway network (kilometres) | 3 061 | 3 061 |
| Train-kilometres (m) | 155 | 155 |
| Number of railway undertakings carrying passengers | 8 | 8 |
| Passenger train-km (m) | 144 | 145 |
| Passenger-km (bn.) | 18 | 19 |
| Number of rail freight undertakings | 22 | 29 |
| Freight train-kilometres (bn.) | 11 | 10 |
| Number of infrastructure managers (subject to licensing) | 1 | 1 |
| Number of contractors | 20 | 18 |
| Number of shunting companies | 20 | 20 |
| Number of carriers with historical rolling stock | 4 | 4 |
| Number of inspection services | 10 | 10 |
| Number of staffing agencies | 11 | 11 |
| Number of training institutions | 6 | 6 |
| Number of examining institutions | 1 | 1 |
| Number of notified bodies | 6 | 6 |
| Number of maintenance companies | 38 | 38\* |
| Number of entities in charge of maintenance (ECM) | 15 | 15 |
| Number of licence holders (National Vehicle Register) | 62 | 62 |

All figures in the table are rounded.

\*Maintenance companies as per Article 48 of the Railways Act

Annex A1 contains a general map of the Dutch main-line railway network (source: Prorail). Annex A2 contains a summary of the railway undertakings and infrastructure managers as at 2014.

**3.3 General trend in railway safety**

The following tables show the injuries and accidents reported to the ERA. The tables are a selection from the full overview of indicators to be reported to the ERA. For a more comprehensive overview see chapter 5.

*Table 2: Injuries 2014 (2013) excluding suicides or attempted suicides.*

|  |
| --- |
| **Category of person Fatalities Serious injuries** |
| **Passengers** 0 (0) 0 (6) |
| **Railway staff** 0 (0) 0 (5) |
| **Level crossing users** 7 (14) 4 (2) |
| **Trespassers on the line** 1 (2) 0 (0) |
| **Others** 1 (0) 0 (0) |
| **Total** 9 (16) 4 (13) |

*Table 3: Significant accidents in 2014 (2013)*

|  |
| --- |
| **Type Total** |
| **Train-train collision** 35 (1) |
| **Train-object collision** 1 (-) |
| **Derailment** 1 (1) |
| **Level crossing accident/collision** 13 (17) |
| **Personal injury caused by rolling** 1 (9)  **stock** |
| **Rolling stock fire** 0 (0) |
| **Other accident type** 1 (1) |
| **Total** 19 (29) |

*Table 4: Accidents involving dangerous substances in 2014 (2013)*

|  |
| --- |
| **Type Total** |
| **Accident in which dangerous substances** 0  **were released** |
| **Accident in which dangerous substances** 16 (0)  **were involved** |
|  |
| **Total** 1 (0) |

The number of injuries and significant accidents fell compared with 2013. The reduction is primarily due to fewer fatalities, level crossing accidents/collisions and personal injuries. Level crossings feature heavily in both the number of accidents, and the fatalities and serious injuries statistics.

5 2 train-train collisions and 1 train-object collision.

6 The collision is not significant based on the abovementioned criteria. However, because dangerous substances were involved in the accident, the accident still has to be reported to the ERA

4 Organisation

Under the Decree Establishing the Living Environment and Transport Inspectorate (Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport – ILT)7, the ILT performs the task of the national safety authority in the terms of the Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC: National Safety Authority), save delegation. A summary of its tasks, under Article 16 of Directive 2004/49/EC et seq., is given below:

* bringing sub-systems into service and checking that they are operated and maintained ‘well’;
* supervising the interoperability constituents;
* authorising the placing in service of new or substantially altered rolling stock;
* issuing, renewing, amending and revoking of safety certificates and of safety authorisations and checking these;
* supervising that rolling stock is duly registered in the national register of vehicles and that the register is accurate and kept up-to-date;
* and promoting and, where appropriate, enforcing the safety regulatory framework, including the system of national safety rules.

The monitoring and development of a regulatory framework is a task of the

Director-General for Accessibility (Directeur-Generaal Bereikbaarheid – DGB) at the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment8.

In total, around 45 full-time equivalents (FTEs) are deployed on the relevant tasks.

Annex B contains the NSA organisation chart.

For promoting, inter alia, safety on the railway the Netherlands has a statutory9 national Safety Board (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid - OvV). The OvV has no duties as an NSA but operates as the National Investigation Body in accordance with Article 21 of the Railway Safety Directive 2009/49/EC, investigating on its own initiative and independently the causes of (major) incidents. After completing its inquiries, the OvV has power to make recommendations to the Infrastructure and Environment Ministry and other relevant organisations.

7 Article 2.3.a.

8 [www.ilent.nl/onderwerpen/transport/inspectie/nsa](http://www.ilent.nl/onderwerpen/transport/inspectie/nsa) and the Rail Regulator Decree

9 Kingdom Act of 2 December 2004, on the creation of the Dutch Safety Board

5 Railway safety trends

**5.1 Initiatives to maintain/improve safety performance**

The ILT has a number of tools available for stimulating improvement in safety, including investigations and/or enforcement. The tables below show the most important events into which an investigation was carried out and the resultant measures together with a number of interventions during enforcement.

Table 5: Some measures as a result of accidents or near misses

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Safety measures taken** | | |
| **Where** | **What happened** | **Measure** |
| **Borne** | Goods train derailed in 2013 due to a ruptured tyre (investigation report completed in 2014) | Encourage railway undertakings to exchange and use maintenance data and warning systems |
| Amsterdam | Train collision after overrunning an STS in 2012. One of the causes was the planning of the trains and the involvement of safety in this. | Enhanced surveillance of the improvement of train planning and staff authorising the movement of trains from the carriers and managers and periodic monitoring to advance the introduction of improvements. |
| **Hilversum** | Train derailed after running through a switch in 2014. Switch appeared to have a technical weakness. | Check the technical condition of all comparable switches and if necessary exchange components of the switch. Adapt maintenance schedule. All parties in the chain (from designer to maintenance contractor) must share information with each other. |

Table 6: Some voluntary or safety measures for reasons other than accidents or near-misses

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Interventions** | | |
| **Legislation** | **What was behind the measure** | **The following safety measure was taken:** |
| Article 53 (3) Railways Act | No certification and no driver licence | Enforcement order |
| Article 53 (1) (b) Railways Act | Inadequate language proficiency | Enforcement order (proposed). |
| Articles 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, 9th Rail Traffic Decree and Regulations | Absence of proper coordination of maximum speed, braking percentage and braked weight | Administrative enforcement |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Interventions** | | |
| N/A | Grant scheme for communications less prone to interference | GSM-R grant scheme |

18

**5.2 Detailed analysis**

Article 19 of the Main-line railway operating licences and safety certificates decree (referring to Article 9 and Annex I of European Railway Safety Directive 2004/49/EC) gives the common safety indicators (CSIs) which must be reported on.

The absolute number of significant accidents in 2014 fell compared with 2013 from 29 to 19. In terms of train-kilometres travelled there was also a fall given that the number of kilometres remained approximately the same as in 2013.

The 3 collisions and 1 derailment resulted in 1 fatality with damage to stock and a delay. Of the collisions, 2 were the result of shunting movements. A goods train collided with wagons which were ready for shunting and a passenger train collided with a shunter. The 3rd collision was the result of a motorist who fell ill while his car was on the railway and was killed. At Hilversum a passenger train derailed after a switch altered when the train was passing it. The switch was defective. This resulted in major infrastructure damage (more than € 2 m and 35 hours’ suspension of service).

During a shunting movement at Onnen a collision occurred with wagons carrying concentrated gas (a dangerous substance). This did not result in any injuries or damage nor in any delay which would make the collision significant. But because the concentrate is a dangerous substance, the collision is included in this report as an ‘accident involving dangerous substances’.

In 2014 there were no broken rails or broken axles reported. The number of STS overruns fell sharply compared with 2013. At 112, the figure was below the limit of the national target of 133 overruns. Compared with the reference year of 2003, the risk fell 75%.

The most significant accidents are level crossing accidents. In 2014 these accounted for nearly half of all significant accidents. There were 7 fatalities and 4 serious injuries. The practical reality is that accidents at level crossings not actively secured are three times more likely than at actively secured level crossings. There were 2 fatalities on the same unattended level crossing on the Winsum route (Voslaan level crossing).

Directive 2009/149/EC sets out methods of calculation of the following indicators of the economic impact of accidents: value of preventing a casualty (VPC) and value of time10. The costs of preventing a serious injury in the Netherlands transport system, calculated as per HEATCO (Harmonised European Approaches for Transport Costing and Project Assessment), are expressed in EUR million per million train-km: EURm/(m train x km).

The cost of all significant accidents was €28.2 m, of which €1.4 m was for delays, €21.1 m for capitalised costs of fatalities and serious injuries, and €5.7 m for rolling stock and infrastructure.

The reports on the economic impact show that the total loss cannot be fully calculated in all cases. There are a number of reasons for this, such as ongoing insurance matters or liability cases. In one case the loss sustained was not revealed.

For more information on accidents and indicators see Annexes C1, C2 and C3.

**5.3 Safety recommendations as a result of safety investigations**

The Dutch Safety Board (OvV) investigated the derailment of the passenger train at Hilversum. The investigation report was completed and published on 18 December

2014 11. The recommendations from the report are shown in the following table.

Table 7: OvV investigations 2014

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **OvV investigation** | **Recommendations** |
| Hilversum derailment | To the manager:  Organise railway maintenance in such a way that safety risks are explicitly and demonstrably managed, irrespective of other interests (such as availability and costs). Develop stimuli for maintenance contracts that offer contractors maximum encouragement in actively promoting railway safety. Monitor to ensure that contractors actually carry out the necessary maintenance and that this maintenance has the desired result.  Ensure that relevant design, user and maintenance information on all railway infrastructure parts is available to the various chain partners. Also encourage active knowledge sharing on (near) accidents and innovative developments.  Tighten up regulations governing the (design, laying and inspection/maintenance of) switches in such a way that flange-back contacts are effectively countered. Incorporate the tightened regulations as mandatory in the (current and future) contractual agreements with the parties involved.  To the manager and contractors:  Together, ensure an up-to-date and complete picture of the technical condition of the railway infrastructure. Use this information for adequate management (asset management) whereby – besides monitoring the functionality and service life – safety is demonstrably guaranteed.  Make sure when transferring a maintenance contract, that all relevant information about the technical condition and maintenance history of the railway in question is transferred fully and in an accessible manner to the future contractor.  To the supplier:  When supplying railway parts (such as the EBI switch point machine), provide users with clear safety-related usage specifications. Monitor to ensure that these requirements are met in practice, and warn users if this is not the case.  To the ministry:  Make sure that the safe usability of the railway infrastructure is granted sufficient weight in relation to other interests (such as capacity and punctuality). Integrate this vision in the current rethink of the policy framework for railway safety, and bring about a situation whereby Prorail and the maintenance contractors (are able to) successfully act in accordance with it. |

Apart from the investigation by the OvV the ILT performs refresher audits resulting in improvement measures. In 2014 the following theme audits were completed.

Table 8: Theme-audits completed in 2014

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Theme-audit** | **Explanation** |
| Performance-oriented maintenance of the Dutch railway infrastructure | On 21 February 2014 the inspectorate published its investigation into the performance-oriented maintenance (PGO) of the Dutch railway infrastructure. The investigation was the result of the quick scan performed by the inspectorate in 2012. |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Theme-audit** | **Explanation** |
|  | In the inspection of 1 500 assets the inspectorate did not find any situations of acute danger. But the inspectorate did find that there was room for improvement. ProRail must place safety more at the forefront when contracting and performing of light maintenance of the railway infrastructure. The inspectorate has also stated that the manager must improve the provision of information on the railway and its maintenance and improve its visibility of the current state of maintenance of the infrastructure. The rail infrastructure manager has also been asked to take more of a lead in guiding quality and safety. ProRail has taken heed of the inspectorate’s recommendations. |
| Report on the physical quality of the Dutch railway infrastructure | On 28 May 2014 the inspectorate published its report on the investigation into the physical quality of the railway infrastructure in the Netherlands. This report was prompted by the recommendation of the Kuiken parliamentary commission of enquiry of 2012 that the physical quality of the railway should be independently checked once every five years. A second report will follow in 2019.  The inspectorate performed 2 500 inspections of railway assets and assessed them in respect of the maintenance standards of the manager. In total 85% of the railway assets met the maintenance standards of the manager. The majority of the railway infrastructure is therefore of adequate quality. But this does not mean that the safety of the other 15% is in question. By maintaining good visibility of where the standards are not being met and taking timely action managers can continue to guarantee safety. Curves and switches are where the manager most often falls down on the standards (average 31% for curves and 23% for switches). No non-compliances with the standards by catenaries were found. Zeeland had the largest number of assets (24%) that failed the standards. This had already been noted in the ILT investigation report on performance-oriented maintenance (PGO) on the railway of 21 February 2014, in respect of which the manager has committed to taking measures. |
| Borne derailment | On 6 November 2013 a goods wagon derailed at Borne as a result of a damaged wheel. This resulted in serious damage to 4 km of railway infrastructure. On 12 November  2014 the inspectorate published its investigation into this derailment.  The most important conclusion from the investigation is that the undertakings make insufficient use of data from the Quo Vadis measurement system. Carriers and entities in charge of maintenance must include the data from Quo Vadis in the maintenance of goods wagons. Had this occurred in this case, the derailed wagon could have been repaired in good time and the derailment prevented. |
| Inspection of the expertise of train service providers | On 30 January 2013 (reference 29984, number 377) a report was submitted to the Second Chamber on the expertise and safety culture of train service providers. A commitment was made to report to the Second Chamber on the follow-up actions.  The follow-up inspection showed that the train service providers had made improvements in the area of safety communication, local follow-up training, safety-critical conduct and open culture. Only in the area of the deviation from internal rules was no clear improvement found. There is no cause to instigate a follow-up inspection, however, provided the improvements that are under way are carried through. |
| Tightened supervision of NSR (Dutch Railways – Passenger Division) and Prorail | On 21 April 2012 two trains collided at Amsterdam Wester- park. As a result of this collision the inspectorate found that ProRail and NS Reizigers had taken insufficient account of the safety risks when drawing up the timetable; the two organisations promised to make improvements and both were placed under tightened supervision by the inspectorate. The inspectorate reported on 23 June 2014 on this tightened supervision. |

21

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Theme-audit** | **Explanation** |
|  | The inspectorate found that ProRail and NS Reizigers had made significant improvements. The two organisations are actively managing and monitoring approximately 95% of the trains to be planned so that there is no ‘planning on the fly’. The safety culture among planners had also improved, though the inspectorate found there was further room for improvement here also. For the 5% of the number of trains planned by ProRail Verkeersleiding as regards planning little or no improvements had been made. The inspectorate found that there must be a rapid improvement in this.  As a result of the report it was decided to continue to apply tightened supervision to ProRail and NS Reizigers. |
| Hilversum derailment | On 15 January 2014 a passenger train derailed in Hilversum. On 28 November 2014 the inspectorate published its report on the investigation of this derailment.  The cause of the derailment was a defect in the switch whereupon the train derailed. The switch blade of the switch concerned became detached from the switch mechanism due to a broken ring. The inspectorate concluded that the ring had a design fault, there were finishing defects during the manufacture of the ring and that switch had been poorly maintained. |

22

6 Major changes to the laws and regulations

**6.1 Laws and regulations**

Dutch railway legislation has been amended as a result, for example, of the new European legislation. The trend at the European Commission is towards more uniform legislation in international traffic, such as in the approval of rolling stock. In addition, the assessment of the Railways Act in 2008 identified a number of areas for improvement. The Coördinatie Implementatie Regelgeving Evaluatie Spoorwetgeving (railway legislation implementation - CIRES) programme seeks to ensure that areas for improvement are gradually reflected in changes to the railway legislation. The table below shows what legislation was published in 2014.

Table 9: Legislation published in 2014

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Publication** | **Title** | **Legislation/Policy rule** |
| Law gazette (Staatsblad – Stb) 2011, 218 | Law of 16 December 2010 amending the Railways Act, the Passenger Transport Act 2000 and the Law on Economic Crimes in implementation of Directives 2007/58/EC, 2007/59/EC, 2008/57/EC and 2008/110/EC.  Coming into force of a number of articles in  2014 (including TSIs and Competitive Trading Act) | Railways Act |
| Law gazette (Staatsblad – Stb) 2014, 247 | Law of 25 June 2014 amending the Act Establishing the Consumers and Markets Authority and a number of other laws associated with streamlining the market supervision to be applied by the Consumer and Markets Authority. | Railways Act |

**6.2 Policy rules**

Occasionally further specification or clarification is necessary for supervision of the legislation. In such cases the inspectorate establishes a policy rule. Policy rules essentially have no basis in law and neither are they standards. They are mainly intended for those under supervision to indicate how the ILT implements the legislation. The policy rules were therefore also published in the Official Gazette so that those under supervision can take cognisance of them.

Table 10: Policy rules published in 2014

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Publication** | **Title** |
| Staatscourant (Official Gazette) 14 October 2014, No 28635 | Policy Rule on Administrative Penalties under the Railway Act (level of penalties for finable offences) |
| Staatscourant (Official Gazette) of 28 July 2014, No 20650 | Policy rule on Renovations or Improvements of Railway Vehicles under the Railway Act (authorisation of changes to railway vehicles) |

7 Developments in safety certification and authorisation; national legislation, commencement dates and

availability

**Commencement date for the issue of safety certificates in accordance with Article 10 of Directive 2004/49/EC (Parts A and B)**

Law on the Operational Safety of the Railways [Wet over de exploitatieveiligheid van de spoorwegen], of 13 May 2011 [Staatsblad 2011, No 218].

**Commencement date for the issue of safety authorisations in accordance with Article 11 of Directive 2004/49/EC**

Law on the Operational Safety of the Railways 1 January 2005 [Railways Act 2005].

**Making the national safety rules or other relevant legislation available for consultation by the railway undertakings and infrastructure managers.**

These are published in the Official Gazette (Staatscourant) and can be consulted in advance by request to the Lawgiver and/or via the website www.wetten.overheid.nl

Table 11: Certificates

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **Total number of certificates** | **Number of Part A certificates on**  **ERADIS[1]** |
| ***Number of current Part A safety certificates issued in*** ***or before 2014 and valid in 2014*** |  | 23 | 23 |
| ***Number of current Part B safety certificates issued in or before 2014 and valid in 2014*** | Number of Part B certificates for which Part A was issued in the Netherlands | 23 | 23 |
| Number of Part B certificates for which Part A was issued outside the Netherlands A is afgegeven buiten Nederland | 9 | 9 |

[1] ERADIS is an ERA data information system for certificates issued by the national rail safety authorities.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | **A** | **R** | **P** |
| ***Number of current Part A safety certificates issued in or before 2014 and valid in 2014*** |  | New certificates |  |  |  |
| Amended certificates | 3 |  |  |
| Renewed certificates | 20 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Number of new Part B safety certificates granted to railway undertakings and issued in 2014*** | Part A of which is issued in the Netherlands | New certificates | 1 |  |  |
| Amended certificates | 0 |  |  |
| Renewed certificates | 22 |  |  |
| Part A of which is issued outside the Netherlands | New certificates | 3 |  |  |
| Amended certificates | 0 |  |  |
| Renewed certificates | 6 |  |  |

**Procedural aspects**

There are three categories of operating licence in the Netherlands:

* the EU operating licence for general carriage of passengers and goods;
* restricted operating licence A for shunting, own transport and involvement in rail traffic without providing transport; and
* restricted operating licence B, for driving within a station and for driverless equipment on decommissioned lines.

The EU licence is valid in all EU countries. A railway undertaking applies for and receives it in the country of its establishment. Category A and B operating licences are only valid within the Netherlands.

The Inspectorate issues the safety certificate to a railway undertaking which has set up a proper and functional safety management system.

Part A of the safety certificate is issued in the country of first establishment of the railway undertaking. Part B is issued in the country or countries in which the undertaking operates.

**Part A safety certificates**

**Reasons for updating/amending Part A certificates (e.g. change in service type, amount of traffic, company size)**

Not applicable

**Main reasons why average time of issue of Part A certificates exceeds the four months allowed by Article 12(1) of the Railway Safety Directive (only certificates mentioned in Annexe E, and counting from receipt of the necessary information)**

Staffing shortages or incomplete documentation provided with the Part A application.

**Summary of requests from other NSAs to check/explain a Part A certificate held by a railway undertaking certified in the Netherlands, but applying for a Part B certificate in another Member State**

Not applicable.

**Summary of problems concerning the mutual acceptance of Part A certificates valid throughout the Community**

Not applicable.

**Fees payable on application for a Part A certificate**

 *Article 6 of the 2012 Charge Regulations under the Railways Act*

 A charge as listed in the table below is payable for processing an application for issue of a safety certificate under Article 32 of the Act.

Table 12: Certificate fees

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Safety certificate | Part A | Part B |
| Safety certificate for a railway undertaking with fewer than 300 staff-members exercising safety functions | EUR 12 757.00 | EUR 8 504.00 |
| Safety certificate for a railway undertaking with 300 or more staff-members exercising safety functions | EUR 27 110.00 | EUR 18 073.00 |
| Safety certificate for a railway undertaking using the main-line railway at one point for the handover of railway vehicles, driverless equipment or similar vehicles, to perform activities on or near a part of the main-line railway which has been removed from service for the purpose. | EUR 4 870.00 | - |

 A charge as listed in the table below is payable for processing an application for renewal of a safety certificate under Article 32 of the Act.

Table 13: Certificate renewal fees

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Renewed safety certificate | Part A | Part B |
| Renewed safety certificate for a railway undertaking with fewer than 300 staff-members exercising safety functions | EUR 9 999.00 | EUR 6 379.00 |
| Renewed safety certificate for a railway undertaking with 300 or more staff-members exercising safety functions | EUR 13 681.00 | EUR 7 548.00 |
| Renewed safety certificate for a railway undertaking using the main-line railway at one point for the handover of railway vehicles, driverless equipment or similar vehicles, to perform activities on or near a part of the main-line railway which has been removed from service for the purpose. | EUR 4 870.00 | - |

 *Article 7 of the 2011 Charge Regulation under the Railways Act*

A charge as listed in the table below is payable for processing an application for amendment of a safety certificate under Article 33(6) of the Act.

Table 14: Certificate amendment fees

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Safety certificate amendment | Part A | Part B |
| Amendment of a safety certificate for a railway undertaking with fewer than 300 staff-members exercising safety functions | EUR 6 379.00 | EUR 4 252.00 |
| Amendment of a safety certificate for a railway undertaking with 300 or more staff-members exercising safety functions | EUR 9 568.00 | EUR 6 379.00 |
| Amendment of a safety certificate for a railway undertaking using the main-line railway at one point for the handover of railway vehicles, driverless equipment or similar vehicles, to perform activities on or near a part of the main-line railway which has been removed from service for the purpose. | EUR 1 623.00 | - |

**Summary of problems using harmonised formats for Part A certificates, especially with regard to the categories for the type and scope of service**

Not applicable.

**Summary of Community problems/difficulties for the ILT with procedures for the application of Part A certificates**

Not applicable.

**Summary of problems reported by railway undertakings with applications for Part A certification**

Not applicable.

**Feedback procedure (e.g. questionnaire) for railway undertakings to give their opinions of the issue procedures/practice or record complaints**

Not applicable.

**Part B safety certificates**

**Reasons for updating/amending Part B certificates (e.g. change of service type, scale of traffic, lines to be operated, type of rolling stock, crew category etc.).**

Not applicable.

**Main reasons why average time of issue of Part B certificates exceeds the four months allowed by Article 12(1) of the Railway Safety Directive (only certificates mentioned in Annexe E, and counting from receipt of the necessary information)**

Not applicable.

**Application fees for a Part B certificate**

See Tables 12 and 13.

**Summary of problems using harmonised formats for Part B certificates, especially with regard to the categories for the type and scope of service**

Not applicable.

**Summary of Community problems/difficulties for the ILT with procedures for the application of Part B certificates**

Not applicable.

**Summary of problems reported by railway undertakings in connection with applications for Part B certification**

Not applicable.

**Feedback procedure (e.g. questionnaire) for railway undertakings to give their opinions of the issue procedures/practice or record complaints**

Not applicable.

**Safety authorisations**

Safety authorisations relate to the infrastructure, managed by ProRail. ProRail’s safety authorisation was renewed in 2014 for a five-year term.

**Reasons for updating or amending safety authorisations**

Not applicable.

**Main reasons why the time taken to issue the safety authorisations exceeds the four months prescribed in Article 12(1) of the Railway Safety Directive (only those listed in Annex E, and after receipt of all necessary information)**

Not applicable.

**Summary of the problems or difficulties that regularly arise in connection with application procedures for safety authorisations**

Not applicable.

**Summary of problems reported by infrastructure managers in connection with applications for safety authorisation**

Not applicable.

**Feedback procedure (e.g. questionnaire) for infrastructure managers to give their opinions of the issue procedures/practice or record complaints**

Not applicable.

**Does the NSA charge for issuing safety authorisation for infrastructure? (yes/no and charge)**

Yes, see Charge Regulations under the Railway Act, Article 4, EUR 112.00 per hour.

8 Supervision of railway undertakings and infrastructure managers

**8.1 Audits/inspections/checklists**

‘The railway’ in the Netherlands is under the supervision of the ILT. The purpose of this supervision is to ensure safe and sustained use of the railway. Supervisory activities include:

 approval and certification (authorisation) of undertakings, companies, vehicles and infrastructure;

 enforcement of laws and regulations (Railways Act, Working Conditions Act,

relevant European legislation) in respect of infrastructure, personnel, stock and safety procedures

Rail supervision takes the form of supervision of the system. This supervision is carried out on the basis of a safety management system supplemented by reality checks (refresher audits on the shop floor and in the field) and asset inspections (inspections of stock and infrastructure).

The supervision covers the following:

* rail infrastructure;
* the manager of the rail infrastructure;
* the operators providing transport via the rail infrastructure;
* certain officials whose work involves them with the rail infrastructure;
* the vehicles running on the rail infrastructure;
* companies which test infrastructure, vehicles or people; and
* companies that provide training and may administer examinations.

The ILT’s full multi-year programme and the responsibility for it are set out in the ILT Multi-Year Plan and ILT Annual Report, both of which are published annually ([www.ilent.nl](http://www.ilent.nl))

**8.2 Authorisation and passenger rights**

In 2014 a number of authorisations were issued and renewed. With driver licences some ground was made up. The table below shows the number of authorisations issued.

Table 15: Number of authorisations issued

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Number of rail transport authorisations** | **2014** |
| Operating and equipment authorisations | 253 |
| Infrastructure authorisations | 16 |
| Driver licences | 1 354 |
| % settled within quality standard time | 86 |

Since 4 October 2011, the inspectorate has been the designated body to safeguard the rights of passengers in rail transport and to advise them about their obligations. With effect from 2011, therefore, passengers have been able to report incidents to the Reporting and Information Centre (Meld- en Informatiecentrum - MIC) of the inspectorate.

Most complaints relate to inadequate or refused compensation for delays or cancellations or for missed connections with subsequent transport, due to delay or cancellation.

Table 16: Complaints relating to passenger rights 2014

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Passenger rights in rail transport** | **2014** |
| Number of complaints | 52 |
| % settled within standard time | 95 |

**8.3 Focal points for railway safety in the Netherlands**

The priorities for the ILT’s supportive supervision are based on risks, socio-political problems, the aims of IenM and European policies and the results of its own inspections.

Refresher audits look at whether (certain aspects) of the safety system actually work in practice. Asset inspections look at whether infrastructure, operations (including transport management, train departure processes and personnel) and vehicles comply with the laws and regulations. The ILT also inspects track activities to ensure compliance with the Working Conditions Act. Enforcement action is given in the event of breaches.

In 2014 significant focal points for supervision included:

 Internal policy on route knowledge (including registration);

 Granting of shunting authority to drivers;

 STS overruns;

 Tightened supervision of railway undertaking and infrastructure manager in connection with safety in the timetable in the short term;

 Contracting for short-term maintenance by the manager.

In 2014, 2 168 inspections12 and 168 refresher audits were performed. The inspections included 60 inspections on behalf of the Inspectorate SZW (occupational safety), including workplace safety and safety instructions.

Table 17: Number of refresher audits and inspections

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type of tool** | **2014** |
| Inspection (incl. 168 I-SZW) | 2 168 |
| Refresher audit | 168 |

In most cases when breaches and/or deficiencies are discovered an indication or a warning is given. A breach or deficiency involves, by way of example, being unable to produce the required documentation, such as the driver licence. Sometimes intervention is more far-reaching involving a fine or an administrative penalty, or an administrative order.

An enforcement order is applied in the event of repeated failure to produce a valid driver licence and/or certificate. A fine report was prepared on the causing of a goods train collision on 13 August at the Zwolle shunting yard.

12 Including cableways

Table 18: Number of interventions

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type of tool** | **2014** |
| Provide education | 48 |
| Warning | 102 |
| Enforcement order | 6 |
| Rectification order | 3 |
| Tightened supervision | 2 |
| Administrative penalty | 3 |

**8.4 Assessment of annual reports of infrastructure managers and railway undertakings**

Infrastructure managers, railway undertakings and railway works contractors submit their safety reports to the Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment by 30 June of the current year (as per Article 9(4) of the Railway Safety Directive). This obligation applies to all holders of a Part A safety certificate. Undertakings not registered in the Netherlands have no reporting obligations. They provide information on a voluntary basis. In 2014 all holders of a Part A safety certificate submitted their annual report. Of the non-Netherlands undertakings, 5 submitted a report on a voluntary basis.

The annual reports of holders of Part A certificates have been used to prepare this annual report. There is a marked difference in the reporting in terms of structure, content and the reporting and indication of various accidents and incidents. The reports cannot be readily compared with one another and on such a basis make a comparison between the certificate holders. For this purpose, additional information from other sources is necessary such as Promise from ProRail and the Special Incident Reports from the railway undertakings to the ILT.

It has previously been stated in the 2013 annual report that the ILT is taking the initiative to increase harmonisation of reporting and improve quality. The aim is for the 2015 reporting to allow a comparison between the information contained in the annual reports of certificate holders.

**8.5 Complaints**

Summary of complaints from the infrastructure manager concerning railway undertakings relating to the conditions contained in their Part A/B certificate:

The infrastructure manager claimed what it was due from one of the railway undertakings and sent an invoice for use of the infrastructure used as a base. The amount billed was too high.

Summary of complaints from railway undertakings concerning the infrastructure manager relating to the conditions contained in its licence:

No complaints were received in 2014.

9 **Report on the application of the common safety methods (CSM) for risk evaluation and assessment**

CSM on Supervision spells out, in ‘whereas’ clause 6 and Article 1.3 of Directive 2004/49/EC, what the approach of the legislator is: to state where the responsibilities lie. The risk analysis and assessment should be based on our supervisory activities and addressed to the Minister. The ILT is familiar with the system of bi-monthly policy signals, which deal with the adequacy and/or applicability of policymaking, legislation and regulation and other subjects.

European Regulation 2009/352/EC is in force unabridged in the Netherlands. It establishes a common safety method for risk analysis and risk evaluation in accordance with Article 6 (3) a), of Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.

No experience has been gained with interface management in the application of CSM

concerning risk analysis and assessment.

The NSA has not undertaken any experiments for risk analysis and assessments. During inspections the undertakings are reminded of the importance of performing risk analysis and assessment when major changes are made to the organisation.

There is no procedure, such as a questionnaire, offering railway undertakings and infrastructure managers the possibility of feeding back their experience on the European regulations for a CSM in risk management.

There is no review of the national legislation implementing the European rules for a CSM in risk management. European Regulation 2009/352/EC is in force in the Netherlands without revision.

At the end of 2012 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1077/2012 was published and came into force from 7 June 2013. This brought into force a common safety method for supervision by national safety authorities after issuing a safety certificate or safety authorisation (CSM on supervision).

10 Exceptions in respect of the ECM certification system

**Not applicable.**

11 Conclusions for reporting year 2014

The trend in safety is predominantly positive. Compared with 2013, and with the same number of passenger and goods train kilometres, the total number of significant accidents fell. In 2014 there were no fatalities among passengers and staff. Most fatalities occurred at level crossings.

The high proportion of collisions during shunting movements stands out. Fatalities at level crossings are not just the result of problems between or caused by vehicles. Risky behaviour, such as climbing over barriers that have already closed is a major cause.

Human error is often the cause of collisions. Collisions with buffer stops frequently occur due to an incorrect estimation of train length. With derailments a manual switch is often involved that has not properly changed position.

In one significant derailment an investigation was performed both by the OvV and the ILT. The derailment was the result of a fracture in a switch due to a lack of maintenance. This accident is consistent with the findings of an earlier investigation by the ILT that improvements are required in the way that maintenance is planned and outsourced. A measure resulting from the derailment is that all switches of the same type are to be inspected and where necessary (additional) maintenance performed.

Determining the total loss following an accident, both in terms of costs and delays, is difficult. The losses of all parties involved are not always recorded. There are a number of reasons for this, such as not wishing to report the loss until liability for the loss has been settled.

Annexes

Annex A1: Mainline railway network

Annex A2: Undertakings and infrastructure managers 2014

Annex B: Organisational structure of the NSA (ILT and

DGB) and OvV

Annex C1: Infrastructure manager key figures

Annex C2: Safety indicators: the figures

Annex C3: CSI data and associated definitions

Annex D: Entries in vehicle register

37

Annex A1: Main-line rail network



**Source: Prorail**

**Key**

Single track

Twin tracks

Three or more tracks

O Station/junction

75 Distance in kilometres

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Den Haag Centraal | The Hague Central |
| Hoek van Holland Haven | Hook of Holland Harbour |

Annex A2: Undertakings and infrastructure managers 2014

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Infrastructure managers | | | | | | |
| **Name** | **Postal address** | **Postcode + town** | | | | **website** |
| ProRail | Moreelsepark 3 | 3511 EP Utrecht | | | | [www.prorail.nl](http://www.prorail.nl) |
| Railway undertakings | | | | | | |
| **Name** | | |  | **Postal address** | **Postcode + town** | |
| Arriva Personenvervoer Nederland BV | | |  | Postbus 626 | 8440 AP Heerenveen | |
| BAM Rail B.V. | | |  | Postbus 3172 | 4800 DD Breda | |
| Bentheimer Eisenbahn | | |  | Otto-Hahn-strasse 1 | 48529 Nordhorn | |
| NMBS Logistics NV (Belgium) | | |  | Hallepoortlaan 40 | 1060 Brussels | |
| Captrain Belgium (Belgium) | | |  | Italiëler 2 | 2000 Antwerp | |
| Connexxion Openbaar Vervoer NV | | |  | Postbus 224 | 1200 AE Hilversum | |
| CrossRail Benelux N.V. | | |  | Luchthavenlei 7 | 2100 Deurne | |
| DB Regio NRW GmbH(Germany) | | |  | Willi Becker Allee 11 | 40227 Düsseldorf | |
| DB Schenker Rail Nederland NV | | |  | Postbus 2060 | 3500 GB Utrecht | |
| Euro-Express Treincharter BV | | |  | Burgemeestersrand 57 | 2625 NV Delft | |
| ERS Railways BV | | |  | Postbus 59018 | 3008 PA Rotterdam | |
| Eurailscout Inspection & Analysis BV | | |  | Postbus 349 | 3800 AH Amersfoort | |
| Heavy Haul Power | | |  |  |  | |
| HSA Beheer NV | | |  | Postbus 767 | 1000 AT Amsterdam | |
| HSL Logistiek BV | | |  | Bruistensingel 160-A | 5232 AC  ‘s-Hertogenbosch | |
| HTRS Nederland BV | | |  | Postbus 59179 | 3008 PD Rotterdam | |
| KombiRail Europe BV | | |  | Postbus 540 | 3190 AL Hoogvliet  (Rotterdam) | |
| Locon Benelux | | |  | Noordzeelaan 20 B | 8017 JW Zwolle | |
| LTE Netherlands BV | | |  | Moezelweg 151 | 3198 LS Rotterdam | |
| NS Reizigers BV | | |  | Postbus 2025 | 3500 HA Utrecht | |
| NedTrain BV | | |  | Postbus 2167 | 3500 GD Utrecht | |
| PKP Cargo S.A. | | |  | Grójecka 17 | PL 02-021 Warsaw | |
| RheinCargo (Germany) | | |  | Harry-Blum-Platz 2 | 50678 Cologne | |
| Rotterdam Rail Feeding BV | | |  | Europaweg 855 | 3199 LD Rotterdam | |
| Rail Transport Service Austria GmbH | | |  | Puchstraβe 184b | A-8055 Graz | |
| Ricardo | | |  | Catherijnesingel 33 | 3511 GC Utrecht | |
| Rurtalbahn Benelux BV | | |  | Postbus 59169 | 3008 PD Rotterdam | |
| SBB-cargo | | |  | Riggenbachstrasse 6 | 4600 Otten | |
| Shunter Tractie BV | | |  | Postbus 5185 | 3000 AD Rotterdam | |
| Spitzke Spoorbouw BV | | |  | Peppelkade 3 | 3992 AL Houten | |
| Strukton Rail Materieel BV | | |  | Postbus 1281 | 5200 BH  ‘s-Hertogenbosch | |
| Syntus BV | | |  | Postbus 17 | 7000 AA Doetinchem | |
| TrainGroup B.V. | | |  | Nicolaas Beetslaan 76 | 2985 VH Ridderkerk | |
| TXLogistic | | |  | Lichtenauerlaan 102 | 3062 ME Rotterdam | |
| Veolia Transport Rail BV | | |  | Postbus 1533 | 6201 BM Maastricht | |
| VolkerRail Nederland BV | | |  | Postbus 240 | 4130 EE Vianen | |
| Zuid Limburgse Spoorwegmaatschappij | | |  | Postbus 21071 | 6369 ZH Simpelveld | |

Annex B: NSA (ILT and DGB) and OvV Organisation Chart

**Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment**

**Safety Board**

**Directorate-General of Accessibility**

**Human Environment**

**and Transport Inspectorate**

**Public Transport and Rail Directorate**

**Rail and Road**

**Transport Estate**

Annex C1: Infrastructure manager key figures

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Heading | Figure | Source |
| Train-km | 1.557E+08 | 2014: figures from annual reports and ProRail statements |
| Passenger train-km | 1.45E+08 | 2014: figures from annual reports and ProRail statements |
| Passenger-km | 1.9E+10 | 2014: figures from annual reports of the railway undertakings |
| Number of level crossings | 2 282 | ProRail Statement |
| Number of kilometres of track | 7 030 | ProRail Statement |
| Number of kilometres of line | 3 061 | ProRail Statement |
| Percentage of main line railway with ATC | 100% | ProRail Statement |
| Percentage of train-km using ATC or ERTMS on the (main) line | 100% | Carriers’ and ProRail Statement |

The number of level crossings has fallen as a result of the removal of a number of service level crossings/paths and platform level crossings/paths which according to the ERA definition are not classified as level crossings.

Annex C2: Safety indicators: the figures

*Passengers injured*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Passengers** | **Fatalities** | **Serious injuries** |
| **Total** | 0 | 0 |

*Injuries to all categories of people on and around the track (excluding suicides).*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Category of person** | **Fatalities** | **Serious injuries** |
| **Passengers** | 0 | 0 |
| **Railway staff** | 0 | 0 |
| **Level crossing users** | 7 | 4 |
| **Trespassers on the line** | 1 | 0 |
| **Others** | 1 | 0 |
| **Total** | 9 | 4 |

*Significant accidents (excluding suicides).*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | **Significant** |
| **Train-train collision** | 2 |
| **Train-object collision** | 1 |
| **Derailment** | 1 |
| **Level crossing accident/collision** | 13 |
| **Personal injury caused by rolling**  **stock** | 1 |
| **Rolling stock fire** | 0 |
| **Other accident type** | 1 |
| **Total** | 19 |

*Staff injuries*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Railway personnel** | **Fatalities** | **Serious injuries** |
| **Track workers working on the line** | 0 | 0 |
| **Contractor personnel not working on the line** | 0 | 0 |
| **Shunters** | 0 | 0 |
| **Train drivers** | 0 | 0 |
| **Train managers** | 0 | 0 |
| **Other** | 0 | 0 |
| **Total** | 0 | 0 |
| **Total** |  |  |

*Accidents involving trains carrying dangerous goods*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | **Significant** |
| **Accident in which dangerous substances**  **were released** | 013 (0) |
| **Accident in which dangerous substances**  **were involved** | 114 (0) |
| **Total**  **were released** | 1 |

13 Not including the release of a dangerous substance as a result of a leaky valve. Although there may be a delay of more than 6 hours, the release is not the result of an accident.

14 The collision is not significant based on the abovementioned criteria. However, because dangerous substances were involved in the accident, the accident still has to be reported to the ERA

Annex C3: CSI data and associated definitions

**Safety indicators according to Annex I of the Railway Safety Directive**

**(Directive 2004/49/EC)**

**1. Indicators relating to accidents**

**1.1. Total number of significant accidents and average number of significant accidents**

**(per million train kilometres), broken down into the following types of accident**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | All types of acci- dent | Collisions of trains including colli- sions with obsta- cles within the  clearance gauge | Derailments of trains | Level crossing accidents includ- ing accidents involving pedes- trains at level | Accidents leading to personal injury caused by mov- ing railway vehicles, exclud- | Vehicle fires | Other accidents |
| Total | 19 | 3 | 1 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Average number | 0.122 | 0.019 | 0.006 | 0.084 | 0.006 | 0.000 | 0.006 |

**1.2. Total number and average number (per million train kilometres) of serious injuries and fatalities by type of accident, broken down into the following categories**

1.2.1. Person seriously injured

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | All types of acci- dent | Collisions of trains including colli- sions with obsta- cles within the clearance gauge | Derailments of trains | Level crossing accidents includ- ing accidents  involving pedes- trains at level | Accidents leading to personal injury caused by mov-  ing railway vehicles, | Vehicle fires | Other accidents |
| Total seriously injured | 4 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Average number seriously injured | 0.026 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.032 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Of whom:

injured

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Passengers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Average number of seriously injured passengers | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Average number of seriously injured passengers per billion passenger kilometres | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Average number of seriously injured passengers per million passenger train kilometres | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Employees, including the staff of contractors | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Average number of seriously injured employees, including contractors | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Level crossing users | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Average number of seriously injured level crossing users | 0.026 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Unauthorised persons on railway premises | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Average number of seriously injured unauthorised persons on railway | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Others | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Average number of others seriously | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

1.2.2. Person killed

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | All types of acci- dent | Collisions of trains including colli- sions with obsta- cles within the clearance gauge | Derailments of trains | Level crossing accidents including accidents involving pedestrians at level crossings | Accidents leading to personal injury  caused by moving railway  vehicles, excluding | Vehicle fires | Other accidents |
| Total number of fatalities | 9 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Average number of fatalities | 0.058 | 0.006 | 0.000 | 0.045 | 0.006 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Of whom:

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Passengers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Average number of passengers killed | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Average number of passengers killed per billion passenger kilometres | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Average number of passengers killed per million passenger train kilometres | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Employees, including the staff of contractors | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Average number of employees, including the staff of contractors | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Level crossing users | 7 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Average number of level crossing users killed | 0.045 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.045 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Unauthorised persons on railway | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Average number of unauthorised persons on railway premises killed | 0.006 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.006 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Others | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Average number of others killed | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

**2. Indicators relating to dangerous goods**

**Total and average numbers (per million train kilometres) of accidents in connection with the carriage of dangerous goods, broken down into the following categories**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Accidents in which at least one rail  vehicle carrying dangerous goods | Accidents in which danger- ous goods were released |
| Total | 1 | 0 |
| Aver- age | 0.006 | 0.000 |

**3. Indicators relating to suicides**

**Total and average numbers (per million train kilometres) of suicides**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Suicides | Attempted sui- cides |
| Total | 192 | 11 |
| Average number | 1.235 | 0.071 |

**4. Indicators relating to incidents and near misses**

**Total number and average number (per million train kilometres) of incidents and near misses, broken down into the following categories**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | All incidents and near misses | Broken rails (EIUs on- ly) | Buckled rails (EIUs on- ly) | Signalling errors (EIUs only) | Signals passed at danger | Broken wheels | Broken axles |
| Total | 214 | 63 | 0 | 39 | 112 | 0 | 0 |
| Average number | 1.376 | 0.405 | 0.000 | 0.251 | 0.720 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  | | | | Resulting in an accident | | 0 | 0 |
| Found in service | | 0 | 0 |
| Found during regular maintenance | | 0 | 0 |

**5. Indicators relating to the consequences of significant accidents**

**Total amount in Euro and average values (per million train kilometres) for**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Number of deaths and serious injuries  multiplied by the value  of avoiding accident | Costs of damage to rolling stock and infrastruc- ture | Costs of environmen- tal damage\* | Costs of de- lays caused by accidents |
| Total costs | 21 171 529 | 5 683 300 | n.a. | 1 409 740 |
| Average costs | 136 128 | 36 542 | n.a. | 9 739 |

n.a. = not available

**6. Indicators relating to technical safety of infrastructure and its implementation**

**6.1 Automatic train protection**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Percentage of tracks with automatic train protection (EIUs only) | 100% |
| Percentage of train kilometres run using operational train protection systems | 100% |

**6.2 Number of level crossings (in total, per line kilometre and per track kilometre), broken down into the following eight types:**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | With user-side automatic warning | With user-side automatic protec- tion | With user-side automatic protec- tion and auto- matic warning | With user-side automatic protec- tion and automatic warning and with rail- side protec- | With user- side manual warning | With user-side manual pro- tection | With user-side manual protec- tion and manual warning |
| Actively protected level crossings | 66 | 0 | 1482 | 0 | 176 | 0 | 38 |
| Average number per line kilometre | 0.022 | 0.000 | 0.484 | 0.000 | 0.057 | 0.000 | 0.012 |
| Average number per track kilome- tre | 0.009 | 0.000 | 0.211 | 0.000 | 0.025 | 0.000 | 0.005 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Total |
| Passively protected level crossings | 520 |
| Average number per line kilometre | 0.170 |
| Average number per track kilometre | 0.074 |

**7. Indicators relating to the safety management system**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Total number of internal checks (audits)  carried out | 147 |
| Percentage of internal checks (audits) carried out in relation to the number of checks stipulated or planned | 88% |

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Annex D: Entries in vehicle register

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
|  | Total |
| AAE Cargo AG | 1 |
| AAE Freightcar S.à r.l. | 15 |
| AAE RaiLease S.à r.l. | 917 |
| AAE RailFleet S.à r.l. | 91 |
| ABN Amro Lease N.V. | 2 |
| Alpha Trains Luxembourg No2 Sarl | 12 |
| Alpha Trains Luxembourg Sarl | 4 |
| ANSALDOBREDA S.p.A. | 72 |
| Arriva International Trains Limited | 27 |
| Arriva Personenvervoer Nederland B.V. | 337 |
| Atir-Rail | 181 |
| BAL Global Finance (Deutschland) GmbH | 126 |
| BAM RAIL B.V. | 34 |
| BASF SE | 126 |
| Bentheimer Eisenbahn AG | 1 |
| CBRAIL S.à.r.l. | 1 |
| CFL cargo | 25 |
| Connexxion NV | 50 |
| Corus staal | 6 |
| DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG | 665 |
| DB Schenker Rail Nederland N.V. | 142 |
| Deutsche Leasing für Sparkassen und Mittelstand GmbH | 75 |
| Eiffage Rail Deutschland GmbH | 1 |
| Ermewa Ferroviaire | 585 |
| Eurailscout Inspection & Analysis | 6 |
| GATX Rail Austria GmbH | 2498 |
| GATX Rail Germany GmbH | 2702 |
| GATX Rail Poland Sp.z o.o. | 981 |
| GATX Wagon Leasing GmbH | 13 |
| GATX Zweite Wagon Leasing GmbH | 20 |
| GE Capital Rail Services GmbH & Co KG | 250 |
| Gerd Dieter Wenske | 10 |
| GRAWACO C.V. | 40 |
| Herik Rail Treincharters B.V. | 1 |
| Het Spoorwegmuseum | 62 |
| Historisch Streekvervoer Achterhoek | 2 |
| HSA Beheer N.V. | 19 |
| HSL Logistik BV (NL) | 4 |
| Infraspeed Maintenance b.v. | 2 |
| J. Fijn techniek B.V. | 7 |
| Kockums Industrier AB | 1 |

47

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Kurt Nitzer (GmbH & Co.) KG | 15 |
| LBSH Leasing GmbH & Co. KG | 75 |
| Lloyds Register Rail Europe B.V. | 1 |
| LOCON Benelux BV | 18 |
| LTE Logistik- und Transport-GmbH | 2 |
| Macquarie European Rail | 58 |
| Matériel Ferroviaire et Industriel S.A. | 38 |
| Ministerie van Defensie | 248 |
| Mr. J.L. Pit Beheer B.V | 3 |
| Nacco Luxembourg S.a.r.l. | 400 |
| NACCO S.A.S | 902 |
| NedTrain B.V. | 4 |
| Niteq B.V. | 1 |
| NS Financial Services Company | 1379 |
| NS Reizigers BV | 1966 |
| On Rail Gesellschaft für Eisenbahnausr. mbH | 816 |
| Ontspanningsvereniging NS RB Haarlem | 1 |
| ORV On Rail Gesellschaft für Vermietung und Verwaltung von Eisenbahn- waggons mbH | 784 |
| Personeelsvereniging NS Rotterdam | 2 |
| Rail Rolling Stock B.V. | 91 |
| Railinsight BV | 4 |
| Railpool München | 27 |
| Railpromo Fleet Services B.V. | 1 |
| RailReLease BV | 43 |
| RAS Rail B.V. | 23 |
| Rotterdam Rail Feeding | 13 |
| SC Rail Leasing Europe B.V. | 5 |
| Shunter B.V. | 4 |
| Speno International S.A. | 2 |
| Spitzke Logistik GmbH | 3 |
| Stichting DE III | 1 |
| Stichting Historisch Dieselmaterieel (ANBI) | 15 |
| Stichting Klassieke Locomotieven | 1 |
| stichting Mat'64 | 2 |
| Stoom Stichting Nederland | 12 |
| Strukton Rail Materieel | 175 |
| Swietelsky Baugesellschaft m.b.H | 19 |
| TRANSRAIL SNC | 1142 |
| UBS Leasing | 229 |
| Veluwsche Stoomtrein Maatschappij | 142 |
| Voestalpine Railpro B.V. | 1317 |
| VolkerRail Plant & Equipment B.V. | 69 |
| VPS Verkehrsbetriebe Peine-Salzgitter GmbH | 58 |
| VTG Deutschland GmbH | 1460 |
| Wagon Care B.V. | 134 |
| WASCOSA AG | 842 |
| Zuid-Limburgse Stoom Maatschappij | 28 |
|  | 22689 |
| CB Rail Leasing S.a.r.l. | 2 |
| DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG | 1 |
| Het Spoorwegmuseum | 10 |

48

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Husa Tranportation Ralway Services Nederland BV | 3 |
| NS Financial Services Company | 1 |
|  | 17 |
| NS Financial Services Company | 60 |
|  | 60 |
| AAE Railcar S.à r.l. | 157 |
| AAE RaiLease S.à r.l. | 49 |
| BAM RAIL B.V. | 1 |
| DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG | 220 |
| DB Schenker Rail Nederland N.V. | 96 |
| Herik Rail Treincharters B.V. | 1 |
| Het Spoorwegmuseum | 2 |
| On Rail Gesellschaft für Eisenbahnausr. mbH | 18 |
| Railpromo Fleet Services B.V. | 1 |
| Rotterdam Rail Feeding | 3 |
| Strukton Rail Materieel | 1 |
| VolkerRail Materieel | 6 |
| VTG Deutschland GmbH | 597 |
| Zuid-Limburgse Stoom Maatschappij | 3 |
|  | 1155 |
| BAM RAIL B.V. | 2 |
| DB Schenker Rail Nederland N.V. | 8 |
| NS Financial Services Company | 2 |
| NS Reizigers BV | 158 |
| On Rail Gesellschaft für Eisenbahnausr. mbH | 5 |
| Railpool München | 1 |
| Voestalpine Railpro B.V. | 50 |
|  | 226 |
| NedTrain B.V. | 2 |
| NS Financial Services Company | 2 |
| VolkerRail Materieel | 3 |
|  | 7 |
| NS Financial Services Company | 3 |
| NS Reizigers BV | 227 |
|  | 230 |
| AAE RaiLease S.à r.l. | 3 |
| BAM RAIL B.V. | 11 |
| DB Schenker Rail Deutschland AG | 20 |
| DB Schenker Rail Nederland N.V. | 11 |
| Herik Rail Treincharters B.V. | 2 |
| NedTrain B.V. | 1 |
| NS Financial Services Company | 8 |
| NS Reizigers BV | 173 |
| RailMotion AG | 1 |
| Rotterdam Rail Feeding | 2 |
| Shunter B.V. | 4 |
| Strukton Rail Materieel | 2 |
| UBS Leasing | 76 |
| Voestalpine Railpro B.V. | 266 |
| VolkerRail Materieel | 6 |
| VolkerRail Plant & Equipment B.V. | 1 |
|  | 49 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| VTG Deutschland GmbH | 29 |
|  | 616 |
| Voestalpine Railpro B.V. | 1 |
| VolkerRail Materieel | 1 |
|  | 2 |
| Total | 25002 |

50