

Annual Report 2006

Accident Investigation Board, Norway Railway Section

Accident Investigation Board, Norway

Post box 213

N-2001 Lillestrøm

Norway

Phone: +47 63 89 63 00

Fax: +47 63 89 63 01

<http://www.aibn.no>

E-mail: post@aibn.no

Introduction

Year 2006 has been a challenging year for the Accident Investigation Board, Norway.

The Director, and Aviation-, Railway- and Road Sections have put a lot of effort into the work of accidents and serious incidents investigations.

The value process that started in 2005 has given the Accident Investigation Board, Norway a foundation which emphasizing the following values:

- Competent
- Credible
- Innovative
- Compassionate

It is consensus within the board that these values describe the guidelines we all want to work and be recognized for.

The former Director left The Accident Investigation Board, Norway on April 17th 2006. A new director was appointed November 24th 2006.

Index


1. Key numbers from the Railway Section	4
Notifications of accidents and incidents – statistic.	4
2. Investigations / activities	5
Reports / recommendations	5
3. Organisation	6
The Accident Investigation Boards organisation	6
4. Challenges in 2007	7
Appendix A	
Final reports 2006.....	8
Appendix B	
Safety recommendations 2006	9

1. Key numbers from the Railway Section

The regulation for official investigation of railway accidents and serious incidents was established January 29th 2002, referring to law by June 11th 1998 (The railway law). The Accident Investigation Board, Norway has as of July 1st 2002 investigated railway accidents and serious incidents. Since January 3rd 2005 the Railway Section's work has been regulated by the Railway Investigation Law and Regulations. EUs safety directive for railway was adopted and made official March 1st 2006 as Regulation 2006-03-31 nr 378. *Regulation for official investigation of railway accidents and serious incidents etc.* ("The Railway Investigation regulation")

Notifications of accidents and incidents – statistic.

The Railway Section received totally 206 notifications in 2006, compared to 156 in 2005. In 2006 there has been an increase in the number of notifications concerning both serious accidents and incidents. 11 accidents were recorded with a total of 11 fatalities.



	01.07.02 >	2003	2004	2005	2006
Serious railway incidents	-	-	129	114	142
Railway accidents	-	-	41	42	59
Total number of cases	144	197	170	156	201
Closed after the preliminary investigation	-	184	155	142	190
Published reports	-	3	15	7	11

2. Investigations / activities

Even if there has been an increase in the number of notifications, the number of accidents and serious incidents where the Board has initiated an investigation has been rather constant during the last four years. This is due to the low number of investigators in the Railway Section. This makes it necessary to focus on occurrences with large safety potential. On January 1st 2006, the Railway Section was involved in 18 ongoing investigations.

There has been an increase in numbers of notification related to land slide / avalanche. This is a problem area in which the Board are focusing upon during 2007.

The European Railway Agency (ERA) has established a European network for investigation bodies. The Accident Investigation Board Norway is participating. As a result of implementing the EUs safety directive, the Railway Section is reporting its activity to ERA. A notification is sent for every initiated investigation, and final reports are also sent to ERAs public data base. Through this data base the Railway Section has access to reports from other European investigation bodies.

The Accident Investigation Board, Norway organized a Nordic meeting in November 2006. Representatives from Denmark, Finland and Sweden attended the meeting.

Reports / recommendations

The Accident Investigation Board, Norway, Railway Section, published 11 reports in 2006. See appendix A for more details.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway, the Railway Section, published 21 recommendations from in 2006. According to the National Railway Authority 11 of these recommendations are still open as of January 1st 2007. An Overview of the recommendations is given in appendix B.

3. Organisation

The organisation of Accident Investigation Board Norway

It has not been any changes in the Accident Investigation board's organisation in 2006. It has been stated that the Marin Section will be operative from 01.07.2008.




Figure 1. Accident Investigation Board Norway's organisational placing within the Railway organisation




Figure 2. The Accident Investigation Boards organisation as of December 21th 2006

4. Challenges in 2007

Establishing of the Marine Section is a challenging process for the Accident Investigation Board, Norway. This process is still ongoing. This is an ongoing and important process that will be highly focused within during 2007.

The Railway Sections investigation capacity has been constant over the last years. The number of notifications of serious incidents and accidents has been increasing. The Railway Section needs to give strong priority to which cases there are investigated. The Railway Section is for the time being short on competent people with the right skill in the discipline of track and infrastructure.

Appendix A

Final reports 2006

NR	IDENTIFICATION	DATE
1	REPORT ABOUT AN ACCIDENT WEST OF HALLINGSKEID, BERGEN LINE 26.12.2004 WITH A MAINTENANCE CARRIAGE	26.01.2006
2	REPORT ABOUT AN ACCIDENT BETWEEN NARVIK AND STRØMSNES STATION, OFOT LINE 02.09.2005 WITH A WELDING TROLLEY	26.01.2006
3	REPORT ABOUT AN ACCIDENT AT RAUFOSS STATION, GJØVIK LINE 12.10.2004 WITH TRAIN 210	14.02.2006
4	REPORT ABOUT TWO SERIOUS INCIDENTS AT ASKER STATION, DRAMMEN LINE 05. AND 12.08.2004	07.06.2006
5	REPORT ABOUT AN ACCIDENT AT JAR STATION, KOLSÅS LINE 22.11.2005 BETWEEN METRO TRAIN 408 AND TRAM TRAIN 1701	08.08.2006
6	REPORT ABOUT A SERIOUS INCIDENT AT ALNABRU SHUNTING YARD 17.02.2006	15.08.2006
7	REPORT ABOUT A SERIOUS INCIDENT AT STEINSRUD STATION, DOVRE LINE 07.03.2006 WITH TRAIN 5722	30.08.2006
8	REPORT ABOUT AN ACCIDENT AT MIDDAGSELV TUNNEL, OFOT LINE 12.05.2005 TRAIN 9906	03.10.2006
9	REPORT ABOUT AN ACCIDENT AT MAKRELLBEKKEN STATION, RØA LINE 01.02.2004 WITH METRO TRAIN 205	16.10.2006
10	REPORT ABOUT A SERIOUS INCIDENT AT SANDBUKTA, ØSTFOLD LINE 04.12.2005, WITH TRAIN 4963	23.10.2006
11	REPORT ABOUT AN ACCIDENT BETWEEN SEM OG STOKKE STATIONS, VESTFOLD LINE 31.08.2005 WITH TRAIN 873	23.11.2006

Appendix B

Safety recommendations 2006

Report nr.	Recommendation nr.	Text
JB RAP 2/2006	1/2006	The Accident Investigation Board recommend the National Railway Authority to consider to instruct al Railway undertakers who use trolleys with the same type of braking system as Lameco Svetsralle02, the Norwegian National Rail Administrations name Sveisetralle NHI0001A, to immediately stop using this trolley both as self-fluxing and hauled until it is proved for the Authority that the trolley satisfy the instructions in regulation “§15-3. <i>General demands to rolling stock</i> , and §15-4 <i>Technical demands to rolling stock</i> , letter g) All types of rolling stock shall have brakes. Brakes shall be-----, The Brakes shall be of a kind of construction that no single failure makes it impossible to stop the rolling stock.
JB RAP 4/2006	2/2006	The National Railway Authority should consider recommending the Norwegian National Rail Administration to organize all work in connection with signalling systems so that there will be enough time to carry out all activities in the project in a reliable and acceptable way, especially testing commissioning testing before commissioning the signalling systems.
JB RAP 4/2006	3/2006	The National Railway Authority should consider recommending the Norwegian National Rail Administration to consider if the protocol for commissioning testing should be worked out together with the facility documentation and accommodated the specific changes that are carried out in the signalling system.
JB RAP 4/2006	4/2006	The National Railway Authority should consider recommending the Norwegian National Rail Administration to consider if the necessary resources are available among the service group of signalling plant, and to consider if the training and the courses of the signalling plant are adequate and sufficient.
JB RAP 5/2006	5/2006	The Accident Investigation Board recommends the National Railway Authority to ask Oslo T-banedrift AS to stress the regulations for speed limits.
JB RAP 5/2006	6/2006	The Accident Investigation Board recommends the National Railway Authority to consider if Oslo T-banedrift AS and Oslo sporvognsdrift AS should be instructed to consider the common traffic system on the Kolsås line, so that it as soon as possible can a represent and uniformed traffic system for the whole Metro railway net in the Oslo area.
JB RAP 6/2006	7/2006	The Accident Investigation Board recommends the National Railway Authority to ask CargoNet AS if they think the training concerning the footplate staff this is sufficient.
JB RAP 6/2006	8/2006	The Accident Investigation Board recommends the National Railway Authority to ask the Norwegian National Rail Administration if it, based on security reasons is suitable to have a separate radio channel for the communication between the switching staff and the locomotive driver.
JB RAP 11/2006	9/2006	The National Railway Authority is recommended to ask the Norwegian National Rail Administration to ensure that they keep all types of railway crossings in the condition as described in the Norwegian National Rail Administration technical regulations.
JB RAP 11/2006	10/2006	The National Railway Authority is recommended to ask the Norwegian National Rail Administration to consider establishing a system that makes it possible for user of unsecured railroad crossings to contact the Norwegian National Rail Administration to confirm that it is safe to use the railroad crossing.

JB RAP 11/2006	11/2006	The National Railway Authority is recommended to ask the Norwegian National Rail Administration to survey the status and improve possible waiver to put these in accordance to the signal regulations.
JB RAP 11/2006	12/2006	The National Railway Authority is recommended to ask NSB AS to consider the need too install emergency lights and oxygen mask in locomotives engine room.
JB RAP 11/2006	13/2006	The ministry of Transport is recommended to take an initiative to ensure finances to the ongoing work to close down unsecured railroad crossings and upgrade the remaining railroad crossings.
JB RAP 08/2006	14/2006	The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends The National Railway Authority to ask the Norwegian National Rail Administration to go through the regulations for handling undesirable warping. This in order to fit marginal values and measuring frequency to expected speed of development progress on the different sections of the line. They should also consider altering the plan of action when the limits of action are beyond in order to harmonize with prEN-13848-5.
JB RAP 08/2006	15/2006	The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends The National Railway Authority to ask the Norwegian National Rail Administration to go through, prepare, document and improve the routines for receiving error reports on infrastructure from the train crew, and the following examination and prospective corrective maintenance.
JB RAP 08/2006	16/2006	The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommend The National Railway Authority to ask the Railway undertakers to make sure that error reports on the infra structure observed from the trains arrives in the Norwegian National Rail Administration.
JB RAP 08/2006	17/2006	The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends The National Railway Authority to ask the MTAS to fit internal regulations and practice for the use of brakes on the Dm3 locomotives to the “train conveying regulation” chapter V, item 1.4.3.
JB RAP 10/2006	18/2006	The Accident Investigation Board Norway recommends The National Railway Authority to ask the CargoNet AS to got through their routines for identification, labelling and documentation of the maintenance and use of wheels and axels on goods wagons in order to ensure traceability.

These recommendations are translated from Norwegian. The Norwegian text remains the official version of the recommendations. Should ambiguity arise between the two the Norwegian text takes precedence.