

THE NATIONAL SAFETY AUTHORITY FOR RAILWAYS IN IRELAND

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2024

ANNUAL REPORT  
TO THE EUROPEAN  
UNION AGENCY  
FOR RAILWAYS

#### Version control

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## Definitions and abbreviations

CSI	Common Safety Indicator
CSM	Common Safety Method
CST	Common Safety Target
DoT	Department of Transport
EC	European Commission
ECM	Entities in charge of maintenance
EMM	Enforcement Management Model
ERA	European Union Agency for Railways
ERAIL	European Railway Accident Information Links
ERTMS	European Railway Traffic Management System
EU	European Union
FTE	Full Time Equivalent
IM	Infrastructure Manager
IOD	Interoperability Directive
NIB	National Investigation Body for railway accidents
NoBo	Notified Body
NRV	National Reference Value for CST
NSA	National Safety Authority for railways
PRM TSI	Technical specifications for interoperability relating to accessibility of the Union's rail system for persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility
RAIU	The Railway Accident Investigation Unit, the NIB in Ireland
Railway Organisation	An Irish legal term that collectively describes Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers
RSD	Railway Safety Directive
RU	Railway Undertaking
SMS	Safety Management System
TDD	Train Drivers Directive
TSI	Technical Specification for Interoperability
VA	Vehicle Authorisation

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Purpose, scope and addressees of the report

### 1.1.1 Purpose and scope of the report

The Commission for Railway Regulation (CRR) is pleased to submit its annual report to the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA) for the year 2024. This is the final annual report under the CRR's Statement of Strategy for 2021 – 2024.

Article 19 of the Railway Safety Directive 2016/798/EC (the Directive that is transposed in Ireland by Statutory Instrument 476 of 2020) requires the CRR to publish an annual report by 30th September each year concerning its activities in the preceding year and to send it to the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA).

In this report, the CRR endeavours to show how the railway system in Ireland is performing, highlighting difficulties and good practices while fostering and encouraging the railway industry in Ireland on its safety improvement journey. This report aims to provide evidence of the CRR's ongoing efforts to improve safety performance in the State, communicate its main safety messages and objectives, show what it is doing and why, and explain how well it is succeeding.

The geographic scope of this report is the 1,600 mm gauge national railway system in Ireland.

### 1.1.2 Structure/data to which the document refers

The annual report shall contain information on:

- The development of railway safety, including an analysis at Member State level of the common safety indicators (CSIs) laid down in Annex I of the Railway Safety Directive.
- Important changes in legislation and regulation concerning railway safety.
- The development of safety certification and safety authorisation.
- Results of and experience relating to the supervision of infrastructure managers and railway undertakings.
- Derogations for entities in charge of maintenance of vehicles decided in accordance with Article 14a(8) of the Directive.

This report uses the assigned template (GUI\_MRA\_002 V 3.0) which includes the extended requirements under the fourth railway package.

### 1.1.3 Target audience of the report

To improve European railway safety, the ERA needs to understand how the EU railway system is functioning and any issues that are impacting on safety performance. This annual report demonstrates how the CRR, as National Safety Authority (NSA) for railways in Ireland, is promoting the EU rail regulatory framework while fulfilling its tasks under the Railway Safety Directive (EU) 2016/798.

This report offers some insight to the operational railway companies and applicants for safety certification and safety authorisation, including the railway undertakings (RU), the infrastructure manager (IM) and the entities in charge of maintenance of vehicles (ECM), which should help them to continually improve their safety management systems (SMS).

This report may also be of interest to the National Investigating Body (NIB) for railway occurrences and to the Department of Transport.

### 1.1.4 Availability of the report to stakeholders

This report will be published on the websites of the CRR and the ERA.

## 1.2 Main conclusions on the reporting year

### 1.2.1 Main conclusion about how the railway system performed

Overall, the safety performance of the Irish conventional railway sector was assessed as positive in 2024, both when compared against previous years and European statistics. The CRR consider this as an important indicator of good safety performance in a time where new infrastructure is being added, and more passengers are using the system.

All NSA functions continued to be performed in 2024, which included work associated with the certification and authorisation required under EU legislation, Designated Body recognition and ongoing monitoring, as well as safety supervisory functions on the regulated entities, including audit and inspection planned on a risk-based analysis. We continued to monitor RU and IM implementation of CRR required actions and the recommendations of the Railway Accident Investigation Unit (RAIU), where progress is observed to be reasonable in 2024.

### 1.2.2 Overall Trends

In 2024, the overall safety performance of Ireland's railway system remained positive, continuing a long-term trend of stability and improvement. The number of significant accidents fell to one, compared with five in 2023, and this single event involved a trespasser near a station. All but one fatality was recorded to be suicides or acts of self-harm, reflecting a persistent societal challenge. Ireland continues to record some of the lowest accident and fatality rates per train-kilometre in the EU.

Common Safety Indicator (CSI) data show a sustained decline in the five-year rolling average of significant accidents, confirming that the system's main risks are being effectively managed. Safety precursors also fell from 18 in 2023 to 15 in 2024, with broken rails remaining the main contributor of 4 events in 2024. The infrastructure manager has implemented improved procedures to address this, showing early success. These broken rail events of 2024 have received additional focus from the Compliance, Supervision and Enforcement (CS&E) department of the CRR via periodic meetings with the IM and also via the requirement of the IM to update on their internal recommendations within the Safety Performance Review Meetings with the CS&E department of the CRR.

Signal Passed at Danger (SPAD) incidents remain a key safety focus. Although overall performance is stable, the CRR notes that long-term progress has been achieved through cultural change, improved incident learning, and modernised infrastructure and rolling stock. Overall, despite record passenger numbers for 2024 and increasing system utilisation, safety performance indicators demonstrate that RU and IM Safety Management Systems in Ireland are controlling risk effectively and sustaining high safety standards.

### 1.2.3 Impact of the above analyses on the next year activities

Ascertaining a meaningful trend in accident and incident statistics in Ireland is difficult as the number of occurrences is very low. In response to the significant accident rate experienced in 2023, Supervision adopted a proactive approach with required organisations to review how they may reduce trespass on the railway, and how trespassers may be managed when they are on the railway. Within Safety Performance Review meetings with the IM updates were provided on the IM's and RU's work outputs from this steering group (additional risk mitigations). These updates were provided periodically as this area was receiving due attention from the CRR's Supervision function. It is anticipated this will continue to be an important part of safety performance review meetings. It is also noted that many projects which seek to improve and develop capacity are ongoing. Specific supervision activity will review management of the operational railway whilst these projects are ongoing to ensure interface risks are managed.

### 1.2.4 Priority actions for the next year

With the transposition of the Railway Safety Directive and the Interoperability Directive in 2020, the CRR will continue to supervise Railway Undertakings and the Infrastructure Manager to ensure their SMS's are effective in controlling risk. Similarly, we will ensure that we are in a position to provide conformity assessment and authorisation services as per the processes described in the regulatory framework. This is particularly important in light of the many projects currently being undertaken.

The CRR continued implementing its Statement of Strategy in 2024, albeit 2024 saw the end of the 2021-2024 strategy and the beginning of our new strategy for the period 2024-2027. Implementation of the latest strategy began at the end of the year is in its very early stages. Sustained engagement with all sector stakeholders will be maintained to ensure that the strategy reflects the key objective relevant to the future development of our national rail system and its continuous improvement.

## 2 Summary

The Commission for Railway Regulation (CRR), acting as Ireland's National Safety Authority (NSA), reports continued strong performance of the Irish railway system in 2024. Safety indicators remained broadly positive, with accident and fatality rates among the lowest in Europe. One significant accident was recorded, involving a trespasser, while suicides and attempted suicides accounted for most fatalities. Despite record passenger numbers (over 50 million journeys) and an increasingly utilised network, overall safety levels were maintained, demonstrating that safety management systems (SMS's) remain effective in controlling key risks.

The CRR issued its new Statement of Strategy (2024–2027), aligning with national and EU transport policy and setting five priorities: safe and sustainable railways, organisational development, promotion of high standards, effective market regulation, and strong communication. Supervision continued to be risk-based, combining audits, inspections, and post-occurrence reviews. In 2024, 241 supervision activities were initiated and 147 completed, supported by a structured internal process of review and continuous improvement. Four Improvement Plans were directed to regulated entities for non-compliance issues, none of which required prohibition notices.

No new safety certificates or authorisations were issued for mainline operators, though 74 train driver licences were granted. Vehicle authorisation activity focused on 41 new InterCity carriages and preparations for the arrival of 185 Alstom BEMU/EMU units. Guidance documents were updated, and cooperation with ERA through the One-Stop Shop platform continued.

The CRR maintained active participation in international networks (ERA, ILGGRI, IRSC) and close collaboration with Northern Ireland's Department for Infrastructure, with a memorandum of understanding supporting joint supervision planning and future joint activities in 2025.

Application of the Common Safety Methods (CSMs) for risk assessment, monitoring, and SMS oversight was observed to be maturing. While variations in interpretation exist, overall compliance is satisfactory. Work continues to enhance sector competence in human and organisational factors and safety culture, including workshops, leadership training, and participation in ERA's safety culture initiatives.

No major legislative changes occurred in 2024. The CRR remained funded primarily through the industry levy (73.5%), with additional state support. The All-Island Strategic Rail Review Report, which was jointly commissioned by the Department of Transport in Ireland and the Department for Infrastructure in Northern Ireland, published in 2024, sets out a strategic vision for the development of the rail system across the island of Ireland over the coming decades. The Rail Review Report sets out 32 strategic recommendations to enhance the rail system in Ireland and Northern Ireland up to 2050, aligning with net carbon zero commitments in both jurisdictions. The recommendations seek to transform the quality of the rail system to the benefit of passengers and wider society on the island, involving additional track capacity, electrification, increased speeds, higher service frequencies and new routes.

Overall, 2024 demonstrated that Ireland's railway sector remains safe, well-regulated, and engaged in continuous improvement amid growing demand and infrastructure expansion.

## 3 NSA safety strategy, programs, initiatives and organisational context

### 3.1 Strategy and planning activities

The CRR's new Statement of Strategy (2024 – 2027), issued under the Railway Safety Act 2005, was submitted to the Minister for Transport in June 2024 and published on our website. In developing this strategy, the CRR has taken full account of both national and European policies, strategies and plans relating to transport as well as the additional relevant legislative framework. Specifically, the CRR has developed its new strategy in the context of the current and planned significant expenditure on both railway infrastructure and rolling stock. We actively sought the opinion of our key stakeholders in the preparation of this strategy. We received submissions from all the major stakeholders which were given careful consideration and have helped direct the development of this new strategy.

In accordance with the CRR's vision of "Safe and sustainable railways at the heart of public transport and economic development", its safety initiatives are linked to the main safety critical areas and indicators of accidents and precursors in order to improve common safety indicators.

As part of this statement of strategy, we have identified 5 strategic priority areas with key supporting actions that will be a focus over the life of this strategy:

– **Safe, secure and sustainable railways**

Ensuring through regulation and encouragement that safety, security and sustainability are central to rail transport as part of the public transport network, protecting members of the public, employees and those who interface with the rail network.

– **Our people and our organisation**

Our people are our most valuable asset, and we will promote continuous improvement within our organisation by supporting our staff and encouraging their personal development.

– **Promoting highest standards**

Creating an awareness within the rail sector of changes to the regulatory framework, standards and guidance to support best practice.

– **Effective market regulation**

Effective regulation and monitoring of the Infrastructure Manager in relation to its funding of and expenditure on asset management and network access.

– **Our communication**

Listening, communicating and engaging effectively with all our stakeholders. We have set key strategic priorities relating to rail safety, railway regulation, engagement with Government, communication with stakeholders and for our own organisation.

We have also set key values for how we work, which include integrity, respect, independence, professionalism and pragmatism.

The supervision strategy, in line with CSM 2018/761, continues to be implemented by the Compliance, Supervision and Enforcement Department of the CRR. The CRR plans all its supervision activities across all railway organisation on a risk basis. Via this risk-based process in line with the ERA Supervision Guide the Compliance Supervision and Enforcement departments allocated lead inspectors for each railway organisation and they in turn identify the main areas that require focus through the full suite of Supervision activities available on a risk basis. The full range of Supervision activities available entails Audits, Inspections, Safety Performance Review meetings (SPRM's), CRR outcome/RAIU recommendation review meetings and periodic meetings with key RO management staff as required (investigation managers meetings, etc.). These key supervision activities are undertaken on all heavy railway organisations. The 2024 CS&E programme of work for 2024 for heavy rail railway organisations included 4 audits and 43 inspections within the finalised Supervision programme for 2024.

### 3.1.1 NSA process of review and continual improvement of its strategy and planning of activities/initiatives

#### 3.1.1.1 CRR Supervision

The CRR's supervision activities are planned annually on a risk basis using qualitative and quantitative means considering all available inputs in line with the ERA Supervision Guide. This annual workshop from which the CS&E department and CA/APIS also attend serves as a full evaluation of the safety performance of all active heavy rail organisations on the network. Throughout 2024, the CRR Supervision team met bi-weekly and all primary ongoing tasks and activities were discussed in detail within these platform. At these periodic meetings inspectors can share experiences and often, as a result of these discussions, there are changes to planned activities or the way Supervision work is undertaken hence these periodic meetings are of inherent benefit as a review of all CS&E activities. Inspectors within these bi-weekly meetings feedback on real time safety performance of all regulated railway organisations; a key example being feedback to inspectors from key Safety Performance Review Meetings with railway organisations. There may be instances based on inspector periodic feedback in the bi-weekly meetings where an issue with safety performance needs to be elevated to the Safety Performance Review Platform where top railway organisation management also attend.

At the annual workshop, the CRR Compliance, Supervision and Enforcement team together with colleagues from the Conformity Assessment and APIS Team come together annually to essentially undertake a SWOT analysis of the year's supervision activities. This annual workshop also reviews the safety performance of all active railway organisations as per the principles outlined within the ERA Supervision guide. Feedback on railway organisations from both departments adds an inherent value to the annual workshop as it is an opportunity for the CA/APIS team and Compliance Supervision and Enforcement (CS&E) team to raise key items/developments which then feed into future work planning and also assist significantly with risk profiling of each railway organisation. All inspectors have an opportunity to share their experiences from the previous year's activities as part of an approach that aims to continually improve the supervision function. CS&E Inspection Templates are reviewed within continual improvement sessions hosted outside of the annual workshop and where necessary amended thereby demonstrating continuous improvement/refinement of our supervision processes. During the CRR's periodic monthly staff meetings real time updates on all live CA/APIS and CS&E activities are provided and relayed between both teams. These monthly meetings stimulate real time information exchange between both CA/APIS and CS&E.

The 2024 Annual Supervision Programme continued the process of the prioritisation of activities, particularly in the audit and inspections areas where these were ranked as low, medium or high priorities based on the lead inspector data analysis and their presentations which feed into the CS&E annual workshop. In the event of any resource constraints arising within the CS&E team this hierarchy with respect to activity prioritisation is then executed. As referenced earlier real time feedback within the CS&E's departments periodic meetings may lead to a change in an activities risk profile and the CS&E department utilises a change log to record these decisions and changes to Supervision activities.

To fulfil this supervisory function in 2024 a range of activities were undertaken on railway organisations which comprised primarily of the following:

- Audits.
- Inspections.
- Post occurrence activities (POA's).
- Periodic safety performance review with RO's (SPRM's).
- CRR outcome reviews with RO's.
- RAIU safety recommendations reviews with addressed entities.
- Periodic recurring meetings with railway organisation management personnel (examples: Safety Compliance Manager, Investigations Manager, etc.).

In 2024, a total of 14 regulated ROs were under the CRR's remit for potential supervision activities (5 of these railway organisations operating on the heavy rail network). This supervision was both proactive (planned) and reactive (in response to occurrences).

The planned activity types were as outlined above, with resources allocated in proportion to the level of risk presented by the regulated entities. In 2024, the full range of supervision and inspection activities was available. With respect to methods of working, the CRR now have a well-established approach of hybrid working, which includes a mix of in-person and virtual/online engagement to facilitate all activities.

In 2024, with respect to railway organisations operating on the heavy rail network, 36 inspections were commenced within the calendar year. A further 7 inspection activities commenced in 2023 on railway organisations operating on the heavy rail network were completed in 2024 in addition. CS&E completed 2 audits in full in 2024 on railway organisations that operate on the heavy rail network with a further 5 audits remaining active and being well progressed.

### 3.1.1.2 Assessments and Authorisation

The CRR updated several of its guideline documents. Minor updates were made to CRR-G-51-A, Guidance to the Railway Undertaking Licensing Application Process (v3). CRR-G-034-C, Guideline on the application for a Safety Assessment of New Infrastructure Works on Isolated Heritage or Velo Railways was also updated to include VeloRail infrastructure/operations and to update the document format. CRR-G-053-C, Guidance for CRR Designation/Recognition of Designated Bodies in Ireland (IE-DeBos) included updates on the notification of use of version 2 of the ERA assessment scheme and requirements in relation to changes in legal name or status of the IE-DeBo.

Ireland has a limited number of entities involved in the operation of railways in the state. There is one infrastructure manager and four railway undertakings operating on the network. Therefore, we have clear expectations for SMS certification/authorisation applications in a given year. The only Safety Certificates issued in 2024 related to heritage railways.

Following the review of an application for APIS, and provided that the application is complete and valid, the CRR will issue a letter of acceptance for that application. In 2024, fifty-seven letters of acceptance (56 – Infrastructure/Signalling, 1 Rolling Stock) were issued as part of the APIS process. Through the European Railway Agency's authorisation portal, known as the One-Stop Shop (OSS), the CRR were involved in two authorisations. The first of these was in relation to the fitting of onboard ETCS Level 1 equipment to the 22000 Fleet (A1 Cabs). This authorisation is being led by the ERA with input from the CRR on 'Area of Use' aspects. The second was the authorisation of 41 new Inter City Rail (ICR) (class 22000) carriages.

Ireland's National Development Plan 2018-2027 points to significant investment in the railway system in the coming years which includes further electrification of the conventional railway, new stations, elimination of level crossings, and new rolling stock. Engagement with the CRR continued on a number of these projects in 2024.

### 3.1.2 NSA strategies in international activities

The CRR, although a small NSA, values participation in as broad a range of national and international fora as possible. The virtual and in person engagement in 2024 included the ERA's NSA Network, European Commission's Railway Safety and Interoperability Committee, as well as other ERA Working Groups and Task Forces.

In addition, our nominees continued to contribute to work of the International Liaison Group for Government Railway Inspectorates (ILGGRI) plenary meetings and railway related conferences.

The CRR is also an active member of the International Railway Safety Council (IRSC), which it sees as an excellent forum for the exchange of experience and lessons for improving railway safety. In 2024, the CRR sent three delegates to the conference.

### 3.2 NSA measures adopted or planned regarding to the recommendations issued by NIB and monitoring of their implementation status

(in accordance with art. 26(2) of the Directive (EU) 2016/798)

This is an ongoing task of the Compliance, Supervision and Enforcement (CS&E) team and the CRR have been monitoring the implementation of NIB Safety Recommendations since 2008. Safety recommendation issued by the NIB to the CRR are reviewed and formally issued to the necessary organisations. The organisations in turn are required to advise the CRR of their acceptance or otherwise together with details of actions taken or proposed or details as to why they believe no action is necessary.

Currently the CS&E Principal Inspector meets with key railway organisation personnel on a monthly basis to review the development and implementation of these NIB recommendations. Within these meetings period reporting is provided to the CS&E Principal Inspector. Recommendation submissions are reviewed with a view to expedite submissions and avoid the requirement for multiple submissions. These regular meetings allow NIB recommendations to be assigned and for recommendation review blocks are worked through. Records are kept and there is then a formalised method by which evidence is submitted, reviewed and closed. There is also a requirement for progress to be reported to the CRR on a quarterly basis and for the principal RU's and IÉ-IM to review progress. The status of recommendations is shown in the following table for 2024.

#### NIB recommendations

Year	No. of reports*	No. of recommendations				Total
		Open	Submitted	FER	Closed	
**	19	0	0	0	73	73
2010	4	1	0	0	25	26
2014	6	0	0	2	26	28
2016	3	6	0	2	12	20
2017	1	0	0	1	8	9
2018	1	1	0	1	7	9
2019	4	6	3	6	21	36
2020	4	4	2	6	7	19
2021	7	8	6	9	13	36
2022	3	8	7	1	0	16
2023	5	29	12	1	5	47
2024	3	13	1	0	0	14
<b>Totals*</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>197</b>	
<b>Total recommendations made*</b>						<b>333</b>

\* = USAN's are not referenced within as 'reports' in accordance with RAIU referencing system however the USAN recommendations are included within the table above for the relevant years USANs were issued by the RAIU.

\*\* = All RAIU recommendations from 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2015 are closed in full.

The status categories are:

**Open/In progress**

Feedback (evidence) from Railway Organisation (or another party) is awaited or actions have not yet been completed.

**Submitted**

The Railway Organisation (or other party) has made a submission to the CRR advising that it has taken measures to effect the recommendation and the CRR is considering whether to close the recommendation.

**FER (Further Evidence Requested)**

The CRR has reviewed a submission (or further submission) but considers that further evidence is necessary to close the safety recommendation.

**Closed**

The CRR has reviewed a submission (or further submission) and is satisfied that the safety recommendation has been addressed.

### 3.3 Safety measures implemented unrelated to the NIB Safety Recommendations

#### 3.3.1 NSA measures adopted or planned by NSA

The CRR's Supervision Programme is compiled annually and fulfils the audit and inspection function of the CRR. The focus of the annual programme for 2024 was on:

1. Supervising the continued application of the Railway Organisations approved SMS, i.e., checking compliance with legal requirements, i.e., Common Safety Methods, the Railway Safety Act 2005, etc.
2. Supervising areas of identified and highlighted risks and RO's Risk Control Measures for the avoidance of occurrences.
3. Installing in the minds of railway company personnel, that safety is their no. 1 policy.

Additionally, there were overarching themes in railway safety performance that warrant a multi-annual approach. These themes were:

- Track Worker Safety.
- Level Crossing Safety.
- Contractor Management.
- Risk Management.
- New & Emerging risks.

The Supervision programme for 2024 was also highlighted to have:

- Monitor and sample the Infrastructures Management of highlighted assets that would be more vulnerable to climate change.
- Sampling of heavy maintenance activities of IÉ Railway Undertaking.
- Sampling of works within possessions and review management of possessions.
- Sampling of track worker safety and subsequent reviews of trends with Infrastructure Managers.
- Promote human factors in the sector.

The purpose of the supervision programme is to provide assurance to the CRR that Railway Organisations are applying their SMS through its standards, procedures, practices, rules, conditions and behaviours to ensure that all activities of the Railway Organisations are risk free or as low as reasonably practicable.

The CRR's principal supervision activities, i.e., audits, inspections and meetings, are devised and planned to achieve the above. In 2024, a total of 36 inspections were commenced across the operational RUs and the IM. For the railway organisations, CS&E completed 2 audits in full in 2024 on railway organisations that operate on the heavy rail network with a further 5 audits remaining active and being well progressed.

The CRR continued its engagement with the sector working group on Human and Organisational Factors in 2024, to support efforts to improve the industry's capability in this area. A variety of railway organisations attended the sessions with engagement in the sector being positive. The outputs from the group are cascaded to all participants. A memorandum of understanding continued to be implemented by the CRR and the Department for Infrastructure Northern Ireland (DFI-NI) with the objective of facilitating co-operation, enhancing our actions and establishing principles of engagement. Periodic meetings also took place between DFI-NI and the CRR during 2024 with multiple taking place. These periodic meetings have, from the CS&E perspective, ensured that there is no duplication of activities on NIR within future proposed activities and have greatly assisted in the Supervision of NIR.

### 3.3.2 Monitoring of implementation status

The CRR reviews the implementation of the plan identified in Section 3.2.1 at a bi-weekly meeting at which all Supervision inspectors attend. Activities allocated to individual inspectors are discussed and their progress is reviewed within each of these meetings. Moreover, the wider CRR team meet monthly at which the Principal Inspector with responsibility for Supervision provides an update as to work completed in the previous month and work that is currently in progress. The Commissioner and the Principal Inspectors also meet monthly to review the current and future work activity and outcomes. Lastly, the programme is reviewed annually in quarter 4 at the Compliance, Supervision and Enforcement workshop. Items incomplete or unresolved are reviewed to determine if they should be carried forward to the next year or if they are still valid/a cause for concern. The CS&E annual workshop is further referenced and detailed within Section 3.1.1.1 of this report.

### 3.4 Safety Organisational context

The CRR continued to receive the majority of its funding through the annual levy that the CRR places on the entities that are subject to regulation as allowed for in the legislation establishing the CRR. The levy is allocated on the basis of the level of activity relating to the functions the CRR engages in with each regulated entity including certification, authorisation and supervision in that year. The balance is received as Grant-in-Aid from the Department of Transport and by charging agreed statutory fees for other specific activities such as the designation of DeBo's. Breakdown of funding 2024: Levy 73.5%, Grant in Aid: 25.5% and Fees: 1%

This approach allows the CRR to be independent and to fulfil its functions under the legislative framework.

#### 3.4.1 Railway organisational context in the Member State and main changes

The organisational context in MS IE remained constant in 2024 and there were no significant changes to staff or structure.

The IÉ-IM network, as detailed in its 2025 Network Statement, currently extends to approximately 2,400 km of operational track and includes c. 4,440 bridges, c. 1,100 point-ends, c. 970 level crossings, 146 stations, 3,300+ cuttings and embankments, 372 platforms and 13 tunnels. The network is used for both passenger and freight services, with infrastructure designed for long distance fast services, commuter services, urban high frequency services, and freight transport. The network includes main lines, suburban and commuter passenger routes, together with freight-only routes. Most of the network is comprised of radial lines focused on the capital, Dublin. The network largely provides for inter-urban connections providing strategic transport links at the national level between the six key cities on the island, Dublin, Cork, Galway, Limerick, Waterford and Belfast.

Intra-urban rail is also extensive within the Dublin area with the provision of DART in 1984 on the main network providing the core high-capacity network that is central to the Greater Dublin Area's mass transit system. Passenger transport and freight services are provided on the network by IÉ-RU. In addition, Northern Irish Railways also operate a joint (the 'Enterprise') service with IÉ-RU between Dublin and Belfast as well as operating its own event based special serviced between Belfast and Dublin. The full detail is provided in the Iarnród Éireann Infrastructure Manager Annual Network Statement ([available here](#)).

In 2024, there has been a continuing steady increase in passenger journey numbers, with Iarnród Éireann at 50.66 million passenger journeys, a new all-time high.

The finalised All Island Strategic Rail Review was published by the Government in July 2024. The Report sets out 32 strategic recommendations to enhance and expand the rail system in Ireland and Northern Ireland up to 2050, aligning with net carbon zero commitments in both jurisdictions. The recommendations seek to transform the quality of the rail system to the benefit of passengers and wider society on the island, through additional track capacity, electrification, increased speeds and higher service frequencies. Furthermore, the vision involves the construction of new rail lines, particularly in the North Midlands and Northwest, widening accessibility and connectivity.


### 3.4.2 Information relating to the NSA organisation and main changes

The organisational structure of the CRR is shown in Figure 1, with a corresponding diagram indicating CRR workflow and relationships in Figure 2.

Figure 1  
Organisation Chart



Figure 2  
Organogram of  
independent CRR  
organisation and  
primary workflows



### 3.4.3 NSA staff and the NSA competence management system

(Only staff dealing with railways is included), with a focus on staff dealing with the following activities: issuing Single Safety Certificate, Vehicle Authorisation, Supervision and Train Drivers Licenses.)

The following sections summarise how competence is managed for NSA staff.

#### 3.4.3.1 Single Safety Certificate

The CRR is a small NSA and in 2024 comprised a total of 10 Inspectors with 5 of these being involved in the assessment of single safety certificates and safety authorisations. All staff involved have been with the CRR for at least 2 years and are familiar with CRR processes and the ERA OSS. It should be stated that given the small number of RUs operating in Ireland and the fact that they only require certification every 5 years our interaction with the OSS is limited and skill fade is an issue for us.

Every Inspector has an engineering degree, 10+ years of work experience and further complemented by railway specific training. Users of the OSS have received the ERA OSS Training supplemented with on-the-job mentoring whereby a new/less experienced members of staff shadow a more experienced member of the team.

### 3.4.3.2 Supervision

The principal activities undertaken by CRR Supervision inspectors are audits, inspections, post occurrence activities, responding to representations, and a variety of meetings with railway organisations management.

CRR inspectors are encouraged to maintain their own continuous professional development and are all offered the opportunity to complete a relevant MSc university course such as the 'MSc in Railway Systems Engineering & Integration'.

The Principal Inspector of CS&E, who has responsibility for supervision, has an annual training budget allocation per inspector reporting to them and it is used at the discretion of the Principal Inspector CS&E in consultation with their staff.

Prior to undertaking any activity, there is also a period of on-the-job learning where more junior inspectors are mentored by more experienced staff. This includes acting in a support role on audits and shadowing inspectors as they carry out asset/task observation inspections. In the case of auditing, this is supported by formal, classroom-based Lead Auditor training which all inspectors receive to ISO 19011 principles.

Inspector reports are always peer reviewed and feedback is given when necessary. Moreover, inspector performance is reviewed twice per year as per the CRR Performance Management and Development System (PMDS).

A competence management system (CMS) continued to be developed in 2024. The 2nd cycle ERA audit has identified this as an area for development and CS&E work towards the agreed action plan with ERA.

### 3.4.3.3 Train Driver Licences

Given there are just four Railway Undertakings operating in the state, the number of train driver licences issued in any given year is not significant. Based on applications received in 2024, the CRR issued 74 train driver licences. 73 were 'first issue', 1 was a replacement licence.

The CRR has two members of staff trained in processing Train Driver Licence applications. It is intended to train a further Inspector in this task in 2025.

## 4 Safety performance

Reference to requirement: art. 19 (a) of Directive (EU) 2016/798

### 4.1 Statistics and analysis of general safety performance trends

This chapter uses the CSIs and national safety indicators when considering the reasons and context behind recent safety developments. National safety indicators are shown in the CRR's Annual Railway Safety Performance report which is published separately on the CRR website.

The Irish rail network represents only a small share of overall EU railway traffic. In 2024, it reported 2,486 million passenger-km and 76 million tonne-km of freight. By comparison, the most recent EU-wide figures were approximately 390 billion passenger-km and 400 billion tonne-km.

Passenger services on Ireland's conventional network have continued their long-term growth trend in 2024. This increase is driven largely by a strong economy and rising population, which have boosted demand for both intercity and commuter services. In response, the state railway operator has expanded capacity on many routes.

The Irish system is primarily focused on passenger transport, but freight services – after decades of decline – are now expected to grow again, but this will take time to materialise in data. Key drivers include climate action policies, the efficiency of rail transport, and planned improvements to port connectivity. Freight volumes in 2024 remained broadly consistent with recent years.

There was a decrease in significant accidents in Ireland in 2024 (1) compared to 2023 (5). An underlying factor in all significant accidents was trespass on to the railway. The single occurrence involved a person trespassing onto the track near a station and having a fatal impact with a train travelling at speed. 11 suicides and 3 attempted suicides were recorded in 2024. The establishment of a steering group was of note in 2024 by IM and RU and periodic updates of the outputs of this group were provided to the CS&E Principal Inspector per required. The steering group reviewed potential additional risk mitigations that could be implemented and also an overall review of industry best practices.

Ireland continues to have relatively low accident rates per million train-km. Although it is difficult to pick up on meaningful trends within the CSI data as the values for Ireland are very low, there has been an underlying decline in the five-year rolling average number of reported significant accidents. It is observed from the agency's latest report on Railway Safety and Interoperability in the EU that Ireland is towards the more positive side of comparative data for railway fatality rates in Europe. The overall picture of safety in the rail industry is a good one, with most indicators trending positively.

The Common Safety Indicators (CSIs) for Ireland are provided to European Union Agency for Railways (ERA) using the agency's designated reporting template. The following is an analysis of trends related to CSIs and national safety indicators.

## 4.2 Number of fatalities/serious injuries (total and relative to train-km)

In 2024, there was 12 fatalities on the railway. 11 were determined to be suicide or self-harm occurrences, and the other event was the result of a trespasser accessing the line from a station platform and colliding with a train that was travelling at speed. This number is broadly in line with 2023 but it is noted that suicide events take up a much greater share. Whilst there is a degree of natural variability for this category it is also evident that work undertaken by the sector in Ireland is having some effect. To this end, RU's and the IM in Ireland developed a suicide prevention steering group. The group reviews relevant safety data and implements preventive measures such as coaching staff to intervene with vulnerable people. They are also reviewing the engineering interventions that may be effective.

## 4.3 Number of significant accidents (total and relative to train-km)

One significant accident occurred on the conventional railway in 2024. It involved a trespasser accessing the line from a station platform and being struck by a train that was travelling at speed. The elevated values observed in 2023 may represent an outlier; however, additional data is needed to confirm this. It is also possible that these figures could increase in future years due to substantial population growth and a larger proportion of the population residing in proximity to railway systems. Ireland's population increased by approximately 50% between 1984 and 2024.

## 4.4 Overview of safety incidents (CSI precursors to accidents and nationally used accidents)

In 2024, a total of 15 precursors were recorded, down from 18 in 2023. While this represents a year-on-year decrease, the figure remains slightly above the five-year trend. As in 2023, the increase was mainly attributable to broken rails. This issue was the focus of Supervision activity in 2024, and evidence indicates that broken rails are linked to a higher rate of ongoing track upgrade and renewal works (for example, thermit weld failures as a result of more thermit welds being undertaken in that year relative to others). Two incidents occurred on lines open to passenger services. The infrastructure manager has since introduced several changes to its SMS procedures relating to broken rails, and early indications suggest these measures are proving effective. Other precursors remained broadly consistent with the five-year trend.

## 4.5 Overview of safety outputs CSIs, such as level-crossing per type, ATP statistics and other nationally used metrics

The infrastructure remained mostly at steady state in Ireland in 2024, where there continues to be a significant focus on asset renewals and planning for large projects to replace existing signalling and energy systems. Significant progress has been made on a new signalling system, and it is expected a small section will open in 2025 for test purposes. The infrastructure manager has changed level crossing designation in several categories due to the installation of a new decision support system (DSS) which provides road users with advice on the presence of an oncoming train. Overall level crossing numbers continue to decrease for 2024 albeit it with a reduction of 5 levels crossings from 2024 to 2023 by comparison.


#### 4.6 Analysis of trends for main safety outcomes per category of accident and user type, safety incidents, safety outputs

Signals passed at danger are a primary safety risk on the conventional network in Ireland. A small percentage of track in the Dublin area is fitted with automatic train protection, which automatically stops the train at certain signals or when speed has exceeded its permission. A continuous automated warning system that provides in-cab indication of lineside signals and requires the driver to acknowledge changes in signal aspect is fitted to some intercity routes, whilst several single lines do not have provision for such systems. ETCS is currently being installed on the network, but this project has some time to go before it will be fully operational. In the meantime, it is required that other interventions are required to ensure SPAD risk is reduced to a level that is as low as is reasonably practicable.

Context for this indicator is also important. This report refers to 5 years of data which is a relatively short time to assess improvements in this risk. If one considers the risk over longer time period, then we can see significant improvement late 2000s to 2024 (figure 3). It is clear from Supervision activities that no one intervention has led to improvement. Numerous actions, both large and small, are necessary to impact safety in this area and also to keep that improvement sustained. Although difficult to measure and thus be certain it is likely changes to organisational culture are the single biggest contributor. This manifests in many ways but it is likely improvements in providing enhanced support to operators following an operational error has been important, along with ensuring that SPADs are investigated systematically to ensure that a railway organisation extracts the maximum learning from each event. Some other factors for improvement include:

- Modern rolling stock.
- Changes to infrastructure such as improved track design and signal position.
- Enhanced data collection for SPAD events.
- Safety Management System Certification, Authorisation, and Supervision.
- Improved sharing of guidance and best practice documents from the United Kingdom and the European Union.

Figure 3  
SPAD 2003-2024



The graphic above shows that SPADs averaged at about 11 since 2011, which suggests improvements have been sustained. It is also noted from monitoring and SPAD reviews that the 10 year trendline continues to remain positive for SPADs on the network. The CS&E department review each any every SPAD.

In recent years, a relatively large number of new drivers have been recruited to operate trains; however, this has so far had only a minimal impact on overall performance. While this is a positive indication, continued vigilance is essential to safeguard safety across the network. Ongoing efforts to modernise train control systems remain critical to enable more effective interventions in the event of a SPAD, alongside the further development of strategies to address safety risks associated with human and organisational factors. Monitoring of drivers recently qualified and performance review measures of the RU are followed up by the CS&E department SPAD reviews.

#### 4.7 Provide information on national safety targets and underlying safety improvement plans

Ireland currently does not define targets at a national level through legal mechanisms.

## 5 EU legislation and regulation

Reference to requirement: art. 19 (b) of Directive (EU) 2016/798 and art. 19 (e) of Directive (EU) 2016/798

### 5.1 Changes in legislation and regulations

**5.1.1 Important changes in the implementation of the EU legal framework**  
(e.g., RSD, IOD, other relevant Directives, Regulation and Secondary legislation, including the change in the scope)

In 2024, there were no important changes in the implementation of the EU legal framework.

**5.1.2 Eventual amendments necessary in order to achieve CSTs**  
(art. 4(1) point f, art. 7(7) of the Directive (EU) 2016/798)

Not required in 2024.

**5.1.3 Review of the operational companies' implementation of new EU regulatory framework**

(Concerning rolling stock, infrastructure, staff performing safety-critical tasks, staff competencies and training).

There were no legislative changes introduced in 2024 necessitating changes by operational companies. However, the application of certain TSIs remains a challenge for the sector given interpretations can differ. The CRR, as the NSA, continues to work collaboratively with railway organisations applying a pragmatic approach whilst endeavouring to ensure RU's and the IM remain legally compliant with the regulatory framework.

**5.1.4 Changes in legislation/regulation following the recommendations and opinions of the Agency pursuant to RSD**

(art. 32 of the Directive (EU) 2016/798 and art. 13 of the Regulation EU 2016/796)

Not required in 2024.

**5.1.5 Changes in legislation/regulation following the NIB Safety Recommendation**  
(art. 26(2) of the Directive (EU) 2016/798)

Not required in 2024.

**5.1.6 Changes/amendments to the national legal framework relating to railway safety**

(Legal acts and administrative regulations)

The following Statutory Instruments were published in 2024:

- S.I. No 237/2024 Railway Safety Act 2005 (Section 26) Levy Order 2024.

## 5.2 Derogation from RSD system of certification of ECM

### 5.2.1 Derogations decided in accordance with Article 15 Directive (EU) 2016/798 (Derogations from the system of certification of Entities in Charge of Maintenance (ECM))

No derogations.

### 5.2.2 Information according to art. 15(3) of the Directive (EU) 2016/798

No derogations.

## 6 Safety certifications, safety authorisations and other certificates issued by the NSA

Reference to requirement: art. 16 of the Directive (EU) 2016/798, art. 19 (c) of the Directive (EU) 2016/798, art. 24 of the Directive (EU) 2016/797, art.7 of the Commission Regulation No 445/2011, art.14 of the Directive 2007/59/EC and art. 20 of the Directive 2007/59/EC)

### 6.1 Safety Single Certificates and Safety Authorisations

#### 6.1.1 Status and changes to the number and awardees of safety certificates and safety Changes to strategy and procedure related to the process of issuing Safety Single Certificate/Safety Authorisation

The railway sector in Ireland is small with just 1 Infrastructure Manager (IM) and 4 railway undertakings (RU) operating on the heavy rail network. Consequently, there are very few changes to the number and awardees of safety certificates year or year, as can be seen in the table below.

Status	Change/detail	Number
Number and awardees (names of the companies) of new safety certificates		0
Number and awardees of renewed safety certificates		0
Number and awardees of amended safety certificates (e.g., for extensions or reductions in scope...) and main issues faced		0
Number of revoked safety certificates and main reasons		0
Number and awardees of new safety authorisations		0
Number and awardees of renewed safety authorisations		0
Number and awardees of amended safety authorisations (e.g., for extensions or reductions in scope...) and main issues faced		0

In quarter 4 2024, the CRR commenced SSC pre-engagement with the Railway Preservation Society of Ireland with an expected renewal in early 2025. With regards to changes to strategy or procedures related to the process of issuing Safety Single Certificate/Safety Authorisation, there was no change in the CRR's assessment process.

#### 6.1.2 Outcomes of discussions of supervision results with other NSAs in the context of certification/authorisation

There was no activity in this area in 2024.

#### 6.1.3 Changes to strategy and procedure (shall only be included if relevant) related to the process of issuing Safety Single Certificate/Safety Authorisation

There were no changes to strategy and procedure in this area in 2024.

## 6.2 Vehicle Authorisations

### 6.2.1 Status of the number and awardees of Vehicles Authorisations (VA) during the reporting year

#### 6.2.1.1 Certificate/Safety Authorisation

The railway sector in Ireland is small with just 1 Infrastructure Manager (IM) and 4 railway undertakings (RU) operating on the heavy rail network. Consequently, in any given year there may well be no applications for Vehicles Authorisations given the life expectancy of rail vehicles is reasonably long. That said since 2021 Iarnród Éireann have ordered a total of 185 EMU/BEMU vehicles from Alstom with the first train arriving in Ireland in late 2024. For the next year Iarnród Éireann will conduct a rigorous testing regime before they go into passenger service in 2026/27. The authorising entity for this new rolling stock fleet is the ERA with the CRR responsible for the 'Area of Use' aspects. Submissions are expected in 2025.

The table below lists those projects that were either received or advanced in some way during 2024, e.g., number and awardees of new issued VA, number and awardees of modified and/or renewed VA and main issues faced, number of suspended VA and main reasons, number of withdrawn VA and main reasons.

Status	Change	Number
Number and awardees of new issued VA	In 2019, IÉ-RU entered into an agreement with Hyundai-Rotem to supply 41 additional intermediate vehicles known as the 'B2' cars. The CRR authorised these vehicles through the ERA OSS in February 2024.	1
Number and awardees of modified and/or renewed VA and main issues faced		0
Number of suspended VA and main reasons		0
Number of withdrawn VA and main reasons		0

### 6.2.2 Changes to strategy and procedure related to the process of Vehicle Authorisation

CRR guideline CRR-G-009 Revision H, which remained in place during 2024 is the principal standard relevant to the process of vehicle authorisation. It covers the 'Application for Authorisation and Application for Acceptance for Heavy Rail Fixed Installations and Vehicles'. It provides guidance and explanation on the European and Irish legal requirements for authorisation of fixed installations and vehicles.

### 6.3 Entities in Charge of Maintenance (ECM)

Not applicable.

#### 6.3.1 Certificates issued, amended, renewed, suspended, and revoked during the reporting year

Nil.

#### 6.3.2 In case of suspended or revoked certification please describe the main causes/reasons

Nil.

#### 6.3.3 Report of non-conformities which have been detected by the NSA during its surveillance activities

Nil.

#### 6.3.4 Changes to strategy and procedure related to the process of ECM certification

Nil.

### 6.4 Train drivers

#### 6.4.1 Train driver licenses issued, amended, renewed, suspended, withdrawn during the reporting year (Directive 2007/59/EC, Art.14)

There were a total of 74 licences issued by the CRR in 2024. One of these licences was a replacement owing to loss. The table below shows the breakdown by railway undertaking.

Railway Undertaking	No. of Licences Issued
Rhomberg Sersa	0
NIR Translink	13
Irish Rail	61
<b>Total Licences issued</b>	<b>74</b>

Rhomberg Sersa are a very small RU with just 29 Train Drivers holding European Train Driver Licences. They operate and maintain the On-Track-Machine (OTM) fleet for Iarnród Éireann – Infrastructure Manager. NIR Translink operate train services in Northern Ireland and also operate a cross-border train service to Dublin in the Republic of Ireland. Some 70 Train Drivers hold a European Train Driver Licences. Irish Rail (Iarnród Éireann), the state railway undertaking operating passenger and freight services, are the principal applicant for European Train Driver Licences with in-excess of 800 being issued to date.

#### 6.4.2 Training centres recognized during the reporting year (Directive 2007/59/EC, Art.20 and Art.23(6))

Currently there is just one recognised training centre in Ireland, that is operated by the national state railway, Iarnród Éireann. They were recognised in March 2020 for a period of 5 years. Consequently, there was no activity in this area in 2024.

#### 6.4.3 Changes to strategy and procedure related to the process of train driver licensing

There were no changes to the CRR's procedures in 2024.

### 6.5 Other type of authorisation/certifications

#### 6.5.1 Cases where NSA acts as certification body for other type of railway authorisations/certification

The CRR is the recognition body for Designated Bodies (DeBo's) for the IÉ network. Since 2022, the CRR have recognised 6 organisations as an IE-DeBo, each for a period of 5 years. No monitoring activities took place in 2024 but several are scheduled for 2025. The CRR did receive a further IE-DeBo application in 2024, and the assessment of same is set to commence in early 2025.

### 6.6 Contacts with other National Safety Authorities

#### 6.6.1 Cooperation with foreign safety authorities

The CRR cooperate with the Department for Infrastructure of Northern Ireland and specifically their Railway Safety Authority. In 2022 the CRR signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the DfI with the principal purpose of sharing information pertaining to the supervision of cross border RUs.

In 2024, the CRR and DfI did start to engage on vehicle authorisations/projects of mutual interest which is seen as a positive development.

The other main route to engagement with other NSAs is through the CRR's attendance at ERA NSA Network meetings and other working groups. However, given our small size, the CRR must prioritise our resource in terms of selecting which working groups and task forces to attend. That said we did attend all NSA network Meetings including the on-site meeting in Budapest in June 2024.

#### 6.6.2 Outcomes of discussions of supervision results with other NSAs

In terms of Supervision the CRR met with the Railway Safety Authority of Northern Ireland on two occasions in 2024 which included a site meeting. Information was shared regarding supervision activity on Northern Ireland Railway and Iarnród Éireann – Railway Undertaking which in turn assists significantly with future Supervision work planning on NIR and in terms of sharing of information with respect to NIR's safety performance.

## 6.7 Exchange of information between NSA and railway operators

### 6.7.1 Exchange of information between the NSA and RU/IM

(describing the scope, the frequency and how the exchange is done)

On a quarterly basis, CRR Inspectors meet with company executives from 'high priority' railway organisations. These are the state RU (Iarnród Éireann – Railway Undertaking) and the state IM (Iarnród Éireann – Infrastructure Manager). At these meetings safety performance is reviewed along with discussions on railway accidents/incidents. In advance of these meetings the railway companies provide Key Performance Indicator data that is then discussed in the meetings.

Meetings pertaining to new/modified infrastructure and Vehicle authorisations also take place with Iarnród Éireann on a Quarterly basis. At these we are advised of new projects and CRR Inspectors can answer any APIS/VA questions the project teams might have. In 2024, the CRR met 4 times with the Capital Investment Division Director on new infrastructure projects and 4 times with the Chief Mechanical Engineer's Team in respect of VA.

### 6.7.2 Topics/critical points exchanges/discussed for the reporting year

There was no activity.

### 6.7.3 Relating findings and initiatives

There was no activity.

## 7 Supervision

(Reference to requirement: art. 19 (d) of Directive (EU) 2016/798 and Commission Delegated Regulation EU 2018/761)

### 7.1 Strategy, plan, procedures and decision making

7.1.1 Supervision strategy, including how planning (e.g., data concerning CSIs, input from Safety Recommendations, etc.) takes this into account and any relevant changes made as a result of the analysis of safety data along with an explanation of why those changes were made

The CRR's Statement of Strategy, published in 2024 and covering the period 2024-2027 inclusive, is the high-level document (Supervision Strategy) that sets out the Commission's mandate, mission, vision and key priorities in the period. It forms the basis of the Commission's activity across all units, including the Supervision Section. These key priorities, from a supervision perspective, are areas of risk on which the CRR will pay particular attention during the life cycle of the strategy. These are identified based on our knowledge of trends in safety performance, previous audit/inspection findings, NIB safety recommendations and other sources. For the period 2024-2027, the CRR have identified 4 key areas, and these are:

- Develop an annual programme of work that addresses key performance indicator areas.
- Have an active engagement plan with contractors, suppliers and partners to promote rail safety.
- Our supervision activity will be directed by procedures based on European Railway Agency (ERA) guidance, and best industry practice.
- Evaluate the effectiveness of our key activities of supervision, conformity assessment and authorisation.

Also identified in our Statement of Strategy are risks associated with Human Factors (HF), e.g., automation and the digitisation of our railways. Moreover, HF integration not only in systems/sub-systems but also into railway organisations SMSs is an area the CRR will focus on.

Taking the above into account, i.e., to address these areas of risk and to supervise the continued application and effectiveness of each RU and IM safety management system, the CRR prepares annual supervision plans for several RU's and the IM. For 2024, these included:

- Iarnród Éireann (IÉ-IM) – Infrastructure Manager.
- Iarnród Éireann (IÉ-RU) – Railway Undertaking.
- Rhomberg Sersa Rail Group (Ireland) – Railway Undertaking.
- Railway Preservation Society of Ireland (RPSI)– Railway Undertaking.
- Northern Ireland Railways (Translink) – Railway Undertaking.

Each railway organisation's supervision plan that the CRR develop includes audits, inspections and meetings with senior managers.

These plans are developed by the CRR Inspectors at an annual workshop where the safety performance of each individual railway organisation supervised is reviewed in detail and presented by lead inspectors. This includes review of National Indicators and Common Safety Indicators. Then depending on their performance, i.e., is it improving or worsening trend the level of activity can increase or decrease.

Additionally, in terms of a plan's execution, each organisation is assigned a risk classification that determines the level of supervision activity they will receive for that year.

With regards to the Infrastructure Manager, the CRR sought to focus on level crossing assets inspections, review of tandem lifting arrangements within possessions, road rail vehicles in track maintenance possessions, possession inspections, inspection of stations and review of risk mitigations against coastal erosion. On the state railway undertaking the focus was on review of heavy maintenance, inspection of stations, cab rides, wheel set management, review of introduction of safety control equipment on services, major event planning, management of PTI risk, management of driver monitoring, management of train driver fatigue, major event inspection, verification of pre-departure checks, potential overcrowding inspections and train dispatch inspections from stations with highest footfalls.

On the sole On-Track-Machine RU the CRR conducted activities on Operational Planning and Control (including HOF).

### **7.1.2 Decision-making criteria on how the NSA monitored, promoted and enforced compliance with the regulatory framework and the procedure for establishing those criteria**

The CRR's supervision activities are based on assessed risk to the safety of passengers, staff and third parties. Safety performance data together with intelligence sources such as previous CRR supervision activities, accidents, incidents and dangerous occurrences, NIB reports, etc., collected in the preceding year informs Inspectors of areas where their attention may be required and supports the development of the next year supervision plans.

RU's and the IM are assigned a risk profile based on expert inspector opinion and those organisations with a higher risk profile can expect more supervision than better performing railway organisations.

When it comes to enforcement CRR Inspectors can employ the 'risk gap' technique where they first assess the level(s) of actual risk arising from the railway organisation's activities, in particular the risk to the safety of persons. Inspectors base this judgement on information about risk levels perceived for the issue at hand, using evidence obtained in the inspection and knowledge of best practice within the industry.

Having identified the level(s) of actual risk the Inspector may identify the risk gap, i.e., is it minor, inadequate, absent or extreme. Depending upon the Inspectors judgement together with a peer review an enforcement action is taken. The process for doing this CRR Guideline RSC-G-023-C and is available on the CRR website.

Relative to the national rail network, Section 76 of the RSA 2005, a request for Improvement Plan was used on 4 occasions in 2024. Two were related to Rhomberg Sersa Rail Group (Ireland):

– Railway Preservation Society of Ireland Train Operation

This direction for an improvement plan relating to a minor non-compliance was issued to RPSI. This outcome was in relation to the safety of persons in the operation of the railway. The RPSI was assessed to be non-compliant with the Railway Safety Act 2005, due to stewards being observed with heads outside of open drop lights during train movements and due to train movements being observed with the generator van door open and staff hanging out of the generator van.

– IÉ-RU Concessions Management (Drogheda and Fairview) Depots Inspection

This direction for an improvement plan was in relation to a major non-compliance which was issued to IÉ-RU. This non-compliance related to the management of concessions for vehicles being against Section 36 of the Railway Safety Act 2005. Vehicles were found to be in service without appropriate risk mitigations in place, and as such, without the associated risks being as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

IÉ-RU Train Driver Medical and Competency Check

An initial letter was issued to IÉ-RU with the intention of serving an Improvement Notice. It was identified that a major non-compliance existed regarding compliance with the requirements for medical examinations, in relation to licences and in the undertaking of periodic checks to maintain the validity of the licence or associated certificate. Following the immediate actions after the issuing of the letter of intention to serve an improvement notice the CRR went down the route of directing the submission of an improvement plan to resolve this major non-compliance.

– IÉ-RU Platform Train Interface Injury Connolly Platform 5

This direction for an improvement plan was in relation to a minor non-compliance which was issued to IÉ-RU.

An improvement notice was issued to IÉ-RU in relation to 230/23-I detailing the intention to serve an improvement notice but following immediate actions undertaken by IÉ-RU this was addressed via a direction for an improvement plan.

No prohibition notices were issued in 2024.

### 7.1.3 Main complaints submitted by stakeholders (if any) on decisions taken during supervision activities and the replies given by the NSA. If there is a negative return this should be recorded

Following a supervision activity, be that an audit, inspection or meeting draft reports/minutes are issued for comment to the relevant organisation. The applicable organisation is encouraged to raise any concerns they have and identify any factual inaccuracies that may have been made. These are formally recoded and then responded to by the lead Inspector. In most cases issues are resolved prior to the finalisation of the report/minutes, however, if there are diverging views these are recorded in the report together with CRR reasoning for its decision.

No formal complaints were raised by stakeholders regarding decisions taken during supervision activities or on the replies given by the NSA to any comments or queries raised by CRR Inspectors in 2024.

### 7.1.4 Any changes to the regulatory regime in the member state with impact on supervision strategy, plan or decision making

Nil.

## 7.2 Supervision results

### 7.2.1 Number and outcome of inspections and audits carried out during the reporting year

In 2024, CRR inspectors concluded a total of 36 Inspections broken down as follows:

- IÉ-IM: 11 Inspections.
- IÉ-RU: 16 Inspections.
- NIR: 2 Inspection.
- RPSI: 5 Inspections.
- RSIE: 2 Inspections.

These inspections included inspection of stations, cab rides, wheel set management, review of introduction of safety control equipment on services, major event planning, management of PTI risk, management of driver monitoring, management of train driver fatigue, major event inspection, verification of pre-departure checks, potential overcrowding inspections and train dispatch inspections from stations with higher volume. These inspections resulted in a multitude of outcomes ranging from 'scope for improvement' where action is determined by the railway organisation to 'minor non-compliance' where evidence is sought by CRR inspectors to see that action has been taken. Primary results are discussed in section 7.1.2 in terms of key issues raised.

Two audits were completed in 2024:

- RPSIL Audit on Criteria J, K, P and S.
- IÉ-IM: Support, Operations and Performance Evaluation within the SET Department.

The CRR conducts post occurrence activities on accidents and incidents to review compliance with the regulatory framework. 61 such activities were recorded as completed for 2024. Significant occurrences are previously identified in the enforcement element of 7.1.2.

### 7.2.2 Results of and experience related to the supervision such as how many visits required remedial work from the supervised entity

In total for completed audits in 2024, 21 tracked outcomes by the CRR were made across organisations within the scope of this report.

In total for completed inspections in 2024, 41 tracked outcomes by the CRR were made across organisations within the scope of this report.

Key findings are summarised within 7.1.2 of this report but included:

- 6 minor non-compliances were identified in regard to SMS requirements associated with Support, Operations and Performance Evaluation within an infrastructure manager.
- A minor non-compliance associated with open droplights and an open door on a generator van of a steam train operator.
- Risk evaluation as it pertains to managing the platform train interface.
- Change management with respect to track design.

Actions have or are being taken by railway organisation to address issues found and CRR Inspectors actively follow up with the companies to ensure this is being undertaken.

### 7.2.3 Supervision results by topic of supervision, including supervision of training centres and transport of dangerous goods

No activities were conducted on training centres or dangerous goods in 2024.

### 7.2.4 Supervision results of the correct application by RUs/IMs and effectiveness of all processes and procedures in the management system according to Regulation (EU) 1078/2012<sup>1</sup>

All RUs and the State IM have an approved SMS that are assessed as having adequate internal audit standards to monitor the correct application and the effectiveness of their SMS. The CRR meets quarterly with the larger RUs and the IM to review their safety performance in the preceding quarter. A standing item on the agenda at these meetings is to review their progress against their own internal audit/inspection plans, finding and outcomes from these and any actions being taken to address issues found.

Similarly, following accidents and incidents railway organisations must conduct robust investigations to determine immediate, underlying and root causes. Action plans must be put in place and these are sampled by CRR Inspectors to seek what actions have been taken. No major concerns were identified for this regulation in 2024.

1. Art 1 2(a) to check the correct application and the effectiveness of all the processes and procedures in the management system, including the technical, operational and organisational risk control measures.

**7.2.5** In relation to the implementation of the 4th railway package, the supervision results for closing out the ‘type 3 issues’ raised during the single safety certification of the SMS by from either ERA or the NSAs for the areas of use Three ‘Type 3’ issues for one railway undertaken were addressed by the Supervision team in 2024. Feedback on this activity was provided to the certification body for the management system. Work continues to address all ‘Type 3’ issues with supervision activities being assigned and associated resource in order to address these ‘Type 3’ issues.

**7.2.6** Evidence obtained in supervision activities, when an ECM is not compliant Railway Undertaking SMS’s were checked for compliance with SMS requirements, as indicated in earlier sections, but there was no check of ECM’s against ECM management system requirements.

#### **7.2.7** Comments on the success of the SMSs in controlling risks

Overall, safety management systems appear to have been effective in managing the most significant safety risks. The increased focus on human and organisational factors has encouraged railway organisations to adopt a more holistic approach to safety management, with greater attention now placed on designing systems and processes that better align with human capabilities. Since 2015, utilisation of the Irish railway system has increased markedly – passenger numbers are at record levels, the network is busier than ever, and employment in the sector has grown significantly. The fact that this growth has occurred while overall safety performance has been broadly maintained indicates that safety management systems have had some success in controlling risk. See section 4 also.

#### **7.2.8** Any specific interventions with the operational companies on specific topics, why these took place and results

See section on enforcement in 7.1.

### **7.3** Coordination and cooperation

#### **7.3.1** Outcomes of discussions of supervision results with other NSAs

The CRR maintains a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Department for Infrastructure (DfI), the National Safety Authority in Northern Ireland. Both organisations collaborated closely during 2024, including coordination of Supervision planning, which proved highly beneficial in developing effective oversight. It has been agreed in principle that joint activities are planned to be undertaken in 2025.

## 8 Application of relevant CSMs by RUs and IMs

Reference to requirement: art. 19 (f) of Directive (EU) 2016/798

### 8.1 Application of the CSM on Safety Management System

#### 8.1.1 Analysis of the application of the CSM on SMS by RUs and IMs

[e.g., if through an evaluation of the EMM the NSA identifies for RUs and IMs the need of specific training to develop Safety culture and/or address Human and Organisational Factors]

As stated previously the railway sector in Ireland is small with just 1 Infrastructure Manager (IM) and 4 railway undertakings (RU) operating on the heavy rail network. Consequently, the application of this CSM is still in its early stages. As of 31st December 2024 two RUs and the 1 IM have been assessed against the requirements of (EU) 2018/762.

In Q4 of 2024, the CRR commenced engagement with the 3rd of 4 RUs regarding their renewal (new SSC) and it is expected that this will be concluded early in 2025.

One item that has been noted is the fact that the sector has varying levels of in-house competence in the area of human and organisational factors and safety culture. In response to this the CRR are endeavouring to improve the sector knowledge of these new concepts through the establishment of a HOF Sector Working Group.

### 8.2 Application of the CSM for Risk Evaluation and Assessment

#### 8.2.1 The changes of the sector maturity with the understanding of the CSM, and the increase or the decrease of its application

Application of this CSM has remained broadly consistent amongst the sector in Ireland. The method for assessing 'significance' of a change within the CSM provides for variations in how the regulation is interpreted by an RU/IM, and as such places a reliance on the management maturity of an RU/IM. Work is ongoing to develop approaches for the assessment of organisational maturity. One RU reported that nine ongoing projects were found to be significant for the purpose of applying the CSM-REA. These projects also require APIS/APOM. Each project is being managed in accordance with the CSM-REA. The IM reported 9 ongoing projects also, and all of them require APIS. No related compliance issues were detected by inspectors in 2024.

#### 8.2.2 The differences of experience and application between big and small companies, newcomer and incumbent railway companies, RUs, IMs and ECMs

The quality of application of the CSM by big and small companies is not noted to be substantially different in Ireland in 2024. One minor observation is that small companies apply the regulation less frequently and typically to projects of smaller scale.

#### 8.2.3 The differences in the assessment of technical, operational and organisational changes, including the actor who plays the role of CSM assessment body for operational and organisational changes

Technical and operational changes tend to be grounded in standardisation and technical rules, where use of explicit risk estimation methods is restricted to when codes of practice are not deemed practicable or applicable. Assessment of organisational change is heavily reliant on qualitative risk assessment and is difficult to standardise using a code of practice approach.

#### 8.2.4 Coordination (or lack of) with the actors involved in the change/project for a joint identification and joint management of the risks shared across the interfaces between them, including the way the relevant information is exchanged between them

Experience of management of interface risks during a change project is generally good. As the system in Ireland is not large and SMS's are quite integrated, the number of interfaces is not considered substantial.

#### 8.2.5 Availability in the companies of sufficient qualified and competent resources in the risk assessment and risk management fields

Objectively assessing if relevant practitioners within companies are qualified is a difficult task as NSA-IE has observed some difficulty in interpreting competence management requirements in CSM SMS; railway organisations have worked together in Ireland to develop competence management guidance which was implemented in 2022. In practical terms, it is generally noted that most projects have a safety and compliance expert involved who generally ensures the project meets relevant SMS and legal requirements.

#### 8.2.6 Combined use of the CSM for risk assessment and CSM for monitoring for a proactive and controlled management of changes, including the identification of information for the monitoring during the operation and maintenance of the railway system and the effectiveness of predictive measures from risk assessments

CSM MON is observed to be embedded in the SMS's in the sector in Ireland, the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle is accepted as an important principle for safety management. CSM MON is typically applied automatically following a project where CSM REA is relevant. Significant projects in Ireland are expected to embed monitoring systems to check the safety of the change at all points in lifecycle of the system being changed. When the CSM REA process is concluded, risk assessments are required to be embedded into the register of risk for that company; the effectiveness of how this is done in practice is uneven, however. It is expected that enhance guidance emanating from the latest SMS requirements will clarify further what is expected of involved organisations.

#### 8.2.7 The overall railway sector experience in the country, including the moment when the risk assessment is done (e.g., from the beginning or at the end) in the project and the quality of the risk assessment documentation (real proactive risk management or purely cosmetic paper work)

Projects assessed as significant typically have the NSA's APIS (Authorisation to Place In Service) process applied hence are subject to elevated scrutiny by NSA-IE. The experience is observed to be acceptable, and the quality of risk assessment is mostly adequate. Deficiencies have been observed in inspections in the past and further improvement is considered possible.

#### 8.2.8 The proper use of the concept of significant change or misuse of the concept to escape the obligation to appoint an independent CSM assessment body (lack of trust). In the second case what is the quality of the demonstration of a correct control of the risks arising from non-significant changes when Annex I of the CSM is not used by RUs, IMs and ECMs

The 'test' for significant change is considered to have numerous interpretations that are compliant hence there is little evidence of 'misuse' of the concept. A more precise definition of the concept would be helpful. Railway organisations in Ireland tend to apply the same basic safety principals to significant and non-significant projects, although the level of verification in significant projects is typically higher.

### 8.2.9 The most positive experience found with the use of the method and the main remaining problems

The most positive experience is the greater degree of standardisation that CSM REA has provided, and all primary problems have been discussed in previous sections.

### 8.2.10 In relation to the implementation of the 4th railway package, the actions for closing out the 'type 4 issues' raised during the single safety certification of the SMS by from either ERA or the NSAs for the areas of use

No type 4 issues have been closed in Ireland. The relevant CSM was applied first in mid-2022.

## 8.3 Application of the CSM for Monitoring

### 8.3.1 Any changes of the sector maturity with the understanding, correct application of the CSM, and improvement of documentary evidence

No changes observed in 2024.

### 8.3.2 How the companies set out the strategies, priorities and plans for monitoring activities among the following options

The following options were provided by the agency in the guidance for this report:

- a) Proactive monitoring as part of the SMS that checks the effectiveness of the SMS processes, procedures and risk control measures, based on priorities (i.e., areas of greatest risk); or
- b) Monitoring everything; or
- c) Proactive monitoring based on expertise and results from previous monitoring activities to identify what to monitor, but unclear links to SMS;
- d) Reactive monitoring strategy based on lessons learnt from accidents and incidents investigations in order to prevent similar occurrences.

Safety Strategies and plans are guided by a legal principle in Ireland that it is the general duty of an RU/IM to ensure, in so far as is reasonably practicable, the safety of persons during railway operation. As such, the approach to monitoring combines options a, c, and d. Option b is not used as it is accepted that it is not practical to continually monitor everything. For option a, the NSA requires annual plans to be produced and presented at the beginning of each year, where these plans are reviewed quarterly with the NSA. Options c and d are considered reactive but important to implement when unplanned or unexpected events occur. For example, RUs are expected to implement additional interim risk control measures in the event of vehicle fire whilst the cause of the fire is being determined.

### 8.3.3 In relation to the implementation of the 4th railway package, monitoring of the OPE TSI for any key issues that arise

No issues were observed or reported in the application of CSM MON to the implementation of the fourth railway package or OPE TSI.

#### 8.3.4 Availability in the companies of sufficient qualified and competent resources in the risk assessment and risk management fields

Objectively assessing if relevant practitioners within companies are qualified is a difficult task as NSA-IE has observed some difficulty in interpreting competence management requirements in CSM SMS; railway organisations have worked together in Ireland to develop competence management guidance which was implemented in 2024. In practical terms, it is generally noted that RU/IM's have a safety and compliance expert involved in managing safety who monitors conformance with SMS and legal requirements.

#### 8.3.5 Any differences with respect to the monitoring of operational processes and procedures vs. organisational and technical risk control measures (e.g., effectiveness or quality of documentary evidence)

No major differences are observed as focus in the Irish sector is on monitoring the process used to ensure the safety of an asset/process rather than just the end result.

#### 8.3.6 Any differences of experience and application between big and small companies, newcomer and incumbent railway companies, RUs, IMs and ECMs

None observed.

#### 8.3.7 Proper coordination (or lack of) with other stakeholders (including the suppliers and sub-contractors) for monitoring the effectiveness of control measures for the risks shared across the interfaces, in particular reporting to manufacturers of defects and non-conformities or malfunctions of technical equipment

Processes for checking control of supplier of services and suppliers of components require improvement within the sector in Ireland. Several minor compliance issues have been observed where service providers are not properly assessed for competence and component suppliers do not always provide a product to the correct specification. NSA-IE has prioritised inspection of related compliance requirements.

#### 8.3.8 Combined use of the CSM for risk assessment and CSM for monitoring for a proactive and controlled management of changes, including the identification of information for the monitoring during the operation and maintenance of the railway system the effectiveness of predictive measures from risk assessments

CSM MON is observed to be embedded in the SMS's in the sector in Ireland, the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle is accepted as an important principle for safety management. CSM MON is typically applied automatically following a project where CSM REA is relevant. Significant projects in Ireland are expected to embed monitoring systems to check the safety of the change at all points in lifecycle of the system being changed. When CSM REA process is concluded, risk assessments are required to be embedded into the register of risk for that company; the effectiveness of how this is done in practice is uneven however, and NSA-IE is in discussion with regulated entities about how to further improve transfer of risk from the project to operation. Additional guidance on how to assess and transfer risk is one measure being considered.

**8.3.9** In relation to the implementation of the 4th railway package, the actions for closing out the 'type 4 issues' raised during the single safety certification of the SMS by from either ERA or the NSAs for the areas of use

No type 4 issues have been closed in Ireland. The relevant CSM was applied first in mid-2022.

**8.3.10** The sector perception of the CSM for monitoring on whether it is considered as a proactive tool protecting the company business and enabling to optimise the company costs and competitiveness or seen just as a legal obligation

The sector has not reported such concerns to the NSA regarding CSM MON. Discussion generally indicates its requirements are appropriate.

**8.3.11** The use of results from monitoring by the company top management and middle management to identify the necessary action plans and review the monitoring strategy, priorities and plans

Top management in the sector are made aware of results from monitoring. There is some concern regarding how top management track the effectiveness of action plans; it has been observed that lagging indicators are the main measurement type applied, but this is not always the case as leading indicators are sometimes used.

**8.3.12** The overall railway sector experience in the country with the method in using it proactively to prevent accidents and incidents, or just as purely cosmetic paper work

The experience of the regulation is good and is expected to improve further when with further maturity of regulatory changes related to the fourth railway package.

**8.3.13** Any areas for improvement

NSA-IE propose the agency develop a guide that shows how CSM REA and CSM MON may be integrated, similar to the guideline 'Taking Safe Decisions' from the UK Railway Safety and Standards Body.

## 8.4 Participation and Implementation of EU projects

NSA-IE is not involved in any such projects.

## 9 Safety culture

### 9.1 Safety culture evaluation and monitoring

#### 9.1.1 Evaluation and monitoring of the development of safety culture at the national level

No specific safety culture evaluation or monitoring activity took place in 2024, at least none at a national level. Knowledge of safety culture within the principal railway organisations (RUs and the IM), excluding Iarnród Éireann is limited and developing knowledge and gaining experience in the area will take time to develop.

As these organisations go through the conformity assessment process, they will need to fulfil the new SMS requirements in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/762.

In mid-2024, the CRR did convene a sector Safety Culture Workshop which was very well attended by representatives from all RUs and the IM. The ERA Safety Culture Model was the focus of discussion with small groups discussing selected fundamentals and enablers.

The CRR also attended and contributed to the ERA task-force on safety culture oversight.

#### 9.1.2 Use of safety culture models or conceptual frameworks to support regulatory oversight of safety culture

As reported above just one specific safety culture activity was undertaken in 2024. The CRR have not undertaken any auditing of SMS compliance in relation safety culture and consequently have not yet used any models in the field. That said CRR Inspectors are aware of the ERA Safety Culture Model and have been encouraged to review and use it in their everyday engagements with railway organisations.

CRR inspectors are also periodically reminded to record positive and negative markers/findings as part of our railway organisation picture building activity.

#### 9.1.3 Evaluation method to oversee safety culture of RUs and IMs

As first reported in our 2021 annual report the CRR do not yet have a formal evaluation method to oversee safety culture within the RUs and IM. As railway organisations obtain certification/authorisation against the 2018 CSM SMS they can expect to be formally audited against those specific safety culture requirements.

The method by which safety culture has been reviewed to date in the sector has been somewhat ad-hoc insofar as Inspectors would build a picture in their own minds based on their interaction with railway personnel, what they have seen, heard, etc. Then come the planning of annual supervision plans they would recommend supervision activities based on their knowledge, experience of the railway organisations they supervise.

This is of course further informed by our reviewing NIB and railway organisation accident investigation reports, investigating public/railway staff complaints, etc.

#### 9.1.4 Summary of activities relating to safety culture included in the planning and execution of supervision and results of those activities

No dedicated safety culture activities were undertaken in 2024 other than the inspection/meeting with Irish Rail regarding their implementation of a 'Just Culture'. Given they are the first railway organisation (Iarnród Éireann – Infrastructure Manager) to be authorised (March 2022) to the new CSM on Safety Management Systems it is still early days in its implementation. Over the authorisation lifecycle, it is planned that the requirements relating to safety culture will be formally audited. The same will be true of all RUs once they have been certified to the new CSM. Moreover, it will likely feature in other supervision activities such as inspections and in quarterly meetings.

### 9.2 Safety culture initiatives/projects

#### 9.2.1 Initiatives/projects undertaken by the NSA or within the national sector which contribute to the development of a positive safety culture

In 2022, the CRR established a Rail Human & Organisational Factors Sector Group open to all railway organisations operating within the state. In 2024, the group met twice, the first being a Safety Culture Workshop and the second being a day long Safety Leadership Training Day, ran by Iarnród Éireann personnel who had completed the ERA course and the Train the Trainer session.

Participants ranged from heads of safety to engineering/operations managers all with an interest in HOF. Feedback from both events was very positive with a real willingness to share openly and learn from each other.

#### 9.2.2 If safety culture is a separate project for the NSA, description of the project carried out

Nothing to report.

#### 9.2.3 Initiatives implemented within the NSA to improve its own safety culture

Nothing to report.

### 9.3 Safety culture communication

#### 9.3.1 Communication activities to the public/stakeholders relating to the safety culture activities performed

See sections 9.2.1.

## 10 Theme chapter

The activities of the NSA in Ireland have been described in Section 1 – 9, no other significant activities are completed.

## Annex: Progress with Interoperability, 2024

<b>1</b>	<b>Lines excluded from the scope of IOP/SAF Directive (end of year)</b>	
1a	Length of lines excluded from the scope of application of the IOD Directive [km]	0
1b	Length of lines excluded from the scope of application of the SAF Directive [km]	0
<b>2</b>	<b>Length of new lines authorized by NSA (during the reporting year)</b>	
2a	Total length of lines [km]	0
<b>3</b>	<b>PRM adapted stations (end of year)</b>	
3a	PRM TSI compliant railway stations	1
3b	PRM TSI compliant railway stations – partial TSI compliance	8
3c	Accessible railway stations ('step-free' access to platforms)	115
3d	Other stations (i.e., where all or part of station is not 'step-free')	31
<b>4</b>	<b>Train driver licenses (end of year)</b>	
4a	Total number of valid European licenses issued in accordance with the TDD	871
4b	Number of newly issued European licenses (first issuance)	74

<b>5</b>	<b>Number of vehicles authorized under the interoperability Directive (EU) 2008/57 (during the reporting year)</b>	
<b>5a</b>	<b>First authorization – total</b>	<b>0</b>
5aa	Wagon	0
5ab	Locomotives	0
5ac	Hauled passenger vehicles	0
5ad	Fixed or pre-defined formation	0
5ae	Special vehicles	0
<b>5b</b>	<b>Additional authorization – total</b>	<b>0</b>
5ba	Wagon	0
5bb	Locomotives	0
5bc	Hauled passenger vehicles	0
5bd	Fixed or pre-defined formation	0
5be	Special vehicles	0
<b>5c</b>	<b>Type authorization – total</b>	<b>0</b>
5ca	Wagon	0
5cb	Locomotives	0
5cc	Hauled passenger vehicles	0
5cd	Fixed or pre-defined formation	0
5ce	Special vehicles	0
<b>5d</b>	<b>Authorizations granted after upgrade or renewal – total</b>	<b>0</b>
5da	Wagon	0
5db	Locomotives	0
5dc	Hauled passenger vehicles	0
5de	Fixed or pre-defined formation	0
5df	Special vehicles	0
<b>6</b>	<b>ERTMS equipped vehicles (end of year)</b>	
6a	Tractive vehicles including trainsets equipped with ERTMS	0
6b	Tractive vehicles including trainsets – no ERTMS	0
<b>7</b>	<b>Number of NSA staff (full time equivalent employees) by the end of year</b>	
7a	FTE staff involved in safety certification	5
7b	FTE staff involved in vehicle authorization	2
7c	FTE staff involved in supervision	5
7d	FTE staff involved in other railway-related tasks	4



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