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REPORT BY THE CHANNEL TUNNEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON SAFETY IN THE CHANNEL TUNNEL FIXED LINK DURING 2017

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**A - Scope of the report**

1. This report contains information relating to the activities of the Channel Tunnel Intergovernmental Commission (IGC) in its role as the safety authority for the Channel Fixed Link (the Channel Tunnel) within the terms of the European Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC). The IGC’s responsibilities extend only to the area of the Fixed Link as described in the Treaty of Canterbury[[1]](#footnote-1) between the United Kingdom and France and the Concession Agreement[[2]](#footnote-2) between the two Governments and the Concessionaires. This report covers the period from 1 January to 31 December 2017.
2. As this report is also available in English, an optional English summary is not provided. A French version of the report has been prepared and submitted to the European Union Agency for Railways (the Agency) together with the English document, as it is the IGC’s policy make all of its documents that are in the public domain available in both English and French. Readers of the French version who wish to consult the optional English summary are invited to refer to the full English version.

**B. Preliminary section**

1. **Introduction**- The directive on safety on the Community's railways (2004/49/EC, amended) contains a clause concerning a binational body entrusted by the Member States to ensure a unified safety regime for specialised cross-border infrastructures, said body performing the functions of a 'safety authority' (NSA). This clause has been implemented for the Fixed Link, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreeing that the IGC would be the ‘safety authority’. This report is prepared in accordance with Article 18 of the Directive and complies as far as possible with the model established and guidance issued by the Agency, which aims to provide a structure and table of common elements for this type of report. As required by the Directive, the report is submitted to the Agency.
2. **Information on railway infrastructure** – The Channel Tunnel railway infrastructure includes a rail link consisting of two drilled twin rail tunnels connecting Cheriton in Kent, England and Fréthun in the Pas-de-Calais, France, as well as the terminals located on each side. The terminals include: high-speed lines linking the tunnel to the UK and French national railway networks; rail loops and platforms for loading and unloading passenger and freight shuttles; depots, maintenance facilities and tracks linking these facilities to the rest of the infrastructure.
3. **Infrastructure manager** - A network map and information about Eurotunnel, the infrastructure manager of the Fixed Link, are given in **Annex A**.
4. **Railway undertakings** – The rail transport undertakings which have operated trains in the Channel Tunnel during the period covered by this report are: DB Cargo UK, Eurostar International Ltd and GB Railfreight Limited. The addresses and websites of these railway undertakings are provided in **Annex A.3**. The annual reports of the French and UK safety authorities provide further information about them.
5. **Summary** - In 2017, the major events were as follows:
* continuation of the dedicated working group’s work reviewing and monitoring measures taken by Eurotunnel and ElecLink to manage the safe installation of a high-voltage electricity cable in the Tunnel, as required under the prior consent given by the IGC for this project on 7 February 2014. There are outstanding issues to be resolved from the IGC’s perspective and, against this background, consent was suspended on 18 October 2017 and a Direction issued to Eurotunnel on 12 July 2018, under Article 27.5 of the Concession Agreement, which makes installation of the cable in the tunnel dependent on restoration of the consent. However, the IGC is working closely with Eurotunnel to seek to both lift the Direction and reinstate the consent;
* ongoing monitoring by the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority (CTSA) of measures taken to comply with recommendations made in two reports in respect of the fire on an Arbel freight shuttle on 17 January 2015: the National Investigation Body (NIB) report published by the Bureau d’Enquêtes sur les Accidents de Transport Terrestre (BEA-TT) and the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) on 5 May 2016; and the report commissioned by the IGC from Claude Gressier and Chris Gibb into the management of disruption in the Channel Tunnel;
* ongoing monitoring of Eurotunnel’s response to the recommendation regarding ‘Management of the risks associated with over-height objects’ from the 2016 National Investigation Body (NIB) report into the 17 January 2015 Channel Tunnel fire. This suggested the reinstallation of pagodas or consideration of alternative mitigation measures. Eurotunnel gave the IGC a commitment to deliver a programme to fit two pagodas per wagon on the Arbel type shuttles. The IGC also asked for operations to be monitored closely over the course of the next year to assess whether additional measures would be necessary to guarantee system safety;
* authorisation of renewed Part B Safety Certificates for Eurostar and DB Cargo;
* ongoing additional authorisations for the new Velaro e320 / Class 374 trainset to be used in the Channel Tunnel.

8. **Analysis of global trends** - the IGC and CTSA continued their monitoring of Eurotunnel's safety management system (SMS) as well as their monitoring of safety outcomes. Most of the common safety indicators reported in detail in **Annex C** remain at zero.

The value of Eurotunnel’s internal Passenger Individual Safety indicator (which analyses events likely to affect a small number of people and monitors issues such as emergency braking due to slippage or automatic activation and stopping in the tunnel for more than 30 minutes), was 225 in December 2017, which is below the Eurotunnel target of 270. The comparable figure for 2016 was 288. The Passenger Collective Safety indicator (which analyses events likely to affect the safety of a large number of people through the involvement of a train in an incident endangering the train itself and covers issues such as near misses, SPADs (Signals Passed at Danger), loss of control of points, detection of locked brakes, emergency braking, stopping in tunnels, failure to comply with signals, fuel spills, crossover door incidents and Major failure of track equipment) was 80 in December 2017. This was above the target figure of 75, and also higher than the figure of 69 achieved in 2016.

**C - Organisation**

1. The IGC was created by the Treaty of Canterbury to supervise, on behalf of the governments of the United Kingdom and the French Republic and by delegation thereof, all issues concerning the construction and operation of the Fixed Link. Among its duties, the IGC is responsible for drawing up any regulations applicable to the Fixed Link or contributing to this process.
2. The Treaty of Canterbury also set up the CTSA to advise and assist the IGC on all matters relating to safety during the construction and operation of the Fixed Link. The functions of the CTSA are also to ensure that safety regulations and practices applicable to the Fixed Link comply with national or international regulations, to enforce such regulations and to monitor their implementation, to examine reports into any incidents affecting safety, to carry out investigations and to report to the IGC.

11. The UK and French Secretariats are responsible for preparing and implementing the decisions taken by the IGC and the CTSA.

12. A diagram showing the structure of the IGC and its links with other organisations is given in **Annex B**.

**D. Changes in railway safety**

**D 1 - Initiatives to maintain or improve safety results**

***Table D.1.1 - Safety measures triggered by accidents / precursors of accidents***

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Accidents / precursors of accidents which triggered the measure** | **Determined safety measure** |
| **Date** | **Place** | **Event description** |  |
| 9 May 2017 | Eurotunnel Folkestone Terminal | Agent 5 injured by moving lorry whilst carrying out safety checks on lorries prior to their boarding the freight wagons | Risk controls on ramps / platforms:* Hatching on platforms was removed and replaced with improved the road markings - stop lines and signs marked on the ground in an arc – for drivers to know where to stop and Agent 5 to know where to walk.
* Lighting has been upgraded and improved.
* New and better torches have been given to Agent 5 to aid visibility when they carry out their visual checks.
* New hands free radio systems have been provided
* Instruction and training has been re-written with the input from agents and union reps and staff have been retrained.
* Active monitoring of how Agent 5 performs the vehicle checks and complies with procedure/training have been introduced and checked by management.
* Assessed the need for Agent 5 checking vehicles on the platforms/ramps and reviewed and revised its risk assessment.
* Set up a Workplace Transport and People Interface Working Group to give additional impetus to the work being undertaken. The aim of the group is to identify the measures required to minimise and eliminate risk. The group will help to identify both human factor elements and risks to those on the platforms.
 |

***Table D.1.2 - Safety measures (or voluntary measures) triggered by factors other than accidents / precursors of accidents***

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Description of the area of ​​concern** | **Description of the trigger** | **Determined safety measure** |
| N/A |  |  |

**D 2 - Detailed analysis of trends**

1. Very few precursors (incidents that could have led to an accident) occurred in the Channel Tunnel. The IGC and the CTSA did not conduct a "detailed analysis of trends" compared to the CSIs (Common Safety Indicators) because in view of the small number this would not be a useful or proportionate method likely to provide significant information on safety performance. In 2017, there were fifteen broken rails and five SPADs. Below, a summary of the CSI precursors that did occur allows a comparison with the incidents of the previous year:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2016** | **2017** |
| Total number of precursors | 17 | 20 |
| Total number of broken rails | 15 | 15 |
| Total number of track buckles | 0 | 0 |
| Total number of signalling failures | 0 | 0 |
| Total SPAD | 2 | 5 |
| Total number of broken wheels on rolling stock in service | 0 | 0 |
| Total number of broken axles on rolling stock in service | 0 | 0 |

14. **Common Safety Indicators (CSI)** - Details on CSIs as defined in Directive 2009/149/EC (amending Directive 2004/49/EC with regard to CSIs and common methods to calculate the cost of accidents) are given in **Annex C**. It should be noted that the IGC and the CTSA receive a significant amount of richer and more useful information from Eurotunnel and the railway undertakings which helps them develop their approach to regulatory and supervisory activity. However, this information falls outside the scope of CSI reports.

**D 3 - Results of safety recommendations**

1. On 5 May 2016 BEA-TT and RAIB published their joint NIB report into the fire on Eurotunnel (Arbel) freight shuttle 7340 which occurred on 17 January 2015.[[3]](#footnote-3) This report contained six recommendations (all addressed to Eurotunnel) and six invitations (five for Eurotunnel and one for the IGC). In accordance with its legal obligations[[4]](#footnote-4) the IGC, as NSA for the Channel Tunnel, provided its response to this report on 11 May 2017 outlining the measures taken or planned as a consequence of the recommendations made. It also submitted an annual report on progress to the investigation bodies on 8 June 2018.
2. The IGC has committed to monitor actions to respond to the outstanding recommendations and invitations and to report at least annually to BEA-TT and RAIB on progress. These monitoring activities have led the IGC to request that Eurotunnel conduct a robust risk assessment to support a decision as to fitment of pagodas to each wagon and to request Eurotunnel to conduct analyses over the course of a year to consider any additional solutions.

**E - Important legislative, regulatory and administrative changes**

1. **Regulation on the safety of the Channel Tunnel Fixed Link** - No new regulations were published for the Channel Tunnel in 2017.
2. **Other major regulatory matters processed by the IGC and CTSA** - Other important issues processed by the IGC and the CTSA during the year are as follows:
* **Cross-acceptance of rules for railway vehicles passing through the Tunnel –** Following the signing in 2013 of a formal agreement between ORR and EPSF regarding cross-acceptance of railway vehicles, the CTSA continued to work with EPSF and Eurotunnel to compare the requirements of the relevant national and Channel Tunnel network statements to assess whether the rules are equivalent and therefore do not need to be re-checked as part of the vehicle re-authorisation process.
	+ - **Discussions with railway undertakings and rolling stock manufacturers -** During the year, the IGC and the CTSA continued to hold discussions with railway undertakings and rolling stock manufacturers about the requirements they must meet to obtain technical authorisation to operate in the Tunnel. This included discussions in respect of upgrades required to the Eurostar Valero fleet to address ERTMS issues for the new Amsterdam route, and with parties interested in producing freight wagons for use through the tunnel including Belper Rail, Wascosa and Daher.
		- **Participation in the work of the Agency and its working groups -** The IGC and CTSA have continued to play a full part in the work of the Agency and its various working groups. Given their close relationship with the safety authorities of France and Great Britain, the IGC and CTSA rely on their close links with the safety authorities’ experts (many of them are themselves members of or advisors to the CTSA). The IGC and CTSA only participate directly in working groups that are particularly relevant to the Channel Tunnel, for example, the TSI for Safety in Railway Tunnels, but its representatives have attended all meetings of the Agency’s network of national safety authorities and working groups dealing with national rules and cross-acceptance.

**F - Changes in safety certificates and authorisations**

1. The directive on Community Railway Safety was transposed in respect of the Tunnel by the Binational Safety Regulation of 24 January 2007 which entered into force on 4 July 2008 via Statutory Instrument 2007-3531 in the UK and Decree 2008-748 in France. The revised Railway Safety Directive (2008/110/EC) and the new Interoperability Directive (2008/57/EC) were transposed for the Fixed Link in March 2013 via a modified binational regulation supplementing the regulation for national interoperability. The revised guide to the implementation of the regulations is available on the IGC website via the following URL:

<http://www.channeltunneligc.co.uk/-Regulations-and-guidance-.html?lang=en>

1. During 2017 the IGC authorised three new freight shuttles for Eurotunnel, a further four Valero E320 trainsets for operation by Eurostar as part of their new fleet, and three upgraded Velaro trainsets with ERTMS modification to allow the new service to Amsterdam.
2. The IGC also issued renewed Part B Safety Certificates to Eurostar and DB Cargo.

**G - Supervision of railway undertakings and infrastructure managers**

1. The 1986 Treaty of Canterbury assigned to the CTSA the responsibility to ensure that safety regulations and practices applicable to the Fixed Link comply with national and international laws, to enforce those laws, to monitor implementation and to report to the Intergovernmental Commission. The treaty also stipulates that, in order to ensure its remit, the CTSA may request the assistance of the administrations of each of the governments, as well as the assistance of any body or expert of its choice, and that both governments must give the CTSA and its members and agents the powers of investigation, inspection and prescription necessary to exercise its functions. The quadripartite Concession Agreement stipulates that the concessionaires must give access to any part of the Fixed Link to persons duly authorised by the IGC or with the approval thereof by the CTSA, so that these people, as part of their duties, may inspect the Fixed Link and investigate any matter relating to the construction or operation thereof. The concessionaires must provide these people with all means necessary to exercise their functions.
2. The broad mandate given to the CTSA by the Treaty of Canterbury means it is responsible for overseeing a number of matters outside the scope of safety authority safety tasks under the Safety Directive, in particular emergency and civil safety issues. This is reflected in its supervision strategy.

*1.1 Audits / Inspections / Controls*

1. The CTSA’s annual inspection and audit programme is designed to take account of key information included in the safety management systems (SMS) of Eurotunnel and the railway undertakings authorised to use the Channel Tunnel.

1. The following monitoring methods were used in 2017:
* inspections of Eurotunnel and railway undertakings (a list of the subjects covered is given below);
* information flows - regular reports from Eurotunnel such as daily reports by the Operations Duty Manager (ODM); monthly summaries of incidents and safety performance, minutes of the Concession Safety Committee, Operating Performance reports, etc.;
* information obtained from incident and accident investigations;
* audit reports (internal and external);
* ad hoc meetings between Eurotunnel and CTSA experts;
* meetings with the railway undertakings; and
* Eurotunnel information about its interface with the railway undertakings and change management.

*1.2 Points of note / sensitive issues to be monitored by the safety authority*

1. Inspections during the year have resulted in recommendation on the following issues, which were officially communicated to Eurotunnel (and to the railway undertakings if applicable) by the CTSA:
* Eurotunnel required to revise internal operational documentation to include issues such as feedback processes; data from Railway undertakings and other infrastructure managers;
* Eurotunnel must schedule training on “Analysing accidents and incidents using the causal tree analysis method” and update the duty sheets for the VSF / RCC / Service Clients France departments ;
* Eurotunnel must introduce a system for efficiently and regularly monitoring progress with work orders (WO) and must provide an overview of WO monitoring activities by 30/11/2018;
* Eurotunnel must provide an analysis of the detection log between 16/07/2017 and 15/08/2017 for the UK and France and the causes of the resulting alarms;

Eurotunnel must examine and analyse the effect of exhaust gases from the refrigeration units on the overhead detectors, and take measures to reduce the number of false alarms;

* Eurotunnel’s to investigate a variety of issues in respect of its UK Customer Services UK Freight Frontier Controls Antenna Detection Tests work instruction;
* Eurotunnel need to consider how it will address an anticipated loss of corporate knowledge in the short and medium term;
* Eurostar should overhaul and amend its engineering change document EF003 by 2 July 2018 with a view to:

i) incorporating the principle of additionality to its engineering change management process;

ii) incorporating the requirements of the national safety authorities (NSA) with regard to the proposed change information and reiterating the need to have any significant changes approved by the NSA before they are implemented;

iii) making a clear distinction, both in the process and in the relevant standard, between existing 373 and E300 trains and the interoperable E320 trains which have recently been authorised in view of the legal interoperability obligations underlying their authorisation, including the requirement to update technical documents;

* Eurostar should keep the CTSA informed of progress with replacing the overload relay (R-OL-16) in the refurbished 373 fleet.
1. All recommendations have been added to a consolidated recommendations follow-up table to enable the CTSA to monitor and review Eurotunnel’s progress in implementing appropriate measures to comply with these recommendations.

*2. Description of the coverage of legal issues in the annual reports of the railway undertakings and infrastructure manager - availability of annual reports by 30 June [in accordance with Article 9 (4) of the Railway Safety Directive]*

1. The infrastructure manager and railway undertakings have reported their activities in accordance with the requirements of Article 9.4 and Annex I of the Railway Safety Directive.

*3. Inspections*

1. The planned inspection activity was still based on the areas identified by the CTSA experts in their analysis of the Eurotunnel and railway undertakings’ SMS. However, the inspection plan provides for flexibility to address concerns revealed by Channel Tunnel activities during the year.
2. In total, 7 inspection reports produced by the CTSA experts were sent to the undertakings in 2017. These covered the following topics:
* Feedback audit
* Monitoring implementation of recommendations after previous CTSA inspections
* Risk control strategy and measures to prevent electrical sparking between the transported freight vehicles and the catenary
* Inspection of SAFE fire suppression stations and Piston Relief Ducts
* Inspection of maintenance management for existing TMST trains and for extended service lives
1. *Audits*
2. In 2017, Eurotunnel carried out 23 internal audits, and the three railway undertakings carried out a total of 25 internal audits on topics such as managing monitoring and measurement equipment, fitting pagodas and managing subcontractors.

*5. Summary of measures and relevant corrective actions (amendment, revocation, suspension, important warnings, etc.) related to safety aspects following these audits / inspections*

**H - Report on the implementation of the common safety method (CSM) for risk evaluation and assessment**

32. In 2017, Eurotunnel reported that the installation of the ElecLink cable would represent a significant change and also carried out a risk assessment under the CSM in respect of its proposal to fit two pagodas to its Arbel type Wagon fleet. This proposal has since been superseded. The three railway undertakings reported that all other changes undertaken were found to be non-significant in accordance with the definition in the CSM.

**I – IGC conclusions regarding 2017 - Priorities**

33. The Channel Tunnel is extremely important. It is used every year by more than twenty million road and rail passengers between the United Kingdom and France and connects the United Kingdom to the high-speed rail network of the rest of Europe. The use of the 50 km long underwater tunnel does not fully meet the Safety in Railway Tunnels TSI, and poses specific safety problems, especially in the event of fire or breakdowns immobilising passengers for hours. It is therefore entirely justifiable that particular attention be paid to the safety rules applicable to the Fixed Link.

34. Priority issues for the future are as follows:

* ongoing monitoring of works associated with Eurotunnel’s ElecLink project to ensure that installation and operation of the cable are managed safely;
* publication and notification in clear terms of all technical, operating and safety rules applicable to the Channel Tunnel to show that they are aligned with interoperability directives and safety regulations;
* continued application to the Channel Tunnel of existing and new European laws, including safety, interoperability and cross-acceptance requirements;
* consideration of how the EU Fourth Railway Package should be transposed in respect of the Channel Tunnel, and the implications of BREXIT for Eurotunnel and users of the infrastructure.
* review of applications for authorisations of new passenger and freight rolling stock for use in the Tunnel, and timely assessment of certification applications from railway undertakings proposing to launch new services in the Tunnel;
* timely assessment of applications for new and renewed safety authorisations and safety certificates to ensure that operations through the Chanel Tunnel continue;
* continuous review and improvement of the methods used by the IGC in its supervision, certification and authorisation activities;
* preparing for and addressing serious safety and security incidents, including the annual repetition of the binational emergency plan, which is a framework for cooperation between the emergency services of both countries in the event of accidents or incidents in the Tunnel; and
* ongoing monitoring of responses to the recommendations of the Eurotunnel investigation bodies (BEA-TT and RAIB) following the fire on an HGV shuttle on 17 January 2015.

**J - Sources of Information**

35. The following sources were used when drafting this report:

- Eurotunnel Annual Report on Health and Safety for 2017

- GB Railfreight Annual Report on Health and Safety for 2017

- Eurostar Annual Safety Report for 2017

- DB Cargo Annual Safety Report for 2017

**K - Annexes**

Annex A: Information on railway infrastructure and transport undertakings

Annex B: IGC Structure and Relationships

Annex C: Data on Common Safety Indicators (separate Excel spreadsheet)

Annex C1: Safety-related incidents included in previous reports published by the CTSA

Annex D: Important legislative and regulatory changes

Annex E: Granting of safety certificates and authorisations – Numerical Data

**ANNEX A:** Information on railway infrastructure and transport undertakings

**A.1. Network map**

Maps showing the layout of the UK and French terminals and a schematic diagram showing the running tunnels – including the two crossovers – are shown overleaf.

**A.2 Information about Eurotunnel, Infrastructure Manager for the Channel Tunnel Fixed Link**

**Name:** Eurotunnel

**Address:** UK Terminal, Ashford Road, Folkestone, Kent CT18 8XX

**Website:** [www.eurotunnel.com](http://www.eurotunnel.com)

**Network Statement link:**

<http://www.eurotunnelgroup.com/uploadedFiles/assets-uk/The-Group/Operations/Railways/DRR_NS_2016_EN_Final1.pdf>

**Start date of commercial activity:** May 1994

**Total track length:** 159 km main tracks plus 50 km secondary tracks

**Track gauge:** UIC

**Electrified track length:** All track, both main and secondary, is electrified

**Voltage:** 25,000 volts alternating current

**Total double/single length track:** 100% double track

**Total track length – High Speed Line:** 108 km

**Automatic train protection equipment used:** TVM 430

**Number of level crossings:** None on main tracks

**Number of signals:** 655

**Network Map showing layout of UK Terminal and running tunnels** 

**Network Map showing layout of French Terminal**



**A.3 Information about the Railway Undertakings**

The railway undertakings which operated trains through the Fixed Link in 2014 were as follows:

**Name**: DB Cargo Rail (UK) Limited

**Address**: Lakeside Business Park

 Carolina Way

Doncaster

South Yorkshire

DN4 5PN

UK

**Website**: <https://uk.dbcargo.com/rail-uk-en/start/>/

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**Name**: Eurostar International Ltd

**Address**: Times House

Bravingtons Walk

Regent Quarter

London

N1 9AW

UK

**Website**: [www.eurostar.com](file:///C%3A%5CUsers%5Caeyles%5CDesktop%5C2016%20Annual%20IGC%20safety%20report%5Cwww.eurostar.com)

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**Name**: GB Railfreight

**Address**: 3rd Floor

55 Old Broad Street

London

EC2M 1RX

**Website:** [www.gbrailfreight.com](http://www.gbrailfreight.com)

**ANNEX B: IGC STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS**



Each Government appoints half the members of the IGC which comprises 14 members including at least two representatives of the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority (CTSA).

The composition of the CTSA is determined by the two Governments by agreement and each Government appoints half of its members. In 2017, the CTSA had ten members in total, and its work was supported by a number of advisers, inspectors and auditors.

**ANNEX C: COMMON SAFETY INDICATOR (CSI) DATA**

Data on Common Safety Indicators for 2017 is shown in a separate Excel file.

**ANNEX D: Important legislative, regulatory and administrative changes**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | **Legal reference** | **Date legislation comes into force** | **Reason for introduction(Also specify whether this is a new law or amendment to existing legislation)** | **Description** |
| **General national railway safety legislation**  |  |  |  |  |
| Legislation concerning the national safety authority | NONE | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Legislation concerning notified bodies, assessors, third party bodies for registration, inspection, etc. | NONE | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| **National rules concerning railway safety** |
| Rules concerning national safety targets and methods | NONE | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Rules concerning requirements for safety management systems and safety certification for Railway Undertakings | NONE | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Rules concerning requirements for safety management systems and safety certification for Infrastructure Managers | NONE | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Rules concerning requirements for wagon keepers | NONE | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Rules concerning requirements for entities in charge of maintenance | NONE | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Rules concerning requirements for maintenance workshops | NONE | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| National safety rules applicable to RUs\* and safety rules applicable to other parties in the rail sector | NONE | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Rules concerning requirements for the authorisation of placing in service and maintenance of new or substantially modified rolling stock, including rules for exchange of rolling stock between Railway Undertakings, registration systems and requirements for testing procedures | NONE | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Common operating rules for the railway network, including rules relating to signalling and traffic procedures | NONE | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Rules laying down requirements for additional internal operating rules (company rules) that must be established by the Infrastructure Managers and Railway Undertakings | NONE | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Rules concerning requirements for staff executing critical safety tasks, including selection criteria, medical fitness, vocational training and certification | NONE |  N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Rules concerning investigation of accidents and incidents including recommendations  | NONE | N/A | N/A | N/A |

**ANNEX E: Changes in safety certificates and authorisations – numerical data**

E.1 Safety Certificates according to Directive 2004/49/EC

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. To ensure the information on ERADIS is up-to-date, please supply numbers of existing certificates in ERADIS which were valid at the end of the reporting year
2. Please ensure that the information provided in this table is in line with the information provided in section ‘’G. Supervision of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers‘’
 | Total number of certificates | Number of Part A certificates in ERADIS  |  |
| E.1.1. Number of Part A safety certificates issued in the reporting year and in previous years and still valid at the end of 2017 | 0 | 0 |  |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. To ensure the information on ERADIS is up-to-date, please supply numbers of existing certificates in ERADIS which were valid at the end of the reporting year
2. Please ensure that the information provided in this table is in line with the information provided in section ‘’G. Supervision of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers‘’
 | Total number of certificates | Number of Part B certificates in ERADIS |  |
| E.1.2. Number of Part B safety certificates issued in the reporting year and in previous years and still valid at the end of 2017 | Number of Part B certificates, for which Part A was issued in your Member State | 0 | 0 |  |
| Number of Part B certificates, for which Part A was issued in another Member State | 3 | 3 |  |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Please provide information on applications for Part A certificates received in the current reporting year for new certificates or existing certificates which need to be renewed or updated/amended | A | R | P |
| E.1.3. Number of new applications for **Part A** Safety Certificates submitted by Railway Undertakings in 2017  |  | New certificates | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Updated/amended certificates | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Renewed certificates | 0 | 0 | 0 |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Please provide information on applications for Part B certificates received in the current reporting year for new certificates or existing certificates which need to be renewed or updated/amended | A | R | P |
| E.1.4. Number of new applications for **Part B** Safety Certificates submitted by Railway Undertakings in 2017 | if Part A was issued in your Member State | New certificates | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Updated/amended certificates | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Renewed certificates | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| if Part A was issued in another Member State | New certificates | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Updated/amended certificates | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Renewed certificates | 2 | 0 | 1 |

A = Accepted application, certificate already issued

R = Rejected applications, no certificate issued

P = Case is still pending, no certificate issued so far

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| To ensure the information on ERADIS is up-to-date, please supply numbers of certificates in ERADIS revoked at the end of the reporting year | Total number of revoked certificates in 2017 | Number of revoked certificates in ERADIS (which were revoked in 2017) |
| E 1.5 Number of Part A certificates revoked in the current reporting year | 0 | 0 |
| E 1.6 Number of Part B certificates revoked in the current reporting year | 0 | 0 |

E.1.7. List of countries where RUs applying for a Part B Safety Certificate in your Member State obtained their Part A Safety Certificate

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Name of RU | Member State where Part A Safety Certificate was issued |
| DB Cargo UK | UK |
| Eurostar International Ltd | UK |
| GB Railfreight | UK |

E.2. Safety Authorisations according to Directive 2004/49/EC

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Please ensure that the information provided in this table is in line with the information provided in section ‘’G. Supervision of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers‘’ | Total number of safety authorisations |  |  |
| E.2.1. Number of valid Safety Authorisations issued to Infrastructure Managers in the reporting year and in previous years and still valid at the end of the 2017 | 1 |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Guidance:Please provide information on applications for Safety Authorisations received in the current reporting year for new authorisations or existing authorisations which need to be renewed or updated/amended | A | R | P |
| E.2.2. Number of applications for Safety Authorisations submitted by Infrastructure Managers in 2017 | New authorisations | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Updated/amended authorisations | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Renewed authorisations | 0 | 0 | 0 |

A = Accepted application, authorisation already issued

R = Rejected applications, no authorisation issued

P = Case is still pending, no authorisation issued so far

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| E 2.3 Number of Safety Authorisations revoked in the current reporting year | 0 |

E.3. Procedural aspects – Part A Safety Certificates

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | New | Updated /amended | Renewed |
| The average time between receiving the application with the required information and a **Part A** Safety Certificate being issued to Railway Undertakingsin 2017  |  | n/a | n/a | n/a |
|  |

E.4. Procedural aspects – Part B Safety Certificates

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | New | Updated /amended | Renewed |
| The average time between receiving the application with the required information and a **Part B** Safety Certificate being issued to RUsin 2017  | if Part A was issued in your Member State | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| if Part A was issued in another Member State | n/a | n/a | 85 |

E.5. Procedural aspects – Safety Authorisations

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | New | Updated /amended | Renewed |
| The average time between receiving the application with the required information and a Safety Authorisation being issued to IMs in 2017  | n/a | n/a | n/a |

1. Available on the IGC website at <http://www.channeltunneligc.co.uk/spip.php?action=acceder_document&arg=93&cle=939ac28402cdf20e06d641b2ef2d1ece&file=pdf%2FTreaty_of_Canterbury_1986.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Available on the IGC website at <http://www.channeltunneligc.co.uk/spip.php?action=acceder_document&arg=94&cle=eb523418f351e57679238f0cf5452e8d&file=pdf%2FConcession_Agreement.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Available on the RAIB website at <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/521184/160505_ReportET2016_eurotunnel_eng.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Pursuant to Article 752 of the Regulation of the Intergovernmental Commission on the use of the Channel Tunnel dated 24 January 2007, as amended by the IGC Regulation signed on 6 February 2013, published in France by Decree No. 2013-318 of 15 April 2013 and the United Kingdom by the Statutory Instrument 2013 No. 407: The Channel Tunnel (Safety) (Amendment) Order 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)