MINISTRY OF
INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY

DEPARTMENT OF RAILWAY AUTHORITY

NSA Annual Safety Report

Reporting year: 2017

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A. Scope of the report

According to Article 18 of the Railway Safety Directive (RSD as follows) the National Safety Authorities (NSA as follows) have to prepare annually a report which covers the trend of the Common Safety Indicators (CSI as follows), the changes in the national legislation, the development of the safety certification and safety authorization system and the experiences of the related supervision activities.

With this report the Hungarian NSA intends to provide insight on the safety related processes of the Hungarian railway market and to communicate its activity in publicity and for the European Union Agency for Railways.

This Annual Report covers the country's railway safety performance in the light of the year 2017 with the application of the common structure that the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA as follows) proposed in its guidelines.

B. Introductory Section

1. Introduction to the report

This report presents an overview of the processes concerning the safety of railway transport, the condition of the safety of the Hungarian railway sector, the changes of the rules, and the activities of the Hungarian NSA. Also shows the CSI statistics of 2017 and gives an analysis of the trends on the safety performance of the country.

2. A brief introduction into the national legislation in the light of the EU legislation

The Hungarian railway transportation's basic principles are laid down in the Act no. CLXXXIII of 2005 on Railway Transportation (Railway Act as follows). This is in harmony – among others – with the RSD, the Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and Council, Directive 2007/59/EC of the European Parliament and Council, Commission Regulation No. 445/2011/EU, Commission Decision No. 2011/765/EU.

There are Government and Ministry Decrees which specify the details of the Railway Act's regulation. This includes the GKM Decree no. 40/2006 of the Ministry of Economy and Transport which corresponds with the RSD, the Commission Regulations no. 653/2007/EC, 1158/2010/EU and 1169/2010/EU; the NFM Decree no. 19/2011 (V.10.) of the Ministry of National Development which is identical to the RSD, the Directive 2007/59/EC of the European Parliament and Council; the Government Decree no. 203/2009 (IX.18.) which describes professionally and in details all the health requirements and the way of the examination procedure of people working in railway safety related jobs.

The latest part of the EU legislation related to the railway sector is applied in an 'as is' form. E.g. most of the TSIs don't have peculiar national rules.

3. The railway network

Based on the Railway Act, the elements of the railway infrastructure in Hungary are classified in five regional categories. These serve different purposes and various conditions must be fulfilled in order to operate and use them.

Open access railway infrastructure: The length of the Hungarian rail network is 7690 km. Annex A contains the map of the Hungarian railway network showing the major lines. There are two Infrastructure Managers in Hungary, the MÁV Hungarian State Railways Co. (MÁV Co.) and the GySEV Co. The major part (7251 km) of the network is managed by MÁV Co. There are no high-speed lines in Hungary. The national infrastructure includes 2830 kilometres of lines operating as part of the Trans-European freight corridors, as well as all other major nation-wide railway lines.

The Regional infrastructure is appointed for regional commercial railway activity; it expands over no more than three counties or up to the limit of 400 km. Nowadays, only narrow-gauge railway lines belong to this group. It includes altogether 480 km of railway lines, which primarily serves passenger transport for touristic purposes.

The Municipal railway network serves for public transport between a city and its suburbs. The length of this network is 210 km and consists of public rail network and other different transport means.

Local/City railway networks include tracks within the city borders and its surrounding areas, as well as rail service between a city and surrounding suburbs. The local network of Budapest, Debrecen, Miskolc and Szeged belongs to this group. In these cities their respective transportation companies are operating the railway, underground, tramway and trolley infrastructure and are also providing scheduled passenger service. That's why from the viewpoint of the railway regulatory environment the local railway network operating companies are 'integrated railway companies'. That means they are acting as RU and IM in the same time. It is a great challenge because they have to fulfil both the requirements of RUs and IMs.

Private railway networks are operated by the owner of the industrial sidings. These can be found at harbours, logistical complexes, mines (usually gravel), power-stations and large factories (i.e. car- or steel factory, oil refinery, chemical plant, paper factory).

The list of the Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers operating in Hungary can be found in Annex A.

3. Summary – General Trend Analysis

The table below summarizes the key indicators of the railway safety performance since the beginning of the reporting regime.

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total number of all accidents	142	147	152	186	190	156	162	160
Number of serious injuries	70	76	88	87	73	38	54	40
Number of fatalities	82	84	72	102	108	109	97	101
Number of precursors	754	391	602	352	518	783	370	309
Total precursors of accidents with signals passed at danger	10	18	21	18	18	11	4	17
Number of level crossing accidents	42	38	37	35	28	33	27	33
Number of valid Part B Safety Certificates	32	35	36	43	42	42	46	40
Number of ECM Certificates*	-	5	8	15	20	21	21	24
Number of Maintenance Functions Certificates**	-	0	0	4	6	15	20	18

*= Numbers show only the ECM Certificates issued by the Hungarian NSA as certification body

**= Numbers show only the Maintenance Functions Certificates issued by the Hungarian NSA as certification body

In 2017, the number of significant accidents decreased sightly by 1,23 % (from 162 to 160) compared to the previous year, which can be attributed to the decrease of accidents involving serious injuries of unauthorised persons – caused by moving rail vehicles – decreased from 54 to 40.

The number of precursors shows improvement, however the number of total precursors of accidents with signals passed at danger has increased fivefold, which was typically caused by the inattention and inadequate performance of rail drivers. The trend of accidents occurred in level crossings – after last year's decrease – reversed again and returned to the value of 2015 (33 events).

Further analysis will follow in the 2nd paragraph of Chapter D. in this report, and detailed statistical data can be found in Annex C.1.

C. Organisation

1. Introduction to the organisation

In 2016, in the field of rail transport, the Railway Department of the National Transport Authority acted as the Hungarian NSA. From 1st of January 2017 the Department of Railway Authority of the Ministry of National Development took over its role as the legal successor. This institution continues to operate under the name of the Ministry of Innovation and Technology since May 2018 with unchanged authority. Its duty is carrying out authorization tasks in the field of rail transport, with national jurisdiction.

2. Organisational structure; relationship with other national bodies

The diagrams can be found in Annex B.

Railway Department (current staff: 47 people)

- Represents the Hungarian NSA at RISC, ILGGRI and ERA events
- Gives opinion on railway legislation, technical directives and regulations, makes suggestions to amend them
- Provides assistance to the ministry for the preparation of draft proposals for legislations, concerning the railway sector
- Deals with various tasks within the conventional, urban, narrow gauge and industrial rail networks nationally in the following fields:

  - Railway Safety and Supervision Unit

    - Performs its task nationally within the conventional, private rail and urban transport network.
    - Issues safety certificates and authorizations, ECM certificates.
    - Issues the technical approval of workshops for the maintenance of railway vehicles not covered by the ECM;
    - Announces (NoBo) and designates (DeBo) conformity assessment bodies;
    - Assures the fulfilment of the interoperability in case of every subsystem.
    - Supervises the operational and maintenance activity, and checks the compliance with legal framework.
    - Supervises RUs, IMs, ECMs.
    - Informs the leaders of the relevant fields on the experiences of supervisions and prepares an annual report by 28th of February of each year, concerning the previous year.
    - Carries out legal action in the cases of offensive behaviour or when railway safety is put to risk.
    - Prepares the Annual report.
    - Deals with the tasks given by the ERA.
    - Represents the Hungarian NSA at the Transportation Safety Bureau of Hungary in case of accidents.

  - Railway Mechanical Unit

    - Issues type licences and places conventional, urban, narrow gauge, etc. railway vehicles in service,
    - Carries out on-track tests of vehicles,
    - Authorises the construction, modification, demolition and placing in service of mechanical equipment (eg. scales, turntables, cranes, etc.) and operational facilities (eg. elevators, escalators), and further supervises the operational status of these items.

- Deals with cases concerning special railway systems (eg. checking condition of vehicles for operational safety, type and modification authorisations etc.) and the placing in service of railway vehicles.

- Railway Infrastructure Unit

  - Authorises the establishment, placing in service, modification and the tearing of railway tracks and other infrastructure elements (eg. signalling, bridges, tunnels, etc.) nationally.
  - Authorises the establishment, placing in service, modification and the tearing of railway interlocking and train control systems.
  - Acts as specialized authority.
  - Contributes to regional development concepts, programs and town planning in terms of rail transport.
  - Manages the register of rail infrastructure.

- Urban Rail Infrastructure Department

  - Authorises the establishment, placing in service, modification and the tearing of railway tracks and other infrastructure elements (eg. signalling, bridges, tunnels, etc.) urban level.
  - Authorises the establishment, placing in service, modification and the tearing of railway interlocking and train control systems at urban level.
  - Acts as specialized authority.
  - Contributes to regional development concepts, programs and town planning in terms of rail transport.
  - Manages the register of urban rail infrastructure.

- Examination and Training Supervision Unit

  - Supervises and controls the training and examinations of engine drivers and other employees related to railway safety.
  - Approves the corporate instructions of the railway undertakings related to railway staff training and development or activities affecting the safety of the railway operation.
  - Defines the strategy, directives and requirements of the examination and other materials of courses concerning railway professional staff training and development.
  - Registers professional tutors and examiners.
  - Issues driving licences and complementary certificates for engine drivers.
  - Appoints examiners.
  - Transposes foreign rail qualifications.

D. The development of railway safety

1. Initiatives to maintain/improve safety performances

Hungary fully implemented all essential requirements of the Railway Safety Directive 2004/49/EC in its national law.

In Hungary the Transportation Safety Bureau (TSB as follows) – independent from the NSA and other organizations in the railway sector – is responsible for the investigation of transport accidents, and is also belongs to the organization of the Ministry of Innovation and Technology. According to the act No. CLXXXIV of 2005 its main duty is the independent technical investigation of aviation, railway and shipping accidents and incidents. To increase the safety level of the transport system the TSB issues recommendations if necessary. The purpose of the independent investigation is to find the cause of the accident or incident to prevent similar future events, but not its duty to determine the liability.

The recommendations which were issued and addressed to the Hungarian NSA can be found in table D.1.1.

Please note that in the following table:

- Investigation Committee means the TSB's group of experts investigating the given accident,
- NSA refers to Hungarian NSA (National Transport Authority),
- For the explanation of other abbreviations please refer to Annex C.3.

Table D.1.1 - Safety measures triggered by accidents/precursors

Accidents/precursors which triggered the measure			Safety measure decided
Date	**Place**	**Description of the trigger**	
2016.08.14	Újszász	The passenger train number 5736 arriving to the station derailed with one bogie at the rail switch number 6. No personal injury occurred.*	**BA2016-0898-5-01:** The investigative commission of the TSB determined during the on-site investigation that after the track regulation no complete checks, measurements and documentation was made in case of the railway switches. The railway switch regulation involves the displacement of the gearbox and the working points of the adjusting device, and therefore the relevant rules provide post-intervention measurement, but those do not specify exactly what to measure and how to document it. The TSB recommends to the Hungarian NSA to review whether the safety management system of MÁV Zrt. adequately includes tracking, measurements and documentation in the field of supervision regulations. When accepting and executing the recommendation, there would be greater chance that the track supervisor will discover the railway switches in dangerous position during track control and verify the status of railway switches after track regulation. **BA2016-0898-5-02:** The investigative commission of the TSB determined that in the safety features of the safety device there was a known, but not corrected failure for 10 months, the main inspection of the safety device has not been completed at the time of the investigation. The TSB recommends to the Hungarian NSA to examine whether the safety management system of MÁV Zrt. adequately includes the main inspection system of the safety devices, the main examinations and the reparation of the deficiencies are carried out accordingly, and shortcomings during the security checks are explored, risks are treated. When adopting and executing the recommendation, it would be ensured that the operating organization keeps its safety equipment in safe condition. **BA2016-0898-5-03:** The investigative commission of the TSB determined that the handling and recording of paper locks at the station is chaotic, multiple, non-ordering, and the transfer is inaccurate. The TSB recommends to the Hungarian NSA to review whether the safety management system of MÁV Zrt. adequately includes the use, handling and registration of metal locks, paper locks used in the safety devices. They recommend the use of locks where the unique identifier is installed at the time of manufacture.

			Adoption and execution of the recommendation may result in traceability of safety devices other than normal operating conditions, which is indispensable and necessary for the continuous maintenance of safety.
2016.09.03.	Budapest-Déli station	The side of the passenger train number 4927 arriving at the train station was hit by a chopped porcelain piece and an overhead contact line. As a result of this incident, a passenger of the train suffered slight injury from the sparks.*	**BA2016-0968-5-01:** The investigative commission of the TSB found during the technical investigation that the upper openable aluminum frames of the split windows of the 1415 series (FLIRT) EMUs are electrically insulated from the vehicle enclosure. For any reason, window frames are placed at the potential level above the contact protection voltage, there is a risk of electric shock. The TSB recommends to the Hungarian NSA to in order to prevent electric shock from accidents, call the railway undertakings which operates the 1415 series (FLIRT) EMUs to analyze the risks of contact protection split windows frame. When accepting and executing the recommendation, the risk of electric shock may be excluded when the window frame is touched.
2017.01.10	Debrecen	The first two wagons of the train number 64348 leaving the station on track XVII. has derailed at the railway switch number 34. No personal injury occurred.**	**BA2017-0033-5-01:** The investigative commission of the TSB determined, that at Debrecen station, in contrary to the two pieces required by the traffic instructions only one fastening bracket is used to hold the vehicles, which is even defined in the station regulations. The TSB proposes to the Hungarian NSA to review the internal rules of the safety management system of MÁV Zrt. which applies to the F.2. Traffic Instructions and the rules for preventing the rail vehicles from running away. When accepting and executing the recommendation the safety of vehicles would be more reliable.
2017.03.03	Székes-fehérvár	The first wagon of the train number 86905 leaving the station on track XXIII. has derailed at the railway switch number 108. No personal injury occurred.**	**BA2017-0214-5-01:** The investigative commission of the TSB found during the technical investigation that at the station, the regulation does not define the person assigned to remove the anti-rolling devices in the same way as the traffic instructions. In addition, regulation of the station itself contains minor contradictions. The TSB proposes to the Hungarian NSA to review the internal rules of the safety management system of MÁV Zrt. which applies to the F.2. Traffic Instructions and the rules for preventing the running away of rail vehicles. When accepting and executing the recommendation the safety of vehicles would be more reliable.
* The closure of the investigation of the extraordinary events and the issuance of the recommendations were only made in 2017. ** The two incidents (2017-0033-5; 2017-0214-5) were investigated by the NIB in one report due to the accumulation of their occurrence.			

2. Detailed data trend analysis

The indicators are based on data provision "*Annual aggregated data on railway accidents and incidents*" – Annex No. 2. of the Railway Safety Certificate Decision – which was mandatory (with a deadline of 28 February 2018) for all the railway undertakings operating railway activities in Hungary.

The number of significant accidents decreased sightly by 1,23 % compared to the previous year, which can be attributed to the decrease of accidents involving serious injuries of unauthorised persons caused by moving rail vehicles.

2.a. Collision accidents

The number of collision-related accidents increased considerably compared to the previous year, but three of the five events occurred with the obstacle within the clearance gauge and did not cause serious injury and material damage.

The event occurred on 2nd January 2017 was of particular importance: between train stations Ceglédbercel-Cserő and Cegléd the train number 2846 was hit by the locomotive of train number IC616 from behind. In the accident two persons suffered serious, three persons lighter injuries. 3 wagons and the locomotive were damaged.

Examination of passenger wagons and locomotive damaged during the incident
(Source: Magyar Távirati Iroda)

The event was caused by the inadequate activities of the train drivers and the traffic controller, during troubleshooting.

2.b. Derailments

Train derailment incidents increased significantly in 2017, as their number increased to 10 events (2016: 2 cases) due to improper maintenance of the railway track, the overload of rail freight wagons and the irregular work of rail workers. During the derailments, personal injury was not typically and material damages in the railway track and in the vehicles were not always significant.

Among the derailment-type accidents, the most significant occurred at Ács station on 27th May 2017, when from the freight train number 44288 (FLOYD Zrt.) – arriving on track VIII. – 2 locomotives and 6 grain wagons derailed with 4-4 axes. No personal injury occurred.

Railway track after derailment at Ács station on 27th May 2017
(Source: ITM VHF VBEO)

The derailment occurred due to the interaction between the railway wagons and the poorly maintained railway track.

Among the derailment-type accidents, an other significant occurred at Vép station on 13rd September 2017, when from the freight train number 97943 (RCH Zrt.) arriving at the station derailed and several tank wagons had fallen on its side. The transported gasoil from the tank wagons went to the tracks. Environmental damage and material damage were significant. No personal injury occurred.

Tank wagons derailed at Vép station on 13rd September 2017
(Source: Katasztrófavédelem)

On the basis of the investigation carried out by the railway infrastructure manager the derailment of the tank wagons was caused by the wear and tear of certain sleepers for the support of a 200 meter radius track section, due to the insufficient tightening of the rails and the combined effect of the moving liquid in the tanks of the wagons.

2.c. Accidents in level crossings

The number of serious accidents occurred in level crossings increased compared to the previous year, as their number increased from 27 to 33. Most of these accidents involved both personal injury and material damage, caused drivers who violated traffic rules related to railway level crossings. The most common cause of this accident type, that the driver does not start braking in proper time approaching the level crossing and collide with the train from some direction.

Two real example for this accident type:

The locomotive of the train number 37226 collided with a car between Kiskunfélegyháza and Lakitelek stations at the unprotected level crossing. The driver of the car lost his life on the spot and the passenger of the car was transported to the hospital with serious injury. In the car the DMU the material damage was significant.

The car damaged during an accident on 5th February 2017
(Source: Katasztrófavédelem)

The investigative commission of the TSB determined that the driver of the car was driving the vehicle without a valid driving license. Approaching the passage, he was not convinced of the danger of passing, and he drove in the level crossing at a high speed, even though the DMU was approaching the crossing.

An other example when the locomotive of the train number IC947 collided with a coach between Kóny and Enese stations at the level crossing number AS186 protected with warning lights and half-barriers.

A 2017. november 20-án The coach damaged during an accident on 20th November 2017
(Source: kisalfold.hu)

Of the bus passengers 3 people suffered slight injuries, while the passengers on the train did not get injured. During the site inspection the level crossing was in a state of "disruption" when the accident occurred. At the time of the accident due to fog the visibility was limited.

2.d. Accident to persons caused by rail vehicle in motion

The accidents involving serious injuries caused by moving rail vehicles decreased by almost 16.16% compared to 2016 (2016: 115; 2017: 99), however, the number of deceased persons remained high (2016: 38; 2017: 24), and the number of seriously injured personsdecreased sightly, from 101 to 97 events in 2017 compared to 2016.

2.e. Accidents involving fire

In 2017 there was no accident involving personal injury caused by fire in rolling stock, alhough a fire broke out 8 times, which is a slight decrease as in 2016 there were 9 cases. In the mentioned fire accidents no passengers were affected.

Accidents involving fire typically leads less material damage, because as the train crew or the locomotive driver usually detects failure and smoke and can intervene with the fire extinguishers of the vehicle in time.

Regarding the accidents involving fire in railway vehicles, on 6th July 2017 at Balatonkenese station the locomotive of the train number 1972 came on fire. The arriving firefighters stopped the fire. No personal injury occurred. Passengers were transferred to another train.

The locomotive affected by fire on 6th July 2017
(Source: Katasztrófavédelem)

The number of precursors has increased significantly. This is mainly due to an increase in the number of stop signal passings (2016: 4 cases; 2017: 17 cases).

Based on the closed investigations, a significant part of the stop signal passings were due to personal omissions: fatigue, unbearable heat in the summer period, inattention, late braking. In the course of our examinations, the stop signa lpassings were prioritized, we called attention to the importance of avoiding emergency situations by the railway undertakings concerned.

Transport of dangerous goods: In the case of the transportation of dangerous goods an accident occurred caused damage to the environment (see derailment at Vép station above).

The cost of material damage caused by major accidents is increasing steadily, as a result of the significant increase in the value of used rolling stock and railway infrastructure. The cost of environmental damage in 2017 was neglibile for major accidents.

In summary, the picture of the CSIs is very colourful and shows many aspects. The slight decrease of the total number of accidents is an appropriate result, because this indicator is developing in the desired way. The situation has depraved at the site of level-crossing accidents and number of precursors, but the overall safety level of the Hungarian railway network was preserved.

3. Results of the Safety Recommendations

Accidents *(Details in Table D.1.1)*	**Result of the Safety Recommendations**
2016.09.03. Budapest, Déli station	**Recommendation number BA2016-0968-5-01:** We accepted a safety recommendation related to the accident at Budapest, Déli station. Implementation is in progress.
2017.01.10. Debrecen	**Recommendation number BA2017-0033-5-01:** We accepted a safety recommendation related to the accident at Debrecen station. Implementation is in progress.
2016.08.14. Újszász	**Recommendation number BA2017-0033-5-01:** We accepted a safety recommendation related to the accident at Újszász station. Implementation is in progress.

E. Important changes in legislation and regulation

There was no significant legislative change affecting the national rail transport during the reporting period. The modifications in legislation contain only refinements.

F. The development of safety certification and authorisation

Safety Certification:

In 2017 one new Safety Certificate (Part A & Part B) were issued for MÁV Vagon Kft.

Regarding the renewals of the safety certificates, 5 Part A & their accompanying Part B safety certificates were renewed in 2017.

The rail safety certificate (Parts A and B) of KÖZGÉP Zrt. was revoked at the request of the railway company in 2017.

Among the RUs located in other MSs, new part B has not been issued beside 3 renewals (CRW, PETROLSPED and METRANS).

Safety Authorization:

In safety authorisation has not been renewed by the Hungarian NSA, because all the authorisations issued are still valid (MÁV, GYSEV).

1. National legislation – starting dates – availability

   Legal materials are available for the applicants on CD. Also, on the homepage of the Hungarian NSA, there is a section dedicated for the legislation which relates to the railway sector. This contains even more information in connection with the certification processes and other important topics. After that for the applicants the formal requirements, the application form for Safety Certificates, ECM Certificates are provided.

   In addition, the Hungarian NSA successfully reworked the information materials for the applicants. A new set of documents are available with a cleaner structure and logic resulting the decrease of administrative burden for the applicants as they need to handle less documents during the process.

2. Numerical data

   See Annex E.

3. Procedural aspects

   3.1. Safety Certificates Part A

   Reasons for updating/amending Part A Safety Certificates

   The reasons of the amendments are typically the expansion of the companies' activities, as well as the changes in internal processes. This includes the increase of the quantity of the rolling stock and the staff.

   NSA Charging fee for issuing a Part A Certificate

   The amount of fees charged by the NSA is described in the Decree No. 72/2006. (IX. 29.) GKM of the Ministry of Economy and Transport. The fees were slightly reduced in October, 2012. In 2015 and also in 2016 there were no changes in the fees.

   The fee depends on the number of vehicles and the type of service. The fee can vary from 3 300 € to 6200 € for each activity.

   Summary of the common problems/difficulties for the NSA in application procedures for Part A Certificates

   No major problems were reported with application procedures for Part A certificates.

   Summary of the problems mentioned by Railway Undertakings when applying for a Part A Certificate

   Usually, the formation of the Safety Management System according to Commission Regulation No 1158/2010/EU assign a workload for the Railway Undertakings. It needs several turns to provide a material which is in compliance with the regulation.

   In case of submission of a new application or renewal of an existing certificate the transfer of changes through the safety management system also gives a workload for the experts.

The NSA helps with consultations and with providing a check-list in which the compliance of the submitted Safety Management System documentation can be checked in details, according to the regulation.

Feedback procedure (e.g. questionnaire) that allows Railway Undertakings to express their opinion on issuing procedures/practices or to file complaints

RUs can contact the NSA in person, via written letter or in urgent cases by phone and email as well.

3.2. Safety Certificates Part B

NSA Charging fee for issuing a Part B Certificate

The amount of fees charged by the NSA is described in the Decree No. 72/2006. (IX. 29.) GKM of the Ministry of Economy and Transport. The fees were slightly reduced in October, 2012. The fee depends on the number of vehicles and the type of service. The fee can vary from 3 300 € to 6 200 €. Since 2012, there were no changes in the application fee.

Summary of the common problems/difficulties for the NSA in application procedures for Part B Certificates

No major problems were reported with application procedures for Part B certificates.

Summary of the problems mentioned by Railway Undertakings when applying for a Part B Certificate

There was no problem mentioned by Railway Undertakings when applying for a Part B Certificate.

Feedback procedure (e.g. questionnaire) that allows Railway Undertakings to express their opinion on issuing procedures/practices or to file complaints

Railway Undertakings can contact the NSA in person, via written letter or in urgent cases via phone and by email.

3.3. Safety Authorisations

Feedback procedure (e.g. questionnaire) that allows Infrastructure Managers to express their opinion on issuing procedures/practices or to file complaints

Infrastructure Managers can contact the NSA in person, via written letter or in urgent cases by email.

NSA Charging fee for issuing a Safety Authorisation

The amount of fees charged by the NSA is also described in the Decree No. 72/2006. (IX. 29.) GKM. The fee can vary from 6.400 € to 11.625 €, depending on the length of the operated line. The fees were slightly reduced in October, 2012. Since then, there were no changes in the fees.

G. Supervision of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers

1. The Hungarian NSA supervises the operational- and traffic-safe state of the railway tracks, the technical conditions of the operational equipment, the rolling stock and the railway workers and whether the occasional examinations and necessary repairs are completed. The RUs and IMs are

obligated to ensure all conditions of free supervision, especially access to the relevant documents and equipment under supervision. If the NSA during its supervision determines an omission, it obligates the operator to conduct the necessary examination or repair, and may impose a fine on the operator, or suspend its operations.

The new regulation that appeared at the end of 2014 provides the opportunity for the NSA as well to impose a fine on the lawbreaker RUs, IMs or railway workers.

The NSA also has to deal with the public and the trade union complaints concerning railway safety.

1.1. Audits/Inspections/Checklists

The content of the annual audit programme (supervision of the conditions of the issued safety certificates):

- supervision of processes according to documents
- supervision of the Safety Management System of the RU
- reviewing the effectiveness of the measures taken after the findings of previous supervision
- checking that the lessons learned from accidents and incidents of the given RU are taken into account
- on site supervision
- supervision of running trains.

Audits/inspections are carried out by the NSA. Only 6 people are available for audits. These people also deal with issuing the Safety Certificates, Safety Authorizations, issue ECM Certifications, Maintenance Function Certificates, deal with public complaints and also with the authorization of NoBos and DeBos. Experts of other units are also involved if necessary and are available.

Economic and human resource aspects:

- The availability of human resources is at a critical level.
- The amount spent on the inspections is included in the budget of NFM.

1.2. Vigilance aspects/Sensitive points to follow-up by the NSA

There can be mentioned two sensitive points:

- calling upon RUs or IMs to eliminate insufficiencies identified during the audit,
- examining the measures taken since the last audit/inspection.

In 2017, the NSA performed 20 on-site inspections. The audits did reveal serious discrepancies in some cases. These were the improper implementation of the SMS, failing to include the newly appeared EU and Hungarian regulations, breaching the allowed driving time and rest period rules set by national law. Also, severeal administrational shortcomings were identified. e.g.: incomplete preparation of route logs, the training report not complying with the rules. After the NSA issued the obligations, imposed fines and took other enforcement actions, the companies performed the necessary corrective measures.

INSPECTIONS		Issued Safety Certificates Part A	Issued Safety Certificates Part B	Issued Safety Authorisations	Other Activities (Issued ECM or Maintenance function certificates)
Number of audits of RUs/IMs for 2017	planned	*	4	2	0
	unplanned	*	15	2	0
	carried out	*	17	2	0

*= Audits for Part A Safety Certificates are included in the audits of the safety certificate Part B in the case of Hungarian RUs. Audits of RUs located in other MSs (and possessing a Part B Safety Certificate for the Hungarian railway network) are included in the number of audits of issued Safety Certificate Part B.

AUDITS		Issued Safety Certificates Part A	Issued Safety Certificates Part B	Issued Safety Authorisations	Other Activities (Issued ECM or Maintenance function certificates
Number of inspections of RUs/IMs for 2017	planned	*	41	1	41
	unplanned	*	8	1	0
	carried out	*	20	1	16

*= Inspections for Part A Safety Certificates are included in the inspections of the Safety Certificate Part B in the case of Hungarian RUs. Inspections of RUs located in other MSs (and possessing a Part B Safety Certificate for the Hungarian railway network) are included in the number of audits of issued Safety Certificate Part B. This is because systematically the content and also the conditions of Part A and Part B Safety Certificates are interconnected.

2. Summary of the relevant corrective measures in 2017:
   - registering the real knowledge of routes of the engine drivers in supplementary cartificates;
   - enforcing the regulations authorised by the NSA;
   - enforcing the operational rules of RUs;
   - enforcing the loading rules of freight transport;
   - enforcing RUs and maintenance workshops to properly identify and improve the technical requirements for repairing rail vehicles;
   - promoting the importance of safety culture and the improvement of the RUs SMS into a more applicable way – if needed.

   The observations of the audits are recorded in writing. Based on these records, the NSA decides about the further tasks.

   The RUs and IMs have to make an action plan to eliminate the deficiencies and inform the NSA about the stage of implementation of their plan. The NSA could check the implementation of the

plan during the next inspection or immediately and continuously depending on the nature of the case. The NSA's activity is based on the risk analysis of the processes.

3. There were no complaints from IM('s) concerning RU('s) related to conditions in their Part A/Part B Certificate.

4. There were no complaints from RU('s) concerning IM('s) related to conditions in their authorisation.

H. Reporting on the application of the CSM on risk evaluation and assessment

The actual processes of the NSA in 2017 have been determined on the basis of the risk analysis of the activities of railway companies. The NSA uses the results of this process to compile the next annual inspection program. The quantified risk analysis method is still under development and testing. The method is based on the following steps:

1. Data collection: this process covers accident reports, complaint reports, and protocols recorded by the railway undertakings and infrastructure managers in the year prior to the current year, as well as on - planned and extraordinary - official inspections.

2. Evaluation: at the end of the current year, the data mentioned in the preceding paragraph is evaluated as follows:
   - Counting the exceptional events typically occurring in the day-to-day reports of the period under investigation by defining the railway company associated with the extraordinary event in question;
   - Recording the experiences gained during the on-site traffic safety inspections (driver, locomotive, train, track) by defining the railway company concerned;
   - Summarizing the results of last year's supervisory processes.
3. Summarization: factors taken into account during the summarization at organizations:

   a) the number of events occurring during the period under investigation;
   b) the number of nonconformities and deficiencies experienced during on-site traffic safety inspections;
   c) the number of the company's railway vehicles;
   d) the number of employees working directly in the field of transport safety;
   e) the company's permissions of transportation of dangerous goods;
   f) the last date of the company's latest annual inspection;
   g) official processes initiated during the period under investigation.

   These factors mentioned above are weighted according to different calculations in the risk assessment.

   The experience of the last annual inspection is taken into account in the rating of companies, however, those are not included in the classification determined to weighting.

4. Classification: Based on the values obtained during the summarization, the classification of railway undertakings contains three risk classes as follows: Low Risk Class (0-15), Medium Risk Class (16-30), High Risk Class (31-45).

Application of the CSM by railway undertakings

During the annual inspections and new railway safety certification or railway safety license issuing procedures, the NSA draws the attention of railway undertakings to the importance of applying a risk management system and to cases requiring a risk assessment under the CSM.

In certification procedures, the NSA requires applicants to have a functioning risk management system on the basis of CSM,

I. NSA Conclusions on the reporting year – Priorities

The main objective of the NSA is to improve railway safety, in accordance with the EU and national objectives.

As an important task, the accreditation of NoBos and DeBos is delegated to NSA HU as well. This needs significant resources. In 2017, regarding these accreditation activities, the necessary audits also have to be carried out after the certification.

Some other tasks needed to be postponed to 2018 because of the lack of staff. With the number of tasks increasing year-by-year, more professional staff is required.

The annual supervision plan of the NSA for 2017 was only partially fulfilled due to the lack of human resources. A large part of the human resources was occuped by the certification of locomotives and passenger cars developed at national leven along the logic of ECM certification system.

Taking a bigger part in international activities, our NSA considers it very important to deal with the introduction of the 4th Railway Package and participate in most ERA workshops and working groups, provide the necessary information and improve the already good partnership with ERA and the other NSAs. This also results in a notable increase of workload.

J. Alternative measures through derogations regarding ECM certification scheme

According to article 14a (8) of Directive 2008/110/EC alternative measures are no longer allowed to be implemented, so Hungary does not apply such measures.

K. Sources of information

The source of the data in the report:

- Accident, incident reports and the annual reports submitted by the railway undertakings and infrastructure managers
- IM's daily accident reports
- IM's investigation reports on accidents
- Final reports and the included safety recommendations of the investigations carried out by the Transportation Safety Bureau (NIB of Hungary), and the organisation's website (www.kbsz.hu)
- The NSA's internal background data about the RU's Safety Certificates and IM's Safety Authorizations, inspections, audits, procedures

- Complex Law Library
- ERADIS
- ERAIL database of accidents and Common Safety Indicators

L. Annexes

ANNEX A: Railway Structure Information

ANNEX B: Organisation chart(s) of the Department of Railway Authority

ANNEX C: CSIs data – Definitions applied

ANNEX D: Important changes in legislation and regulation

ANNEX E: The development of safety certification and authorisation – Numerical Data

ANNEX A: Railway Structure Information

A.1. Network map



A.2. List of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers

A.2.1. Infrastructure Manager(s) in 2017

	Name	Address	Website/Network Statement Link	Safety Authorisation (Number/Date)	Start date commercial activity	Total Track Length	Total Track Length HSL	Number of LC
1.	GySEV Zrt.	9400 Sopron, Mátyás király u. 19.	www.gysev.hu	HU 21 2016 0001 2016.12.15.	2008.10.02.	439 km	-	298
2.	MÁV Zrt.	1087 Budapest Könyves Kálmán krt. 54-60.	www.mav.hu	HU 21 2015 0001 2015.06.29.	2010.07.01.	7251 km	-	5743

A.2.2. Railway Undertaking(s) in 2017

	Company Name	Address	Homapage	EIN* of Safety Certificate	Service is to begin	Activity
1.	AWT Rail HU Zrt.	1134 Budapest, Róbert Károly krt. 64-66.	www.awt.eu	HU 11 2015 0012	16.11. 2010	traction freight forwarding
2.	BoBo Kft.	3528 Miskolc, Csele utca 10.	www.bobokft.hu	HU 11 2016 0008	02.04. 2008	traction freight forwarding
3.	boxXpress.de GmbH	21129 Hamburg, Köhlfleetdamm 5.	www.boxxpress.de	HU 12 2016 0011	16.04. 2009	traction freight forwarding
4.	BSS 2000 Kft.	2700 Cegléd, Alkotmány út 59.	www.bss2000.hu	HU 11 2016 0011	30.11. 2011	traction freight forwarding
5.	Central Railways, s.r.o.	040 01 Szlovákia, Košice, Kriva 21.	www.crw.sk	HU 12 2017 0002	01.02. 2012	traction freight forwarding
6.	CER Zrt.	1097 Budapest Könyves Kálmán krt. 16.	www.cer.hu	HU 11 2016 0009	28.11. 2011	traction freight forwarding
7.	Continental Railway Solution Kft.	1143 Budapest, Hungária krt. 80/a II/3.	www.continentaltrain.com	HU 11 2015 0006	15.05. 2015	traction, passenger transport, freight forwarding
8.	DB Cargo Hungária Kft.	9027 Győr, Hűtőház út 23.	hu.dbcargo.com	HU 11 2016 0012	15.12. 2011	traction
9.	DRT Danubius Rail Transport Kft.	1064 Budapest, Podmaniczky utca 57.	www.danubiusrailtransport.hu	HU 11 2013 0001	10.04. 2013	traction
10.	DS VASÚT Kft.	4400 Nyíregyháza, Derkovits utca 74.	www.dsvasut.uniweb.hu	HU 11 2017 0006	10.05. 2015	traction and freight forwarding

11.	DUNAGÉP Szolgáltató Zrt.	2316 Tököl, Csépi út 221.	www.dunagep.hu	HU 11 2013 0005	16.06. 2013	traction
12.	Express Group a.s.	82109 Bratislava, Plynárenská 7/B.	www.expressgroup.sk	HU 12 2015 0012	01.07. 2015.	traction freight forwarding
13.	FEHÉRVILL-ÁM Kft.	8000 Székesfehérvár, Szedres út 23.	–	HU 11 2014 0006	30.06. 2014.	vontatás árutovábbítás
14.	Floyd Zrt.	1138 Budapest, Madarász u.47-49.	www.floyd.hu	HU 11 2017 0004	01.09. 2008	traction freight forwarding
15.	FOX Rail Zrt.	1042 Budapest, Árpád út 56, II. em. 4.	www.foxrail.hu	HU 11 2013 0009	10.10. 2013	traction freight forwarding
16.	G & G Kft.	6726 Szeged Torockói u. 3/b	www.gesgkft.hu	HU 11 2014 0008	16.12. 2008	freight forwarding
17.	GySEV Cargo Zrt.	9400 Sopron, Mátyás király u. 19.	www.gysevcargo.hu	HU 11 2015 0007	01.06. 2010	traction freight forwarding
18.	GySEV Zrt.	9400 Sopron Mátyás Király u. 19.	www.gysev.hu	HU 11 2011 0007	28.06. 2007	passenger transport traction
19.	Hungarian Railway Kft.	1053 Budapest Magyar u. 29.	www.hungarian-railway.hu	HU 11 2016 0007	01.06. 2016.	passenger transport traction
20.	IntegRail Zrt.	1138 Budapest, Révész u. 27.	www.integrail.hu	HU 11 2016 0006	01.06. 2016.	passenger transport traction
21.	Kárpát Vasút Kft.	2737 Ceglédbercel, Virág utca 9.	www.karpatvasut.hu	HU 11 2017 0001	01.05. 2010	traction freight forwarding
22.	LOKORAIL a.s.	82 109 Bratislava, Horárska 12.	www.lokorail.sk/hu	HU 12 2016 0006	23.08. 2016.	vontatás árutovábbítás
23.	LTE Hungária Vasúti Árufuvarozó és Logisztikai Kft.	1117 Budapest, Október 23. utca 8-10.	www.lte-group.eu	HU 11 2015 0013	24.02. 2015	traction freight forwarding
24.	LTE Logistik- und Transport GmbH (2017.áprilisban visszavonva)	Karlauer Gürtel 1 A-8020 Graz Austria	www.lte-group.eu	HU 12 2015 0016	12.02. 2010	vontatás árutovábbítás
25.	Magyar Vasúti Áruszállító Kft.	4028 Debrecen, Jósika utca 9.	www.mvakft.hu	HU 11 2015 0008	15.08. 2011	freight forwarding
26.	MÁV FKG Kft.	5137 Jászkisér Jászladányi u. 10.	www.fkg.hu	HU 11 2013 0010	16.11. 2008	traction freight forwarding
27.	MÁV NOSZTALGIA KFT.	1142 Budapest, Tatai út 95.	www.mavnosztalgia.hu	HU 11 2016 0001	01.06. 2009	passenger transport traction freight forwarding

28.	MÁV-START Zrt	1087 Budapest Könyves Kálmán krt. 54-60.	www.mav-start.hu	HU 11 2015 0009	01.07. 2010	passenger transport traction, maintenance services
29.	MÁV VAGON Kft.	8000 Székesfehérvár, Takarodó út 1.	www.mavcsoport.hu	HU 11 2017 0009	2017. 11.17	vontatás árutovábbítás
30.	METRANS /Danubia/ a.s.	92901 Szlovákia, Dunajska Streda, Povodska cesta 18.	www.metrans.cz	HU 12 2017 0007	01.07. 2012	traction freight forwarding
31.	METRANS /Danubia/ Kft.	9024 Győr, Somogyi Béla utca 22. B. ép. 2. em. 7.	www.metrans.hu	HU 11 2016 0005	01.05. 2016.	traction freight forwarding
32.	MMV Zrt.	1035 Budapest, Kerék u. 80.	www.mmv.hu	HU 11 2017 0008	01.10. 2007	traction freight forwarding
33.	MOL Nyrt.	1117. Budapest, Október huszonharmadika u. 18.	www.mol.hu	HU 11 2012 0001	01.04. 2012	freight forwarding
34.	MTMG Zrt.	1012 Budapest, Logodi u. 34/A	mtmgzrt.com	HU 11 2015 0010	16.11. 2009	traction freight forwarding
35.	PETROLSPED s.r.o.	98401 Lučenec, L. Svobodu 2839/1 Szlovákia	www.petrolsped.sk	HU 12 2017 0005	16.05. 2012	traction freight forwarding
36.	PKP Cargo Spółka Akcyjna	Grójecka 17., PL-02-021 Warszawa	www.pkp-cargo.pl	HU 12 2014 0009	10.05. 2013	traction freight forwarding
37.	Prvá Slovenská Železničá, a.s.	934 01 Levice, Ku Bratke 5. Szlovákia	www.psz.sk	HU 12 2014 0004	16.05. 2008	traction freight forwarding
38.	Rail Cargo Hungaria Zrt.	1033 Budapest, Váci u. 92.	www.railcargo.hu	HU 11 2016 0002	01.03. 2011	traction freight forwarding
39.	Rail Cargo Carrier Zrt.	1033 Budapest, Váci u. 92.	www.rcc.hu	HU 11 2014 0010	01.04. 2013.	traction freight forwarding
40.	RailTrans International a.s.	920 41 Leopoldov, Trnavská cesta	www.railtrans.eu/en/	HU 12 2018 0002	19.12. 2013.	vontatás árutovábbítás
41.	RTS Rail Transport GmbH	A-8055 Graz, Puchstraße 184	www.rts-rail.com	HU 12 2011 0003	13.10. 2011	traction freight forwarding
42.	SŽDS a.s.	960 01 Zvolen, Na Štepnici 1379/1., Szlovákia	www.szds.sk	HU 12 2013 0011	16.10. 2008	traction freight forwarding

43.	STRABAG Vasútépítő Kft.	1117 Budapest, Gábor Dénes utca 2.	www.strabag.com	HU 11 2015 0011	01.10. 2015.	traction freight forwarding
44.	Swietelsky Vasúttechnika Kft.	9500 Celldömölk, Nagy Sándor tér 14.	www.vasuttechnika.hu	HU 11 2013 0007	16.08. 2013	traction freight forwarding
45.	STRABAG RAIL Kft.	6000 Szentes, Baross G. u. 2.	www.strabag.com	HU 11 2014 0002	16.05. 2008	vontatás árutovábbítás
46.	Train Hungary Kft.	4028 Debrecen, Szoboszlói u. 50.	www.trainhungary.hu	HU 11 2017 0007	01.09. 2007	traction freight forwarding
47.	Vasútépítők Kft.	9031 Győr, Csaba utca 9. 1123 Budapest, Alkotás u.50 C.épület	www.vasutepitok.hu	HU 11 2015 0014	22.12. 2015	traction freight forwarding
48.	Vasútvillamosító Kft.	1106 Budapest, Jászberényi út 90.	www.vasutvill.hu	HU 11 2016 0010	15.11. 2011	traction freight forwarding
49.	Záhony-Port Zrt.	4625 Záhony, Európa tér 12.	www.zahony-port.hu	HU 11 2013 0008	16.09. 2008	traction freight forwarding
50.	ŽSSK CARGO a.s.	Bratislava, Drieňová u. 24. 820 09 Slovakia	www.zscargo.sk	HU 12 2015 0014	16.10. 2010	traction freight forwarding

ANNEX B: Organisation chart(s) of the National Safety Authority

B.1. Chart: Internal organization



B.2. Chart: Relationship with other National Bodies



ANNEX C: CSIs data – Definitions applied

C.1. CSIs data

Outcomes






Serious injuries per accident type
100
80
60
40
20
0
76
88
87
90
38
54
40
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Collisions
Derailments
Level crossing accidents
Accidents to persons caused by RS in motion
Fires in RS
Others


Serious injuries per user
100
80
60
40
20
0
76
88
87
90
38
54
40
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Passengers
Employees
Level crossing users
Unauthorised persons
Others



Exposure data




Number of passenger kilometers (millions)
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
7795
8070
7830
7379
7244
8652
7689
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Passenger km


Number of line kilometres
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
7690
7691
7590
7706
7737
7736
7736
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Line km



Risk indicators




Passenger fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion passenger-km (CST 1.2)
1,00
0,90
0,80
0,70
0,60
0,50
0,40
0,30
0,20
0,10
0,00
0,795
0,880
0,766
0,732
0,538
0,659
0,208
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
FWSI per billion passenger-km


Employee fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km (CST 2)
25,00
20,00
15,00
10,00
5,00
0,00
9,981
9,507
4,351
16,816
21,296
11,218
1,720
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
FWSI per billion train-km


Level crossing user fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km (CST 3.1)
300,00
250,00
200,00
150,00
100,00
50,00
0,00
264,032
253,237
208,854
220,580
241,667
146,637
175,454
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
FWSI per billion train-km


Level crossing user fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km / Track-km per No of level crossings (CST 3.2)
180,00
160,00
140,00
120,00
100,00
80,00
60,00
40,00
20,00
0,00
150,850
144,635
119,286
150,007
164,367
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
FWSI per exposure


Other user fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km (CST 4)
16,00
14,00
12,00
10,00
8,00
6,00
4,00
2,00
0,00
0,000
0,000
13,053
9,891
0,000
8,013
8,601
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
FWSI per billion train-km


Unauthorized person fatalities and weighted serious injuries per billion train-km (CST 5)
1000,00
800,00
600,00
400,00
200,00
0,00
500,844
374,237
684,867
856,603
745,370
608,984
694,934
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
FWSI per billion train-km



Precursor to accidents







Please note: For reporting years 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 no input data were available.


Number of level crossings by type
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
6043
6041
6041
6041
6041
6047
6047
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Active
Passive

C.2. Definitions used in the annual report

C.2.1. Definitions in Regulation 91/03 to be applied:

deaths (killed person)
means any person killed immediately or dying within 30 days as a result of an injury accident, excluding suicides

injuries (seriously injured person)
means any person injured who was hospitalized for more than 24 hours as a result of an accident, excluding attempted suicides

passenger-km
means the unit of measure representing the transport of one passenger by rail over a distance of one kilometer. Only the distance on the national territory of the reporting country shall be taken into account

passenger
means any person, excluding members of the train crew, who makes a trip by rail. For accident statistics, passengers trying to embark/disembark onto/from a moving train are included

suicide
means an act to deliberately injure oneself resulting in death, as recorded and classified by the competent national authority

significant accident
means any accident involving at least one rail vehicle in motion, resulting in at least one killed or seriously injured person, or in significant damage to stock, track, other installations or environment, or extensive disruptions to traffic. Accidents in workshops, warehouses and depots are excluded

train
means one or more railway vehicles hauled by one or more locomotives or railcars, or one railcar traveling alone, running under a given number or specific designation from an initial fixed point to a terminal fixed point. A light engine, i.e. a locomotive traveling on its own, is not considered to be a train

train*Km
means the unit of measure representing the movement of a train over one kilometer. The distance used is the distance actually run, if available, otherwise the standard network distance between the origin and destination shall be used. Only the distance on the national territory of the reporting country shall be taken into account

C.2.2. National definitions

Directive 2004/49/EC lays down in Annex 1, point 6:

"Definitions

The reporting authorities may use nationally applied definitions of the indicators and methods for calculation of costs when data according to this Annex are submitted. All definitions and calculation methods in use shall be explained in an Annex to the annual report described in Article 18."

National definitions and methods to calculate costs concerning the items listed in the Annex 1 to Directive 2004/49/EC are to be reported in this paragraph, whether not defined in this legal act and in the Reg.91/03.

C.3. Abbreviations

CSI	Common Safety Indicator
CSM	Common Safety Method
SPAD	Signal Passed At Danger
CST	Common Safety Target
Reg.	Regulation
ATP	Automatic Train Protection
EIN	European Identification Number
ERA	European Union Agency for Railways
NIB	National Investigation Body
RSD	Railway Safety Directive
LC	Level Crossing
MLN	10^6
BLN	10^9
NSA	National Safety Authority
RS	Rolling Stock
RU/IM	Railway Undertaking and Infrastructure Manager

ANNEX D: Important changes in legislation and regulation

Please refer to section 'E' for the report on the current and upcoming changes in the national legal environment.

ANNEX E: The development of safety certification and authorization – Numerical Data

E.1 Safety Certificates according to Directive 2004/49/EC

	Number of certificates 'Part A' – 2017			
	Number of part A New	Number of part A Amended	Number of part A Renewed	Number of part A Revoked
Total	1	3	0	4

	Number of certificates 'Part B' – 2017			
	Number of part B New	Number of part B Amended	Number of part B Renewed	Number of part B Revoked
Total	1	4	1	7

E.1.3. List of Railway Undertakings with only part B certificate

Name of RU	Member-State where Safety Certificate 'Part A' was issued
boxXpress.de GmbH	Federal Republic of Germany
Central Railways a.s.	Slovak Republic
Express Group a.s.	Slovak Republic
Lokorail a.s.	Slovak Republic
METRANS /Danubia/ a.s.	Slovak Republic
PETROLSPED s.r.o.	Slovak Republic
PKP Cargo Spółka Akcyjna	Republic of Poland
Prvá Slovenská Železničá, a.s.	Slovak Republic
Railtrans International, s.r.o.	Slovak Republic
RTS Rail Transport Service GmbH	Republic of Austria
Slovenská Železničná Dopravná Spoločnosť a. s.	Slovak Republic
Železničná spoločnosť Cargo Slovakia a. s	Slovak Republic

E 1.5. Number of certificates Part A revoked in the reporting year	0

E 1.6. Number of certificates Part B revoked in the reporting year	1

E.2. Safety Authorisations according to Directive 2004/49/EC

	Total number of safety authorisations
E.2.1. Number of valid Safety Authorisations issued to Infrastructure Managers in the reporting year and in previous years and remain valid at the end of the year 2017	2

		A	R	P
E.2.2. Number of applications for Safety Authorisations submitted by Infrastructure Managers in year 2017	New authorisations	-	-	-
	Updated/amended authorisations	-	-	-
	Renewed authorisations	1	-	-

A = Accepted application, authorisation is already issued
R = Rejected applications, no authorisation was issued
P = Case is still pending, no authorisation was issued so far

E.3. Procedural aspects – Safety Certificates part A

		New	Updated /amended	Renewed
The average time after receiving of the application with the required information and the final delivery of a Safety Certificate **Part A** in year 2017 for Railway Undertakings [days]	Where the part A has been issued in the Member-State	90	90	30
	Where the part B has been issued in another Member-State	90	90	30

E.4. Procedural aspects – Safety Certificates part B

		New	Updated /amended	Renewed
The average time after receiving the application with the required information and the final delivery of a Safety Certificate **Part B** in year 2017 for RUs [days]	Where the part A has been issued in the Member-State	90	90	30
	Where the part B has been issued in another Member-State	90	90	30