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REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA
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Number: 010-36/2026-2430-10
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Subject: **Closure of the safety investigation into occurrence ERAIL SI-1267 (train derailment, Ljubljana Zalog station, 10 October 2011) without a final report**

This document sets out the reasons for which the Air, Maritime and Railway Accident and Incident Investigation Unit (hereinafter: the investigation body) closed the safety investigation into the occurrence described below without issuing a final report, and completes the information on this occurrence held by the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA).

1. The occurrence

ERAIL reference:	SI-1267
Occurrence type:	Train derailment
Date and time:	10 October 2011, 02:06
Location:	Switch No. 19, Ljubljana Zalog station, three-track line, km 560+200
Train:	Freight train No. 47502
Consequences:	No fatalities or injuries

The first wagon behind the locomotive of freight train No. 47502, passing through Ljubljana Zalog station from the direction of Dobova towards Sežana, derailed on switch No. 19 at a speed of 80 km/h. The train with the derailed wagon stopped on track No. 1 after running approximately 1,500 m.

2. Status of the investigation

The occurrence was notified to ERA through ERAIL on 17 October 2011 with the legal basis “(b) it forms part of a series of accidents or incidents relevant to the system as a whole” (Article 19(2) of Directive 2004/49/EC). The investigation was formally opened by the then Railway Accident and Incident Investigation Division of the Ministry of Transport, the predecessor of the investigation body. After the initial assessment, the investigation body decided not to continue the investigation and closed the case without issuing a final report.

3. Legal framework

The occurrence, a derailment of one wagon without fatalities or injuries, was notified as a discretionary investigation under Article 19(2) of Directive 2004/49/EC and not as a serious accident under Article 19(1).

Under Article 19(2) of Directive 2004/49/EC on safety on the Community's railways, which applied at the time, the investigation body may investigate accidents and incidents other than serious accidents and decides at its discretion whether or not to investigate, taking into account (a) the seriousness of the accident or incident, (b) whether it forms part of a series of accidents or incidents relevant to the system as a whole, (c) its impact on railway safety on a Community level, and (d) requests from infrastructure managers, railway undertakings, the safety authority or the Member States. Under Article 19(3), the investigation body decides the extent of an investigation

and the procedure to be followed, taking into account the lessons it expects to draw from the investigation for the improvement of safety. The same principles are now laid down in Article 20(2) and (3) of Directive (EU) 2016/798 on railway safety.

4. Assessment

Having assessed the occurrence against the criteria of Article 19(2) and (3) of Directive 2004/49/EC, the investigation body concluded that continuing the investigation would not result in relevant safety findings that would contribute significantly to the improvement of railway safety, for the following reasons:

– There were no fatalities or injuries; the consequences were limited to the derailment of a single wagon and the related damage.

– The technical causes of a derailment of a single wagon (condition of the vehicle, its load or the track) fall within the safety management systems of the railway undertaking and the infrastructure manager, which are responsible for identifying and rectifying them.

– In accordance with the rules in force at the time, the infrastructure manager, Slovenske železnice d.o.o., was required to carry out its own investigation of the occurrence and to report its findings and the measures taken to the investigation body. The infrastructure manager submitted such a report. Since the cause of the occurrence was addressed by the measures already taken by the infrastructure manager, the investigation body considered that continuing its own investigation would not add safety value.

– The system-level aspects of derailments on station switches have since been examined by the investigation body in the investigations of the derailments at Zidani Most on 19 June 2017 and at Kranj on 11 July 2017. In both cases the infrastructure manager was recommended to carry out load tests of switches on main station tracks in the diverging position with measuring trains, in order to detect hidden track settlement.

5. Decision

On the basis of the above, the investigation into occurrence SI-1267 was closed without a final report. With this document the closure is communicated to ERA, and the occurrence is reported as closed in the data submitted to ERA. This document forms part of the case file.

With Regards,

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