




Transporta nelaimes gadījumu un incidentu izmeklēšanas birojs

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Railway accident investigation final report № 5-02/4-25 (Extraction)

Serious accident at railway level crossing No. 910 on 1 October 2025 on the Zaslauks–Priedaine railway section



Translation

Translation provided in terms of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/572 of 24 April 2020 on the reporting structure to be followed for railway accident and incident investigation reports.

The translation requirements of the Regulation apply to the Summary, Conclusions and Safety Recommendations sections of the Final Report.

This document is the translation of Points 1, 5 and 6 of the Latvian version of the Final Report. Although efforts have been made to translate the mentioned parts of the Final Report as accurately as possible, discrepancies may occur. In such case, the Final Report in the Latvian language is the authentic and official version.

1. Summary

The railway traffic accident (hereinafter – the accident) occurred on 1 October 2025 at 18:00 during the movement of rolling stock at railway level crossing No. 910 near Imanta stopping point (hereinafter – the stopping point) on the Zaslauks–Priedaine railway section. Two underage girls were fatally injured in the accident when, while crossing the railway level crossing on an electric scooter, they came under passenger train No. 6432M and sustained fatal injuries.

Protected railway level crossing No. 910 is equipped with automatic level crossing signalling, which activates stop signals towards the road, and the automatic barriers assume the closed position sufficiently in advance of the arrival of rolling stock to allow road vehicles to clear the crossing. The automatic level crossing signalling continues to operate and the automatic barriers remain in the closed position until the rolling stock has completely cleared the crossing. At the time of the accident, the light signalling and barriers were operating, while a malfunction of the acoustic signalling had been identified on one side; no causal link between that malfunction and the accident was established. Signs reading “Beware of train” were placed at the crossing in clearly visible locations, and an equivalent inscription was also marked on the asphalt of the pedestrian path (see Figure 1).



a) View from the Akācījas iela side



b) View from the Rostokas iela side

Figure 1. Location of safety signs and markings

On the day of the accident, the protected level crossing was attended by a level crossing keeper of the Track Department of the railway infrastructure manager (LDZ). While performing her duties, the level crossing keeper was awaiting passenger train No. 6432M approaching from the Jūrmala direction, standing facing the approaching train. As the train approached the railway level crossing, the level crossing keeper noticed the girls travelling at high speed on an electric scooter along the pedestrian path on Zolitūdes iela from the Jūrmalas gatve side and crossing the level crossing. The crossing was closed and an acoustic signal was sounding. The level crossing

keeper gave a warning signal with a signal horn, but the girls did not react and continued moving. While continuing to cross the level crossing, the girls entered the path of passenger train No. 6432M, resulting in a collision with the train. Following the collision, the electric train stopped beyond the level crossing area.

Passenger train No. 6432M (electric multiple unit 16Ev No. 0011, manufactured in 2023 at the “Škoda Vagonka a.s.” plant) was operated by a traction unit driver (train driver) (hereinafter – the electric train driver) working alone. Before Imanta stopping point, train No. 6432M was carrying 103 passengers. A scheduled stop was planned at this stopping point. When approaching Imanta stopping point, the electric train driver commenced service braking at a train speed of 99 km/h and, at the location specified by the railway infrastructure, sounded a warning acoustic signal using the low-volume whistle. The electric train driver then noticed two persons on an electric scooter crossing the railway level crossing via the pedestrian path without stopping, while the crossing was closed to road vehicles and pedestrians, and not reacting to the acoustic warning signal. The electric train driver sounded the high-volume warning signal (horn) and applied emergency braking at a train speed of 75 km/h, however, the collision could not be prevented.

Causal factor

The injured persons entered the danger zone of the railway level crossing and crossed it while the level crossing light and acoustic signalling prohibited crossing and passenger train No. 6432M was approaching the level crossing.

Contributing factors

- The crossing area of the railway level crossing was not equipped with physical measures requiring users to change their movement trajectory or reduce their speed, thereby encouraging assessment of the situation and verification, before crossing the tracks, that no train was approaching;
- Limited visibility of the approaching train from the approach to the level crossing, which reduced the possibility of visually perceiving the approaching train in sufficient time;
- At the time of the accident, the access-control measures of the shared electric scooter rental service did not ensure effective compliance with the age restriction established by the Lessor, as a result of which the injured persons were able to obtain access to the shared vehicle used in the accident, although the Lessor’s rules prohibited its use by persons under 18 years of age.

Systemic factor

The legislation in force at the time of the accident did not establish specific requirements for the minimum safety equipment of railway pedestrian crossings depending on train speed, train visibility and pedestrian traffic intensity.

The causal and contributing factors identified during the investigation describe the accident mechanism and the functioning of the safety system and shall not be regarded as a determination of personal fault or legal liability.

As a result of the investigation, three safety recommendations were developed.

The safety recommendations concern:

- improvement of systematic inspections of railway level crossings and assessment of pedestrian safety equipment;
- assessment of the need for permanent video surveillance at the Imanta railway level crossing;
- implementation of the planned engineering safety measures and assessment of their effectiveness in order to reduce the risk of unauthorised and unsafe track crossing and prevent the recurrence of similar accidents.

5. Conclusions

5.a. Summary of the analysis and conclusions with regard to the causes of the occurrence

The investigation identified the following factors affecting the occurrence:

Causal factor

The injured persons entered the danger zone of the railway level crossing and crossed it while the level crossing light and acoustic signalling prohibited crossing and passenger train No. 6432M was approaching the level crossing.

Contributing factors

- The crossing area of the railway level crossing was not equipped with physical measures requiring users to change their movement trajectory or reduce their speed, thereby encouraging assessment of the situation and verification, before crossing the tracks, that no train was approaching;
- Limited visibility of the approaching train from the approach to the level crossing, which reduced the possibility of visually perceiving the approaching train in sufficient time;
- At the time of the accident, the access-control measures of the shared electric scooter rental service did not ensure effective compliance with the age restriction established by the Lessor, as a result of which the injured persons were able to obtain access to the shared vehicle used in the accident, although the Lessor's rules prohibited its use by persons under 18 years of age.

Systemic factor

The legislation in force at the time of the accident did not establish sufficiently specific requirements for the minimum safety equipment of railway pedestrian crossings depending on train speed, train visibility and pedestrian traffic intensity.

The causal and contributing factors identified in the investigation describe the accident mechanism and the functioning of the safety system and shall not be regarded as a determination of personal fault or legal liability.

5.b. Measures taken since the occurrence

In October 2025, an unscheduled inspection of the technical condition of safety devices at all level crossings in the Riga region was organised. The inspection established that all facilities were in proper technical and visual condition and no defects were identified.

Representatives of the Infrastructure Manager and the Railway Undertaking carried out an investigation into the accident that occurred on 1 October 2025 at railway level crossing No. 910 on the Priedaine–Zasulauks railway section. The results were documented on 19 November 2025 in the “Serious Accident Investigation Report”. The investigation involved representatives of the Track Department and Electrotechnical Department of the Technical Operations Directorate and the Technical Inspectorate of State JSC “Latvijas dzelzceļš”, as well as a representative of JSC “Pasažieru vilciens”. The investigation report specified the following measures to be taken:

1. For the Track Department:
 - 1.1. by 21.11.2025, update the data in the existing list of pedestrian crossings;
 - 1.2. by 30.11.2025, develop a layout for pedestrian movement control barriers (labyrinths) for the pedestrian crossing on Zolitūdes iela;
 - 1.3. by 31.12.2025, equip the pedestrian crossing with pedestrian movement control barriers (labyrinths), subject to favourable weather conditions.
2. For the Electrotechnical Department:

2.1. by 05.12.2025, develop technical documentation for equipping the pedestrian crossing on Zolitūdes iela with temporary additional traffic lights;

2.2. by 09.01.2026, equip the pedestrian crossing with temporary additional pedestrian traffic lights.

3. LDZ:

3.1. carry out a review (inspection) of existing pedestrian crossings in order to identify measures for improving the safety of the respective crossings and their gradual inclusion in investment plans;

3.2. participate in and provide proposals for the development of amendments to Cabinet Regulation No. 392 “Regulations regarding the Construction, Equipment, Servicing and Closure of Railway Level Crossings and Pedestrian Crossings”.

At the time of preparation of this Final Report, the implementation status of the recommendations for improving traffic safety specified in the above-mentioned investigation report was as follows:

- In December 2025, the Technological Processes and Diagnostics Division of the Track Department updated the data in the existing list of pedestrian crossings;
- The Track Design Division of the Track Department developed a layout for pedestrian movement control barriers (labyrinths) for the pedestrian crossing on Zolitūdes iela at level crossing No. 910, km 8 pk 2, on the Zaslauks–Priedaine section and, on 14 April 2026, equipped it with pedestrian movement control barriers (labyrinths); see Figures 14 and 15.



Figure 14. Pedestrian movement control barrier installed after the accident.
View from the Akāciju iela side



Figure 15. Pedestrian movement control barrier installed after the accident.
View from the Rostokas iela side

- On 05.12.2025, the Electrotechnical Department of the Infrastructure Manager developed technical documentation for equipping the pedestrian crossing on Zolitūdes iela at level crossing No. 910, km 8 pk 2, on the Zaslauks–Priedaine section with temporary additional traffic lights,

and on 08.01.2026 the signalling at the pedestrian crossing was put into operation, with additional traffic lights A and B with light and acoustic signalling installed;

- A review (inspection) of existing pedestrian crossings was carried out in order to identify measures for improving the safety of the respective crossings and their gradual inclusion in investment plans. A “Plan of Measures for Improving Safety at Railway Pedestrian Crossings and Their Approaches” was developed, providing for improvements at 45 pedestrian crossings, of which improvements at 17 pedestrian crossings are planned for 2026 and at 28 pedestrian crossings for 2027;

- The Infrastructure Manager participated in and provided proposals for the development of amendments to Cabinet Regulation No. 392.

In addition, within the project “Development of connecting infrastructure of the Riga railway junction: Riga International Airport – Riga Central Railway Station – Aizkraukle direction” (RIX–RCS–Aizkraukle direction), in relation to Imanta stopping point and the Zolitūdes iela level crossing, funding has been approved (Cabinet Regulation No. 599 of 7 October 2025 “Implementing provisions for measure 3.3.1.1 ‘Development of railway infrastructure and improvement of energy efficiency in public passenger transport’ of specific objective 3.3.1 ‘Develop resilient defence infrastructure by promoting military mobility in the European Union’ under Priority 3.1 ‘Sustainable TEN-T infrastructure’ of the European Union Cohesion Policy Programme 2021–2027”). In total, three construction procurements are planned (Torņakalns–Imanta, Imanta–RIX and Jāņavārti–Ogre); so far, two procurements, Torņakalns–Imanta and Jāņavārti–Ogre, have been launched. The Imanta–RIX procurement is planned to be announced by the end of 2026 and will include modernisation of the Zolitūdes iela level crossing (signalling and access).

During the investigation, the project developed by the Infrastructure Manager to improve railway traffic safety at the Imanta railway level crossing was also examined. The project provides for the construction of fences on both sides of the pedestrian crossing in order to prevent bypassing the labyrinth-type barrier, as well as the construction of additional fencing at locations where it is currently possible to cross the railway tracks outside the pedestrian crossing; see Figure 16. At the time the investigation was completed, the safety measures provided for in the project had not yet been implemented.



Figure 16. Locations of additional fencing envisaged by the project

In this connection, Safety Recommendation No. 2026-4 was developed.

Changes to the legal framework for electric micromobility vehicles

Following the accident at the Imanta railway level crossing on 1 October 2025, the issue of the classification of electric micromobility vehicles and the conditions for their use in road traffic, including in relation to minors, was brought into focus.

On 6 November 2025, amendments to the Road Traffic Law were adopted, clarifying the definition of a bicycle and introducing separate terms “electric bicycle” and “self-propelled bicycle”. The amendments distinguished types of electric bicycles according to electric motor power and operating principle and established additional requirements for their use.

At the same time, it was established that persons under 14 years of age are prohibited from participating in road traffic with an electric bicycle, self-propelled bicycle or electric scooter, while persons aged 14 and over must hold the right to drive a bicycle or a vehicle of any category. Additional requirements were also established for shared-vehicle service providers concerning verification of the user’s age and driving entitlement.

The relevant provisions of the Road Traffic Law concerning the classification of electric bicycles and self-propelled bicycles entered into force on 1 February 2026.

On 24 March 2026, amendments to Cabinet Regulation No. 279 of 2 June 2015 “Road Traffic Regulations” were adopted, specifying the requirements for the use of bicycles, self-propelled bicycles and other micromobility vehicles in road traffic.

At the same time, following the accident, the need to improve safety requirements for railway level crossings and pedestrian crossings themselves, including their construction, equipment and safety assessment, was also brought into focus. During the investigation it was established that the Ministry of Transport had developed a draft Cabinet Regulation “Amendments to Cabinet Regulation No. 392 of 6 October 1998 ‘Regulations regarding the Construction, Equipment, Servicing and Closure of Railway Level Crossings and Pedestrian Crossings’”. The annotation to the draft states that the need for the amendments was also prompted by the tragedy that occurred at the Zolitūdes iela railway level crossing on 1 October 2025.

The planned changes include stricter requirements for the equipment of level crossings and pedestrian crossings, more detailed classification thereof, regular safety inspections, clearer allocation of responsibilities between the parties involved, restrictions on the construction of new level crossings, and gradual adaptation of the infrastructure to the new requirements by 2037 (see Table 1). These measures are aimed at improving the safety of road users and reducing the risk of similar accidents in the future.

Table 1

Area of change	Previous regulation	Planned changes	Expected safety benefit
Level crossing equipment	The legislation established only general requirements, leaving the Infrastructure Manager broad discretion in selecting equipment.	Detailed requirements are introduced for each category of level crossing. At certain level crossings, automatic lifting protective barriers closing two thirds of the carriageway will be mandatory, and requirements for the pedestrian walkway section are specified.	The possibility for road users to deliberately cross the level crossing while prohibiting signals are displayed or barriers are lowering will be reduced.
Safety of railway pedestrian crossings	Only general requirements applied to pedestrian crossings, without classification according to risk.	Pedestrian crossings will be classified according to train and pedestrian traffic intensity. Depending on the risk, automatic traffic-light signalling, protective barriers and other safety equipment are provided for.	Safety equipment will be adapted to the actual risk at each specific location.
Annual safety inspection	Regular technical inspection of all pedestrian crossings was not prescribed.	An obligation is introduced to inspect railway pedestrian crossings annually and assess their technical condition.	Timely identification of defects and non-conformities and maintenance of the safety level.
Construction of new level crossings	In certain cases, it was possible to construct lower-category level crossings.	Construction of Category IV level crossings is restricted and construction of level crossings is prohibited at locations with high train speeds or with three or more main tracks.	The number of new high-risk conflict points between road traffic and trains will be reduced.
Closure of existing level crossings	The Infrastructure Manager could propose closure of a level crossing.	In specified cases, closure of a level crossing will become mandatory where a grade-separated crossing (bridge or tunnel) is available nearby.	The number of level crossings, which statistically are higher-risk facilities, will gradually decrease.

Allocation of responsibilities	In practice, disputes often arose regarding maintenance of approaches and the division of responsibilities between infrastructure managers and road managers.	The boundaries of approaches to level crossings and pedestrian crossings, as well as the duties of each party involved regarding construction, maintenance and equipment, are precisely defined.	Clearer responsibility reduces the risk that safety-critical work is not carried out due to unclear competence.
Road signs	Responsibility for maintaining certain safety-relevant road signs was not clearly defined.	Responsibility is established for the installation and maintenance of the road signs "Stop" and "Height restriction".	Traffic organisation is improved and the risk of overhead contact-line damage and other accidents is reduced.

Measures taken by the Consumer Rights Protection Centre (CRPC)

Following the accident of 1 October 2025, the Consumer Rights Protection Centre (CRPC) initiated supervision measures concerning the micromobility vehicle rental service provided by the Lessor. On 2 October 2025, the CRPC required the immediate suspension of the service and submission of evidence confirming its suspension. Subsequently, the service provider's explanations were assessed, checks of the operation of the service were carried out and, on 9 and 13 October 2025, a risk assessment of the service was organised with the participation of representatives of the CRPC, the State Police, State JSC "Road Traffic Safety Directorate", Riga State City Municipality and the Children's Clinical University Hospital. The risk assessment concluded that the service posed a serious risk because minors were able to use the rental service without effective identity and age verification.

On the basis of the risk assessment, on 20 October 2025 the CRPC adopted a decision ordering the Lessor to discontinue provision of the service until effective verification of the identity and age of service recipients had been introduced and the service had been made unavailable to persons under 18 years of age. At the same time, the CRPC established additional safety requirements in the event that the service were to be provided to minors in the future, including requirements concerning minimum age, driving entitlement, personal protective equipment and consent of legal representatives.

According to information provided by the CRPC on 9 July 2026, the Lessor subsequently introduced an identity and age verification solution using document and biometric data verification, which the CRPC recognised as sufficient to eliminate the serious risk. The CRPC also carried out mystery-shopping checks, which established that minors using their own identity documents could no longer gain access to the rental service. Certain cases identified later were related to unauthorised use of third-party identity data rather than deficiencies in the Lessor's control mechanism.

Safety measures implemented and planned by Limited Liability Company "RIDE"

In connection with the accident of 1 October 2025, the Investigation Bureau contacted the shared micromobility service provider (the Lessor), requesting information on measures implemented and planned by the company to reduce the risk of similar accidents.

The Investigation Bureau specifically requested information on measures for restricting minors' access to the service, ensuring and monitoring compliance with the prohibition on several persons simultaneously using one vehicle, as well as on other safety improvements implemented or planned after the accident and cooperation with State, municipal or other institutions.

- Restriction of access by minors

The Lessor informed that the company's services may be used only by persons who have reached the specified age and comply with the requirements laid down in legislation.

To restrict minors' access to the service, the company has introduced user identity and age verification. Before starting a ride, the customer must complete verification by submitting an identity document confirming that the person is at least 18 years of age. Where breaches of the terms of use are identified, the company may block or restrict the respective user account.

In addition, the Lessor informs users in the application about the safety requirements for using the service and the restrictions laid down in legislation.

- Restriction on several persons travelling on one vehicle

The Lessor's terms of use prohibit several persons from travelling on one vehicle at the same time.

To reduce the risk of such infringements, the company displays safety rules and warnings in the application, and information stickers are placed on the self-propelled bicycles stating that two persons are prohibited from travelling on one vehicle at the same time. Where breaches of the terms of use are identified, the company may block or restrict the user account.

At the same time, the Lessor indicated that complete control of such infringements by technological means in the field of shared micromobility services is difficult. In the company's view, public education and road-safety campaigns also play an important role. The Lessor also indicated that, in practice, enforcement of prohibitions laid down in road traffic regulations falls within the competence of law-enforcement authorities, including the State Police and municipal police.

- Other safety improvements and initiatives

After the accident, the Lessor additionally assessed possible measures for improving the safety of shared micromobility services.

As directions for further safety measures, the company identified enhanced information to users on safety requirements in the vicinity of railway level crossings and other high-risk locations, cooperation with State and municipal institutions on road-safety matters, and analysis of safety data and incidents in order to identify potential risks and improve preventive measures.

The Lessor confirmed its readiness to continue cooperating with the responsible institutions in order to promote traffic safety and reduce the risk of similar accidents.

5.c. Additional observations

Following the railway traffic accident that occurred on 1 October 2025 at 18:00 during the movement of rolling stock at railway level crossing No. 910 near Imanta stopping point on the Zaslauks–Priedaine railway section, on the same day, 01.10.2025 at 20:39 on the Sloka–Ķemeri section, km 40 pk 3, the same electric train driver of passenger train No. 6534M (electric multiple unit 16Ev-0011) applied emergency braking in order to avoid striking a person (a woman). The collision could not be avoided; the woman was struck and sustained an injury to her arm. The police and emergency medical personnel were called. The following trains were delayed: No. 6534M – 1 h 19 min; No. 6531 – 1 h 05 min; No. 6536 – 1 h 12 min; No. 6533 – 1 h 07 min; No. 6538 – 1 h 05 min; No. 6535 – 51 min; No. 6537 – 27 min.

At the time of the accident, the Railway Undertaking's internal rules did not establish a specific procedure for replacing a train driver in cases where a train had struck a person, animal, object or vehicle, etc. Following any accident, the responsible (duty) driver instructor conducts a conversation with the train driver in order to determine the train driver's psychological condition and ability to continue the journey. If the train driver reports that he or she cannot continue driving the train, replacement of that train driver is organised immediately and, in parallel, passenger transport by alternative means is arranged. If, however, the train driver states that he or she is able to continue the journey, replacement is organised in a planned manner in Riga or at the turnaround point.

Following the accident under investigation, the electric train driver informed the driver instructor that he felt normal and would continue the journey. Taking into account the seriousness of the accident involving train No. 6432M at railway level crossing No. 910, the Railway

Undertaking had planned to replace the train driver immediately after completion of train No. 6534M service upon arrival in Riga (another reserve train driver had been called in for duty).

In this connection, TNGIIB sent a letter through the network of European national investigation bodies requesting information on the handling of train drivers in situations where a train has struck a person, animal, object or vehicle, etc. The replies received concerning train-driver replacement practices in other European countries are summarised in Table 2.

Table 2

Country	Legal requirements	May the driver continue working?	Practice / notes
Denmark	Yes	No	Medical authorisation is suspended; the driver is replaced immediately.
Slovenia	None	No	Railway undertakings replace a driver involved in a fatal accident.
Finland	None	No	The driver is replaced; an occupational-health examination is mandatory before returning to work.
Greece	None	Usually no	The driver is replaced immediately or at the next station; psychological assessment is provided.
Romania	None	Yes	Replacement is not mandatory; it may take place at the request of the police or the driver.
Sweden	None	No	After a serious accident, continuing the shift is not permitted.
Czechia	None	Yes	Depends on the driver; the driver may request replacement.
Lithuania	None	Depends on the situation	Management assesses the condition; replacement is made if the driver cannot or refuses to continue.
Germany	None	Exceptionally	The driver is normally replaced; in rare cases the driver may continue to the next station.
Croatia	None	No	The driver is normally replaced; leave or sick leave may be granted.
Netherlands	None	Yes	There are no national requirements; the police interview the driver and companies provide support.
Slovakia	None	Yes	If the alcohol test is negative, the driver may continue at his or her own discretion.
United Kingdom	None	Usually no	The driver is normally relieved of duties; exceptionally, the driver may continue to the nearest station.
Spain	None	Yes	The decision is taken by the driver; psychological support is available.
Portugal	None	Yes	The same approach as in Spain.

During the investigation, the Railway Undertaking reached an agreement with the Latvian Railway and Transport Industry Trade Union on amendments to the Collective Agreement concerning specific actions to be taken when a person has been struck. The Collective Agreement was supplemented with the following provisions:

- replacement is ensured as soon as possible, while remuneration is retained until the end of the working period (tour of duty);
- three days of rest are granted from the day following the end of the working period (tour of duty) during which the collision occurred, while average earnings are retained;
- initial psychological assistance is provided within 72 hours after the occurrence;
- on the basis of an employee's application, the Railway Undertaking sends the employee for rehabilitation as soon as possible. Average earnings are retained for the period spent at the rehabilitation centre, but not longer than the period covered by an A-type certificate of incapacity for work.

The Railway Undertaking's internal procedure was improved, namely the "Process Description for Organising the Work of Traction Rolling Stock Locomotive Crews" was approved (by JSC "Pasažieru vilciens" Order No. 34-2026 of 06.02.2026), which also provides that, in cases where a person has been struck or a collision has occurred resulting in injury to a person, replacement of the locomotive crew must be organised as soon as possible. The locomotive crew

is permitted to operate the service as far as Riga Passenger Station with a conductor-controller invited into the driving cab, where replacement of the locomotive crew will take place.

The investigation established that the previous arrangement allowed the train driver to continue working after a fatal accident without mandatory replacement and without a specified rest period, creating a human-factors-related safety risk. Taking into account the measures already implemented by the Railway Undertaking to reduce this risk, an additional safety recommendation is not necessary.

6. Safety Recommendations

Safety Recommendation 2026-2*

State joint-stock company “Latvijas dzelzceļš” should develop a uniform checklist for annual inspections of railway level crossings, also including criteria for assessing equipment and infrastructure intended for the safety of pedestrians, cyclists and users of micromobility devices.

Justification: Use of a uniform checklist will promote a systematic and consistent approach to railway level crossing safety assessment, completeness of inspections and timely identification of safety deficiencies and necessary improvements.

Safety Recommendation 2026-3

State joint-stock company “Latvijas dzelzceļš” should assess the need to install a permanent video-surveillance system at the Imanta railway level crossing in order to obtain objective information on the level crossing and the adjacent pedestrian movement area, identify possible unsafe behaviour and assess the effectiveness of the safety measures implemented.

Justification: The purpose of the video-surveillance system is to improve monitoring of traffic-safety risks, provide objective information for the investigation of accidents and incidents, identify trends in dangerous behaviour by road users and assess the effectiveness of the safety measures introduced, enabling necessary safety measures to be taken in a timely manner and thereby contributing to the prevention of similar accidents in the future.

Safety Recommendation 2026-4

State joint-stock company “Latvijas dzelzceļš” should implement the engineering safety measures provided for in the project at the Imanta railway level crossing by constructing fences at both approaches to the level crossing in order to restrict the possibility of bypassing the labyrinth-type barrier and accessing the railway tracks outside the designated pedestrian crossing.

Justification: The existing solution does not restrict the possibility of bypassing the labyrinth-type barrier and accessing the railway tracks outside the designated pedestrian crossing point.

** The numbering of safety recommendations here begins with the second recommendation. The first recommendation in 2026 was developed by the Investigation Bureau in the course of investigating another accident.*

Riga, 29 September 2026

Investigator in charge
Railway Accident Investigator

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