



Havarikommisjonen

Accident Investigation Board Denmark

2025-390, Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations



Collision between a train and a tractor with wagon between Henne and Outrup on 26-8-2025.

OKTOBER 2026

PREFACE

The Danish Accident Investigation Board for Civil Aviation and Railway (the Accident Investigation Board) is an independent government body whose purpose is to investigate accidents and incidents within the aviation and railway sectors.

The Accident Investigation Board investigates railway accidents and incidents with a view to improving railway safety and preventing accidents.

In accordance with the Danish Railway Act, this report sets out the Accident Investigation Board's investigation and safety assessments of the circumstances of the accident or incident, as well as its causes and consequences.

The investigations are conducted solely for railway safety purposes and are not intended to apportion blame or liability. Accordingly, any use of this report for purposes other than improving railway safety or preventing railway accidents and incidents may lead to erroneous or misleading interpretations.

This document contains an English translation of the chapters Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations from the published Danish investigation report.

The full report in Danish can be found under this link:

<https://havarikommissionen.dk/undersogelsesresultater/soeg-i-jernbane/2026/redegoerelse-2025-390>

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1 SUMMARY

On 26 August 2025, a regional train travelling from Varde towards Nørre Nebel collided with a tractor and trailer combination (a tractor towing an empty straw trailer) at an automatically protected level crossing near Henne Stationsby (level crossing 103, Over Fidevej).

As a result of the collision, the trailer became detached from the tractor and was pushed into the ditch on the right-hand side of the train. The train was travelling at approximately 73 km/h when the brakes were applied shortly before the collision. The train came to a stand approximately 66 meters beyond the level crossing.

No serious injuries were sustained, but the collision resulted in extensive material damage.

The level crossing was protected by a warning system which alerted road users to an approaching train by means of audible warning bells and flashing red lights.

The Danish Accident Investigation Board's investigation showed that the level crossing protection system signals for railway traffic were functioning correctly and that the level crossing signal displayed "level crossing protected" (flashing white light). The road traffic signals had displayed flashing red lights for at least 38 seconds before the train passed the level crossing.

The examination of the level crossing protection system did not identify any conditions affecting its fundamental safety function.

The length of the tractor and trailer combination and the traffic conditions around the level crossing were assessed as contributing to the tractor driver's attention being diverted from the active road traffic signals.

As the level crossing protection system was scheduled to be upgraded to a half-barrier system in October 2026, the Danish Accident Investigation Board did not issue any safety recommendations.

5 CONCLUSION

Based on the available evidence, the Danish Accident Investigation Board assessed that the technical components of the level crossing protection system had functioned as intended and that the road signals had therefore been flashing red for approximately 38 seconds prior to the accident.

The investigation found no faults in the level crossing protection system that could have affected its safety function in relation to the accident.

The tractor driver, who was occupied with checking for other traffic and manoeuvring the tractor and trailer through a right-hand turn and onto Over Fidevej, did not notice that the road signals at level crossing 103 were flashing to indicate that a train was approaching the crossing. It was likely that the tractor driver was affected by the phenomenon of “attentional guidance”, as manoeuvring the tractor and trailer is assumed to have required most of the driver’s attention. Consequently, although the tractor driver had an unobstructed view of the active road signals, the tractor and trailer were not brought to a stop before level crossing 103, and a collision became unavoidable.

7 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the information provided by the infrastructure manager that level crossing 103 at Over Fidevej will be upgraded with a barrier system in October 2026, the Danish Accident Investigation Board has no safety recommendations to make.