



NOTE

Date 20-05-2026
Casenr. 2025-265

English translation of summary, conclusion and recommendations

Summary

Whilst shunting from a platform track to the supply facility at Copenhagen Central, the rolling stock from train 2408 (hereinafter referred to simply as 2408 during this shunting manoeuvre), first passed a signal at danger and collided with train 1030, which was stationary and waiting for permission to proceed. Thereafter, 2408 passed yet another signal at danger.

The station manager utilised the option in the signalling system to hold the final section of the shunting route until it was possible for the signalling system to automatically execute it. Consequently, a shunting signal without a technical barrier became the end point of the shunting route.

The investigation showed that the driver, who was carrying out the routine shunting task with 2408, may have been distracted by, among other things, the rolling stock from train 1030 and additional work tasks.

The AIB has issued two recommendations.

Conclusion

Shunting signal 202.4 was passed whilst in Danger position by 2408 because the driver, who was distracted by a number of factors, failed to notice the signal. This, along with other shunting signals, had previously been passed whilst in a position that did not permit passage.

The driver was convinced that permission for the shunting manoeuvre was still in place as the locomotive approached train 1030, and therefore expected to be able to pass. It was normal practice to pass closely by other vehicles when shunting at Copenhagen Central.

The stationmaster made use of the option in the signalling system to set part of the shunting route in the system, which then set as much as possible automatically and placed the remainder of the train route in a buffer for execution once the track was clear.

This storage meant that shunting signal 202.4 became the end point for the shunting manoeuvre, which was subsequently to continue to track 62, and that points 224a turned to run along the right-hand branch.

The only remaining barrier was therefore dependent on human factors, including limitations.

The task was routine for both driver and stationmaster, which in all likelihood contributed to the fact that no particular attention was paid to the increased risk involved in shunting towards signals without a technical barrier.

Recommendations

The traffic density at Copenhagen Central was heavy, which meant that the likelihood of a collision resulting from a SPAD was also increased.

DK-2026 R 1 of 19-05-2026

The AIB recommends, that the Danish Transport Agency ensure, that Banedanmark, taking human factors and the heavy traffic density at Copenhagen Central into account, carries out a risk assessment of the use of signals without a technical barrier as the end point of a shunting route, and thereby determines whether the risk of a serious accident during shunting is acceptable.

The driver failed to maintain focus on signal observation whilst shunting from track 2 towards the supply facility, and was distracted by a number of factors.

Research has shown, that the risk of being distracted from activities, essential to safe driving, increases with the number of sources of distraction.

DK-2026 R 2 of 19-05-2026

The AIB recommends, that the Danish Transport Agency ensure, that DSB identifies sources of distraction during shunting, and assesses the need to mitigate these, so as to ensure, that the risk of collision during shunting is kept at an acceptable level.