



## NOTE

Date 11-09-2025  
Casenr. 2024-472

### English translation of summary, conclusion and recommendation

#### Near miss track workers near Slagelse on 13-09-2024, Occurrence ID ERA DK-10615.

##### Summary

On the evening of Friday, September 13, 2024, a trackwork had been initiated on the line between Slagelse and Forlev.

A freight train, which had just been dispatched onto the right line from Slagelse towards Forlev, was at approximately 23:40 near kilometer 97.0, dangerously close to hitting two railway workers, who were walking on the track with their backs turned to the train.

The train driver's quick reaction, using the horn and initiating the emergency brake, was the reason the two trackworkers managed to get off the track just seconds before the freight train would have struck them.

The investigation revealed that the two railway workers were working on the track under the assumption that the line was blocked.

The track had indeed been blocked, but the track was reopened for traffic five minutes before the incident.

##### Conclusion

The primary cause of the incident was that the railway workers were working alone on a track that was not blocked.

This situation arose due to a misunderstanding between the railway workers and the controller of site safety (COOS), and was able to escalate because the work had commenced without prior and adequate instruction to all parties, and without supervision from the COSS or assistant.

The investigation revealed that the two railway workers had commenced work on the track under the belief that it was blocked. The line had indeed been blocked, but reopen five minutes earlier by the COSS and the Signaller.

Both human and organizational factors contributed to the occurrence of the incident.

The miscommunication between the railway workers and the COSS, along with the fact that the railway workers had seen a train traveling on the left track towards Forlev just minutes earlier, reinforced their belief that the line was still blocked.

The employees' focus on completing the task likely overshadowed considerations for their own safety and increased their willingness to disregard applicable safety regulations.

This risk-taking behavior may arise, as in this case, when the railway workers was not ready on time. Once the railway workers were finally prepared, their attention was solely directed toward completing the task. Apparently, no consideration was given to following prescribed procedures, questioning whether the work could be carried out at all, or refusing to proceed.

Another contributing factor was that the description of the work in the railway safety plan was general, and the specific task related to track adjustment was listed as one among several tasks in the plan. It was the assessment of the Accident Investigation Board that the involved employees' focus on completing the infrastructure work influenced their risk tolerance, thereby negatively impacting railway safety.

### **Recommendation**

The investigation revealed that employees certified with the "Watch out on the track" (Pas på, på banen) competence began work on the track without adequate instruction or supervision.

It was the assessment of the Accident Investigation Board that the involved employees' focus on completing the infrastructure work influenced their risk tolerance, thereby negatively affecting railway safety.

The many different types of work and tasks outlined in the railway safety plan made it unclear which specific rules applied to each individual job.

As the issue of railway safety plans had previously been addressed in Recommendation DK-2024 R 6 dated September 5, 2024, the following recommendation is now issued to address safety communication between the COSS and employees certified with the "Watch out on the track" competence.

### **DK-2025 R 7 dated September 12, 2025**

The Accident Investigation Board recommends that the Danish NSA ensure that Banedanmark (IM) initiates measures to improve safety communication between the COSS and employees certified with the "Watch out on the track" competence at the commencement of work. This communication should include instruction on the railway safety aspects relevant to the specific tasks being performed.