



NOTE

Date 16-05-2025
Casenr. 2024-274

English translation of summary, conclusions and recommendation

Summary

After arriving at Høje Taastrup Station, freight train 6160 had to be shunted to the terminal. The shunting was initiated before all conditions were met. This led to the front wagon in the shunting train colliding with a derailment device, and the shunter jumping off the shunting train to avoid serious injury. The wagon remained on the track and the damage costs were limited to DKK 35,000.

Several barriers, which depended on human factors, failed, paving the way for an incident that had previously and under similar conditions led to a serious accident.

The Accident Investigation Board made one recommendation.

Conclusions

On 15-05-2024 at 18:51, a shunting train with wagons from train 6160 hit Derailing device 1 in Høje Taastrup. The reason for the collision was that the shunting had been initiated before the conditions for this were met. The underlying causes, which in combination led to the accident, were that:

- a safety message was misinterpreted by the receiver, and this was not noted by the sender
- a signal was overlooked, because the shunter believed that permission to start shunting already had been given. In addition, the shunter probably avoided looking in the direction of the signal, due to the position of the bright sun.
- the speed was not adjusted towards Derailing device 1, because the shunter did not expect to encounter an obstacle here, and because the color of Derailing device 1 blended in with the surroundings.

The barriers that were set up to prevent these causes were not sufficient.

All the barriers were dependent on human performance (soft barriers).

The consequences of the collision with Derailing device 1, which was not designed for collision in this direction, were limited to a shunter who was injured when he jumped off the shunting vehicle, as well as costs for inspection and repair of approximately € 5,000.

In a similar accident in 2016, a wagon derailed. One person lost their life, and there was also a real risk that the wagon could hit, or be hit by, an oncoming train on track 1.

The outcome of collisions with Derailing device 1 during shunting from Høje Taastrup track 0 towards the terminal must therefore be expected to have been determined by coincidence.

Recommendation

Since a collision with Derailment device 1 posed a risk of collision with a train on track 1, a serious danger for the shunter who was located outside on a vehicle, and since shunting from Høje Taastrup track 0 towards the terminal took place several times a day, Accident Investigation Board Denmark assessed that the use of exclusively soft barriers did not ensure an acceptable level of safety.

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Accident Investigation Board Denmark recommends that the Danish Safety Authority ensure that Banedanmark (the infrastructure manager) introduces measures to prevent collisions with Derailment device 1 when shunting from Høje Taastrup track 0 towards the terminal.