



Havarikommisjonen

Accident Investigation Board Denmark

Summary 2024-199



Nr. Asmindrup, Trains near miss (27-03-2024)

MARTS 2025

SUMMARY

On Wednesday 27-03-2024 at 18:45, two regional trains were at risk of colliding with each other at Nr. Asmindrup Station (Odsherredsbanen). Train 190074 departed from Nr. Asmindrup Station, track 1 without signal/permission and drove out towards the free track, where Train 190075 was simultaneously on its way to the platform on track 2. The route was single-track, and the two trains were scheduled to cross each other at Nr. Asmindrup Station at 18:45.

CONCLUSION

Based on the investigations carried out, the Accident Investigation Board assessed that the time pressure caused by Train 1's delay and Lkf 1's perception that there was no need to cross anyway were contributing factors to Lkf 1 starting the train without permission. In addition, this perception could have been strengthened by the initiation of crossing 55, which reflected a normal departure without crossing.

The Odsherredsbanen, which was not equipped with a train control system, had had 39 signal overruns in the past five years; of these, initiations without a signal accounted for 20. Several of these took place on No. Asmindrup Station, where previous attempts had also been made to stop oncoming trains.

On lines without train control systems, passing signals poses a greater risk of collision than on lines equipped with train control systems.

The operation of the safety system did not allow the Railway Safety Officer to detect the impending danger, as the system did not give a RED ALARM supplemented by an acoustic alarm. This is considered to have contributed to the Railway Safety Officer not being aware of the danger.

The Accident Investigation Board assessed that the lack of an alarm had no influence on this incident, as a collision was so imminent that the Railway Safety Officer had not had the opportunity to react before a possible collision.

In its risk profile, LT had identified a hazard concerning passing signals when departing from a station without a driving permit, which was categorized under the accident type Collision, train against other railway vehicle.

Barriers were in place for this hazard, but these were not sufficient to prevent this incident.

It was the Accident Investigation Board's assessment that an accident was prevented when Lkf 1 chose to warn Lkf 2 by flashing the train's headlights. However, this barrier was not described anywhere as a possible risk control measure.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On the Odsherredsbanen, several starts without a driving permit were identified. This single-track section did not have a train control system that could stop trains that had started without a driving permit. The section therefore had a greater risk of collision than similar sections with train control systems. The barriers set up by the railway undertaking to prevent starts without a driving permit were not sufficient and did not appear to take into account the factors that, according to the Accident Investigation Board's assessment,

influenced the train driver in connection with the train's departure from Nr. Asmindrup Station.

DK-2025 R 1 of 27-03-2025.

The Accident Investigation Board recommends that the Danish Transport Authority ensure that Lokaltog conducts an analysis that clarifies which human factors may constitute reasons for starting without a driving permit in connection with crossings at stations without train control systems, and, taking into account the clarified human factors and their probability of causing starting without a driving permit, ensures that barriers to achieve an acceptable level of safety are set up and function effectively.