

# **ERA ERTMS conference**

**Operational harmonization workshop** 





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# SP objectives

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- The System Pillar is the "generic system integrator" for the Europe's Rail Joint Undertaking (EU-Rail), and the architect of the future EU's railway system.
- Whilst most individual railway systems have views of the future railway architecture, there is no common EU railway system view that is used today. The problem with this is that innovations and changes to the system are very difficult and costly to achieve.

Goals

 System Pillar is the opportunity for the sector to converge on the evolution of the railway system – operational concept and system architecture.





# System Pillar CCS view Logical Architecture & Organization



# OH current activities and SP complementarity



- Already in the last ERTMS Conference 2022, the need for the sector to work on a more uniform ERTMS deployment was identified by ERA
- Harmonised trackside engineering was recognised to have a strong effect on operational interoperability



#### ERTMS/ETCS Reference Architecture

-Emergency Services -Railway Neighbours -Level Crossings -Unfitted Infrastructure -National Signaling and Operating Rules -Existing ATP Systems	Rolling stock •TSI Compliant Rail Network •Harmonised Application & Operating Rules •Train Data	Harmo	Architecture
Objects •Control Centre •Train Detection Systems •Driver and Work ers	-GSM Radio & Eurobalise Air Gaps -Adjacent Radio Block Centre (L2 Only) -Train Interface to TSI compliant		ERTMS/ ETCS Reference



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The ETCS toolbox (1/2)

Engineering rules and Operational rules



- The work in the System Pillar focuses on a particular subset of implementation Level 2 ETCS without lineside signalling, and specific harmonised technical approaches and the associated operational processes, harmonized architecture, and linked engineering rules.
- In this way harmonised operational processes for this particular subset of implementation can be derived beyond the current scope of the OPE TSI.
- ETCS toolbox can be used in numerous ways, all leading to TSI-compliant implementations. However attractive to designers, this freedom can lead to a large disparity among implementations, each offering substantially different "user experience" to the driver
- for ETCS Level 2, there is a certain degree of freedom e.g. when to use which mode, how the sequences of message exchanges happen, where to place balises with what content, or what the sequences of human and system actions are in different situations. This freedom leads to different processes for actors and to different product implementations (for example in interlockings and RBC) on the trackside



The focus of the System Pillar work on a harmonised target system - radio-based ERTMS implementation without lineside signalling – potentially allows for a number of complementary changes compared to the current TSI OPE that contribute to a further step towards further harmonisation of operational processes and operational rules = in the case of implementation of the target system.



In addition to the currently harmonised system, this uniformity will reduce freedom of implementation flexibility but also bring several positive side-effects, for example in standardising hardware and software modules, reducing cost, freeing capacity for faster development and implementation, accelerating deployment and streamlining certification and authorisation



### Scope of actors

- Consideration of all actors (especially signaller) included in the analysis beyond a driver focus
- Scope of rules
  - Harmonised rulebook through reducing the variability of trackside implementation, i.e. by discipline and uniform in the implementation of the functions and engineering
  - Deeper consideration of processes
  - Consideration of harmonised degraded modes taking opportunity of new only ETCS lines including steps of harmonized and uniform system requirements for other underlying systems
  - Configuration dependency of harmonised operational processes
- Presentation and structuring of the Operational rules
  - A scenario-based (situation specific time-ordered process sequences of state-dependent actor actions and interactions with systems) as well as functionality-based description, with the advantage of a description from the perspective of the user that this text can be copied in its entirety in a rulebook subset for the RU.





#### **ERTMS/ETCS** Reference Architecture

#### **Harmonized Target System** Interlockings & Trackside GSM Radio & Objects Eurobalise Air Gaps •Control Centre Adjacent Radio Block Centre (L2 Train Detection Only) Systems ERTMS/ ETC S Driver and Workers Train Interface to TSI compliant Reference Emergency Services Rolling stock Architecture Railway Neighbours In green those TSI Compliant Rail additional aspects SP Network Level Crossings considers relevant for Harmonised Unfitted Infrastructure Application & harmonisation National Signaling and Operating Rules Operating Rules Train Data Harmonised Existing ATP Systems Domain Scheme and Train Specific Data National Signalling Domain



#### Engineering rules and Operational rules





• Rules for positioning and configuring trackside CCS assets for ETCS Level 2 for example balises and boards.



# Current TSI : App A

# <u>Functional based</u> description of the use of the system that fits in all the variants of ETCS.

(B2, B3, B4, L1, L2, with signals/without signals, with packet88/ without packet88, with baliselist /whitout baliselist etc. )

List of functions from the perspective of the driver

"Add on": App B, C , D if also applicable on a certain implementation

# Future TSI : App A + App A2 ?

<u>Scenario</u> based description of the use of the ERJU Target System. Including possible "Add on" from App B, C, D

List of scenarios including perspective of all relevant actors in the scenario

Easy way to derive content for harmonized rulebooks.. Or should the rulebook also be part of the TSI OPE ?



# Current TSI : App A

#### 6.44. .Managing a level crossing not protected

The train is approaching a level crossing which is not protected. Levels 1, 2

6.44.1. *If in FS, OS or LS* When the following symbol is displayed: the driver shall apply rule 7 of Appendix B2.

6.44.2. *If in SR* When the following text message is displayed: "Level crossing not protected", the driver shall apply rule 7 of Appendix B2

# Future TSI : App A + App A2 ?

SP OD 315 Managing a level crossing not protected (driver)

When approaching a defective level crossing the following symbol on the DMI is shown.

A braking curve is offered to an EOA that is in approach of the level crossing.

If the train is close enough to the level crossing, the MA will be extended by a maximum speed of 30 km/h.

When approaching the level crossing, the driver sounds the horn and stops in front of the level crossing if safety so requires.

If the level crossing is obstructed, the driver shall call the signaller

As soon as the front end of the train has passed the level crossing, the LX symbol disappears of the DMI and the MA shows a higher speed again.



# Current TSI : App A

#### 6.44. Managing a level crossing not protected

The train is approaching a level crossing which is not protected. Levels 1, 2

6.44.1. *If in FS, OS or LS* When the following symbol is displayed: the driver shall apply rule 7 of Appendix B2.

6.44.2. *If in SR* When the following text message is displayed: "Level crossing not protected", the driver shall apply rule 7 of Appendix B2

# Future TSI : App A + App A2 ?

# SP OD 315 Managing a level crossing not protected (signaller)

A route is set to a part of the line in which there is a defective level crossing. The system will automatically detect this defect and give the trains on that line an adjusted MA with an instruction on how to act at the level crossing. The driver follows up on this MA.

If it is not possible to give an MA, the train will be able to continue in SR. In this case, the signaler must contact the driver and provide him with a European Instruction #8

# From OH to target system requirements





- 1. Scope of Work and Methodology
- 2. List of OD Operational Capabilities
- 3. Concept Template
- 4. Example 315: Passing non protected LX
- 5. Next Steps





OD Scope of Work: ERTMS/ETCS operational harmonization

#### SEMP methodology



## **ARCADIA OA methodology**

- analyzing stakeholder requirements
- analyzing national variants
- deriving operational needs
- defining harmonized processes

## Major advantage of this method

- Layering: OD focuses on operational needs
- Other domains: Technological decisions, migration



OD Scope of Work: ERTMS/ETCS operational harmonization

#### SEMP methodology





#### N. 32 Operational Capabilities

- N. 12 Regular
- N. 3 Transitions
- N. 14 Degraded
- N. 3 Maintenance

C SPT.	20D-1942	101-Preparation to train departure and starting a journey	C SPT2OD-1961	3
C SPT	20D-1943	102-Operate the train from A to B (force movement permission)	© SPT2OD-1962	3
C SPT	20D-1944	103-Train arrival (ending journey)	© SPT2OD-1963	3
C SPT	20D-1945	104- Splitting a train	© SPT2OD-1964	3
C SPT.	20D-1946	105- Joining trains	C SPT2OD-1965	3
C SPT	20D-1947	106-Change of train orientation	© SPT2OD-1966	3
C SPT	20D-1948	107- Approaching stop location	© SPT2OD-1967	3
C SPT.	20D-1949	108-Revoke Movement permission	© SPT2OD-1968	3
C SPT	20D-1950	109- Pass a level crossing	© SPT2OD-1969	3
(C) SPT	20D-1951	150- Shunting inside controlled areas	© SPT2OD-1970	3
	20D-1953	152-Entering into a non controlled area (Shunting yard)	© SPT2OD-1971	3
			© SPT2OD-1972	3
	20D-1954	153-Exiting from a non controlled area (Shunting yard)	© SPT2OD-5637	3
	20D-1956	21-Entry Transition from non CCS area	© SPT2OD-1974	4
C SPT.	20D-1957	22-Exit Transition to CCS area	© SPT2OD-1975	4
C SPT	20D-1958	23-HO Handover between ETCS systems	C SPT2OD-1976	4

302-Moving under driver responsibility 305-Reversing 306- Continue After Trip/ Post Trip 307-Handling of Emergency situations 308- Train assistance 309-Handling of a train after loss of communica 310-Proceed after TIMS failure 311-Runaway Vehicle 312-OS Sweeping a track section 314-Pass a technically non-supervised point 315-LX Pass a defective level crossing 316-INIT Trackside initialisation 317 - Obstacle detection 401-Working area excluding normal train operat 402-Working area allowing normal train operativ 403-UR Manage usage restrictions

List of Actors: https://polarion.rail-research.europa.eu/polarion/redirect/project/SPT2OperationDesign/workitem?id=SPT2OD-1568 List of Operational Capabilities: https://polarion.rail-research.europa.eu/polarion/redirect/project/SPT2OperationDesign/workitem?id=SPT2OD-1937



- 1. Sources
- 2. Abstract
- 3. Target and Ambitions
- 4. Actors
- 5. Identification of national variants
- 6. Hazard Analysis
- 7. Analysis of national variants
- 8. Harmonized proposal
- 9. Harmonization conflicts
- 10. Annex: Remarks and recommendations

ARCADIA diagrams to complement textual description







Scenario diagram

https://polarion.rail-research.europa.eu/polarion/redirect/project/SPT2OperationDesign/workitem?id=SPT2OD-860





#### **Target and ambition**

Increasing automation of protection measures Minimize delay to pass non protected LX Abolish need for written instructions

#### **National Variants**

On-Sight (e.g. max speed 5 Km/h) Staff Responsible/Shunting (e.g. max speed 10 Km/h) Packet 88, LX icon & Full Supervision (e.g. max speed 30 Km/h) European Instruction 8

#### **Common operational need**

Hazard prevention: Raise the attention of the driver

#### Harmonized Proposal

Full Supervision with Temporary EoA Blinking yellow icon shown to the train driver Acknowledgment before passing the LX Parameters: Speed and compulsory stop

## ARCADIA OA methodology

- analyzing stakeholder requirements
- analyzing national variants
- deriving operational needs
- defining harmonized processes

https://polarion.rail-research.europa.eu/polarion/redirect/project/SPT2OperationDesign/workitem?id=SPT2OD-1267

# 4. Example 315 - Passing non protected Level Crossing (3)

#### Excerpt from TSI OPE Appendix A, B, D

#### 6.44 MANAGING A LEVEL CROSSING NOT PROTECTED

The train is approaching a level crossing which is not protected. Levels 1, 2, 3

#### 6.44.1 If in FS, OS or LS

When the following symbol is displayed:



the driver shall apply Rule 7 of Appendix B.

#### 6.44.2 If in SR

When the following text message is displayed:

"Level crossing not protected",

the driver shall apply Rule 7 of Appendix B.

#### Harmonized uniform Proposal

Full Supervision with Temporary EoA Blinking yellow icon shown to the train driver Acknowledgment before passing the LX Parameters: Speed and compulsory stop



https://polarion.rail-research.europa.eu/polarion/redirect/project/SPT2OperationDesign/workitem?id=SPT2OD-1267



- Consolidating ERTMS/ETCS operational capabilities
- Integrating operational capabilities for GoA 2
- Proposing desired rulebook structure and format



Operational Architecture domain Architecture domain Traffic Control & Control & Control & Supervision Supervision



# > Why is architecture important?

• Common understanding through a clear and concise description on the system needs, behaviour and functionality.

# What do we do?

- Analyze Operational Need and determine the system function and actor role responsibilities. Including the CCS system boundary and external actors.
- Functional allocation between different systems based upon functional and non-functional requirements.

# > What is it used for and by who?

- Agree with Operational Design on how the technical system fulfils the harmonized operational processes.
- o Inform the system domains on their functional and interface requirements.
- Provides the link from the business and operational targets to the detailed system specifications.





- In system pillar we will use a model-based systems engineering approach based on ARCADIA and Capella
- Processes and methods are defined in the SEMP.
   Modelling principles are defined in Annex B
- Documents in Polarion as output artefacts are generated from the model
- "Avoid writing, encourage modeling" principle





Core activities of the ARC domain will be

- Define the operational vision together with OD domain, as a typical operational process description is a mixture from OA and SA layer
- Define the black box level 3 system with concrete actors
- Split the level 3 system into multiple systems for the individual domain in level 4



Definition of the system capabilities needed to pass level crossing and involved external actors

Definition of system functions involved into the system capabilities for the black box CCS system



Show tracing from OD concept over CCS SysC to Traffic CS SysC + functions







# Linking top-down and bottom-up work



# How can operational harmonisation simplify the technical specifications of Traffic CS

Europe's Rail



Show tracing from OD concept over L3 SysC to Traffic CS SysC + functions



## Implementation of Harm. Operat. Concept and Roadmap (see STIP)





## **Current draft from system concept**











# Preliminary CCS On-board architecture | Current understanding in the team



# Specific ASTP (Advanced Safe Train Positioning)





Now we want to hear from you

